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ABSTRACT 




Advisor: Dr. Susan Saegert 
This dissertation examines the New York City Department of Correction (DOC) from 1954 
to 1990—a period that began with an audacious program, led by progressive penologist and DOC 
Commissioner Anna M. Kross, to replace “custodial” prisoner warehousing with a rehabilitative 
model directed by civilian experts. As part of this plan the political legitimacy, executive strength, 
and most importantly, the institutional capacity of DOC were expanded, while the department’s 
plant facilities were increasingly concentrated on Rikers Island. The previously remote penal 
island was connected by bridge to mainland Queens amid plans for dazzling new jails and a 
university-affiliated research institute, to be a model the world over for progressive penology. 
This dissertation examines the questions of how Kross’s plan went so horribly wrong. I 
demonstrate that by the early 1970s, amid economic crisis, racialized urban unrest, and rebellion 
in the jails themselves, Kross’s rehabilitative model was largely disavowed. DOC subsequently 
used the buildings constructed and planned during the Kross period as human warehouses 
attendant to the rise of a racially-infused movement of “law and order” and the present regime of 
mass incarceration. Specifically, I emphasize how the movement of rank-and-file unionism in 
DOC and New York Police Department (NYPD), empowered by the post-war recognition of 
municipal unions, capitalized on the mid-1970s fiscal crisis to carve out an indispensable role for 
itself in violently managing the City’s racialized working-class amid crushing austerity. I 
demonstrate that this history supports the radical divestment and redistribution of resources from 
police, courts, and jails—not their repurposing for social good, as Kross attempted, and failed.  
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CHAPTER 1:    SITES OF CIVIC UNITY? 
 
This work undertakes a social history of the New York City Department of Correction from 
1954 to 1990. My primary purpose is to inform contemporary debates about the future of the Rikers 
Island penal colony and the New York City jail system a whole. In the present moment, a bloc of 
jail reformers rooted in the non-profit industrial complex has gained the support of Mayor de 
Blasio and other putative progressives, for a plan to shutter the penal colony on Rikers Island and 
replace it with four skyscraper jails rooted in the most state-of-the-art, humanistic principles of jail 
design. The local jail, argues the chief proponent of this plan, Judge Jonathan Lippman, can and 
should be a “site of civic unity,” tying communities together at their heart, both geographically 
and socially. A longtime court reformer, Lippman chaired the Independent Commission on 
Criminal Justice and Incarceration Reform, commonly called the Lippman Commission, to study 
the closure of Rikers Island and its replacement with new jails. The problem with Rikers, Lippman 
and his cohort argue, is that it is not living up to the social potential of a jail. According to 
Lippman’s plan, some of the strongest threads cohering the City’s social fabric should be police, 
courts, jails, and ancillary non-profits, with jails repurposed to do good by well-meaning reformers 
rooted in the social sciences.1   
Simultaneously, a coalition of community activists and prison abolitionists has organized 
under the banner of No New Jails, to demand not just the closure of Rikers Island, but its 
                                                            
1 Van Alen Institute and Lippman Commission, Justice in Design: Towards a Healthier and More Just New York City 
Jail System, (New York: Lippman Commission, 2017), 9, bold in original. See also: Lippman Commission, A More Just 
City, (New York: Lippman Commission, 2017); Lippman Commission, A More Just City: One Year Forward, (New York: 
Lippman Commission, 2018); Michael Jacobson, Elizabeth DeWolf, Margaret Egan, and David Hafetz, “Beyond the 
Island: Changing the Culture of New York City Jails,” Fordham Urban Law Journal 45, no. 2 (2018): 373-436; Janos 
Marton “#CLOSErikers: The Campaign to Transform New York City’s Criminal Justice System,” Fordham Urban Law 
Journal 45, no. 2 (2018): 499-570. 
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replacement by no new jails. The program they offer calls for the redistribution of the City’s 
carceral budget to the working-class communities of color most historically disfigured and preyed 
upon by the carceral net. Instead of anchoring communities around police, courts, jails, and 
ancillary non-profits, this campaign argues, directly-impacted communities must fight for wealth, 
resources, and power sufficient to reproduce themselves free from the tentacles of mass 
incarceration. Whereas the Lippmans of the world see the new jails as a qualitative turn toward a 
more humanistic carceral future, the campaign for No New Jails sees much of the same old wine, 
in shiny, new, multi-billion dollar jars. 
The context is key. In recent years, New York City Department of Correction has found 
itself in a state of deepening scandal surrounding its plant facilities on the Rikers Island penal 
colony.2 This is part of a broader national trend, constituting a crisis of legitimacy for mass 
incarceration. The bipartisan political consensus supporting “law and order” politics and mass 
incarceration has begun to break apart, most notably following the Black Lives Matter movement 
and the Democratic Party receiving considerable pushback during the 2016 election for its role in 
the proliferation of “law and order” policies disproportionately targeting black and brown men. 
Cultural figures like Michelle Alexander’s bestseller The New Jim Crow and Ava DuVernay’s film 
13th speak to the widespread audience for a critical perspective of mass incarceration and policing.3 
                                                            
2In addition to a steady stream of negative press in official society media such as The New York Times, DOC has more 
importantly run afoul of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the New York City Department of Investigation 
(DOI), in addition to an ongoing engagement with the federal courts. Relevant documents include: United States 
DOJ, CRIPA Investigation of the New York City Department of Correction Jails on Rikers Island (New York: DOJ, 2014); 
DOI, “New York City Department of Investigation Report on Security Failures at City Department of Correction 
Facilities,” (New York: DOI, 2014); DOI, “Investigation Finds Significant Breakdowns by Corizon Health Inc., the City-
Contracted Health Care Provider in the City's Jails, and a Lack of Oversight by the City Correction and Health 
Departments,” (New York: DOI, 2015); DOI, “New York City Department of Investigation Report on the Recruiting 
and Hiring Process for New York City Correction Officers,” (New York: DOI, 2015); and the ongoing litigation of 
Benjamin v. Malcolm (1980), Fisher v. Koehler (1986), Ingles v. Toro (2001), and Nunez v. City of New York (2011). 
3Michelle Alexander, “Why Hillary Clinton Doesn’t Deserve the Black Vote,” The Nation, February 29, 2016. In 
particular, Alexander’s The New Jim Crow (New York: The New Press, 2010) has carried a radical critique of mass 
incarceration far beyond the university gates and into the popular imagination, where movements like Black Lives 
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In response, prominent New York City Democrats have joined with representatives of the real 
estate industry, and a coalition of non-profit organizations, to form the Lippman Commission and 
a nexus of organizing around its plan. These reformers argue the jail should be a welcome fixture 
in communities, given that it is capable of solving the problems that led to incarceration in the first 
place.  
The present juncture calls to mind an earlier moment of reform. In 1954, Mayor Robert 
Wagner, Jr., elected on a platform of “A New Deal for New York,” appointed another longtime 
reformer judge, Hon. Anna Moscowitz Kross, to lead the New York City Department of 
Correction. Under Kross’s leadership, DOC undertook the most ambitious program of reform in 
the agency’s history. Kross condemned DOC conditions as antiquated and its practices “custodial,” 
existing only to warehouse people sent there by police and courts, and counterposed an ultra-
modernist rehabilitative school of penology, based on a medical model for understanding 
criminality, and calling for nothing short of “human engineering.” Kross also sought an expansive 
construction program for erecting new jails to accommodate a jail population that had been steadily 
rising since the end of WWII. Under Kross, civilian experts—psychologists, sociologists, social 
workers, architects, and other champions of progressive penology—assumed a heightened role in 
DOC, meant in time to supplant unskilled, custodial guards altogether.  
These experts and the social sciences they represented served as the central figure of 
Kross’s plan for DOC’s expansion—and ultimately, for the development of Rikers Island, which 
Kross imagined would become a world-renowned site  for progressive penology, under the 
stewardship of elite universities and non-profit organizations. With the unwavering support of the 
mayor, cooperation from uniformed DOC unions purchased by increased wages and a staff of 
                                                            
Matter are challenging the fundamental assumptions of “law and order” that have been largely uncontroversial in 
mainstream US politics since the 1970s.  
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fiercely loyal experts, Kross undertook over a decade of aggressive reform to DOC, culminating 
with the construction of a bridge to the previously remote Rikers Island, which made the island 
the natural site for future DOC facilities. With the best of intentions, however, Kross had paved 
the road, quite literally, to the Rikers Island of today.  
My intentions in undertaking this study are threefold. First, I aim to rectify the absence of 
a sustained scholarly engagement with the period of DOC history from 1954 to 1990, which I 
reconstruct in detail using every archival source at my disposal, wherever possible, grounding this 
analysis in the lived-experiences of the people who lived and worked in DOC facilities. Second, I 
aim to integrate this history in to the broader political economic history of New York City, 
demonstrating that jails are an integral part of any historical period, with much to tell the discerning 
observer. Finally, as the specter of jails as “sites of civic unity” once again rears its head, I hope 
to provide a rigorous and historically-grounded answer to this recurring question of whether police, 
courts, and jails can be repurposed as agents of social good. My answer is no.  
 
Literature Review 
Methodology: A Materialist History of Punishment 
Modern incarceration dates to the punitive confinement of “able-bodied” poor, “petty 
offenders, vagabonds, petty thieves, prostitutes and poor people refusing to work,” accomplished 
around enclosure movements beginning in the fifteenth century in England and Germany.4 The 
“workhouses” pioneered amid enclosure, fueled by “poor laws” designed to enforce wage 
discipline, subsequently appeared across the European countryside in tandem with the introduction 
of mercantile capitalism, the expropriation of peasant land, and the formation of a landless 
                                                            
4 Dario Melossi and Massimo Pavarini, The Prison and the Factory: Origins of the Penitentiary System (London: 
Macmillan, 1981), 30.  
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proletariat deprived of means of subsistence outside the wage relation. Workhouses served as both 
deterrents to those who resisted working for a wage, and an unpleasant alternative to public charity, 
to absorb unneeded labor in times of its oversupply.5 In fact, workhouse facilities served, at least 
in part, as the prototype for the factory itself, the advent of which would only hasten and exacerbate 
the violent formation of an industrial and agricultural proletariat. Workhouses were also the basis 
for the modern jail.6  
Talk of “civic unity,” notwithstanding, there is scant civility in the history of this 
institution, so central to the formation and proliferation of contemporary capitalist society.7 Jails 
facilitated the brutal and murderous processes of expropriation and so-called primitive 
accumulation through which the modern proletariat was born. It is, as Marx puts it, a history 
“written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.”8 The jail was home to callous 
deprivation and ghastly tortures meted out against any “rebel bodies” resistant to 
proletarianization, perhaps especially women who possessed knowledge enabling social 
reproduction outside of patriarchal forms of governance and the imperative to work for a wage.9 
Despite the historically unprecedented changes that have befallen the world since this early period 
of accumulation, the figure of the jail has retained its role in the discipline and warehousing, 
                                                            
5 Melossi and Pavarini, Prison and Factory, especially 11-15; Georg Rusch and Otto Kirchheimer, Punishment and 
Social Structure (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2003), especially 15-17.  
6 Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 1750–1850 (New York: 
Pantheon, 1978), 32.  
7 Van Alen Institute and Lippman Commission, Justice in Design, 10.   
8 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1 (New York: Penguin, 1992).  
9 Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch (New York: Autonomedia, 2004); Ignatieff, Just Measure.  
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of wayward proletarians.10 Such is the context in which jails have always existed, and the horizon 
within which they can be “reformed.”11  
 
The Social Position of the Jail Reformer  
 Lippman and Kross occupy a distinct social position recurring perennially throughout the 
history of mass incarceration: the figure of the middle-class reformer. “Middle-class” in this sense 
does not refer to the vulgar calculation of median income or assets, but a political position situated 
between the working class, which has scant possessions save for its capacity to labor, and the 
owners of great reserves of land and means of production. The latter have far less compunction 
about organizing as a class and acting accordingly than do their social inferiors, and much of the 
practical work of this class rule is carried out by the middle class. In particular, the middle position 
is defined by administering the working class and reproducing its subordinate relationship. All 
good deeds done by the middle-class reformer are secondary to this task.   
Class domination is not simply repressive. While policing, courts, and jails have an obvious 
repressive function, the institutions administered by the middle class have an equally important 
generative nature, promoting a particular form of life with instruction and incentives, alongside 
negative reinforcement. Discipline itself does not have a simply negative function, but generates a 
new mode of being in the world. Importantly, middle-class administration often has beneficent 
                                                            
10 My method in this study is treating the history of policing, courts, and incarceration as the history of class 
domination under capitalism. In doing so, I follow a number of fine studies, including: Ignatieff, Just Measure; Melossi 
and Pavarini, Prison and Factory; Rusche and Kirscheimer, Social Structure; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 
(New York: Vintage, 1979); Michel Foucault, The History of Madness (New York: Routlege, 2006); Ruth Wilson 
Gilmore, Gulden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2007); Stuart Hall et al, Policing the Crisis, Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (London: Palgrave, 
1978); and John Irwin, The Jail: Managing the Underclass in American Society (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1985); all of which share the present study’s incalculable debt to Marx and Engels.  
11 Key works of Marx and Engels, and latter-day Marxists, on questions of crime and punishment, are collected in 




effects in the lives of individual needy people, as in the case of charity and social work. These 
fields absorb many well-meaning social actors, motivated to improve ameliorate social ills and 
improve the lives of powerless people. However, in undertaking this work, the middle-class 
administrator takes care to preserve and even deepen the class relation itself. Challenges to the 
existence of class society, itself the root of the social problems to which the reformers respond, are 
off limits. When such challenges arise, as in the case of revolts and revolutions, the benevolence 
of the middle-class reformer most often evaporates in an instant and gives ways to support for 
repression by any means, no matter how barbarous. 
In concrete historical terms, the mid-to-late nineteenth century saw the emergence in New 
York City of an increasingly professionalized milieu of private charity and public health 
administrators, whose work was closely related with the development of the City jail system. In 
fact, the precursor to the DOC was the Department of Public Charities and Correction, a 
department defined by considerable ambiguity between the administration of lawbreaking and the 
administration of poverty. As urban power elites were faced with the daunting task of 
administering the discipline and acculturation of massive populations of recent immigrants, the 
late nineteenth century saw the emergence of professionalized fields of urban planning, public 
health, social work, and a veritable constellation of specialized work surrounding the practices of 
policing, courts, and incarceration. The professional forces that emerged in this period serves as 
the basis for the Progressive Era, of which Kross was a product par excellence, and of which 
Lippman is a latter-day heir.12 
 
 
                                                            
12 Jayne Mooney and I develop this framework in relation to the charity reform movement of nineteenth century 
New York in the forthcoming article “‘Explosive Elements Beneath the Surface of the City of New York.’”  
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The Figure of the Jail  
While the prison looms large in the social science literature, the literature treating the jail 
as a unique and particular social institution is modest at best.13 Fewer studies look at a particular 
jail system for a sustained period.14 Amid the decarceration movement of the 1970s, Ronald 
Goldfarb advanced the hypothesis that jails are “the poorhouse of the twentieth century.” 
Goldfarb’s argument chronicled the US jail’s function of warehousing poor people who wind up 
sick or substance-dependent, in addition to unruly working-class juveniles.15 Goldfarb’s largely 
journalistic and anecdotal analysis has been augmented in the years since by a number of studies 
focused on the high density of mentally-ill, substance-dependent, and homeless populations in US 
jails, in addition to the overwhelming racial disparities in jail populations that are more familiar to 
today’s reader of the literature of mass incarceration.16  
                                                            
13 Prisons are administered by state and federal authorities for sentenced prisoners serving state sentences, which 
in today’s New York means excess of one year. Jails, by contrast, are administered by counties, responsible for 
holding pre-trial detainees, material witnesses at risk of not appearing in court, and sentenced prisoners serving 
short bids, usually not in excess of one year. Key studies of the jail as an entity separate from the prison include:  
Joseph Fulling Fishman, Crucibles of Crime: The Shocking Story of the American Jail (Monclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, 
1923); Louis N. Robinson, “The Perennial Jail Problem,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 35, no. 6 (1945): 
369-374; Daniel Glaser, “The Contemporary Jail in the United States: An Unknown and Neglected Area of Justice,” in 
Handbook in Criminology (New York: Rand McNally, 1974); Ronald Goldfarb, Jails: The Ultimate Ghetto of the Justice 
System (New York: Anchor Books, 1976); J.M. Moyhanan and Earle K. Stewart, The American Jail: Its Development 
and Growth (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1980); Irwin, The Jail; Stephen E. Tillotson and Jennifer A. Colanese, “Jails in the 
Early American Republic: Transcarceration, Decarceration, and Rabble Management,” The Prison Journal 97, no. 1 
(2017): 118-139; Loic Wacquant, “The Curious Eclipse of Prison Ethnography in the Age of Mass Incarceration,” 
Ethnography 3, no. 4 (2002): 371-397.  
14 The closest in existence to the present study is Kelly Lytle Hernandez, City of Prisoners (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press), 2017.  
15 Goldfarb, Jails. On decarceration and the contemporary critiques of the “total institutions,” see Andrew T. Scull, 
Decarceration: Community Treatment and the Deviant — A Radical View (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall), 1977.  
 
16 David Michaels, Steven Zoloth, and Phil Alcabes, “Homelessness and Indicators of Mental Illness among Inmates 
in New York City’s Correctional System,” Hospital and Community Psychiatry 43 (1992): 150-155; Marilyn Chandler 
Ford, “Frequent Fliers—High Demand Users of Local Corrections,” American Jails (July/August 2008): 18-26; Douglas 
Shenson, Nancy Dubler, and David Michaels, “Jails and Prisons: The New Asylums?” American Journal of Public Health 
80, no. 6 (1990): 655-656; Freda Adler, “Jails as a Repository for Former Mental Patients,” International Journal of 
Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 30 (1986): 225-236; Nicholas Freudenberg, “Jails, Prisons, and the 
Health of Urban Populations: A Review of the Impact of the Correctional System on Community Health,” Journal of 
Urban Health 28, no. 2 (2001): 214-235. 
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Building on Goldfarb’s analysis, John Irwin formulated “the rabble management 
hypothesis,” according to which jails respond not simply to lawbreaking but to the public existence 
of socially “offensive” populations of poor people, based on a spatial hierarchy of places where 
behavior deemed offensive to bourgeois sensibilities was alternatively barred (affluent areas) and 
conditionally tolerated (ghettos).17 Irwin argues that the jail is not the result of lawbreaking, but 
the inevitable result of a “rabble class” at the bottom of the social division of labor, whose existence 
begs removal from sight by their social betters. The jail therefore could not be a site of reform, as 
it was merely a stopgap measure, and a particularly brutish one at that, for largely social problems 
being effectively swept under the rug. In short, Irwin argues that the solution to the problems of 
the jail lie outside the jail itself, in the elimination of the class the jail is meant to contain.  
A recent study returning to Irwin stands not simply as a grounded validation of his “rabble 
management thesis,” but also a testament to the rightward shift in criminological thinking, amid 
decades of ceaseless neoliberal restructuring of punishment, public services, and the universities 
producing critical scholarship about social institutions.18 The authors embrace Irwin’s rabble 
management thesis, using quantitative data to prove it far in excess of anything Irwin ever 
attempted. However, by way of a conclusion, the authors disagree with what they call Irwin’s 
“pessimism”—actually a sophisticated materialist analysis of society—and maintain instead that 
the jail is “structurally positioned as a strategic site for interventions aimed at helping the homeless 
and other constituencies of the underclass.”19  The jail, they conclude can “link arrestees up with 
services (for pretrial detentions who can make bail), or provide services within jails (for pretrial 
                                                            
17 Irwin, The Jail, 1-17.  
18 Kevin M. Fitzpatrick and Brad Myrstol, “Jailing of America’s Homeless,” Crime & Delinquency 57, no. 2 (2008): 271-
297.  
19 Fitzpatrick and Myrstol, “Jailing of America’s Homeless,” 292.  
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detainees who cannot make bail20 and for sentenced inmates).” This, they call a “new vision, armed 
with empirical clarity,” which “has the potential to disrupt the cycle of incarceration” and “help to 
establish a new identity and hope for a severely disadvantaged, service-challenged population.”21 
 This could be a page from Lippman’s report. By contrast, I will demonstrate through a 
critical history of DOC that this is hardly a new vision. Instead, it was attempted at the most optimal 
historical moment for its success: New York City amid the post-war boom. As a matter of full 
disclosure, I maintain the admittedly counter-factual position that if anyone, in any city, in any 
period of recent US history could have repurposed the jail as a force for social good, it was Anna 
M. Kross in post-war New York City. But more broadly and on firmer theoretical ground, I will 
inquire: can we defend the authors’ position that jails can be reconfigured as positive social 
institutions, used to mitigate the problems to which they respond?   
Scholarship by environmental psychologists and researcher in related fields has largely 
assumed the answer to be yes. Environmental psychologists have treated as a fait accompli the 
enduring presence of jails as depositories for large concentrations of disproportionately non-white 
poor, marginally housed, and substance dependent people, as a necessary part of courts and police 
enforcing law and order in capitalist society. From this premise, researchers and reformers have 
taken the jail itself as their point of intervention, confining themselves to identifying the most 
unpleasant or harmful excesses of jail design and function, and mitigating the worst of the harm 
with the aid of better facilities.22  
                                                            
20 They simply “cannot make bail.” 
21 Fitzpatrick and Myrstol, “Jailing of America’s Homeless,” 292-3.   
22 W.T. Austin and Frederick L. Bates, “Ethological Indicators of Dominance and Territory in a Human Captive 
Population,” Social Forces 4, no. 2 (1974): 447-455. Sheldon Ekland-Olson, “Crowding, Social Control, and Prison 
Violence: Evidence from the Post-Ruiz Years in Texas,” Law & Society Review 20, no. 3 (1986): 389-422; Travis W. 
Franklin,  Cortney A. Franklin, Travis C. Pratt, “Examining the Empirical Relationship between Prison Crowding and 
Inmate Misconduct: A Meta-analysis of Conflicting Research Results,” Journal of Criminal Justice 34, no. 4 (2006): 
401-412; Gerald G. Gaes, “The Effect of Overcrowding in Prison,” Crime and Justice 6 (1985): 95-146; Jan Lee-Jan, 
“Overcrowding and Inmate Behavior,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 7, no. 3 (1980): 293-301; Patrick Kinkade, 
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Most importantly, a number of scholars have thrown in their lot with the “direct 
supervision” model of human caging, implemented in New York City in the Tombs and the 
Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York.23 Direct supervision is in fact the model proposed 
by the Lippman Commission for the new facilities slated to replace Rikers Island upon its closure, 
to become “sites of civic unity.”24 This approach shares with Fitzpatrick and Myrstol that the 
problem of jails can be addressed by interventions upon the jails themselves. But can they? 
 
Research Design  
This dissertation is, above all else, a scholarly history of DOC, with an emphasis on its role 
in New York City history during the period under consideration. I draw from social history, 
economics, sociology, and environmental psychology to craft an interdisciplinary history of DOC 
and its facilities over thirty-six years of day-in, day-out practical functioning, with an eye to their 
position in the broader socio-economic context of New York City during this tumultuous period.25 
  
                                                            
Matthew Leone, Scott Semond, “The Consequences of Jail Crowding,” Crime and Delinquency 41, no. 1 (1995): 150-
161; Peter L. Nacci, Hugh E. Teitelbaum, Jerry Prather, “Population Density and Inmate Misconduct Rates in the 
Federal Prison System,” Federal Probation 41 (1977): 26-31; Paul Paulus, Verne Cox, and Garvin McCain, Prison 
Crowding: A Psychological Perspective, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988; R. Barry Ruback and Christopher A. Innes, 
“The Relevance and Irrelevance of Psychological Research. The Example of Prison Crowding,” American Psychologist 
43, no. 9 (1988): 683-693. Benjamin Steiner and John Wooldredge, “Rethinking the Link Between Institutional 
Crowding and Inmate Misconduct,” The Prison Journal 89 (2009): 205-233. 
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My primary method of investigation is archival research. In order to capture both the 
structural forces shaping DOC facilities, and the institutional life dwelling therein, I have virtually 
exhausted all archival material relevant to the New York City Department of Correction available 
to the lay researcher. This includes Annual Reports, policy documents, official memoranda, and 
academic studies commissioned by DOC. This material is available through a number of archival 
sources, especially the Special Collections at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Special 
Collections at the New York Public Library, the Microform Division of the New York Public 
Library, the New York City Municipal Library, the Anna M. Kross Papers at Smith College, and 
the LaGuardia Wagner Archives at LaGuardia Community College.  
I have also drawn extensively from journalistic accounts of the period under consideration, 
including mainstream publications like The New York Times, and institutional publications like the 
prisoner-run Rikers Review, and the DOC staff newsletter Correction Sidelights. The work of an 
archival researcher is titillating yet fraught. Most available history is from the institutional 
perspective, including even the Rikers Review, which though putatively written by prisoners, bears 
the imprint of civilian administrators throughout. The lack of sustained accounts from prisoners’ 
perspectives is made all the more dire by the imperative, which I share with historian Peter 
Linebaugh, for a history of punishment to highlight, if not foreground, the experiences of those 
subjected to it.26 Moreover, I have largely refrained from interpolating “(sic)” in quotations from 
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primary sources, and have presented instead a variety of voices directly as they come to us from 
the archives, free from my judgment on the correctness of their language. 
Picking up on Linebaugh, Mary Bosworth has aptly described the past as “a foreign 
country” which the historian must navigate, steered not only by their knowledge but also by 
emotion and ethical reflection on the political meaning of their scholarship.27 I have foregrounded 
wherever possible the voices of people who have been locked in the City’s cages. In the case of 
prisoner memoir, of which a few excellent examples can be found from this period, I have largely 
taken the prisoners’ word. This is partly so because prisoners’ accounts of certain key events in 
the story that follows are more reliable than accounts of staff and their sympathetic scribes. I do 
not fret bending the stick too far in favor of the prisoners’ perspective, even where ambiguity 
persists. Since the majority of material that survives from this period is from an unabashedly 
institutional perspective, to do so would be quite impossible. In fact, the following account 
remains, by necessity, hopelessly biased toward the institutional perspective. I am consoled only 
by the fact that even from this vantage, which we can surmise is purged of countless acts of 
violence, depravation, and everyday indignity, the view is still quite damning. 
As a final point of method, I have avoided theory and jargon wherever possible, and have 
tried to let the story unravel on its own terms.  In the study of incarceration, abstract thinking ought 
to be used sparingly and for good cause. Both great violence, and everyday indignity, can be 
concealed behind sanitized buzzwords. So too can reliance shopworn tropes take the place of 
dynamic thinking. By nature theory exists to fill gaps where empiricism fails. I have used it 
accordingly, and only when necessary. Ultimately, however, not only does daily life in the carceral 
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CHAPTER 2:    THE ERA OF HORSE AND BUGGY 
 
A rebellion of imprisoned women sheds light on the conditions of the jails and the social conditions 
underlying incarceration in New York City. Robert F. Wagner is elected mayor, and riding the 
wave of the City’s postwar prosperity, promises a “New Deal for New York.” To clean up the 
City’s corrupt and dysfunctional jails, Wagner taps reformer judge Anna Moskowitz Kross to lead 
the Department of Correction (DOC). Kross introduces an ambitious plan to reform the City jail 
system, drawing from the highest ideals of the Progressive Era. Kross intends to run jails on a 
medical model, replacing guards with trained clinicians and social workers. Kross wagers that a 
jail can be radically remade as an agent of social good. But can a jail be anything but a warehouse 
for unwanted people?  
 
Obscenity 
On the evening of September 24, 1954, a woman locked on the fourth floor of Greenwich 
Village’s House of Detention for Women (HDW), identified only as a “narcotic addict,” was 
accused of making an “obscene comment” toward a guard. Escorted from a dayroom to her cell as 
punishment, she loudly denied the charges and protested the injustice of her treatment. Other 
women rose to her defense and shouted protestations of their own, and they too were locked in 
their cells. Guards shut off the lights in a misguided attempt to calm down the clamor, but in 
response the women took to their cell windows, broadcasting the rebellion to other floors of HDW, 
at least one of which followed in kind, and to the street below. For two hours they set small fires, 
clanged their metal cups against the bars, and shouted protests to passersby. A large crowd 
gathered on the Greenwich Village sidewalk until it too was forcibly dispersed, this time by fifteen 
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cops. The spirited demonstration only ended with the arrival of acting superintendent Loretta 
Moran, restored the lights. Flanked by guards, Moran toured the rebellious floors to personally 
speak with the riotous women, who were now able to grieve directly to a high-ranking DOC 
official roused from the comfort of her home to meet them face-to-face.28  
In the aftermath of this well-publicized riot, DOC blamed persistent overcrowding, a lack 
of medical, psychological, and psychiatric treatment services, poor management, untrained staff, 
and pervasive idleness.29 A subsequent investigation reiterated these findings, to which it added 
two telling details. First, it was commonplace at HDW for women to be denied basic rights such 
as visitation. Second, women classified as narcotic addicts suffered the addition indignity of being 
forced to wear blue chambray dresses as marking, inscribing confrontation into the prisoners’ very 
dress.30 But the primary cause of this riot seems more fundamental. The typical prisoner was black, 
aged between twenty-five and thirty, hailed from outside of New York State, possessed an 
elementary school education, and was locked away on charges of “disorderly conduct,” drug 
possession, or sex work for an average of five months.31 These women were disadvantaged from 
birth, discriminated against in housing, employment, and before the law, and subsequently 
deprived of their freedom for “crimes” attendant to daily survival. At HDW they struggled to eke 
out a dignified existence in a cramped and squalid facility never intended for more than temporary 
detention. Placed in such a situation, the question begging explanation is not why do people 
sometimes riot, but why, most of the time, don’t they?  
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The setting of these dramatic events was a twelve-story facility resembling an art deco 
high-rise simply marked “Number Ten Greenwich Avenue.” HDW was built in the early 1930s as 
a short-term detention facility for pretrial prisoners, with little space for programming, education, 
or recreation, and with a maximum capacity of 401. While notorious by 1954, HDW began as the 
result of a hard-fought campaign of reform. Prior to its opening in 1932, women detained awaiting 
trial simply lived in police cells pending the outcome of their cases. Clarice Feinman describes a 
status quo in which detained women, mostly “mendicants, prostitutes, vagrants, or elderly” were, 
regardless of age, offense, or health, “housed together, often in a common cell, and it was not 
unusual to have mothers with babes-in-arms among the women. They slept on wooden benches in 
unsanitary, vermin-infested surroundings.”32  
Sentenced women were confined on Blackwell’s Island, a dangerous and squalid facility 
notorious for over a half century before its closure, which was expedited by the construction of 
HDW. HDW was heralded as a reform victory. But for two decades—practically since its 
opening—DOC had used HDW for its entire female population, packing pre-trial detainees and 
prisoners serving sentences upwards of three years into persistently overcrowded facilities that 
often necessitated doubling women up in “small, dark, and inadequate cells.”33 A contemporary 
photograph shows three women biding their “recreation” time sitting on the floor outside their 
cells.34  
A teenage Angela Davis walked by the facility daily on her way to Elizabeth Irwin High 
School. “I used to look up at this building almost every day, trying not to listen to the terrible 
noises spilling from the windows,” she recalls. “They were coming from the women locked behind 
                                                            
32 Feinman, Imprisoned Women, 55. 
33 DOC, 1954, 110-112.  
34 DOC, 1954, 115.  
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bars, looking down on the people passing in the streets, and screaming incomprehensible words.”35 
Davis was not alone in taking note. By 1954, HDW had attained notoriety in the very reform circles 
that had campaigned for it so vehemently for so many years. By the mid-50s, this perspective had 
taken hold in DOC itself. In the wake of the September 1954 rebellion, DOC’s new commissioner, 
herself an advocate for the original facility, made no excuses for HDW. Anna M. Kross called it 
“a shocking penal anachronism.”36 As for the women who rioted there, Kross was even more 
direct: “I don’t blame them one bit.”37  
 
DOC Facilities in 1954 
By Kross’s own account, the DOC in 1954 was still in the era of “horse and buggy.”38 The 
system Kross took over was complex and accreted with over a century of disparate parts. The New 
York City jail system functions akin to a massive and geographically diffuse county jail. In 1954, 
as now, DOC oversaw remand facilities for detainees, and sentence institutions for convicted 
prisoners serving short sentences.39 Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx hosted borough-
based remand facilities called City Prisons, accused men over the age of sixteen (or fifteen for 
homicide charges) awaiting trial, in addition to City and State parole violators, sentenced prisoners 
serving ten days or less, and witnesses detained prior to their testimony.40 These facilities were all 
“maximum security steel and stone cages designed to hold prisoners securely, but with a minimum 
of privacy.”41  
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The Manhattan facility remains colloquially known as the “Tombs.” The original Tombs, 
named after its Egyptian revival architecture, dated back to 1838, erected on a site of public 
execution that was older still. This was the facility of which prominent visitor Charles Dickens 
wrote “such indecent and disgusting dungeons as these cells would bring disgrace upon the most 
despotic empire in the world!”42 Since Dicken’s visit the jail had been rebuilt twice, with the third 
incarnation opened in 1941, connected to the New York County Court at 100 Centre Street, “on 
the very site where formerly were the gallows, stocks, and other forms of punishment and torture 
of those earlies days,” as DOC itself puts it.43  
The Brooklyn facility was commonly known as the Raymond Street Jail. It had been 
constructed over a century earlier, in 1836, to service the then-City of Brooklyn, though it had 
been remodeled in 1909 upon transfer from the Kings County Sheriff to DOC after New York’s 
consolidation.44 Similarly, the City Prison Queens, opened in Court Square as the Queens County 
Jail in 1875, has been under DOC control since 1912.45 The Bronx City Prison had been in DOC 
hands since its transfer from the Bronx County Sheriff in 1942, and was the newest jail, built in 
1938.46  
The entirety of the City’s women prisoners were held at HDW, adjacent to the Jefferson 
Market Court in Greenwich Village, known for a colorful night court revolving around illicit street 
life, especially sex work, which had caught the attention of a young Anna Kross. HDW opened in 
1932 for purely detention purposes, to replace the police station jail cells in which women 
detainees had been held previously. The facility represented victory for a longstanding activist and 
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legislative movement dating back to at least 1910. HDW had served its original purpose for all of 
two years, to the satisfaction of reformers. But in 1934 the sentenced facilities at Greycourt Farms 
and Blackwell’s Island Correctional Hospital closed due to budgetary strain and decrepitude, 
respectively, and HDW inherited the city’s entire population of detained and sentenced women, 
despite lacking adequate facilities for the latter.47 By 1935 crowding at the facility was already 
earning criticism from the Prison Association.48 A combination of these conditions and the 
presence of HDW on a well-trafficked street in downtown Manhattan made it singularly notorious, 
even next the Tombs and the Raymond Street Jail, for nearly the entirety of its existence.  
Once tried and sentenced, most male prisoners serving determinate sentences of a year or 
less, or indeterminate sentences stretching from six months to three years, found themselves at the 
Rikers Island Penitentiary. If they were aged sixteen to thirty, and serving time on their first 
misdemeanor, they may have been sent to the New Hampton Reformatory. Prisoners sentenced to 
less than six months, and who did not simply remain at one of the City Prisons, wound up at the 
Rikers Island Workhouse, largely for offenses such as disorderly conduct and public intoxication.49 
In 1954 Rikers Island was not nearly the hub of DOC operation that it is today, but it was 
nonetheless a looming presence for the City’s sentenced male prisoners. Accessible only by ferry, 
it was even more cut off from the outside world than it is today.  
The Rikers Penitentiary was celebrated as a model prison, attended by the “dream team” 
of Austin McCormick and Richard McGee, featured an array of rehabilitative programming, an 
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impressive library,  and most strikingly, a state-of-the-art seven-story hospital meant to provide 
the entire DOC with everything from minor medical care to serious surgery.50  The Penitentiary 
was based on Fresnes Prison in France, with a “telegraph-pole” design stratifying multiple parallel 
cellblock buildings separated by modest courtyards and traversed at a ninety-degree angle by a 
connecting corridor. The cell blocks were based on the Auburn model pioneered in the United 
States a century prior, in which lengthy corridors of cells stacked three tiers high faced outward 
on either side of the long rectangular structures, bifurcated longwise by a catwalk accessible only 
to staff.51  
Upon the closure of DOC facilities on Blackwell’s, its Workhouse was moved not to Rikers 
but to Hart Island. During the WWII lull in the City’s jail population, Hart Island was turned over 
to the Navy as a barracks. After the war, the island was returned to the City, which resumed its use 
as a Workhouse in 1947, before the Workhouse was once more transferred to Rikers Island in 
1950, taking up residence in a disused Penitentiary facility.52 Finally, the New York City 
Reformatory in New Hampton had been established in 1905 on Hart’s Island, before being moved 
to New Hampton in 1914 under the reform administration of Commissioner Katherine B. Davis. 
At New Hampton prisoners serving upwards of three year indeterminate sentences performed 
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Enter Anna Kross 
Hon. Anna Moscowitz Kross was sworn in as Commissioner of New York City’s 
Department of Correction on January 1st, 1954, the breaking dawn of a new era in New York City 
politics. The Times lauded Kross as “a unique and woman jurist whose ability, example, and 
integrity have made her a civic symbol.”54 The Rikers Review, a prisoner magazine produced at 
the Adult School of the Rikers Island Penitentiary by a carefully vetted group of male prisoners, 
wasted no time beginning its twelve years of uncritically lauding Kross. “We can expect changes 
and improvements very shortly,” the editors wrote, “for Commissioner Kross brings to the job the 
type of mind which inquires and then acts… witness the changes made to correct the evils that 
existed in Women’s Court and Home Term Court prior to her appointment to the Bench.”55 
Born Anna Moscowitz in 1891, Kross’s working-class Jewish family emigrated from 
Russia in a ship’s cargo hold when she was two years old, with Kross the only child of three to 
survive passage.56 Kross came of age in a Chrystie Street tenement on Manhattan’s Lower East 
Side, adjacent to the Allen Street brothel district, where she observed police harassing and arresting 
female sex workers while largely accommodating the male clients soliciting them.57 As an 
adolescent, Kross attended public school, worked in an apparel factory, and tutored fellow 
immigrants in English, before attending Columbia University’s Teachers College and earning a 
scholarship to New York University Law School, where she completed a law degree at age 
nineteen.58  
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As a teenage law student, Kross began monitoring women’s night court and advocating for 
the provision of clothing to the poor women tried there, many of whom were sex workers who 
reported victimization by the NYPD Vice Squad. Through these efforts Kross became chair of a 
“committee of fifteen” spearheaded by Reverent Percy Stickney Grant of the Ascension Church, 
operating first a Legal Committee, then a Prison Committee, providing legal and material 
assistance to imprisoned women.59 Kross was given a small office, courtesy of DOC, where she 
and a growing network of progressive reformers assisted and interviewed women “who for the 
first time found someone interested in their fate and honestly committed to helping them.”60   
As a private law practitioner from 1923 to 1934, Kross primarily represented labor unions, 
while campaigning for civil rights, women’s suffrage, Irish Home Rule, and the establishment of 
a Jewish state in Palestine. “I love to match my wits against men,” a young Anna Moscowitz told 
a reporter. “It is great fun, and I just love to beat them. You ought to see how foolish men feel 
when I win a case.”61 However, beginning at a young age, “public service was always a lodestar 
star that kept attracting Kross away from her private practice.”62 While arguing compellingly—
and losing—an indigent suspect’s burglary case before Tammany judge Warren Foster, Kross 
caught Foster’s eye and was invited to speak on his behalf in his 1916 campaign for Court of 
General Sessions. That season Kross delivered forty-four addresses on behalf of Foster.  
Though the election proved Kross to be once more arguing for the losing side, the campaign 
initiated Kross into Tammany Hall’s insular inner-circle. As a Jewish child on the Lower East 
Side, Kross had no use for Tammany’s patronage machine operating all around her, largely to the 
benefit of Irish emigrants and their descendants, who received material assistance, employment, 
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and a sense of belonging, in exchange for their votes. Kross had viewed Tammany, as most 
outsiders did, as a mere nexus of electoral graft. But through her dealings with first Foster, and 
later Tammany giants Al Smith and Charles Murphy, who also came of age in immigrant families 
in Lower Manhattan slums, Kross came to appreciate the organization as a kind of social service 
provider. More importantly, it was to be a potential vehicle for her own program of progressive 
court reform, which would require considerable political backing. As a labor lawyer, representing 
among others the Building Trades Compensation Bureau, Kross became acquainted with the 
technical aspects of working class life, augmenting her grasp on its visceral reality which she had 
known from her earliest years. It was a precarious existence eked out beneath the dangling sword 
of danger, deprivation, and premature death, and Kross knew it well.  
Kross’s support for workers’ rights and basic social services for working-class people led 
her to the inner circle of Al Smith’s 1918 gubernatorial campaign. In Smith’s entourage, Kross 
mixed with the likes of Belle Moskowitz and Robert Moses, who similarly viewed the Tammany 
machine as vehicle for a progressive, populist agenda far surpassing localist patronage in working-
class Manhattan. After Smith’s victory, Kross served under Moses on the Reconstruction 
Commission, responsible for reorganizing the New York State government under the principles of 
centralization, and the elimination of redundancy and waste.63  
Much like Moses, Kross’s played politics not for personal enrichment or fame, but to 
advance her own vision for transforming the city’s terrain. But instead of public space, Kross had 
an eye on the City courts. For her share of electoral patronage spoils, Kross demanded time and 
again a position as a judge in Children’s Court. This job proved elusive, however, due in part to 
Kross’s difficulty pursuing reform while remaining in Tammany’s good graces. Ultimately Kross 
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was granted a position on the city’s Magistrate Court in 1933, robed by Smith himself to great 
applause in the otherwise somber court.64 The ceremony was indicative of Kross’s ascent in city 
politics, which she had played for almost two decades, sometimes winning, sometimes losing. “But 
in this game,” she later remarked, “you can’t cry when you lose. It’s part of the gamble.”65  
Kross also enjoyed the continual support of at least one Republican, a former NYU 
classmate she affectionately called “Fiorello.” Long before the HDW riot, Kross toured the facility 
with Mayor LaGuardia, hoping to open the mayor’s eyes to the conditions there. Kross later 
recalled LaGuardia telling her he could put a stop to the women’s criminal careers if he could 
simply find them all a husband. When an unamused Kross pressed the mayor for actual reforms, 
LaGuardia suggested installing a curtain in front of the bathroom area to abet modesty. Kross 
dubbed this solution “the LaGuardia curtain.” 66 Male chauvinism notwithstanding, thanks to 
continual political support from LaGuardia and the more reliable Democratic mayors who 
succeeded him, Kross distinguished herself as a pioneering figure in Family Court, Domestic 
Relations Court, and Women’s Court, in addition to Adolescent Court, Wayward Minors Court, 
and Home Term Court, three “social courts” Kross helped establish, synthesizing the court system 
with the emergent practices of social work.67   
Outside of her distinctly New York City political pedigree, Kross was very much an 
orthodox product of the Progressive Era. Kross followed a trail earlier blazed by the likes of  
Josephine Shaw Lowell, Louisa Lee Schyler, and Katherine Bement Davis, who pursed a distinct 
course of public assistance by deploying courts and carceral facilities in social work—dramatically 
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expanding, in the process, the role of police, courts, and jails in the lives of working class people.68 
In the late nineteenth century organizations like the American Medical Association and the 
American Bar Association fought to professionalize occupations like medicine and law by driving 
out charlatans and implementing clear professional standards and certification protocol.69 
Contemporaneously, the emergent problems of urban administration—including of course the 
prevention of outright proletarian insurrection, but also more fundamental questions of sanitation, 
public assistance, and care for the needy and delinquent young—proved too daunting for localist 
machine politics, and increasingly fell into the domain of university-trained experts representing 
medicine and the law. What emerged was a distinct middle class not necessarily possessed of great 
land holdings or capital, as much as growing expertise, and hence power, in the administration of 
daily life for working people.70  
This tradition came to fruition in the early twentieth century, when Kross was studying law 
and first experimenting with reform. With prisons and courts enjoying ill-reputation and largely 
evacuated of reformist intent, the Progressives were able to campaign for an expansive overhaul 
of the relationship between police, courts, jails, and prisons, and social problems. They  operated 
largely under a medical model for understanding criminality and delinquency reflecting their 
professional roots. As Rothman demonstrates, this was the era in which probation, juvenile courts, 
and all manner of progressive prison schemes were deployed by an ascendant class of university-
trained social managers as a humanistic alternative to discredited institutions.  
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These programs, however, failed at their intentions, and represented instead the further 
integration of police, courts, jails, and prisons into the fabric of working class social life, with all 
the attendant harm and little if any of the positives this was meant to entail. The arbitrary executive 
power of the judge was strengthened, probation accompanied incarceration rather than replacing 
it (or else was deployed in the place of outright dismissal), juveniles became ensnared in the 
carceral net at a young age, and prison reform schemes proved short-lived.71 This was the period 
that produced Kross—when enthusiasm ran high for the use of the judge as a social worker, the 
jail as clinic, and the probation officer as mentor, advanced by a new administrative middle class.  
Kross advocated a medical approach to understanding and treating criminal behavior, with 
an emphasis on psychology and social work. Kross argued that a large share of those consigned to 
criminal courts were the proper domain of the Department of Welfare and not that of Correction, 
two departments which had been cleaved from one through the work of Lowell and Schulyer, for 
the purposes of erecting separate but parallel carceral systems.72 Among these “mentally ill,” Kross 
classed “the senile, the mentally deficient, the psychotic, the neurotics, the sex deviates, the 
prostitutes, and the sociopathic, who comprise among others the alcoholics and the narcotic 
addicts.”73 Kross advocated a broad-based restructuring of social services to redefine how society 
apprehends and treats deviant behavior.  
Yet, this quasi-utopian vision was matched with a clear-eyed understanding of how New 
York City politics functions. Whatever reforms Kross was able to achieve in the City court system 
were not the result of compelling moral arguments waged in the pages of academic journals, but 
how well she was able to maneuver the political games of Tammany and its rivals. Kross was the 
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first to admit it. “There isn’t a judge on any one of our benches from the highest to the lowest,” 
she later declared, “who is there by virtue of what he knew, but rather by whom he knew, including 
myself.”74  
 
A New Deal for New York 
Kross’s tenure as DOC commissioner occurred no more in a political vacuum than had her 
rise in the courts. When Robert Wagner was elected mayor in 1953 he sought a new commissioner 
to reform the scandal-plagued DOC.75 He turned to Anna Kross. In addition to a stalwart 
progressive and loyal Democrat, Kross was also a fried of his father, Robert Wagner Sr.76 It is 
impossible to understand Kross’s tenure as DOC commissioner without understanding Wagner’s 
concurrent mayoralty. Like Kross, Wagner had made peace with the unseemly side of Tammany 
Hall in order to pursue a progressive agenda that simultaneously risked undermining Tammany’s 
interests in localized graft. It was a delicate dance, and by the early 1960s they had both broken 
with Tammany altogether. Also like Kross, Wagner’s newly assumed office was awash in crisis. 
Wagner’s predecessor Vincent Impelliteri had assumed office after the abrupt resignation of 
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William O’Dwyer, amid state and federal corruption investigations of his ties to the mafia and 
other unsavory attendants to his rise through Brooklyn machine politics. With the Democratic 
Party in disarray, Impellitteri was unable to develop a solid base, and waffled under corruption 
scandals of his own, including in DOC.  
By 1953, as political scientist Richard M. Flanagan puts it, “New York did not feel 
governable without La Guardia.”77 The crisis of leadership proved an opportunity for the younger 
Wagner, who had served as a state representative, and Tax and Housing Commissioner under 
O’Dwyer, whose taint he was able to successfully avoid, and was the present borough president of 
Manhattan. Capitalizing on the Wagner name, which made him akin to New Deal royalty, and 
drawing on not a small bit of nostalgia for the salad days of the Democratic Party, Wagner 
challenged Impellitteri on the platform of “a New Deal for New York.” Wagner wielded a broad 
appeal in a time of disarray among Democrats, including the ambiguity of a name that allowed 
both Irish and German voters to imagine him as a fellow countryman.78 Wagner didn’t simply rally 
the Democratic base, however. He changed its composition. In so doing, helped establish a 
powerful base in City politics for the ascendant municipal unions, including the Correction 
Officers Benevolent Association, the organization which since 1901 had represented guards (as 
opposed to captains and wardens) in the DOC system.79  
Before Wagner’s 1953 campaign, New York’s labor unions were lukewarm on Democrats, 
who were known for patronage in city employment and hostile to the radicalism that still had a 
foothold in the labor movement of this period. Unionists were just as likely to vote with either the 
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American Labor Party or the Liberal Party, and unlike today, general election results could split 
three or four ways among serious contenders. In order to unseat the incumbent mayor, Wagner 
drew on his New Deal pedigree to court a labor base, promising to formally recognize City unions, 
which had hitherto operated on the fringes of legality and lacked the powers of formal 
representation and collective bargaining. Wagner effectively promised to replicate for public 
sector unions what his father had done for the private sector under the National Labor Relations 
Act. This strategy paid off; Wagner received significant support from City unions, but much was 
expected in return.80  Kross therefore assumed control of the Department of Correction as an 
activist-commissioner with the backing of a popular mayor pursuing a progressive agenda that 
paired increased taxes with increased public spending—while empowering municipal unions to 
seize a greater share of the city’s wealth, and its balance of power. In DOC, these new forces would 
converge an increasingly crisis-driven mode of daily operation.  
 
Hysteria in the Community 
The 1954 riot at HDW did not arise from circumstances exceptional to DOC in 1954. Just 
a month after Kross took office, DOC’s census reached a fifteen-year high, amid a spike in violent 
crime, notable for its commission by very young people.81 In Kross’s words, an “unprecedented 
increase in violent crime particularly as it involved our youth has created almost hysteria in the 
community.”82 This “hysteria” was hardly the figment of an overactive public imagination.83 In 
1946, a quarter of all suspects arrested for murder were under twenty years old, and this remarkable 
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doubling of the rate from just a few years prior represented an upward trend that would endure, 
with intermittent repose, for decades.84  
Violent crime and drug addiction had increased considerably, especially among young 
people, since the end of World War II. Then as now, explanations in official society typically 
emphasized the aberrant or dysfunctional culture of the people committing crimes. A sophisticated 
1952 study by the Times, for instance, pointed to the war mobilization, under which “[f]amilies 
are once again on the move, women are entering the labor market, and the number of ‘latchkey 
kids’ is growing.”85 The growing public perception of this crime epidemic, which began during 
the war, was from the start explicitly racialized.86 Tabloids wrote of the “Harlem crime wave,” as 
if its conditions were not general.87 
This social instability came to be typified in the figure of the youth gang. In a textured 
study of the youth gang phenomenon of the post-war period, Schneider argues “gangs were not 
the product of youth culture but were rooted in a working-class world turned upside down.” This 
included a “declining job base; the influx of African-American and Puerto Rican youths into a 
hostile environment; public policies that wiped out neighborhoods, ignored the displaced, and 
reinforced segregation; and the gradual abandonment of the city by better-off whites.”88 “Urban 
renewal” in particular was immensely disruptive to the racialized lower strata of the city’s working 
class, and a dire shortage of legally-mandated replacement housing resulted in a housing shortage 
alongside elimination of entry-level manufacturing work. Despite its impressive blossoming 
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during this period, public housing could not accommodate the staggering numbers of dislocated 
people and a class of transient residents floating between inadequate and illegal housing became 
common.89  
Moreover, the war had dislocated traditional forms of authority, empowering adolescents 
and women to leave school and domestic work in favor of labor jobs, and endowing them with 
considerable freedom. High school enrollment plummeted.90 A lucrative trade in nightlife, 
including sex work, beckoned to New York City’s liberated youth.91 Veterans returning from the 
war even introduced firearms such as German lugers, and even military tactics such as 
sophisticated ambushes, into existing youth gangs.92  
Predictably, this budding youth independence, and the generalized social chaos in which it 
thrived, were perceived by the police as a direct challenge to traditional forms of authority. This 
was especially so when youth revolt involved black and brown men building complex associations 
and acting unruly in public space. Deploying the time-honored “muss-em’-up” tactic, police 
endeavored to control the youth with violence and arrests that flooded jails. These tactics fed 
perceptions of the growing youth crime problem, while exacerbating it in the streets, and behind 
bars.93 In 1954, the NYPD launched “Operation All-Out,” an aggressive street-level, arrest-
intensive strategy responding to the perceived spike in quantifiable street crime, contributing to 
the rising arrest rate—and the rising population of City jails.94    
A 1962 study commissioned by Wagner, the first of its kind to deal with the problem of 
youth unemployment in New York City, sheds considerable light on the crisis that Kross 
                                                            
89 Schneider, Vampires, 42-45.  
90 Schneider, Vampires, 29, 55.  
91 Johnson, Street Justice, 192.  
92 Schneider, Vampires, 71.  
93 Johnson, Street Justice, 205. 
94 Eric C. Schneider, Smack: Heroin and the American City (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 138.  
33 
 
confronted in the City’s jails. The study found that from 1950 to 1960 wages increased fifty-seven 
percent on the national level, sixty percent in the nation’s cities, and only forty-four percent in 
New York City. While New York boasted the nation’s largest manufacturing sector, with upwards 
of 950,000 workers, these jobs typically fell on the low end of manufacture, such as textile, apparel, 
and leather, which were overrepresented in New York. The FIRE sector (finance, insurance, and 
real estate) and ancillary white collar industries experienced the highest rate of growth, while 
manufacturing, and especially apparel, was declining and sowing in its wake high unemployment 
in the lowest tiers of the city’s workforce.95 The result was an astounding number of young people 
“drifting in a tide of discouragement and frustration;” some 76,800 youths from fourteen to twenty-
four were out of school and either unemployed or relegated to part-time work.96  
Precarity was not unfamiliar to the black and Puerto Rican New Yorkers who accounted 
for the highest rates of unemployment. The mass migration of this period from the US Black Belt 
and Puerto Rico can be traced in many respects to mechanization of agriculture and the attendant 
disruption of local economies that suddenly rendered large swaths of unskilled labor superfluous 
and forced laborers and their families to relocate to cities like New York.97 Once in New York, the 
young people of these groups were disproportionately unemployed due to a combination of overt 
discrimination and structural disadvantage resulting from differential access to education and 
employment experience. Additionally, youths from ages fourteen to nineteen, and those without 
high school diplomas, were likeliest to be unemployed.  
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The report warned of a deepening crisis to come, due to an increase in youth seeking work, 
a decrease in high school completion, a shift in New York City demographics toward nonwhite 
populations with generally less educational and work experience than their white counterparts, and 
an “accelerated trend…to increased demand for skilled and educated workers and a decrease in 
opportunities for the unskilled and undereducated.”98 The correlation between this unemployment 
epidemic and the rising rate of incarceration is direct. In 1958 DOC conducted a study of 3,296 
adolescent and adult male inmates sentenced to Rikers Island. Of this sample, one percent could 
claim “a history of being fully employed,” or of having “remained at a job steadily [with] regular 
attendance.”99 
Amid these conditions, widespread heroin use and dependency took root. Between 1946 
and 1950, the number of teenagers charged with heroin possession increased literally tenfold. The 
ground zero of this new wave of heroin was the subculture surrounding jazz and bebop music, 
where a hipster rejection of the “square” status quo of post-war US life was embraced largely by 
young black and Latino musicians and fans at the bottom of the City’s labor market. Heroin’s 
unique social setting, an underground music subculture largely populated by black youths, spared 
most white New Yorkers, and certainly white suburbanites, from an explosion of heroin use—and 
the subsequent response by police, courts, and jails—that hit black and brown neighborhoods hard. 
By 1951, however, the fad of heroin use among young people had largely passed, as the devastating 
effects of the drug had been revealed empirically to young people who watched addiction take its 
toll on their friends and family. Nonetheless, a spate of draconian legislation between 1951 and 
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1956, culminating in the Narcotic Control Act of the latter year, made heroin use and addiction 
into a serious criminal matter.100  
The political and economic changes undergirding the much-vaunted youth crime and drug 
waves were not limited to the youth of New York City, nor were they unique to the 1950s. While 
New York City remained a manufacturing hub well into the 1970s, the percentage of the city’s 
workforce laboring in manufacture had been on the decline since 1910. Large-scale manufactories 
in apparel, machinery, chemical, and leather production were the exception, as the average 
manufactory was small-scale, clustered around ancillary businesses and services in “external 
economies” producing limited runs of commodities on a “flexible” model. This model represented 
a lucrative source of employment for many working-class New Yorkers, though long-standing 
ethnic and racial protectionism and male chauvinism combined to restrict most desirable jobs to 
white men.101 However sweet the fruits of such malicious and self-defeating intra-class 
chauvinism, they were soon to sour. Historian Joshua Freeman notes “as soon as a product became 
standardized and began to be sold in large quantities, its production was moved out of the city, and 
often out of the region entirely”—when not simply de-skilled and therefore devalued.102 As the 
ranks of the poor and unemployed swelled, so too did the City’s jails.  
 
Flotsam and Jetsam 
Kross referred to the City jail population as “people of all social and economic stations of 
life and from the far-flung corners of the earth… first offenders as well as the recidivists, the 
‘flotsam and jetsam’ of our urban culture, the alcoholics, the drug addicts, the prostitutes, the 
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homosexuals and other social misfits.”103 But their common ground was more homogenous than 
such language lets on. Then as now, a majority of detainees were simply unable to make bail, as 
Kross herself acknowledged: 
About one fourth of our detained prisoners have bail set at less than $250. Half of the 
inmates of detention prisons have bail set between $250 and $1,500. Bail of over $1,500 is 
unusual, but is required in about one sixth of the cases. It is self-evident that the individuals 
who are held in detention in default of bail are not usually our dangerous criminals nor our 
high-powered racketeers. They are the small-fry who do not have the means to put up bail. 
Half of our trial cases in detention are married, yet the greater reliability of family men, 
and the disruption of homes resulting from their incarceration apparently is not often 
considered by the judges in setting bail. Bail seems to be determined principally by the 
category of the offense rather than the responsibility of the defendants or the social 
consequences of his incarceration.104 
 
 “The real crooks are out!” Kross put it, decidedly more bluntly. “Whether it’s $25,000, $50,000, 
or $100,000 bail, you notice they get it somehow. But the poor devil with $500 bail that’s the 
equivalent to $100,000, they’re [in jail]!”105  
Then as now, addiction and incarceration went hand in hand. Kross had gained a reputation 
for her longstanding position that the “socially sick,” as the Post put it, did not belong behind 
bars.106 In 1965 the Kross administration reflected: 
Year by year, there is no lessening of the number of sentenced to the Department because 
of various manifestations of ‘disorderly conduct’ or other euphemisms for deviate behavior 
stemming from acute or chronic alcoholism. The men sentenced on these charges constitute 
the major proportion of the population in the sentenced institution on Hart Island. Their 
incarceration on what has been aptly called ‘the revolving door’ basis represents the neglect 
of government and society in not providing proper facilities for their rehabilitation; for 
those not responsive to rehabilitation, for their domiciliary care. Sweeping them under the 
rug of Correction is the easiest way out for the busy law enforcement agency. 
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That year, DOC found “50 percent to 60 percent of the male sentenced inmates, 75 percent to 80 
percent of the female sentenced inmates and 30 to 40 percent of those being held in detention give 
a history of use of narcotic drugs at some time.”107 Even at the height of New York City’s “social 
democratic polity” celebrated by Freeman and others, the City’s jails served as repositories for the 
highly-racialized lowest rungs of the City’s working class for whom there was no dignified place 
in the City’s social fabric. 
Similarly, Kross’s DOC avoided explicitly addressing the racial composition of its prisoner  
population, befitting a general outlook that could be called race-blind.108 In fact it is easier to find 
data on the racial composition of DOC prisoners for the 1910s than for the 1950s.109 Thankfully, 
a study on bail for adolescent detainees conducted by DOC and NYU in 1956 sheds some light on 
the racial composition of jail population of this period, and the structural inequality underlying it. 
The study looks at a large sample representing the 10,924 adolescent detainees who cycled through 
the system in 1956, in detention ranging from short-term imprisonment in City Prison pens, to 
incarceration at the Penitentiary. In a marked departure from earlier epochs, 99.3 percent were US 
citizens, 16.9 percent of whom born in Puerto Rico. The black population is striking: 37.1 percent 
of the total jail population were listed as black, despite black people only registering 13.98 percent 
on the 1960 census. Perhaps the greater shock to today’s reader will be that the remaining 
population was classed as “white,” though that figure somewhat confusingly includes 78.4% of 
those with Puerto Rican birth, many of whom would likely today be called Hispanic. The rest were 
classified as “Negro,” with the exception of four “Mongolians.” 
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Evoking themes familiar to today’s reader, the survey found that black people and those 
with Puerto Rican heritage were likelier to stay longer in jail, receive harsher penalties for the same 
crimes, and above all, have greater difficulty making bail. Concretely, forty-five percent of white 
detainees, thirty-seven percent of Puerto Ricans, and twenty-seven percent of black detainees were 
released on bail.110  
Moreover, such glaring racial inequality characterized facilities that were becoming ever 
more crowded and dehumanizing for those locked inside of them. The black revolutionary 
Sundiata Acoli was first incarcerated in New York City in the late 1950s, where he witnessed 
firsthand this marked racial disparity in tandem with deplorable conditions. “I came face to face 
with the stark reality of the American system of ‘justice,’” Acoli recalls. “I saw with my own eyes 
that overcrowded, inhuman, sadistic environment where, in New York City, 90 per cent of the 
inmates are black or Puerto Rican. I saw depraved, sadistic guards club brothers into 
unconsciousness. I saw sick addicts or just plain mentally disturbed prisoners slash their wrists, 
hang themselves with sheets, or burn themselves in a pile of blankets and newspapers.”111  
In short, Kross inherited facilities taxed to the absolute breaking point by the racialized 
bottom tiers of the New York City working class. Since the end of World War II, the yearly DOC 
census had more than doubled, from 49,330 to 110,048. The census of admitted detainees had risen 
from 42,539 to 81,879, and  the number of sentenced prisoners had exploded from 6,791 to 
28,169.112 In September of 1954, DOC reached what was then  an all-time high of 7,921 prisoners, 
for whom there were only 4,276 cells. The Tombs was rated for a capacity of 824, and in 1954 the 
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population peaked at 1,660.113 The Raymond Street jail, rated for 465, peaked at 848.114 City Prison 
Queens was rated for 199, and peaked at 316.115 City Prison Bronx was rated for 239, but the 
addition of bunk beds increased that figure to 431, and technically speaking capacity had not been 
breached by a peak of 423, though in reality the facility was well over capacity.116 HDW was rated 
for 401 and peaked at 452, maintaining an average census of 421, which still necessitated doubling 
of its small cells.117 The Rikers Penitentiary and Workhouse, rated for 1,887 and 1,000, 
respectively, were thronged with 3,759 total prisoners. 118 Given that a contemporaneous account 
puts the Workhouse population peaking at 1,548, this would place the Penitentiary at around 
2,200.119  
A technical note offered by City Hall illustrates how overcrowding was conceived in this 
period. “The so-called stated capacity of an institution,” it reads, “does not necessarily indicate the 
number of inmates that can be housed there. The normal capacity can be temporarily increased 
during peak load periods [!] by the use of double decked bunks, the placing of cots in corridors 
and the use of quarters normally used for other purposes.”120 By this reasoning, short-term 
immiseration during “peak load periods” was excusable as long as it did not affect, in the long run, 
the functioning of the institution. This kind of grim calculus would define DOC management for 
decades to come. 
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Despite this steady climb in census, no additional cells had been constructed since before 
the war. DOC had instead relied on stopgap measures like double-bunking and the conversion of 
non-residential facilities to makeshift dormitories. Kross declared the two capital projects her 
administration inherited, new City Prisons in Brooklyn and Queens, to be inadequate to the rising 
census and in need of radical reconsideration.121 Upon taking office, Kross’s administration 
anticipated a further population climb of 17 to 22 percent in the coming five years, due to 
“municipal population growth, an increase in adolescent crime, and increased police activity.”122 
This estimate would prove conservative.123  
“Recently many agencies of the City of New York started a drive in which summonses by 
the thousands were issued to landlords for failure to maintain living conditions as required by the 
laws of this City,” wrote Kross’s chief architect in a 1954 internal memorandum. “About all that 
can be said is that we are very fortunate that prisons were not included in these inspection trips. 
Very obviously we cannot operate within the laws regulating housing standards, means of egress, 
ventilation, sanitary facilities, and likely many more.”124  
The Rikers Island Workhouse provides a concrete illustration of the stopgap measures that 
prevailed amid this dramatic population surge. The facility was fashioned in 1950 out of disused 
workshop and warehouse space from the Manufacturing Industries program at the Rikers Island 
Penitentiary. From the onset it lacked “any security features whatsoever and [was] equipped with 
sanitary facilities considered sufficient only for the needs of the inmates who were assigned to 
work details in these buildings.” The jury-rigged facility was equipped with “a chapel, auditorium, 
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recreation and admittance room, and also an Arts & Crafts project workshop for the benefit of 
overage and physically unfit inmates.” 125 A maximum census of 900 was fixed, meant to share 
forty-three toilets, twenty-three urinals, and seventy-five water faucets—itself a thoroughly 
unpleasant ratio of prisoners to sanitary facilities. By 1954, however, census had reached a peak 
of 1,548.  
Under these conditions, beds discarded by other city agencies (including hospitals, police 
stations, and shelters) were packed into every conceivable space, including the auditorium, 
recreation rooms, and even the chapel, “not more than one foot apart.” Programming facilities, if 
they had ever really served their purpose, ceased to function as anything but dormitories amid this 
crowding. Clothing and bedding were in chronic short supply. Staffing had actually declined amid 
a sixty-six percent hike in the prisoner population since 1952.126 Individual guards were 
responsible for the custody of upwards of 200 prisoners at a given time, in conditions providing 
“occasion for inmates to resort to disturbances and possibly riots,” as COBA argued.127 As a result, 
wrote Workhouse Warden Edward Dros, “we can no longer say that there is any program of 
rehabilitation, recreation, or therapy existent at this institution and it remains no more than a mere 
over-crowded hostelry, unworthy of the name of a correctional institution.”128 This, for a 
population experiencing the myriad health effects of hard living on the outside, perhaps especially 
withdrawal from alcohol and narcotics. 
The City’s half-hearted attempt to match this influx of “flotsam and jetsam” with increased 
staffing had consistently fallen short. “Custodial” staff (uniformed guards) had increased only 
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seventy-one percent, from 882 to 1,237, and civilian staff, including medical staff, psychologists, 
psychiatrists, educators, and social workers, had remained virtually flat. Civilian hires met the 
near-doubling of the jail population with an increase from 424 civilians in 1945 to 443 by 1954, 
and practically all of these positions were manual labor, unrelated to prisoner programming or 
“rehabilitation.”129 One psychologist and one psychiatrist were stretched across the entire DOC, 
including Rikers Island, which was only accessible by a time-consuming ferry ride.130 The ratio of 
civilian experts to custodial guards, Kross declared immediately upon assuming office, “must be 
increased several-fold so that not only a more adequate amount of treatment service many be 
rendered directly to inmates but in order that the professional personnel may be adequate in 
numbers to guide and direct the uniformed personnel in its program activities with inmates.”131 
This authority structure would of course represent an inversion of the traditional power dynamics 
of a jail system ruled by the uniformed guards.  
 
Professional People 
When Wagner tapped Kross for the Commissioner position, she replied: “Just give me the 
trained professionals,” meaning college-educated civilian experts.132 By 1953, only $50,000 of 
DOC’s $8,700,000 budget was allocated to “rehabilitation.”133 By Kross’s math, DOC was 
spending $.02 per day, per prisoner, on rehabilitation.134 Kross found the Department lacking 
“minimal standards of medical care”, treatment for drug addiction, alcoholism, or age-related 
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afflictions. Sentence institutions were in need of a treatment program “to include reception, 
diagnostic, classification, medical and social treatment services, vocational guidance and 
counselling, education, vocational training, recreation, and separation services.”135 There were no 
mental health services to speak of for prisoners.136 Rehabilitation would become the watchword of 
Kross’s administration, driven by two progressive mantras: “we must abandon the notion that we 
are merely jailers or keepers,” and “we must do a job of human engineering.”137 The first 
represented a fundamental shift in the power relations inside DOC from the custodial to the 
rehabilitative powers, or, at least, the conversion of the former to the latter. The second defined 
the task of expert rule in the highest ideals of the Progressive Era. 
Kross’s program was reliant on clinical care but also education. “Investigation of the 
educational backgrounds of our prisoners in 1954,” the administration later reflected, “disclose 
(sic) that there was a great necessity to raise the level of the 3 Rs (“Reading, Writing, and 
Arithmetic”) of many of our prisoners before they could be taught vocational skills that might open 
up the world of social acceptability and offer economically rewarding employment to them.”138 In 
a 1954 address to the American Prison Association, Kross invoked the spirit of professionalism 
that had animated DOC under McCormack and McGee two decades prior. “Formerly, we had a 
sizeable social service department, a modern medical service, classification, a staff of psychiatric 
and psychological personnel—in brief, a roster of professional people.”139 Wagner’s New Deal for 
New York, Kross wagered, was the setting in which the spirit of this period could be recaptured.  
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The Rikers Island Hospital provides a concrete illustration of the downward trend in 
civilian staffing and medical facilities in the decade and a half preceding Kross’s administration. 
Opened in 1935 as an impressive, seven-story monument to progressive penology, the ambitious 
hospital had succumbed to neglect during the war years, from which it did not recover. A DOC 
medical report later summarized its descent: 
In its early years the hospital had earned and enjoyed an enviable reputation and was 
accredited for internships and residencies. The program maintained the high level as 
planned for about five years. In the 1940’s the hospital begun (sic) to deteriorate. The zest 
of the initial interest exhibited by the visiting staff had been tempered by the time-
consuming problem of transportation. Visits to the hospital took too much time out of a 
busy day. The service needs of the Second World War made heavy inroads on the staff of 
visiting and consultant physicians. Those who left did not return at the close of the war nor 
were they replaced. By 1954, when the current administration took office, there was no 
visiting staff to speak of. The operating rooms were literally in wraps, no surgery having 
been performed in more than ten years. Essential equipment, viz., sterilizers, autoclaves, 
x-ray apparatus, developing tanks, electrocardiograph, etc., etc., were either in need of 
repair or replacement. Essential supplies were inadequate or missing.140  
 
As an avatar of this degeneration, when Kross inherited the hospital, the entire surgical floor was 
used as storage.  
In terms of staffing, the hospital had only six positions for resident physicians, of which 
only three were filled, and only one of whom was licensed. These overworked physicians were 
assisted by six part-timers, working shifts totaling a few hours each day, despite a daily census in 
excess of two-hundred prisoners presenting the myriad health effects of hard living on the outside. 
DOC could only manage fifteen dental sessions per week, which at Rikers had come to be largely 
extractions of problem teeth—regardless of whether the tooth was salvageable.141 The barrier to 
hiring presented by the arduous daily trip to Rikers was likely secondary to the low wages medical 
professionals could earn in DOC compared to employment elsewhere, but nonetheless a strong 
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disincentive. Thus, whatever residents DOC could entice to the job were “foreign physicians who 
stay only until they can get State licenses.”142  
Kross’s application of a medical model to understanding criminality did not mean she 
wanted the jails under her command to provide hospital services to patients who could be 
consigned to the care—and budget—of another City department. This was the case for the “self-
committed” narcotics addicts who could avoid a jail sentence for by committing themselves to the 
Rikers Island Hospital, where there was no rehabilitative care for addiction. A 1944 ruling in the 
case of Wallace v. Ashworth had concluded these admissions were legally patients, not prisoners, 
and were therefore not to be fingerprinted or forced to labor. This infuriated Kross. “An inmate 
who is not fingerprinted,” screamed the administration’s 1954 “Supplemental Budget” request, in 
underscored type, “can use the Rikers Island Hospital as a hide-a-way from officials and authorities 
seeking him. This self-committed group lolls away its time at the hospital without treatment or 
assignment of any minor duties due to the above judicial opinion.”143 Kross demanded that this 
population either be taken off the hands of DOC by the Department of Hospitals, or else the city 
fund proper hospital facilities at Rikers capable of handling addiction treatment.  
Deficiencies of staffing and facilities were joined by a problem more fundamental to 
operating a medical facility in a jail, symptomatic of the primary obstacle facing Kross’s bold 
redesign of both DOC’s division of labor, and prisoner life in its facilities. “To these lacks,” writes 
Boyer, after enumerating the shortcomings of DOC’s medical capacities,  
must be added the difficulties stemming from the differing values of the two disciplines – 
the custodial, on the one hand, and the medical on the other. To the custodial officer, 
understandably, an inmates need for medical services is an inconvenient incident 
interfering with the routine of his functions and responsibilities. To the physician, the fact 
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that the sick man is being held in security custody and the service he can render is thereby 
limited, is the inconvenient interference. Each is thwarted in his relation to his basic 
function and responsibility. The chasm of dichotomy is difficult to bridge.144 
 
Then as now, this difference was not settled by appeals to morality or justice, but by daily power 
struggle for dominion over institutional life. Kross represented the best chance the civilian staff 
had at beating back the custodial force and translating some of the humanism of progressive 
penology into concrete institutional practice. But she was far from unopposed.  
 
Custodians 
The state of this uniformed staff, though larger, was scarcely better than the civilians. Kross 
often pointed out that in 1954, guard jobs were posted advertising no prerequisites in education or 
experience.145 Guards started at a yearly salary of $3,565, for a 48 hour work week.146 Upon taking 
office, Kross noted “a backlog of building operations, pending and delayed for a variety of reasons, 
a commissioner for several years under attack, a city naturally Democratic suffering because of 
party disunity, and inadequate budgetary provisions; all of which added up to the low and 
discouraging morale of staff.”147 One incident in particular stands out as exemplary of this disarray. 
In the summer and fall of 1953, conflict had escalated between Williams and COBA over 
sick leave policy, the duration of dreaded shifts in the Tombs court pens, and other bread and butter 
issues of guard control over the conditions of their labor. The primary issue seems to have been 
the COBA demand for sick leave on par with police, fire, and sanitation, and especially, the ability 
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for guards to accumulate sick time. Williams argued this was a matter of law, not DOC policy.148 
COBA and Williams vied for Impellitteri’s support amid claims of bad faith and retaliation.149 
Their feud escalated to the point at which Williams stripped all DOC uniformed staff, from rookie 
guards all the way to wardens, of their metallic badges. Some even lost their right to carry a gun 
outside the jail, and were thus deprived of a cherished perk of uniformed DOC employment. 
 Williams said precious little about the alleged abuses, besides noting that guards used 
badges to ride the bus for free, in addition to referencing an alleged ring of guards counterfeiting 
police badges (the relationship of this to genuine badges being unclear). A subsequent meeting of 
roughly 400 COBA members voted unanimously to demand Impellitteri terminate Williams, 
appending to their resolution a letter accusing the Commissioner of “acting like a little boy who, 
having been spanked cries, ‘I’ll get even with you’ and then proceeds to pull out his mother’s 
flower bed.”150 The Chief sided with COBA, depicting Williams, in the spirit of the season, as a 
Thanksgiving turkey awaiting the axe of “DISMISSAL.”151  
The Williams affair, remarkable in its time by the degree of  belligerence COBA 
demonstrated toward a sitting commissioner, recalled lingering controversy surrounding 
Williams’s administration, which had culminated in a 1952 report detailing allegations of anti-
Semitism against staff, favoritism granted to a famous gangster held at Rikers Island, and the 
misappropriation of DOC property. Impellitteri successfully fought to keep the findings of the 
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investigation sealed, but none of this looked good for Williams or the embattled mayor protecting 
him.152 Behind the public feuding, however, many guards quietly enjoyed the benefits of 
Williams’s hands-off approach, typified by his office door being famously closed to all comers, 
which simultaneously allowed small-scale corruption to thrive.153 One such case came to light in 
in 1952, when the Bronx DA handed down nine indictments of civilian and custodial staff for 
running a complex drug smuggling operation on Rikers Island.154 A similar scheme would soon 
be brought to light at the Tombs, precipitating a major shakeup in DOC and a standoff of sorts 
between the uniformed powers and the incipient civilian leadership.  
A surprisingly candid 1958 interview with Kross on the radio program This is New York 
demonstrates not only the challenge the Kross administration posed to DOC’s status quo, but the 
belligerence with which she met it behind closed doors—and named it in public. The exchange 
calls to mind a reporter’s characterization of Kross as “in action… still retain[ing] the fire of her 
early suffragette career. She gestures energetically, her eyes snap, her voice becomes metallic.”155 
Kross begins the interview complaining about the spate of leaks emanating from DOC that cast 
the rank-and-file as demoralized. In language perhaps familiar to the present observer of American 
politics, Kross complains that in a “reprehensible and contemptible procedure,” employees have 
taken their grievances to the press instead of to her, and in doing so, have distorted reality “in a 
fashion that made it look as if things were completely out of control—which they never were since 
I’ve been commissioner!” This she attributes to retribution for her anti-corruption reforms:  
I found that it was due to the fact that in my cleanup I had been stepping on toes, because 
you might not realize it, when I’d inquire ‘now why do we do things in this fashion’ I was 
told ‘that’s the way we always do it.’ I was also told I should not be surprised that correction 
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officers or police–those were the words used to me, I quote the actual words—are entitled, 
they think they’re entitled, to a gratuity! 
 
 “A gratuity from whom, Commissioner?” the interviewer replies. Kross continues: 
 
From anyone. In my book, a gratuity from a prisoner or a prisoner’s family was a bribe. 
And I would not permit anything of that type to go on, and I started creating situations and 
providing rules to do away with that type of practices. Well you know, we did catch those 
that were selling favors. That was considered a gratuity! Bringing in contraband, selling 
favors, having to pay for that which a prisoner was entitled to. Well, someone said I stopped 
the gravy boat. I said there’d be no gravy boat in the Department of Correction at my time, 
and I’m proud to say we reduced it to an irreducible minimum.156   
 
Earlier that year, and embattled Kross had remarked “I'm really such a peaceable person by nature. 
I don't understand why I'm involved in these arguments.”157 Listening to these remarks, one gets 
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CHAPTER 3:    THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS 
 
Kross’s reform plan faces two obstacles: overcrowding—itself attendant to the City’s use of police 
and courts to discipline its working class—and the recalcitrance of DOC’s guards, who bloc 
against the reformer commissioner. Wagner’s “New Deal” helps mitigate this latter tension, by 
improving wages and benefits for guards, and empowering the Correction Officers’ Benevolent 
Association (COBA) with legal recognition. An uneasy peace holds as Kross attempts to reform 
DOC, which will entail the construction of new jails. Scandal at the House of Detention for Women 
(HDW) highlights the persistence of miserable jail conditions under Kross, shedding considerable 
doubt on the viability of Kross’s reform program, and plan for new jails. Yet plans for jail 
expansion continue, guided by the imperative of the middle-class reformer to solve the problem of 
jails with more jails.   
 
“The institution is crowded,” opined the editors of the prisoner-run Rikers Review. “No 
successful rehabilitation program can be instituted within an overcrowded prison, because vital 
segregation of inmate’s ‘personalities’ or ‘types’ cannot be fully practiced…While this concept 
[rehabilitation] is not new by any means,” they concluded, “progress toward this goal has been 
agonizingly slow.”158 Though by all appearances run by prisoners in earnest, the Review was 
nonetheless administered by civilians in the Adult Education program, and rarely criticized DOC 
or jail conditions directly. In this rare instance of open grievance against DOC, we see not a 
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challenge to Kross, but a reiteration of her main themes upon assuming office. And to meet the 
challenges posed by overcrowding, Kross demanded from the onset the hasty construction of 
additional jail facilities, especially a remand facility for  adolescent detainees (defined in this 
period as aged sixteen to twenty-one), who were hitherto mixed with adults, and a facility for 
women prisoners, who were grouped with detainees in HDW.159 Additionally the Kross 
administration sought an expanded design for projects already underway: the Brooklyn City Prison 
(to become the Brooklyn House of Detention), a City Prison in Queens, and extensive 
improvements to the Penitentiary on Rikers Island.160  
City politics had taught Kross, as it had taught her contemporary Robert Moses, that 
executive power may not be infinite, but it could almost always be expanded. It will perhaps not 
surprise the reader that in addition to deploring the “horse and buggy” conditions she inherited, 
Kross also found the executive office of DOC to be neither sufficiently sophisticated nor, more 
importantly, centralized.161 Kross complained of “an administration characterized by divided 
authority and extreme decentralization of responsibility, with consequent lack of control by the 
Central Office over institutional policy.” Additionally, DOC lacked strong executive positions “for 
such essential services as medical care, social work, education, industries and personnel.”162  
The emphasis on civilian professionals shone especially in Kross’s restructuring of DOC, 
and who she tapped to fill its newly defined central positions. Kross appointed as First Deputy 
Commissioner Harry Manuel Schulman, a Sociology professor at City College with extensive 
experience consultancy experience in policing and incarceration. Schulman was to be in charge of 
budget, construction, treatment, industries, vocation, education, medical and social service, and 
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recreation, and serve as a liaison to the Parole Commission. Kross selected as Second Deputy 
Commissioner Frederick C. Rieber, a lawyer with experience in Army intelligence, and eight years 
on the New York City Department of Investigation, a dogged anti-corruption watchdog agency 
within City government. Rieber would lead the Legal Division, tasked with legislation and liaising 
with the courts and other agencies, in addition to handling inmate complaints, and overseeing 
deaths, injuries, and daily institutional routines. For DOC Secretary Kross tapped Arnold H. 
Wallack, a Harvard trained sociologist and political scientist working in the public relations 
industry. Wallack would provide PR for DOC, in addition to overseeing inmate social services.163 
It’s difficult to imagine which of these three men—the sociology professor, the DOI ratfink, or the 
Ivy League PR maven—would have been most objectionable to the average rank-and-file jail 
guard. 
Despite the turn to experts at the top—or perhaps, because of it—the administration worked 
assiduously to keep the uniforms on its side. Its first major action was the restoration of badges to 
DOC’s 1,100 guards, following an investigation of the charges brought by Williams against 215 
employees.164 While this gesture was in part symbolic, it was nonetheless an important token of 
Kross’s intention to cooperate with guards amid a program of restructuring sure to be profoundly 
unsettling, even for the average guard with no stake in corruption rackets. In fact, Kross’s first big 
institutional shakeup also came in response to the wishes of the guards: the closure of the Rikers 
Island Workhouse and its relocation to Hart Island, a move demanded by COBA. Progress on this 
move began on August 20, 1954, and continued until late in the year.165  
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Additionally, despite Kross’s promises for redoubled civilian hires, of the 135 new 
positions created in 1954, ninety-eight were “custodial staff” (guards) and thirty-seven were 
civilians, spread across expanded programs of recreation throughout the system, in addition to 
education and service provision at the sentence jails. This hiring pattern did not modify the ratio 
of custodial to civilian staff, which is surely not how Kross would have liked to have it. 166 The 
opening of the new Workhouse at Hart Island and rebellion at HDW, Kross’s DOC reasoned, 
necessitated the addition of more guards.167  
Still, not all hires were uniformed. Early in 1955, DOC won twenty new hires in psychiatry, 
psychology, social work, rehabilitation, and recreation. As often occurs in the wake of riots, the 
Board of Estimate suddenly discovered $108,794 in available funds after the 1954 riot at HDW 
and passed it along to DOC hoping it would help calm the facility.168 Kross’s DOC also strove to 
professionalize the uniformed staff, adopting a plan to adopt high school diploma as condition for 
being a guard, establish ranks of Sergeant and Lieutenant, establish Deputy Superintendent of 
Women Prisoners, establish a Chief of Staff, and attain pay parity with NYPD.169  
Upon taking office, Kross inherited a budget prepared by Williams, which her 
administration found woefully inadequate to the task it set before itself. In August of 1954 Kross’s 
newly restructured DOC released an appeal for a supplemental budget of $500,000. This 
remarkable text reads more like a manifesto than a budgetary proposal. Its introductory remarks 
include a less-than oblique rebuke of NYPD Commissioner Francis Adams, who was undertaking 
a spectacular demonstration of police power. Similar to Kross, Adams assumed leadership of a 
scandal-plagued department in 1954, announcing plans to root out corruption and demanding a 
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larger staff—in Adams’s case, to the tune of 5,000 new cops.170  That very month, citing ascendant 
crime statistics in a dramatic televised address, Adams had pushed a tough-on-crime posture, 
deploying dragnet-style “drives” against street-level illegality, targeting “undesirables” for 
offenses like loitering.171 172 Under the opening heading “Better Criminals or Better Citizens?” 
Kross argues:  
we know the resultant products of [Adams’s] intensive police drives. Our overcrowded 
detention and sentence institutions can already attest to that fact. Apprehension is the first 
step in this circuitous approach to the crime problem, but not the solution. Our principle 
problem is what we do with the men who have been committed to the Department’s 
custody. This endless process of dumping human material into our correctional institutions 
without a scientific and professional attempt to rehabilitate them is a most wasteful 
procedure. The end result must be that we will need MORE police, MORE prosecutors, 
MORE courts, MORE judges, and bigger and stronger bastilles to hold our prisoners.173 
 
Here a contradiction emerges which would define the Kross tenure and set the stage for the 
unfolding of events beyond it—between pursuing progressive reform on a societal level, while 
adequately administering jails, the inheritor of great injustice, within the existing state of affairs. 
Kross attempted to square this circle by adopting the jail as a site of potential social good.  
What Kross called “progress through crisis in a constantly volcanic situation” presents us 
with an interesting dialectic, illustrative of the Sisyphean task of jail reform.174 From her earliest 
years, Kross routinely decried the criminalization of social disorder, which resulted in relegating 
the “backwash of our highly industrialized complex civilization of today in our jails, all over the 
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country.”175 Kross had long pointed to the economic injustice of the legal system and advocated 
for clinical solutions to deviancy. Without discounting the necessary role of police in enforcing 
social order—Kross was, after all, no radical—Kross had witnessed the senselessness of police 
solutions to structural social problems, and advocated instead for robust social programs in the 
place of the nightstick. As Kross’s Acting Medical Director Rose Boyer put it, in a report Kross 
reprinted favorably: 
Studying the men and women who, day in and day out, stream into the Department of 
Correction I have been struck with the fact that only too frequently the deviate behavior is 
not of a criminal nature. It seems impossible to escape the conclusion that this Department 
has had loaded upon it the additional function of serving as a ‘catch-all’ for a complex of 
medical-sociological problems with economic and psychological overtones for which a 
prison commitment is not effective treatment.176 
The Department of Correction, however, has no control over such matters. Therefore, Kross would 
need new and better jails.  
Looking back on its tenure in 1965, the Kross administration conceded “we are all too 
conscious of the limitations of…attempting to relieve the problems of overcrowding through the 
expedient of spending more and more money to build more and more jails designed to hold more 
and more people who should never have been sent to jail in the first place.” Ultimately, however 
since DOC cannot divert prisoners from its custody, “we have at least done the next best thing. 
We have initiated a far reaching and comprehensive building program, carrying its various phases 
to completion as quickly as funds have been made available.”177 By accepting the strictures of a 
municipal commissionership, Kross agreed to work within parameters limited to providing optimal 
conditions for those placed in DOC custody. In 1958, Kross remarked “If we had more policemen 
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we’d need more jails, but that wouldn’t solve the problem.”178 Yet, within the narrow parameters 
of humanely administering DOC, overcrowding wrought by the police solution to social disorder 
was itself the problem. And new jails were, in fact, the solution. And Kross would build them, as 
she built the administrative capacities of DOC, while struggling to shift the balance of power from 
the uniformed staff to the experts. But was this even possible? 
 
Revolt of Guards 
In December 1955, New York County District Attorney Frank S. Hogan announced 
charges against eight guards at the Tombs, accused of selling a variety of perquisites to prisoners, 
in exchange of course for a gratuity. For fifty cents, the complaint charged, prisoners could leave 
their cells and take a stroll down the cellblock’s bridge. For one dollar, they could visit another 
cell, or else enjoy a steak sandwich in their own. Cash could be smuggled from the outside, but 
would arrive fifteen dollars shy of the original amount. A quart of Scotch, worth roughly seven 
dollars on the outside, netted thirty-five dollars, while “economy sized package deals” priced at 
just twenty-five dollars paired outside food with whiskey. An arrangement with the jail’s 
underground gambling circuit netted guards an unspecified cut in exchange for smuggling in cards 
and dice, and more alarmingly, razor blades. But it was a VIP package—a party for six in a linen 
room, catered with cold cuts and Scotch, for a total of eighty-five dollars—that resulted in the 
racket’s downfall, after one of the attendees offered information to the District Attorney in 
exchange for a deal on his pending larceny charge.179  
                                                            
178 Anna Kross, This is New York. 
179 New York Times, “Scotch Sold at $35 in Racket at Tombs,” December 1, 1955; Don Hogan, “Jail Favors Sold Here; 
Guards Held,” December 1, 1955. In a contemporary advertisement, a fifth of scotch is advertised for $5.63. (New 
York Herald-Tribune, “Tallyho! for the Happiest of Holidays,” December 13, 1955.)  
57 
 
Eight guards in total were arrested, and in a turn of events constituting red meat for the 
press, it was revealed that one of the guards had numerous prior convictions for petty crimes 
including theft, and two others had been arrested for murder and rape, respectively, though had 
not been convicted. Kross expressed anger that DA had not coordinated the investigation with her 
office, claiming “If I had been taken into their confidence, we could have gone much further in the 
matter. I still don’t think the problem is resolved.”180 But even Kross was not above suspicion. 
Soon there were three parallel investigations of the City’s jails, by the New York County Grand 
Jury, DOC, and DOI.181 Kross’s foes attempted to hang the scandal around her neck, but she was 
not cowed. “I’d never resign under fire,” Kross defiantly avowed. 182 She meant it. 
While a public relations disaster in the short term, the scandal was not necessarily a bad 
thing for Kross, who by her own estimation continued to enjoy Wagner’s “100 per cent” support.183 
Citing the scandal, Kross called within days for a “complete reorganization” of the uniformed staff, 
constituting the “largest personnel shift” in DOC history. With Wagner’s approval, Kross 
immediately transferred twenty-five supervisory personnel, and made it clear this was just the 
beginning.184 (As for District Attorney Hogan, Kross insisted they were “the best of friends.”)185 
On March 8, 1956, Kross made good on this promise, announcing a sweeping restructuring of the 
uniform command structure of DOC. Her order transferred forty-six supervisory wardens, deputy 
wardens, and captains. The plan also unfurled a new organizational table for these positions, 
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introduced an additional position of assistant deputy warden, and reinstituted warden positions at 
three institutions where they had fallen into disuse.186  
Kross did this in accordance with Wagner’s Career and Salary Plan, a calculated aspect of 
his “New Deal” which rationalized the employment hierarchies of municipal organizations, 
mitigating both individual and structural corruption—with the tradeoff of higher wages.187 
However beneficial in the long term for the abstract worker, is worth emphasizing how disruptive 
such an action would be for practically every guard up and down the chain of command, including 
those not breaking any laws or even rules. The resistance that met Kross attests to this. Just shy of 
the Ides of March, in a move almost certainly unprecedented in DOC history, representatives from 
all three uniformed staff unions—COBA, the Correction Captains Association, and the 
Association of Wardens and Deputy Wardens—and other high powerful uniformed officials, 
including Warden Thomas McDonnell of the Rikers Island Penitentiary, bypassed Kross and 
grieved the restructuring directly to Wagner.188 Threats hung in the air of a 1,400 guard march on 
City Hall.189 Wagner had been caught off guard by the bold maneuver, and was forced to dispel 
swirling rumors of Kross’s impending termination.190 
The complaints of these unions were couched in concerns over possible favoritism, 
violations of Civil Service law, Kross’s lack of justification for individual transfers, and the 
affordability of new positions—suddenly a concern for organizations perennially calling for new 
positions in DOC.191 But just as Kross’s restructuring likely had little to do with the specifics of 
the Tombs scandal which served as its justification, the united front now meeting the mayor behind 
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her back was rooted less in particular grievances and more in a generalized power struggle between 
uniformed and civilian staff for control of the Department of Correction. A private letter sent the 
following month indicates the depth of this conflict. The three staff unions, writing under the 
umbrella of the United Council of Uniformed Organizations, wrote to Wagner complaining that 
not only had Kross ignored the grievances they had discussed with Wagner, but she had “created 
a number of other grievances” in the interim, including “Intimidation of Organizational officers,” 
and “[d]emanding the names of persons who attended Organizational Executive Board meetings.” 
The terse memo concludes: “Is any relief contemplated for us in the near future? Our membership 
is becoming very restive.”192 This was nothing short of a war of position.  
Kross even suffered a minor personal scandal of her own. It was revealed Kross had hired 
relatives, including her husband Dr. Isidor Kross, and unsubstantiated claims of misappropriated 
commissary funds added to a growing cloud of suspicion. Wagner had hitherto thrown his 
unqualified support behind Kross, but even in exonerating Kross of wrongdoing was forced to 
concede: “Perhaps in all matters she has not used the best judgment. But she is doing a good job 
for the people of the City of New York.”193  
If the concluding line of the unions’ letter to Wagner was a demand for Kross’s removal 
coupled with a threat of future action, the unions were not off-base in believing this to be an 
opportune moment. The Grand Jury convened to investigate DOC in the wake of the Tombs 
scandal was still investigating Kross. Several weeks later, the jury met with Wagner to express 
stern criticisms of her administration.194 The next month, their foreman was still more candid: “We 
want it distinctly understood that her administration has been bad and still is bad and we want 
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something done about it.”195 During this time Wagner had become less vocal in his defenses of 
Kross but was nonetheless loyal. In response to the mounting pressure from the unions and the 
Grand Jury, he convened a special committee to evaluate the recommendations of the Grand Jury 
and use them to improve DOC. Kross, always one to steer into crisis rather than away from it, said 
of the Grand Jury’s findings: “I might have written that report myself.”196 
Thus, if the unions had hoped to remove Kross, they were as correct about the opportunity 
of the moment as they were mistaken in estimating their opponent. Just weeks after the Grand 
Jury’s initial report, Kross received a showing of support from an association of institution heads 
and “warden eligibles” who assembled at HDW. These high ranking DOC officials expressed 
support for Kross’s restructuring, on the grounds that she replace “acting” titles (which did not 
come with a boost in salary) with full positions, convert warden positions providing free food and 
lodging at the institution (so-called “maintenance” positions) to non-maintenance positions—with 
an attendant doubling in salary to reflect the loss of provisions—and moreover to refrain from 
bringing outside administrators into the new institutional structure developed under the Career and 
Salary Plan.197  
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This move was in fact in perfectly keeping with the underlying strategy of both the Career 
and Salary Plan, and Wagner’s broader program of calculated conciliation with the City’s 
municipal workforce. The following week Kross undertook another shakeup, including twelve 
wardens and deputy wardens, eliciting no significant organized resistance.198  
In June, touring HDW with a member of the State Commission of Correction, Kross, 
remarked that she had no intention of quitting, and “there is no danger of my being fired.”199 In 
August, Wagner established a forty-hour work week for police, fire, and jail guards. Two hours of 
compulsory overtime were built into the formula. 200  This was another victory for DOC guards, 
and more cause for an unsteady peace with Kross.  
Still the Mayor’s investigation remained. In a move reminiscent of her contemporary 
Moses, Kross was originally announced as the chair of the mayor’s committee to investigate 
DOC.201 By the time the commission met, however, and the story had garnered negative press, this 
had been chalked up to a “misunderstanding,” and the chair would instead be City Administrator 
Charles Preusse.202 Though a Wagner appointee, Preusse was known for his candor and 
independence. Wagner described him as a “tough guy.” Another associate described him as 
possessed of a “thorough grasp of politics, an equally thorough grasp of administration, a 
reasonably dispassionate ruthlessness and a voice that fittingly resembles the sound of tempered 
metal grating on granite.” Under Wagner, Preusse led studies of a number of City agencies, 
including the Buildings Department, the Department of Education, and DOC. These were no 
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symbolic exercises; in his findings on the DOE, Preusse advocated the abolition of the Board of 
Education and its replacement by a single administrator answerable to the mayor.203  
The findings of the Mayor’s Committee on the Department of Correction did not mark a 
banner moment for Kross. As the Times put it, “it can be assumed she did not welcome all the 
language or the recommendations in the report;” but this was surely recognizable to the Tammany 
veteran as a political victory, especially as it expanded the Department’s staffing to the tune of 
$500,000, spread over ninety-six positions, some of them administrators overseeing rehabilitation 
and other civilian branches of DOC.204 Like the Grand Jury and DOI reports, which it largely 
accepts as given, the majority of the Preusse Report is nothing Kross had not already said about 
DOC. The only substantive criticisms that applied to Kross’s administration directly, and not to 
problems it had simply inherited, pointed to its centralization of executive power. The Committee 
found that twenty-four high-ranking officials reported directly to Kross, “no clear delegation of 
authority and responsibility” existed among this class of administrators, and as a result, “[t]oo 
much detail reaches the commissioner and top aides”—a polite description of micromanagement 
by unchecked executive power. Additionally, the positions as Kross had defined them for the 
highest ranking officials “were unrealistic in that they did not apply to the pattern of the existing 
organization.”205 Kross would most likely beg to differ. 
Like Moses, Kross had sought to maximize the strength of the executive function in DOC, 
and here it had seemed to reach a limit. However, even the solutions proposed by the Committee 
were in themselves a victory for the cunning Kross. Instead of returning to decentralized authority 
held by local uniformed administrators, the Committee called for the establishment of a civilian 
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oversight and planning body, the Board of Correction (BOC). The Committee proposed BOC to 
be modeled on similar lay boards in other states, including California and Massachusetts. The 
purpose of such boards was not simply to check the power of the executive, but to provide long-
term continuity sustaining coherence amid the disruptive and often unpredictable turnover of 
correction commissioners—itself a victory for the civilian side of jail administration. Additionally, 
the Committee cited BOC as providing “a voice for the imprisoned segment of the population,” it 
found lacking in present carceral administration.206  
In sum, the Committee attributed five purposes to BOC: 
(a) Provide continuity of policy and formulate objectives; (b) establish a system of 
inspection with the view of seeing that the Department of Correction and its institutions 
are operating at highest efficiency; (c) develop plans for a capital construction program; 
(d) review and analyze departmental plans, activities and progress with consideration of 
rehabilitation potential of short-term prisoners; (e) render regular reports.207 
 
The Board was thus presented as a check on Kross’s power. Yet, as Kross’s administration would 
subsequently point out, the “record indicates that the original recommendation for a Board of 
Correction dates back to 1954, when this administration took office.” It is recalled that Kross called 
for a civilian oversight board upon taking office, and attention is called to the Citizens’ Advisory 
Committee Kross subsequently established, which though replaced by the incipient BOC, is 
nonetheless uplifted and strengthened in spirit.208 With the issuance of the Preusse Report, and 
Kross’s acceptance of its findings, the Times effectively declared it the dénouement of the crisis 
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begun with the Tombs scandal and kindled by the revolt of the guards. The following the powerful 
newspaper expressed full confidence in Kross.209  
 
A Pastel Dungeon  
The day after the Preusse Report was signed, Wagner oversaw a considerable victory for 
the Kross administration, the opening of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men (HDM) on 
Atlantic Avenue in Downtown Brooklyn. “We can never be happy about prisons,” Wagner 
declared. “But looking at this modern new facility I have a sense of pride in that it is intended to 
help make better citizens of those who have lost the way.”210 DOC celebrated HDM as heralding 
a new era in its carceral facilities, celebrating: 
The modern Brooklyn House of Detention for Men now replaces the antiquated, century-
old Bastille dungeon known as Raymond Street Jail. Structurally, this building has 
incorporated modern and forward looking ideas in the area of penological architecture. 
However, the Department of Correction of the City of New York recognizes that beauty of 
architecture, modern plumbing, and sanitary features are not the only requisites for a 
modern prison. Prison buildings must be adequate frameworks for rehabilitative programs. 
 
We trust that the pioneering programs in rehabilitation and counselling, to be started here 
will be as far removed from the old custody concepts as the new architecture is from the 
old penal dungeon it replaces.211 
 
Standing eleven stories tall with an 817 cell capacity, the $10,642,000 maximum security facility 
had been compared, DOC claimed, to the United Nations building in Midtown Manhattan—on the 
outside, of course.212  
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The facility represented a modified version of the plans Kross had inherited for a detention 
facility in Brooklyn, which by January of 1954 was already under construction. By DOC’s telling, 
HDM’s provisions included twenty-eight “spacious, light and airy dayrooms,” along with 
“spacious, light and airy” cell blocks, “facilities for extensive segregation; modern medical 
treatment; provisions for recreation and religious needs; a library; closed circuit TV; a physical 
interior as light, airy and clean as modern design will permit,” organized “to conform with modern 
prison management methods.” Additionally, the facility was adjacent to a borough court, 
connected in fact, via and underground tunnel.213 Kross modified a key aspect of the original plan, 
replacing space intended for a warden’s quarters—obviated by the abandonment of the 
maintenance pay structure—with office space for community-based service providers.214 Pointing 
to its airy, bright, “colorful and modern” facilities replete with “cell walls in pastel colors,” the 
Times celebrated “a thoroughly modern jail” combining “the utmost in modern jail facilities.”215   
But beneath all the airy, bright, and colorful rhetoric, HDM was still very much an ordinary 
jail, even a particularly nasty one, complete with steel bars, scarce sunlight, and minimal facilities 
for programming or recreation. In this respect it was very similar to HDW. The ideological 
makeover Kross gave this unremarkable facility is sufficient to inspire doubt in her 
administration’s accounts of the rest of its programming and facilities. Further complicating the 
Kross administration’s gloss on HDM, the facility was almost immediately converted into a 
remand center for adolescent detainees, as part of an effort to centralize adolescent detention and 
segregate adolescents from adults. Retreating from language replete with airy lightness, Kross 
admitted the inadequacy of HDM for this task in February 1957, when adolescents were moved 
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into its barred, maximum security cell blocks—of which DOC itself could not muster a single 
photograph not appearing dark, bleak, and almost medieval in its design.216 “But this new building 
is far better than any other available now,” Kross concluded—a mantra aptly capturing her 
increasingly dour pragmatism in the years to come.217  
Most inauspiciously of all, the detested Raymond Street Jail, which BHD was constructed 
to replace, was not in fact shuttered upon its opening, remaining instead in use until 1963. The 
facility had been on the chopping block since at least 1930, when it was bitterly denounced by 
DOC commissioner Richard C. Patterson, Jr. Proposing the construction of a new jail on the site 
of Raymond Street, Patterson claimed the latter facility had “every vicious feature which has been 
condemned by modern penologists, sociologists and social workers in the last thirty or forty 
years.”218  But it would be another thirty or forty years before anything was done about it.  
In 1957 Robert Moses, eager to convert the site to a playground as part of the Fort Green 
Title I Housing Project, wrote to Kross: “I would appreciate it if you’d let me know whether or not 
there is substance to the ridiculous rumor which is going around to the effect that you want to 
continue the old Raymond Street Jail in use indefinitely.”219 For her part, Kross insisted DOC’s 
hands were tied until the City freed up funds for its proposed Adolescent Remand Facility. The 
urgent task of a new adolescent facility, which Kross had declared upon assuming office, was tied 
up on the planner’s board, slated during this period for construction on the present site of Hunt’s 
Point in the Bronx. “Commissioner Moses is extremely anxious to vacate ‘Raymond Street Jail,’” 
Kross wrote to Felt later that year, “and we are even more anxious to comply with this request. 
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Unfortunately, we have 648 prisoners in this ancient prison who cannot be relocated until this 
project is completed.”220 As a cautionary tale informing the present, HDM, meant to conclusively 
close the notorious Raymond Street Jail, effected no such thing by necessity.   
 
A Thankless Job 
Persistent overcrowding notwithstanding, in 1957 Kross would look back on “three and a 
half turbulent years of administrative problems” the likes of which, she imagined, she would not 
have to face again.221 But the people had other ideas. On April 26, 1958, the women of HDW, 
packed well over capacity with a census of 513, once again staged a spectacular revolt. After being 
locked in their cells for the evening, women took to their windows as they had in 1954, shouting, 
setting their sheets on fire, and raining crockery and flaming linen down on the street below. In 
the process, they attracted a crowd of onlookers estimated at 1,000. If the motivations of the 1954 
rebellion had to be deciphered by investigators, this time the message was apparently clear: “they 
were not being given enough to eat,” explained the Times, and “a girl who had protested this had 
been beaten.” Its source was the women themselves.222 The incident called attention to the 
persistent misery of DOC facilities, well into the fourth year of Kross’s progressive regime. And 
its aftermath brought to the surface the conflict between Kross and the “custodial” staff over 
dominion of DOC.  
In the following days it was alleged that Kross had covered up three assaults incurred by 
guards, and had told police who arrived to investigate: “Don’t make an arrest. I’ll take care of the 
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situation. This is my problem.” Subsequently, it was alleged, Kross had done nothing to discipline 
any of the forty women who had taken part. This bolstered the charge, allegedly widespread among 
guards, that Kross was “more sympathetic to inmates than she was to her officers.” The line 
between civilian and uniformed DOC staff had been thrown into sharp relief.223 What followed 
was likely by this point rote for Kross. The media rediscovered City jail conditions all over again; 
the jails, it was revealed were at an all-time capacity of 8,032.224 COBA issued apocalyptic 
condemnations of conditions, urging additional hiring.225 Wagner demanded an investigation, and 
Kross took some heat. Speculation swirled about her fitness for command and the future of her 
position. Yet, when prisoners staged another riot on June 22, 1958, it made less of a splash outside 
the facility.226 The story was losing steam. 
Ultimately, Kross was essentially correct that the real turbulence had subsided, and she 
wasn’t going anywhere. Kross’s friend Eleanor Roosevelt would later reflect “Dr. Kross had a 
particularly difficult time because many of her staff were old-timers who held allegiance to the 
party machine.”227 This may have been true of the old guard peppered throughout DOC. But Kross 
still had the support of Wagner, who told reporters Kross was “running the Department in good 
shape, as far as I know.”228 His loyalty was later satirized at the yearly gala of the Inner Circle, an 
organization of political reporters who presented musical follies lampooning New York City 
politics. On the heels of his 1958 reelection, the Inner Circle’s Wagner character discovers his 
problems remain; among them, his fealty to Kross. “Anna Kross I’m still not rid of” he sings, “Still 
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a judge she would be / Lots of laughs in Corrections / But the laugh’s on me.”229 Kidding aside, 
Kross would prove to be the only department commissioner to stay with Wagner for his entire 
mayoralty.230 
Asked by a reporter what she thought of being called an aspiring “symbol of motherhood 
to the prisoners,” Kross replied: “I don’t care what they call me. I have nothing to cover up. I have 
a thankless job.”231 Decisive action became a hallmark of her tenure. Kross followed the HDW 
uprising with her largest shakeup in four years.232 She further attempted to leverage the bad 
publicity for additional funds.233 Less than a week later she crossed swords with City and State 
officials after winning at long last her four-year battle against the placement of self-committed 
addicts in DOC facilities. Chief Magistrate John Murtagh called the move “cruel and 
inhumane.”234 But there was not to be another “revolt of guards.” In the wake of the HDW rebellion 
and a spate of assaults in the City jails, the three unions representing uniformed DOC workers met 
once again at City Hall—but this time they met not with Wagner but with a representative, and 
when they spoke of Kross, they lavished praise on her reform administration.235  
Tellingly, amid this latest scandal, Kross had been hard at work successfully striking down 
an austerity measure that would trim fifty-six guards from DOC’s ranks—and from the dues base 
of COBA.236 By this point, COBA was far less interested in fighting Kross than they were in 
fighting for three key demands Kross was capable of delivering: better wages and benefits for 
guards, more guards, and above all, more DOC facilities. COBA had passed earlier in 1958 a 
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resolution “Urging Creation of Additional Facilities for Inmates and Appointment of 150 More 
Correction Officers.” Far from opposing it, Kross reprinted this resolution on the front page of 
Correction Sidelights, the official staff newsletter. 237 A clear, if tenuous, unity of interests was 
emerging.  
Kross had argued from the beginning: “While there is a great rank and file pressure for 
improved working conditions and salary schedules, these improvements will be obtained only with 
the transformation of correctional personnel from a purely custodial to a treatment force.” The 
uniformed staff, Kross wagered, could be cajoled to foreswear skull-cracking in the name of a 
more studied approach to custody, if the price was right. DOC had subsequently changed the time 
for guards to reach maximum salary of $4,850 from five to three years.238 When first confronted 
with Wagner’s New Deal for New York, DOC’s unions had bristled against change. Now they 
were clearly coming to understand its benefits. Though turbulence symptomatic of the tension 
between civilians and uniformed staff—to say nothing of the tension between prisoners and their 
keepers—would never completely subside, a kind of uneasy peace had been struck, in which Kross 
was able to pursue an impressive program of expansion and centralization, if not reform, of the 
New York City jail system. 
 
Progress Through Crisis 
“When rehabilitation was first introduced to this island,” Rikers prisoner J. Rogers recalls,   
 
the [guards]… tried to fight it either by ignoring it or giving those whose jobs were 
connected with it a hard time. In their resentment, or maybe one should say—their 
insecurity, they laughed at the ‘bug’ doctors and derided the school program. The guards 
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that were placed in those quarters for security measures made it so miserable for the 
participating inmates that most of them, out of fear of such constant prejudicial treatment, 
just quit, with others not wanting to take their places for fear of the same treatment.239 
 
Against considerable inertia, Kross and her band of civilian experts nonetheless pressed as hard as 
they could. Upon assuming power Kross singled out two populations whose institutions required 
particular attention, and more generally, whose welfare had concerned Kross since her early days 
in the courts: women and adolescents. To address conditions at HDW, Kross campaigned for a 
sentence facility, to realize the original intent of HDW for pre-trial detention. Additionally, Kross 
had singled out the problem of adolescents as both a broad problem facing society and a particular 
problem facing DOC. “Adolescents in our prisons” wrote Kross’s administration in 1956, 
“represent of the most acute problems facing our city. The publicity which our local newspapers 
give to juvenile delinquency, school adolescent problems, gang wars, and adolescent narcotics can 
be taken as a barometer for the adolescent problem in our prisons.” This sense of crisis had not 
been conjured out of thin air; the average number of detained adolescents had doubled in the 
previous three years alone, shooting from 400 to 800.240 Moreover, DOC was doing very little with 
this population. Kross identified the admixture of adolescents and adults in remand facilities, and 
the lack of substantive education and programming, as two primary tasks facing her 
administration.241 
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Prior to 1954, sentenced adolescents had been locked in their cells from 3:30 in the 
afternoon until 7 in the morning. With the addition of more staff, that time was extended to 9 p.m., 
and a number of pilot programs introduced.242  Chief among them was P.S. 616. In 1959, Kross 
used prisoner labor and salvaged materials to convert a Rikers Island warehouse into P.S. 616, an 
accredited public high school for prisoners. PS 616 was converted from the old tailor shop, a 180-
by-sixty foot structure that the inmate Construction Gang built into twenty classrooms, three 
bathrooms, a recreation room, and an auditorium.243 An account of PS 616 by student M. Jones 
describes an intake process where, upon admission, the student was given a tour of the facility, 
and given a choice between academic or vocational training, the former contingent on an aptitude 
test.244 P.S. 616 initially held two hundred twenty students, taught by ten academic and four 
vocational teachers. The school operated with a wait list on account of the eligible population 
being about double its capacity. This capacity was subsequently expanded to hold three hundred 
and fifty students, again, using prisoner labor.245 In fact, much of the maintenance and construction 
during this period was done by the prisoner Construction Gang who would, theoretically, leave the 
island with the value of their labor power dramatically improved.246 
Kross had long complained that DOC was “a step-child of the City,” in terms of the latter’s 
apathy and unwillingness to provide proper funding.247 Absent substantive funds for prisoner 
programming, Kross invited volunteers, and increasingly, non-profit organizations, to fill the gap 
between what the prisoners required and what the City was willing to spend on them. These 
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included clergy, philanthropists, and the twelve-step programs Alcoholics Anonymous and 
Narcotics Anonymous.248 As Feinman argues, it was among the great progressive novelties of her 
administration that Kross deployed these groups to an unprecedented degree to provide a variety 
of services for prisoners. Beyond vocational training and the three Rs, “P.S. 616 also set out to 
open and extend cultural and creative horizons” through collaboration with groups like the 
American Association of Variety Artists and the Joseph Papp Shakespeare Group, in addition to 
two non-profit organizations, the Heckscher Foundation for Children, and Young Audiences, Inc. 
The school had its own student paper, The Open Mind.249  
At HDW, partnerships included the Quakers, Salvation Army, National Council of Jewish 
Women, and the Friendly Visitors. These organizations provided material support and volunteer 
hours in rehabilitative programs. The Friendly Visitors, Inc., a group pioneered by Kross, acted as 
an adjunct to the HDW staff and assisted in implementing rehabilitative services to the prisoners. 
Their organizational goals were: “1. to make the institution more habitable; 2. to organize 
vocational training courses; 3. to better the recreational facilities; 4. to aid released women; 5. to 
acquaint other public-spirited women with the need, and to ask them to join in the work.”250  The 
Visitors served to bring a number of charitable and non-profit organizations into the jail to provide 
services neglected by the state, such as The Manhattan United Church Women, The Key Women, 
The Pilot Club of New York, The Ladies of Charity, Jewish Family Services, The Woman Federal 
Jurors, and the Women’s Conference of the Society for Ethical Culture.251 Additionally, DOC’s 
staff publication Correction Sidelights appeared thanks to an anonymous “group of executives 
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‘with a heart,’ of a well-known printing firm in this City, who have been generously donating 
paper ‘off-cuts’ for use in our adult and adolescent training program.” Kross is less thankful toward 
the prisoners who “donated” their labor printing the newsletter.252 
Thanks to a combination of these volunteers and an expanded custodial and civilian staff, 
HDW was the location of perhaps the most robust prisoner programming. A long-disused beauty 
school was reactivated, and small pockets were found amid HDW’s cramped and overcrowded 
facilities for classes in sewing, typing, knitting, crafts, laundry, cooking, remedial academics, and 
the arts. Outdoor recreation was limited by nature, but more use was made of the roof.253 On the 
citywide level, the Kross administration would later reflect, “volunteers have contributed yeoman 
service [in] social service work, psychological testing and classification, education, library service, 
recreation, counseling, occupational therapy, aftercare planning, and…aftercare services.”254  
DOC touts the story of “Mary H.” as a flagship study in the benefits of such programming, 
as Kross saw it. “Overweight and untidy in appearance, Mary H. had not completed her High 
School education and was being hindered thereby psychologically and materially.” As a prisoner 
at HDW, however, Mary was discovered to possess above average skills in language and typing, 
and received her GED, while also qualifying for the English Regent School which could lead her 
to a degree at Hunter College. Upon release, “after several abortive attempts which she was 
psychologically prepared for,” Mary landed a job as a private secretary. “Naturally enough her 
problems were not all resolved immediately, but her self-confidence and self-esteem were 
sufficiently strengthened to allow her to accept her situation and patiently work toward the desired 
end.”255 
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There was however a problematic side effect to this close partnership between charity 
workers and DOC. In 1965, decades of simmering scandal at HDW reached a boil when a young 
Bennington College student named Andrew Dworkin, briefly jailed for a protest against the 
escalating war in Vietnam, captured international headlines with tales of depravation, depravity, 
and abuse at the Greenwich Village facility, including sexual abuse by staff. Though accounts had 
long emanated from the jail, Dworkin’s class position and media savvy made her more sympathetic 
than the working-class black women who were the facility’s more typical victims.256  
In response, the ecclesiastical staff of HDW distinguished itself by ecumenically rushing 
to defend the facility. HDW’s rabbi claimed anyone “who hadn't been in a prison before would be 
shocked in any prison.”257  Participating organizations also lined up to defend the jail. Joining the 
chaplains, representatives from the Salvation Army, the Women’s Prison Association and the 
affiliated Hopper Home, City Episcopal Mission Society, and the Society for Ethical Culture 
joined forced to pen a letter to every City newspaper. It began:  
The people of New York who pay the taxes for the upkeep of the House of Detention for 
Women deserve an honest and accurate picture of conditions there. We have been appalled 
by the exaggerated and distorted descriptions given by news media. It is hardly 
recognizable as the institution we know. As interested citizens and volunteers, we have 
worked thousands of hours yearly in every corner of this institution; we meet inmates face 
to face in visits and conversations daily. We are qualified to set the record straight!  
 
What followed was a denial of the experiences of Dworkin and other survivors of the horrors of 
HDW. In six bullet points the authors defended the institution, rebutting in particular charges of 
staff brutality. On the contrary, “the attitude toward these economically, culturally and emotionally 
                                                            
256 William E. Farrell, “Inquiry Ordered at Women’s Jail,” New York Times, March 6, 1965; Sara Harris, Hellhole: The 
Shocking Story of Inmates and Life in New York City’s House of Detention for Women, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co.  
1967.  
257 Feinman, Imprisoned Women, 134.  
76 
 
starved women is one of understanding and sympathy.” 258 Kross reprinted the letter on the cover 
of Correction Sidelights.  
Here we see the same dialectic driving Kross’s jail expansion at play once more. These 
organizations were not to blame for the social problems causing incarceration, and sought to 
alleviate them where they appeared inside the jail walls. Further, they were able to make small but 
important contributions to the quality of life and dignity of powerless women trapped in vulnerable 
and miserable positions. However, they did so through accepting a partnership with the jail, to the 
existence of which they were ultimately loyal. Whether or not they understood the degree to which 
criminalization caused social problems, instead of simply depositing them behind bars, this notion 
was off limits to their charity. Threats to the jail’s legitimacy became threats to the legitimacy of 
their own charitable work. This same Faustian pact continually fueled the expansion of the City’s 
jails, under the pretext of reforming them.  
 
Political Afterthoughts 
In 1955 the adolescent (up to twenty-one-year-old) population of sentenced prisoners at 
Hampton Farms was transferred to Rikers Island, to be housed in a modest cluster of dormitories 
and vocational shops fashioned out of the old Workhouse facility at the cost of $100,000.259 The 
following year the farm facility, which cost $10.19 per day per inmate versus $5.07 at Rikers, was 
closed down altogether, and its population transferred to the Penitentiary.260 On Rikers three 
warehouse buildings were repurposed to provide adolescents training in woodworking, printing, 
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carpentry, building maintenance, baking, car repair, furniture, sheet metal, radio and television 
repair, in addition to music and arts. Additional instruction in basic academics, ranging from 
elementary to high school, served as the basis for P.S. 616.261  
In 1959, the Rikers Island Penitentiary was renamed the Correctional Institution for Men 
(CIFM), comprised of an Adolescent Division in dormitories fashioned from warehouse space 
adjacent to the main penitentiary building, and an Adult Division, composed of the original jail.262 
In 1962, Kross opened the C-71 facility for sentenced adolescents, named the Adolescent 
Reformatory. Though it would be expanded significantly in the coming decades, comprising today 
the lion’s share of the massive facility known as the Anna M. Kross Center, C-71 was originally 
two X-shaped buildings connected to CIFM, containing single cells, with a rated capacity of 496. 
C-71 lacks a kitchen, dining area, or other support amenities necessary for an independent facility, 
and thus was connected to CIFM, upon which it was dependent to function.263 At this time, the 
makeshift dormitories previously used for adolescents were subsumed into P.S. 616.264  
BHD had been designated as an adolescent remand facility in 1957, contrary to its original 
plan, and would remain so for the duration of Kross’s tenure.265  Kross claimed this made the 
closure of the Raymond Street Jail impossible in the short term.266 In 1961 DOC opened the 
Queens House of Detention for Men, next to Queens Borough Hall in Kew Gardens. This facility 
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combined a five-story, H-shaped court facility with the eight-story Queens House of Detention for 
Men. The latter building boasted four housing floors containing twenty-four tiers with fifteen cells 
apiece, and eight twenty-bed dormitories, for a total capacity of 520.267 Sufficient capacity 
achieved at last, the Raymond Street Jail was closed at last in June of 1963.268  
Kross’s desired facilities for sentenced women and adolescent pre-trial detainees were 
much slower in coming than the programming improvements, and repurposing of existing 
facilities, that she was able to accomplish in a limited sense. Adolescent and women’s facilities 
had been included in DOC’s Capital Budget since 1955, but getting them built was another 
matter.269 An ambitious City plan envisioned them both to be completed in December of 1962, 
along with a new Workhouse (C-76).270 But Wagner’s New Deal for New York was not limited to 
DOC. When Wagner took office City agencies lined up to cash in, setting consecutive records for 
capital budget requests in Wagner’s first two years.271  
With no adequate DOC facilities capable of absorbing the City’s population of sentenced 
women, in 1955 DOC allocated $50,000 of its own money for the design of a new facility. Initially 
the new women’s jail was slated to take over Riverside Hospital facility on North Brother Island, 
just west of Rikers. Based on a task force led by Preusse, composed of the Commissioners of 
Hospitals, Public Works, Correction, and the Director of the City budget, the plan called for the 
shuffling of a relatively small population, around one hundred fifty-five, adolescent drug addicts 
from Riverside to a facility on Welfare Island. The Riverside facility, with a capacity of six 
hundred, could thus absorb the entire population of HDW, with the costs totaling around 
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$1,600,000—versus $8,000,000 for an entirely new jail.272 Additionally, DOC planned to use 
prison labor from Rikers Island to cut costs on the work.273 This auspicious multi-departmental 
solution was however possessed of many moving parts, perhaps most stubborn among them the 
release of the requisite funds. As it languished on the planners’ board year after year, the 
Department of Hospitals equivocated on its commitment to relinquish Riverside. DOC was 
therefore forced to invest additional funds in maintaining the basic physical plant of HDW, 
throwing good money after bad.274  
 
Roaches and Mice 
This was the period that produced the Dworkin scandal, over ten years after Kross had 
assumed office. Dworkin was only the most famous of former prisoners of HDW who emerged 
telling horror stories; sadly those with the most sympathetic ears were, like Dworkin, affluent 
women sentenced on protest-related charges. These included Benita Cannon, Barbara Pliskow, and 
Helena Lewis, participants in the Congress of Racial Equality’s campaign against white 
supremacist hiring practices in the Building Trades Union, who in 1963 chose five days in HDW 
in lieu of a fine for disorderly conduct. The trio emerged describing hellish neglect amid squalor 
and casual brutality: women screamed in agony for medical treatment to the indifference of guards, 
clothing and blankets came filthy and stained, grimy mattresses emitted dust when touched, rats 
roamed the halls unafraid of humans, basic amenities like toothpaste and soap had to be begged or 
else purchased with sexual favors or simply done without, a rudimentary cocktail of pills for 
withdrawal was indiscriminately administered for all maladies, and double-celling in already tiny 
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cells resulted in an arrangement by which, in Lewis’s words, “either my roommate or I had to 
stand on a cot when the other one had to pass. We took turns getting in or out of the cell. Also, one 
of us had to stand on our cot when the other wanted to get to the toilet or the washbin in the cell.”275  
These conditions were described similarly, though to less fanfare, by the more typical 
prisoners. “Oh God, roaches and mice,” an anonymous teenage HDW prisoner, recalls, “the place 
was corroded with them. The back of my neck was all broken out with some kind of bites while I 
was there. And this rat, I saw it right in my cell.”276 Another young prisoner describes erecting 
clotheslines at night in order to pin up candy bars and other food that would otherwise be eaten by 
mice. “There was two in a cell at the old House of D.,” she recalls, “and you had to sleep in these 
bunk beds. But the problem was, if you slept on the top bunk you got all the roaches falling on you 
from the ceiling and the walls. If you slept on the bottom bunk, you had to deal with the mice. So 
it was like a choice of the lesser of the two evils.”277 HDW Warden Mary Lindsay denied the 
accounts coming out of the jail, going as far as to claim there was no pest problem. In a 
questionable public relations move, she even feuded with highly sympathetic young Dworkin in 
the pages of the Village Voice.278 Warden Lindsay joined with Kross to declare the only serious 
problem facing HDW was overcrowding—incidentally, not DOC’s responsibility.279   
In the midst of heightening scandal, journalist Sara Harris conducted an investigation of 
the facility and the women who called it home. She found all the media account of the facility—
tales of squalor, neglect, and casual brutality—substantiated by numerous women she interviewed. 
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In the process, Harris developed a composite of the jail’s majority demographic. Black women, 
who represented by Harris’s estimation sixty percent of the population, were by and large  
daughters and granddaughters of former sharecroppers, the poorest people in the South, 
who poured into New York during the Great Depression and the decade immediately 
following. They were told that marvelous opportunities for advancement existed in New 
York and that there was no ‘color problem’ there. They were told that Negroes lived in 
houses with electricity, running water, and indoor toilets. They were told that the living 
would be easy in New York and that their children would go to the same schools and have 
the same possibilities of making decent lives for themselves as white children did. To them, 
New York was the ‘promised land’ where they and their children could, as long last, lay 
their burdens down. 
 
And what they found were the dirty, uncared-for slum ghettoes of Harlem and Brooklyn’s 
Bedford-Stuyvesant and East New York, and basically the same sunup to sundown working 
hours they’d known down South. They found that they were no better off in New York 
than they’d been in the South. And they found that in one important way they were worse 
off than they’d been, because, now that they were already in what should have been the 
‘promised land,’ they had no hopes of deliverance anymore.280 
 
These women had watched their families fall apart amid alcoholism, drug addiction, and the 
extreme employment precarity limited to sex work and day labor pickup areas like “the Bronx 
slave market,” where women stood by forcing smiles as their muscles were literally squeezed by 
prospective employers to evaluate their strength for domestic work.281 When finally swept off the 
streets for “crimes” related to survival or despair, often in street-level arrests by slum-trawling beat 
cops called “ragpickers,” these women, in contrast to Dworkin and the rest, were not particularly 
shocked by the indignities to which they were subjected. Some came to consider the facility 
home.282  
This did not however dull the low-intensity struggle constantly waged in the facility 
between prisoners and their jailers. In 1965 alone, prisoners set at least thirty-five “malicious fires” 
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to protest conditions and to demand access to sedatives that would make their time in jail more 
bearable.283 Prisoners would sprinkle Rice Krispies in the hallway in order to hear the approaching 
steps of guards.284 Moreover, a queer subculture ranging from romantic love to violent coercion 
thrived at HDW, with the guards either apathetic, or in some cases, active participants 
themselves.285 The institution took token measures to demonstrate its opposition to queer 
relationships, such as offering only “femme” haircuts in its beauty parlor. In response, “butch” 
women and transmen would simply steal razors or break lightbulbs to cut their hair.286  
HDW remained a great shame of the City, not in the least because it was out in the open, 
with its prisoners within shouting distance of the street below, and hence could not be buried from 
the public mind for long. In a draft copy of DOC’s Saga of Women’s House of Detention donated 
to Smith College by Kross, the text’s diplomatic attribution of “one reason or another” to explain 
the time lapse in building a new facility is clarified in pen scrawl as: “Government bureaucracy 
and political afterthoughts.”287 As these plans languished on the drawing board, it became 
increasingly clear that Preusse’s cost-saving asylum-swapping plan was untenable, and an entirely 
new facility would have to be built.288 In 1960, the City freed up $50,000,000 for DOC’s “long 
neglected” Capital Building Program, which included the construction of an entirely new women’s 
facility on North Brother Island.289 The Dworkin scandal added expediency to this plan, as it 
spawned a number of City and State investigations into the facility.290 In response, DOC made a 
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loud public showing of removing almost 150 women to a special section of the Brooklyn House 
of Detention.291 The women were however moved quietly back to HDW before the year was out.292   
The awful conditions in HDW and others jails, enduring under Kross’s tenure, did not sway 
the reform commissioner from planning the dramatic expansion of the City’s jail infrastructure, as 
a means of solving the problems of its jails. In a bizarre case of historical irony, for a short time 
DOC even plotted an atavistic return of its women prisoners to Welfare Island, from which the 
women’s facility was evacuated in ignominy a quarter century earlier.293 The island solution was, 
it seemed, not simply cost effective, but allowed for a “horizontal design,” to replace the vertical 
design largely discredited by the scandals of HDW.294 “Replace this vertical monstrosity,” Kross 
had said of HDW, “[w]ith a horizontal layout that has a full rehabilitation program.”295 It would 
however be over a decade before the facility opened, and it would not be on North Brother Island, 
nor Welfare Island, but Rikers.  
A similar fate befell the Adolescent Remand facility. DOC originally planned for two 
facilities, one of which was to be located on a City-owned plot of land between Edgewater Road, 
Spofford Avenue, East Bay Avenue, and the Bronx River, in the South Bronx. The area had long 
been a garbage dump, and contained a network of scrap yards and an asphalt production facility. 
Kross hoped that development of this “eyesore” would not conjure the common response to jail 
construction, when “[c]ommunity organizations arise like mushrooms, vociferously clamoring that 
the prison be located elsewhere….anywhere….but not in their neighborhood.”296 But Kross was 
not the only one with eyes on this property. DOC was outmaneuvered by “official and business 
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opposition.”297 The move of adolescents to the Brooklyn House of Detention was a stopgap 
measure, while Kross could effect a construction plan for a permanent adolescent facility. When 
finally completed, the Adolescent Remand Shelter would be one facility, not two, and it too would 



































                                                            
297 DOC, 1959, 26. 
85 
 
CHAPTER 4:    AN ISLAND METROPOLIS 
 
Kross’s reform project becomes ever more invested in expanding DOC’s presence on Rikers 
Island. In response to the enduring misery of incarceration in New York City, Kross designs 
facilities meant to stand as avatars of progressive penology. Kross cultivates partnerships with 
universities and non-profit organizations, whose cooperation is meant to transform incarceration, 
while providing prisoners as subjects for experimentation in the human sciences. Rikers is 
intended to be home to the Institute for the Behavioral Sciences, a collaboration between 
university-based social science and medicine, and DOC. Kross plans to overcome the final barrier 
to DOC expansion on Rikers, by designing a mile-long bridge to Queens. Meanwhile, empowered 
by Wagner’s recognition of police unions, NYPD’s Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) 
becomes increasingly politicized around right-wing “law and order” politics, as New York’s 
growing population of working-class black and brown people get organized and takes action.  
 
Manpower Development 
Writing in 1961, a Rikers prisoner reflecting on the island’s division of labor and leisure conceived 
of it as an “Island Metropolis”:  
Every facet of life that is incorporated in a small town has its reasonable facsimile on our 
island. We have our movie, hospital, dentist, library, band, fire dept., ballteam, employment 
agency (Vocational Service), Chapels, clinic, tailor, grocery store, butcher, school, welfare 
agency (Social Service), psychologist, restaurant (Mess-Hall), shoe repairer, laundry, 
printer, plumber, furniture store (Bed Shop), courthouse (Disciplinary Board) and even a 
jail (Isolation).298  
 
A humorous ad run in the Rikers Review in the summer of 1962 advertised positions for 
dishwashers, porters, housemen, maintenance men, short order cooks, kitchen help, bus boys, and 
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wait staff. Open to prisoners with definite sentences, these positions offered $140 to $220 monthly, 
in addition to free room and board, year-round employment, and transportation to work 
provided.299 In all seriousness, work programs for adult males were available to far more prisoners 
than were the adult education classes. Kross developed and modified the Manufacturing Industries 
of the Penitentiary, adding to the traditional industries of industrial machine repair, printing, and 
bed manufacturing the fields of auto maintenance, barbering, baking, and garment machine 
operation. Kross also introduced the Inmate Wage Incentive Plan, offering wages in the City jail 
system, paid directly to prisoners, for the first time ever. 
The Incentive Plan was augmented by the introduction of a further retraining initiative 
funded by the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962. MDTA was a federal 
program designed to combat nascent deindustrialization by retraining workers whose jobs were 
being automated out of existence. According to a contemporaneous study by the US Department 
of Labor, MDTA, “the major vehicle for providing unemployed and underemployed disadvantaged 
groups with those skills necessary for entry into the competitive labor market,” was part of a “quiet 
revolution” in labor policy, as it “considered the criminal offender as a manpower resource.”300 
Under Kross, this program came to Rikers Island. The occupations it was geared toward at Rikers 
included machine operator and metal fabricator, as well as maintenance, gas appliance repair, and 
shipping clerk.301 
Another program developed locally in DOC, the Restoration of Youth Through Training 
(RYT), focused on adolescent prisoners. RYT preselected adolescent prisoners based on their 
perceived aptitude at operating IBM punch-card data-processing machines. The City subsequently 
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provided qualified candidates with job placement and post-release services. According to one RYT 
report, the prisoners encountered in DOC custody were 
likely to live in marginal, impoverished, culturally deprived sections of the community. 
Their previous employment record is sporadic, a sequence of short-term jobs interspersed 
with frequent periods of unemployment. When they have worked, the jobs are likely to be 
low-skilled and low-pay. The jobs for which they qualify are decreasing in numbers 
because of technological advance and changes in the occupational structure. Not only is 
the number of jobs decreasing, but because more young workers are entering the market, 
the competition for entry-level jobs is tougher.302  
Regardless of their limited impact, MDTA and RYT demonstrated a growing understanding of the 
profound shifts underway in the city, which would be felt with increasing violence in the coming 
decade.  
In 1963, the emphasis of job training at Rikers was shifting to “fields in which the demand 
for trained workers exceeds the supply”: “typewriter repair, food service and preparation, graphic 
arts, plastic fabrications” and other bellwethers of New York City’s shift away from a 
manufacturing-based labor market.303 Additionally, training at HDW was introduced for garment 
workers, a more stubborn, though lower-waged, New York City industry, through the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union.304 However noble the intention of these programs, and 
the isolated cases of quantifiable success, equipping prisoners with industrial skills in New York 
City was shoveling against the tide.305 Andy Battle, historian of New York City deindustrialization, 
calls MDTA “a jobs program for non-existent jobs.”306  In the subsequent decade this would almost 
certainly prove true beyond the wildest imaginings of the well-meaning DOC officials who 
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brought job training to the City jails. More immediately, prisoners regularly emerged from the jails 
to find employers—and unions—averse to hiring them for jobs for which they had been trained 
while in custody, even before the economic crisis of the mid-1970s.307 
 
Reception and Classification 
During this same period, another educational facility opened on Rikers Island, this one for 
staff. DOC first began specialized training for its incoming guards in 1928, the first department in 
the country to do so. This training was a grueling seven days per week for seven consecutive 
weeks, held at the NYPD’s academy at Grand Central Palace. In 1939 the program was relocated 
to Rikers Island, as a two-week residency. In 1942 the program was moved off-site to 100 Centre 
St, and kept at two weeks. In 1946 it was extended to four weeks and remained so under Kross, 
due in no small part to the urgency of getting new staff into the facilities as quickly as possible.308  
Using prisoner labor Kross repurposed an old wardens’ quarters vacated by the elimination 
of maintenance positions into an on-site Correctional Academy for staff. Off-site, Kross partnered 
with City College and NYU to offer an Associate’s Degree in Administration of Correctional 
Institutions, open only to DOC employees at the former, and academic workshops for wardens and 
deputy wardens at the latter.309 Additional university partnerships included a course on correctional 
administration at Long Island University, leadership training through Cornell University, and a 
partnership with CUNY through which guards could take courses through Borough of Manhattan 
Community College on Rikers Island, and civilian staff could attend courses at BMCC’s 
Manhattan campus. In 1964, the original Academy was replaced by another modest brick 
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residence, meant to serve as the basis for turning Rikers Island into a nexus of carceral practice, 
scholarship, and medicine.310  
Beginning in 1956, coordination with the New York City Community Mental Health Board 
brought mental health programming for select prisoners for the first time. The exact scope of the 
program is unclear, but it certainly fell woefully short of the pressing mental health needs of a jail 
system dealing with, as Kross’s administration indelicately put it, “the social deviates, the 
homeless, various categories of alcoholic and narcotic addicts, prostitutes, the mentally retarded, 
the senile, and all the sorry motley crew who can’t quite manage to steer clear of the law” and 
instead “fill our prisons to overflowing without any benefit either to themselves or two the 
community.” An analogous psychotherapy program included the ecclesiastical authorities into a 
program of faith-based counseling.311 Yet another Kross novelty was the “Social Hygiene Project.” 
Under this pilot program, aimed at preventing syphilis and other venereal diseases, male prisoners 
were tested upon admission to sentence institutions, while all arrested women simply accused of 
being sex workers were forcibly tested and administered a penicillin shot.312  
Hiring for clinicians during this time was eased by the incorporation of medical staff into 
the Career and Salary Plan, with attendant rises in pay, and the size of the medical workforce was 
increased by adding positions and filling vacancies. But the problem of positions left vacant for 
long periods of time persisted.313 In 1962 Kross came under fire from medical staff for referring 
to DOC’s doctors and dentists as “generally of low quality,” claiming in most cases “the only 
physicians that can be hired at present rates are those too old for active office practice, those with 
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unfortunate personalities and those physically and mentally handicapped.”314 The following year 
the New York City Department of Health took over the provision of medical services in DOC 
facilities, which the Kross administration welcomed as “a Department fully equipped for the two-
pronged task of medical care for our inmates and the safeguarding of the community against the 
possible spread of infection.” DOC would continue to be responsible for hiring nursing staff, 
administrative and clerical workers, and social service staff.315 The quality of health care providers, 
however, would not improve. 
In a somewhat ironic twist, now freed from primary responsibility for medical care, the 
Kross administration could pursue the pet project of its civilian care program, a complex 
institutional nexus of academic institutions, clinicians, and social workers. Upon taking office 
Kross’s administration observed how idleness and lack of proper classification had resulted in 
“conflicts among inmates and between inmates, smuggling and institutional traffic in contraband 
stolen within institutions or brought in from without, and homosexual practices.” In response, 
Kross’s  
administration took steps to deal with these problems, both at the immediate and long term 
range policy levels. It took the position that it was unsound to penal policy when cell blocks 
were permitted to be dominated by the prisoners, under an open-cell policy that exposed 
tractable and submissive inmates to the aggressions of assaultive, larcenous, and 
homosexual prisoners, owing to a lack of custody and program staff to develop normal 
community life and provide protection to the prisoners. 316 
Central to this undertaking was the practice of classification.  
The question of the proper “classification” of prisoners  has posed a consistent problem 
since the earliest days of large-scale incarceration, which in New York City date to the founding 
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of Newgate Prison in 1797.317 The essential problem of classification hinges on the peculiar 
ideological tryptic of incarceration, combining as it does the contradictory imperatives to protect 
society from an offender, punish the offender, and rehabilitate the offender. Setting aside abstract 
academic arguments intent on justifying the barbaric act of locking human beings in cages, 
classification is ultimately an administrative problem, and its proper exercise is meant to minimize 
violence, negative publicity, and behaviors deemed unacceptable from a management position, 
such as contraband smuggling and flagrant homosexual behavior. Driven by the imperative for 
classification, Kross’s rehabilitative program exercised considerable influence on a major capital 
construction project that would shape the future of Rikers Island.  
The C-76 facility (meaning simply “Capital Project 76”) was originally conceived as a 
replacement for the Hart Island Workhouse, which was, in addition to decrepit and squalid, not 
fireproof, and therefore in violation of City code. In 1957 DOC contracted plans for C-76 as an 
ordinary workhouse. Originally intended for Hart Island, DOC subsequently chose Rikers Island, 
“to take advantage of the savings that are possible by operating two institutions in the same general 
area, and to take advantage of the larger acreage available for a meaningful inmate work 
program.”318 C-76 was meant to absorb and centralize sentenced male prisoners from the Hart 
Island facility and Hampton Farms, in a more functional workhouse setting. It’s original capacity 
was planned as 1,200, with plans for a subsequent annex bringing the maximum capacity to 2,000. 
It would include special housing for alcoholics, narcotic addicts, traffic offenders, and non-
supportive fathers, who were to be housed in dormitories emanating in a chevron pattern from 
either end of a long rectangular administrative building traversed by a three hundred ninety six 
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foot corridor. 319 “Observation should become a keyword in the development of the design,” stated 
the architectural plans, a joint project of DOC, Department of Public Works, and the architectural 
firm Brown and Gunther. “All areas such as dormitories, rooms, cells, toilets, showers and 
dayrooms should be designed for ready observation.”320  
The most prominent feature of C-76, its overwhelming reliance on dormitories housing 
upwards of eighty prisoners, came not from rehabilitative penology, but rather concerns over the 
facility’s price tag. “Because of cost limitations,” the authors remark, “it is necessary to house 
most of these inmates in dormitories rather than private rooms. It is recommended, however, that 
the dormitories be divided into separate areas by low partitions, giving some degree of privacy and 
at the same time permitting observation by the guard.”321 Scarcity of funding delayed the project 
in its early phases. “Interestingly enough,” DOC chided the City, “the World’s Fair for New York 
City is scheduled to be held in 1964 and, from experience gained in the 30’s when the last World’s 
Fair was held here, we can expect an unprecedented increase in our inmate population.”322  
By the time C-76 made it to the advanced planning stages, the facility had been rechristened 
the New York City Reception and Classification Center for Men. Upon the intervention of Kross, 
who was guided by the insight that “the physical environment of an institution bears directly on 
an inmates health, mental attitude, and response,” the original plans had been modified, at least 
rhetorically, such that  
a maximum of light and air is made possible through spaciousness and layout of building 
design. Walls are painted in harmonizing blends of pastel shades that lend a tone of pleasant 
brightness within the institution and seem to blend in with the spreading green lawns on 
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the outside. It is all calculated to lift the spirits not only of the inmates but of the 
institutional staff as well.323 
 
Despite sharing much of the pastel-shaded rhetoric that had accompanied the practically medieval 
BHD, C-76 was a different kind of facility, in both its architectural design, and its intended 
programming.  
The new prisoner was intended to undergo a ten day program, beginning with an orientation 
and followed by a number of psychological tests and interviews conducted by civilian staff. 
Prisoners would be initially screened based on their need for further psychological and psychiatric 
testing, and would be funneled accordingly into a track adequate to their mental state, overseen by 
a director of classification. Based on the ruling of the director, an institutional assignment officer 
would place prisoners in housing, including “special study project housing areas” for prisoners of 
particular clinical interest. “Candidates” selected for these projects would be given additional 
psychological tests by rehabilitation counselors and meet with a number of civilian experts in the 
coming days. Case work on all prisoners continued until the tenth day, when they would be 
assigned housing and work by the Classification Board, and be sent from the intake wing of the 
facility to the housing area for settled prisoners, where they would serve their terms.324  
The $10,000,000 facility officially opened in January of 1965.325 However later that same 
year, DOC complained of inadequate staffing to implement the processing program, and persistent 
overcrowding, until the abatement of which “the Reception & Classification Center facilities will 
be needed for housing purposes, and many of the scheduled activities must be held in abeyance.”326  
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An undated recording from this period documents an anonymous prisoner’s experience at 
the recently opened C-76. Asked, with Kross present, to evaluate C-76, the twenty-eight year old 
white prisoner replies: “If all the inmates were working in here it would probably be a lot smoother 
running, you see. I have a lot of inmates that aren’t working over here presently because they just 
don’t have the jobs…” Yet he is quick to add: “There’s no comparison like from here to the Pen, 
its clean, it’s very clean, and it’s kept clean too… I’m saying this from my heart, I’m not just 
saying it just because the Dep is here and the Commissioner’s here.  It’s the cleanest institution 
I’ve ever been in in my life, and I’ve been in a few.” The prisoner continues to balance the positive 
assessment he clearly perceives to be expected of him, with his actual assessment of the institution:  
I like this institution, the dormitories are alright, they have a pretty nice setup too. But 
presently, they don’t have a complete set of rules that are abided by by all of the officers. 
Some officers will come in and turn the TV off at 8 o’clock, some officers will have no 
this, and no that, no showers, showers at this time, no showers at this time, such and such 
like there’s no orders or nothing yet. 
 
At this point the interviewer interrupts: “Well because it’s new…” at which the prisoner quickly 
corrects himself: “Well, once it gets operational this will be a beautiful institution.” “Yes,” the 
interviewer responds, “that’s right.”327 
Such attempts to force the party line indicate Kross was not naïve about the grandiosity of 
DOC’s rehabilitative program and the difficulties of its application. The administration itself 
remarked in 1965 that it had taken eleven years to actualize a blueprint for “what must have seemed 
like a very simple measure”—bathing facilities and day rooms in every cellblock at the Rikers 
Penitentiary.328 The same prisoner who spoke so guardedly about C-76 had much less of a problem 
cataloguing his experiences as an prisoner in CIFM (“the old Pen”) back in 1962—eight years into 
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Kross’s administration. He describes serving a six month sentence while doubled up with another 
man in a maximum security cell:  
At first I was unassigned for approximately a month and a half, we just laid around and 
done nothing. We stayed at the block all day and just played cards. We had designated days 
for going to the showers and the library, and so forth, but until you were assigned by the 
captain who was in charge of assigning inmates their respective jobs, you just laid around 
in either block 2 or block 3 and done nothing… Radio was on… They have a television in 
the blocks, every block has a television, but it’s pretty hard when you try and get 400 guys 
looking at one little television… At night we lock in, doors would open at about 7:15, and 
you get your hot water to make coffee and so forth, and everyone’s locked in at 7:30… 
lights are out at 9 o’clock… 
 
The interviewer asks if he has a reading light and he responds yes, but it’s useless on the bottom 
bunk. The prisoner is asked if he ever saw a case worker and he says no. Getting back on the 
institutional routine, he continues: 
As soon as you come back from chow you’re locked in and you’re generally not let out of 
your cell until 9 o’clock in the morning. You’re in your cell until after the count, you have 
to have your bed and everything made up before the count, which is at 8 o’clock… And 
after the count you still lay up because, they have what they call the house gang, they clean 
the block, until that’s finished you have to stay in your cell, sometimes it’s 9:30, then you 
come out and by the time you get out and settle down and sit down and play a game of 
bridge it’s time to go to chow… After you come back from chow, you lay around in the 
afternoon until about 3:30, just in the block. Sometimes they have “in or out,”  it depends 
on the officer that’s on, if he wants to bother to open up the cells, you know  for the guys 
who’d rather lock in and read in the afternoon, or if they wanna just stay out, it depends on 
the officer who’s on, but if you got an officer that doesn’t want to open up the cells you 
gotta stay out until 3:30 in the afternoon, then everybody locks in for the count at 4 o’clock, 
you lock out at about 25 after 4, 4:30, and from then you just lay around for a little while 
and wait until you go to chow again. After you come back from chow, you stay around in 
the dormitory until 7:15 til the doors open up, you get your water. Then you just lock in 
your cell again for the rest of the night til they wake you up in the morning, 4:30 4 oclock 
it depends on what officer is on in the control room to put the radio on. You know, in the 
front of the block they have a radio. It’s a very good radios they have too, if they put it to 
good use occasionally, but sometimes they don’t like to put it on blasting, tear your 
eardrums out, just to get you up in the morning. It’s pretty ridiculous at times.329  
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These recordings remained in the personal collection of Kross, and were never publicized. But the 
carefully-curated public image Kross cultivated for herself and DOC was episodically punctured 
by bad press.  
A particularly embarrassing incident came in the Fall of 1962, thanks to a two-part 
documentary for ABC television called “The Big Revolving Door: The Portrait of a Prisoner.” The 
program followed prisoner John Rigby through his Rikers experience and back onto the streets. 
To the chagrin of administration, the filmmakers adopted the prisoner’s  perspective, even allowing 
Rigby to narrate. Rigby claimed that the music piped into the dining hall, a vaunted environmental 
reform under Kross, was only played when Kross was present, and turned off as soon as she left. 
More gravely, Rigby described the atmosphere as rife with the prospect of brutality. When 
confronted with these words on camera, a defensive Kross mistook them for an accusation against 
DOC staff, and responded quite unfortunately: “understaffing and overcrowding have made it 
necessary on occasion to resort to assault.”330 
Such was the bedrock reality for many prisoners beneath the façade of Kross’s 
rehabilitative ideal. But however far it may have remained from the lived experience of the average 
prisoner, this ideal served as the backbone of Kross’s plans for DOC. All the major steps DOC 
took during this period that were not mere reactions to disaster were part of a much larger strategy 
which Kross understood as being fulfilled in small increments across time. Less incremental, 
however, was the island’s explosion of new infrastructure.  
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Renovation for Rehabilitation 
“Swing the crane,” rhapsodized the Rikers Review in 1964. “Sink the girders. Sound the 
rivets. Almost before an inmate can leap or duck out of the way, a building is being born here. 
Since the beginning of the year, it’s build, build, build. It’s a lively little cadence, noisy but very 
constructive. It tolls of big things in the making here at Rikers.” 331 An immense infrastructure 
program was underway. “It almost looks like an atom bomb hit a bull’s eye right on the Island” 
Warden Nobel wrote in a 1960 message to prisoners.332 Though Kross had from the beginning 
expressed skepticism in building more jails to house prisoners who did not belong behind bars, the 
expansion of the island’s carceral capacity during this period was justified by a philosophy of 
“renovation for rehabilitation.”  
Writing in collaboration with Deputy Warden Emil Joehnk, Review editors argued: “The 
present administration of the City’s Correction Department has undertaken a vast program of 
rebuilding in order to foster a clime conducive to reform. Some of the building has to be done, 
some of it doesn’t, but all of it is being done to help the inmates.” Under the philosophy of 
“renovation for rehabilitation,” the new buildings  
will follow the prescribed pattern of being different from the accepted mode of a prison: 
Quadrons are erected with louvered windows instead of bars; cafeteria styled eating areas, 
where inmates are seated at individual tables, are substituted for the cruder type tables; 
recreation day rooms with showered, in every block; an enlarged library and commissary; 
corridors connecting cell blocks with all work industries; and corridors connecting clinic 
with hospital, are all parts of the new design for this institution.333   
 
“It is the opinion of the Correction Department,” Penitentiary prisoner  David Ruskin gushed, “that 
there must be a constant exchange of discovery, improvements and experience. This great building 
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program is to facilitate these ideas. It will play a great part in the rehabilitation programs set up in 
this Institution to help the inmate find his rightful place in life.”334 
In addition to C-76 and the schools for prisoners and staff, two former staff houses were 
converted into a pilot program for adolescents called the Separation Unit, which provided intensive 
expert care, especially counseling and adjustment-oriented services to the select adolescents for 
two months prior to their release.335 Similarly, beginning in 1961 a sizeable brick house, formerly 
a warden’s quarters, served as the headquarters for the Correction Center, headquarters of the 
Division of Research and Planning. Though it would scarcely be out of place on an affluent 
residential block in an idyllic suburb, the facility was meant to be the basis for a cutting-edge 
program of scientific penology based on the collaboration with celebrated research universities, 
guided by a clinical approach to understanding criminality rooted in the ministrations of civilian 
experts.336  
Beginning that same year, Rikers was used as a training ground for students at the NYU 
Graduate School of Social Work.337 When Borough of Manhattan Community College began 
offering a degree program at Rikers, the Kross administration called it “a giant step forward 
unparalleled in the annals of any municipal system anywhere else.”338 Faced with such casual 
grandiosity it is surely easy to laugh. But this claim referred not to the accomplishment of 
instituting an Associate’s Degree in correctional studies, but what was meant to come next.  
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In 1960, Kross unveiled an ambitious proposal for another new facility at Rikers, The 
Institute of Behavioral Sciences. This would not be a jail but an center of higher learning.339 
Planned to solidify and formalize the ties Kross had been assiduously building with New York 
City universities, in addition to sundry civilian programs, including non-profit organizations, 
introduced in the previous six years, the Institute was to be a center for undergraduate, graduate, 
and post-graduate study in a number of fields in the human sciences. The study was not to be done 
by the prisoners, but on them, with no discussion of compensation, privacy, or consent. With the 
City’s captives as test subjects, the Institute would function “as social laboratory for advanced 
students in psychology, psychiatry, education, anthropology, sociology, public administration and 
law to test methods of the various disciplines as applied to the fields of crime, delinquency, and 
correction.”340 Kross’s proposal for the Institute delineated the minutia of complex division of 
labor between civilian DOC staff, university staff, DOC guards, student interns, fellows, research 
assistants, and, of course, the commissioner. Prisoners, the raison d’etre for this knowledge 
production facility, were naturally at the bottom of the pyramid.341  
Upon taking office the Kross administration asserted the prisoners “in our institutions 
provide an important ‘natural’ laboratory for research and study of important socio-medical 
problems of public health, viz: alcoholism, narcotic addiction, geriatrics, sex deviation, and mental 
illness.”342 The Institute also sheds light on what Kross meant by the oft-repeated mantra that too 
many people were being locked in jail. “The Institute,” the administration hoped, would “result in 
many more students entering careers in correction and allied areas than enter these fields at 
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present.”343 Here we see plans for a broadening of “allied areas” administered by experts. Kross’s 
position was therefore not to be confused with the decarceration movement that would arise a 
decade later.344 The problem was not that too many people were policed or incarcerated; it was the 
specific figure of the non-rehabilitative, “worse-than-useless dumping ground” of the traditional 
custodial jail.345 To Kross, this mean the necessity to build new, better jails. And to build them on 
Rikers Island would require a bridge. 
 
The Final Piece of the Puzzle 
By 1961, the dual forces driving the Kross administration—persistent overcrowding and 
the imperative to lay foundation for a science of progressive penology—led Kross to devise an 
impressive program of expansion and centralization of DOC facilities. Recall C-76 was chosen to 
replace another island based facility, so the logistics of increased ferry transport to Rikers hadn’t 
been prohibitive. But construction on C-76 and improvements on CIFM had overwhelmed the 
island’s ferry system and clearly indicated logistical trouble ahead.346 Additionally, a 1957 plane 
crash on Rikers Island raised safety concerns surrounding the ability of emergency services to 
access the island in case of another crash or comparable emergency.347 Moreover, in the most banal 
sense, the ferry was simply a hassle. On the eve of unveiling a massive capital project for 
developing the island, DOC argued: 
The continued expansion of the present New York City Correctional Institution for Men, 
Adult and Adolescent Divisions, and the building of two new sentence institutions at Rikers 
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Island, makes it imperative economically and operationally that a bridge to Astoria, Long 
Island be constructed. The Department finds that in operating an island institution, serviced 
by ferry alone it must constantly suffer interruptions. Personnel recruitment is made 
difficult, work schedules cannot be maintained, deliveries are delayed, emergency service 
is halted and visitors suffer long waiting periods. Ferries are halted due to fog, storm and 
mechanical breakdowns. This is a serious situation in an operation of this magnitude.348 
 
The following year this list would include two more facilities long in search of a home.  
“After repeated failures to secure adequate sites,” wrote the administration in 1962, “the 
City Planning Committee supported this Administration’s plea for a bridge to Rikers Island. It is 
here that we plan to centralize our future sentence institutions (male and female), and to locate our 
long-sought-for, adequately designed Adolescent Remand Shelter.” The bridge became the 
centerpiece of an ambitious capital expansion strategy, centered around Kross’s rehabilitative 
vision, that paved the road, quite literally, to the Rikers Island of today.349   
DOC’s Saga of the Women’s House of Detention suggests that the bridge not only enabled 
Rikers to replace North Brother Island after the latter island had been taken off the table, but 
actually allowed DOC to begin actively looking elsewhere as the prospect of a North Brother 
women’s facility “began to dim.”350 In a 1961 letter to the State Commission of Correction, Kross 
outlined sixteen reasons for them to support the bridge to Rikers Island. The bridge, Kross argued, 
“[w]ill directly connect 500 acres (largely unused because of its remoteness to the mainland of 
New York City.)” It would also eliminate DOC’s $250,000 yearly ferry budget, and an estimated 
$200,000 work hours lost due to ferry travel. Delivery fees and time lost to contractors for travel 
would be eliminated. Overall Rikers Island’s “[p]ractically unlimited land” could be home to new 
carceral institutions easily accessible from the mainland by emergency services, public transit, and 
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employees. Parking on the island for the visiting public would “improve public and labor 
relations.”351  
In addition to solving a number of longstanding logistical headaches for City planners, the 
bridge was also sold to the City as allowing at last the closure of the Raymond Street jail, long 
coveted by many in their ranks, perhaps especially Robert Moses.352 The Review supported the 
bridge as doing away with “the long outmoded and sometimes tardy ferry that presently serves as 
mainland linkage,” adding “we all look forward to seeing such a bridge constructed, of course 
looking at it, someday, from the Queens side of the river.”353   
With the support of the State Commission of Correction, the bridge was adopted in the 
City’s Public Works budget, and was completed in 1966.354 The outcome of the bridge was 
threefold: in the short-term, a cluster of capital projects could proceed on Rikers Island, meeting 
longstanding needs and upgrading facilities that in many cases constituted a dereliction of the 
City’s most basic legal responsibilities to its incarcerated citizens. In the longer term, this move 
allowed for the development of Rikers as a state-of-the-art center for progressive penology, soon 
to be renowned the world over. And most fundamentally, with the bridge in place, the largely 
barren or underused surface of DOC’s sprawling New York City property became the logical place 
for all future jail expansion in the City.  
Addressing prisoners in 1961, Warden Noble argued “the Commissioner and all members 
of the Department of Correction do hope that the situation will be such that we never have to use 
these buildings or any other confinement facilities.”355  Drunker still with rehabilitative zeal, the 
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Review wondered: “Who’s going to occupy them all, when we go home, and no new inmates 
arrive?”356 Two factors should have dampened this enthusiasm.  
First, Kross’s rehabilitative overhaul of DOC programming remained largely a smattering 
of pilot programs that fell drastically short of serving the entire population. Even Roy Caldwood, 
a great admirer of Kross, who worked in DOC during the height of her administration, recalls:  
One thing that didn’t happen very much when I served in the correctional system was the 
sort of education, training, or other social programs that would have given real meaning to 
the word ‘corrections.’ The daily schedule allowed some time for inmates who chose to go 
to school or to spend time in the library. At Rikers, we usually had an inmate magazine or 
newspaper that a few prisoners would work on, often with the help of outside volunteers. 
But attendance at these programs was varied. Systematic efforts at corrections such as job 
training, assistance with job search, or assistance in transitioning back to freedom weren’t 
featured on the daily schedule.357 
 
Second, the swelling ranks of the New York City jail population showed no signs of abating, as 
the attitudes that undergirded this jail expansion began to harden.  In 1965, after eleven years of 
progress through crisis in a constantly volcanic situation, a seemingly exasperated Kross 
administration declared: 
Our major responsibility is to preserve law, order, and outward decency. Our prisons will 
no longer be overcrowded when only those belong in them are committed to them, whether 
for detention or after sentencing. And when our correctional institutions have been 
rendered habitable, when space is available and staff is no longer overwhelmed by sheer 
numbers of prisoners, then re-evaluation and rehabilitation of those who are imprisoned 
may really have a chance to function properly.358 
 
Seldom if ever do “law and order” appear juxtaposed together in Kross’s voluminous body of 
literature, before this frank admission that not only did the administration serve “law and order” 
above all else, but that its experiments in rehabilitation had yet to come to fruition.  
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Upon taking office, the Kross administration had declared: “The ‘lock-’em-up-forget-
about-’em’ policy of the past is over.”359 But by 1965, despite modest advances in programming 
and some basic improvements to infrastructure, DOC was still very much a custodial organization. 
What had changed was that now there was a larger, and ever-expanding, carceral network, under 
DOC command, in which New York City could “lock-‘em-up” and “forget-about-‘em.” In 1964 
the census reached an all-time high of 12,288.360 The population had been steadily rising since the 
end of World War II, while the New York City population itself remained flat. Above all, New 
York City was fast becoming a very different place.  
Wagner himself recalls witnessing firsthand, roughly midway through his mayoralty, the 
change not only in racial composition of the jails, but in the consciousness of the prisoners: “you 
could see the change taking place, where it was almost 70 percent or more blacks and Spanish 
people from Puerto Rico… in the old days, it was mostly the whites, the poor,” but by this point, 
Wagner reasoned, most white New Yorkers had advanced beyond the economic strata regularly 
incarcerated. On one visit to Rikers, Wagner asked a warden why so many black prisoners 
suddenly sported beards. He was informed “black Muslims have begun to recruit here now, and 
they’re recruiting in the prisons.” Nonplussed, Wagner later rationalized: “Maybe they were anti-
white or whatever it was, but they were better disciplined. I think they learned to live better lives 
after they came out.”361  
In 1957, the Review dedicated three pages to a beginner’s guide to Islam, by a prisoner 
named Mumahhad Zahir, meant to facilitate understanding of Muslim prisoners.362 That same year, 
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Rikers Island Penitentiary prisoner J. “Trip” Davis, sports editor for the Rikers Review, reflected 
on the Civil Rights Act. Davis considered the Act “juggled, modified, and compromised to such 
an extent, that what started out as a giant step, has degenerated into an infinitesimal faux pas.” 
Nonetheless, Davis had argued: “A new school of thought is in existence. Old ‘Rev Tonto’ is being 
replaced and the church is playing the part it so courageously played in pre-Civil War days. Elijah 
Mohammed is slowly gaining power among the people. The South is fighting back. The 
N.A.A.C.P. is fighting for Civil Rights all over the United States.”  
To this, Davis added the growing resistance to European imperialism in Africa and the 
Middle East: “The Mohammaden tribes of North Africa want their heads, as tokens of years of 
oppression; just as Henri Christophe, the King, and Jacques Daselines, ‘The Tiger,’ wanted their 
heads, during the turn of the eighteenth century, for the tricks played by that who-faced Napoleon 
Bonaparte on Toussaint L’Ouverture.”363 This remarkable expression of black militancy in the 
pages of the Review was perhaps a novelty in its time. But it would become thoroughly 
unremarkable among DOC prisoners in the coming decade, as Rikers would prove to be far from 
an island removed from the larger metropolis. And it was a metropolis increasingly in the throes 
of crisis. 
 
City In Crisis 
“New York City is the greatest city in the world,” opined the Republican  Herald-Tribune, 
“and everything is wrong with it.” These words launched a broadside at the Wagner 
Administration in advance of the 1965 election. Under the banner of “New York City in Crisis,” 
the paper spent month decrying soaring poverty, rising unemployment, failing schools, 
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proliferating traffic jams, simmering racial tension, crumbling infrastructure, and the flight of 
middle class whites from the City to the suburbs. Simultaneously, the paper alleged, the Wagner 
Administration’s record spending had not alleviated these problems, but had in fact only 
exacerbating them, while feeding a bloated and ineffective City bureaucracy, and setting up the 
City for fiscal crisis.364  
The series was partly a response to a cash-strapped Wagner’s request to finance the City 
budget on borrowed money for the first time since the Depression. More broadly, it was a jeremiad, 
recognizable to today’s reader, against so-called big government.365 Ideology aside, the stories the 
paper unearthed evinced a real web of cracks in the façade of Wagner’s feel-good New York, 
especially around structural racism—seen in disparities of income, housing, employment, 
education, and welfare statistics for black and Puerto Rican New Yorkers, in addition to the 
downward mobility of all blue collar workers amid deindustrialization, and the inability of 
Wagner’s administration take seriously the cauldron of racial animosity these conditions 
engendered.366 “This is becoming a white collar city,” a declassed dress manufacturer presciently 
complained, “with blue collar people.”367  
In 1961, Penitentiary prisoner M. Grice reflected on these changes in the pages of the 
Rikers Review: “machine age and industrial progress have made it compulsory to have some sort 
of technical knowledge and education. As production increases… the uneducated and unskilled 
are left hanging at the cliff’s edge.” Yet, the author does not despair. “There are no patents on skill 
and knowledge… Each of us were endowed with these at birth, we need only to exercise them to 
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succeed!”368 Similarly, in 1964 the Review ran on its inside cover an advertisement for the adult 
school, bearing the likeness of President Johnson, overlaid with his words: “We have entered an 
age in which education is not just a luxury permitting some men an advantage over others. It has 
become a necessity without which a person is defenseless in this complex industrialized 
society.”369 
Employment increased practically every year of Wagner’s term, most prominently the 
public sector, which grew from 347,400; in 1960 to 563,200 by 1970, when it boasted “employees 
than the garment, banking, and longshore industries put together.” Of this massive workforce, 
Freeman estimates roughly “half of it performed functions common to most municipalities: 
elementary and secondary education, police, fire, sanitation, highways, parks, and general 
administration. The other half were employed in New York’s version of social democracy… 
hospitals, public housing, higher education, and mass transit.” 370  
Thanks to Wagner, this immense public sector was also prosperous, and increasingly, 
unionized. Wagner kept his campaign promises, though did so with the calculating political savvy 
that had won him office. Wagner courted comparisons between his “Little Wagner Act” and his 
father’s NLRA. However, unlike the immediate aftermath of the NLRA, which at once freed 
millions of workers to unionize, very little concrete change followed Wagner’s declaration of 
recognition for municipal unions. In fact, the “Little Wager Act” was no act at all. Throughout the 
1950s, Wagner slowly and cautiously legitimized city unions as bargaining agents, establishing 
dues check-off and beginning to recognize elected bargaining representatives. Wagner however 
did so in a piecemeal fashion, using executive orders instead of legislation, enabling him to give 
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strategic preference to his allies while disciplining his foes, and generally keeping a tight grip on 
the balance of power. The executive orders, most prominent among them Number 49, would not 
become codified into law until the 1967 Taylor Law, which built prohibitive penalties against 
striking into a broader recognition of a bureaucratic management structures for public sector 
unions in New York State.371 
Under the Career and Salary, introduced in his first year of office, Wagner rationalized and 
standardized salary scales and lines of promotion under an anti-corruption strategy that considered 
sunlight the best disinfectant. The program was popular however due not only to its meritocratic 
advancement but also an increase in salaries; in the first year alone, Wagner spent an additional 
$27 million on salaries over the previous budget.372 Thus DOC staff unions who had initially 
opposed Kross became evermore cooperative as the maximum guard salaries increased ninety-
four percent during her tenure, and that of captains by 105%, attaining pay parity with the NYPD, 
a central demand of COBA for decades.373 In 1960 Wagner helped eliminate the Lyons Law, which 
mandated that City workers live in the City, paving the way for a stark divide between the 
increasingly well-off police and jail guards, and the working-class communities of black and 
brown New Yorkers they interacted with most.374  
Simultaneously, the Wagner administration forged ahead of even Johnson’s so-called “War 
on Poverty,” not just in support for the programs undergirding the City’s quasi-social democratic 
polity, but the manner, almost inconceivable to the present imagination, by which it was 
financed—taxation.375 With little organized opposition to increased taxation among the City’s 
                                                            
371 Chief among these was Executive Order 49. Flanagan, Wagner, 21; Freeman, Working-Class, 202-203; Jarrod 
Shanahan and Andy Battle, “The Velvet Glove and the Iron Fist,” Jacobin, July 26, 2018.  
372 Flanagan, Wagner, 23.  
373 DOC, Progress Through Crisis, 49.  
374 Freeman, Working-Class, 182.   
375 Flanagan, Wagner, 77-9. 
109 
 
political players, Wagner was able to consistently raise taxes on businesses as well as a variety of 
goods and services, including cigarettes, taxi rides, restaurant meals, and even tickets to 
entertainment events like baseball games and movies. While some of this was offset by the growth 
of wages during this period, Wagner’s taxation per capita actually exceeded income growth. 
 Additionally, Wagner increased the City’s receipt of State aid by a staggering 187% during 
his tenure.376 In the 1961 campaign, union members provided the shoe leather vacated by 
Tammany machine operatives with whom Wagner had broken, and Wagner was able to campaign 
openly against “bossism” and “the clubhouse” in the name of the highest ideals of liberalism, 
harkening back to the New Deal. The result was a Wagner victory, a new charter giving the mayor 
extensive control over the City budget, and a new Democratic consensus, based on the dramatic 
expansion of public services and public employment.377 
This economic basis of this expansion was however not to last. When Wagner and Kross 
came to power in the mid-1950s, the US labor force was enjoying the salad days over which 
Freeman waxes nostalgic, replete with record rates of unionism, enabled by the senior Wagner 
National Labor Relations Act, and an average yearly increase of 3.6% in real wages throughout 
most of the decade. Yet, the investment of mammoth sums into production technology revealed 
what Robert Brenner calls “the weight of fixed capital.”378 As the US rode high on the economic 
prosperity under which Wagner brought the New Deal to New York, the nation’s fixed capital 
(machinery, physical plants, infrastructure) was becoming ever more outdated, and its profit rate 
increasingly sluggish, while unions staved off the impact of a slowed profit rate on wages—for the 
time being.  
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Due to the weight of sunk investment in fixed capital, however, large US firms did not 
perennially revolutionize the means of production to stay on the cutting edge of competition, but 
opted instead to use their size and influence over the market to discourage competition from firms 
able to produce at lower costs. When lower costs firms were able to penetrate commodity markets, 
the larger firms, tied to older fixed capital, were more inclined to meet lowered prices than to 
completely overhaul production or exit an industry in which they were being out-produced. This 
entailed increasing production to enjoy larger yields of a diminished profit rate, in addition to 
living off their fat, and increasingly, incurring debt. Thus, a race to the bottom ensued.379 For New 
York City, this meant the flight of manufacturing jobs from the City. By 1970, researchers found 
the unemployment rate for black youth in working class neighborhoods approaching thirty-five 
percent, or double what it had been in 1960.380 
“Manufacturing jobs have been declining rapidly and steadily,” the City Planning 
Commission’s acting chairman wrote in a 1963 memo to Wagner, “only in a limited sense can the 
current increase in white collar employment be considered a compensating gain, since a large 
proportion of New York City residents are dependent upon blue-collar jobs.”381 Wages for black 
and Puerto Rican young people during this period were markedly lower, and unemployment 
significantly higher, than among their white peers, with significant barriers to entry and 
advancement in most desirable fields. This was also true of the workforce in general, where blacks 
and Puerto Ricans who overcame structural barriers such as differential access to education, and 
subjective barriers like hiring discrimination, were nonetheless consigned largely to blue collar, 
manual labor hit the hardest by the loss of manufacturing jobs.382 And this did not occur in a 
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political vacuum. “At the very moment that civil rights struggles promised to reduce employment 
discrimination,” writes Freeman, “the kinds of entry-level jobs that had provided a level of 
economic stability for earlier waves of newcomers diminished in number, creating overlapping 
racial and economic divides within the city and its working class.”383  
Additionally, during Wagner’s tenure the non-white working class in New York City had 
grown dramatically. Between 1950 and 1970, the City’s black population more than doubled, from 
747,608 to 1,668,115, and its Puerto Rican population more than quadrupled, from 187,420 to 
817,712. Meanwhile, the overall City population remained virtually flat. The changing 
composition of New York City did not mean the wealth formerly held by whites decamping for 
the suburbs was now spread around among those who remained. Instead, racially-stratified 
economic inequality persisted, exacerbated by the decline of manufacturing work, and agitated by 
the Civil Rights movement, and soon, its more militant offshoots. While Wagner had black and 
Puerto Rican voters to thank for both of his reelections, he did not address race as a unique issue 
distinct from economic inequality. For this, he relied on tit-for-tat arrangements with appointees 
and allied politicians, such as Harlem’s J. Raymond Jones, to manage working-class black New 
Yorkers growing increasingly restive as the long Civil Rights movement picked up steam.384 “You 
can spend two hours talking to him,” an anonymous civil rights leader told the Herald Tribune 
“and come away thinking what a nice man he is. Then, when you get around the figuring out 
exactly what you’ve gained, you suddenly realize that he’s given you nothing at all.”385 And this 
he shared with Anna Kross.  
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In a 1962 open letter to Kross published in the New York Amsterdam News, columnist 
James L. Hicks made a number of charges against Kross’s DOC regarding its handling of race. 
Hicks accused DOC of using only black crews—overseen by white wardens—to dig graves on 
Hart Island, and retaliating against a prisoner who had complained. Hicks also pointed to a lack of 
black faces in the upper tier of Kross’s administration, except for the Second Deputy 
Commissioner, whose position, Hicks argued, had been diminished since taking office. Moreover, 
a black staffer who had advanced to the level of Deputy Director of Operations had been removed 
for lack of “penological” training, despite meeting the requisite education requirements, while 
black DOC veteran had suddenly found his position designated as Chief Dietician, including a 
raise in salary—and requiring a BA degree, which he did not possess. Simultaneously, a white 
Director of Operations not meeting educational requirements had mustered the support to remain 
in his position. A qualified black candidate for Second Deputy had advanced through the 
application process, only to have the position redesigned to require a law degree. Meanwhile, a 
NYU program for DOC professional development had not included a single black staffer.  
None of this should have been news to Kross, Hicks claimed. He cited a survey by black 
staffers conducted in 1957, which Kross ignored for a year, and then feigned ignorance of when 
meeting with the aggrieved workers. Hicks claimed, as insult to injury, “the situation has grown 
so bad that prisoners on the Island and ex-prisoners leaving the Island embarrass your loyal Negro 
employees by poking fun at the way they are treated and held back.” Hicks’s grievances against 
Kross’s DOC, he contends, conclude only due to lack of column space.386 
A confidential internal memo documenting Kross’s initial reactions to the story 
demonstrates a blanket dismissal of the possibility of any racial chauvinism at play in her 
                                                            
386 James L. Hicks, “Dear Commissioner,” New York Amsterdam News, June 9, 1962.  
113 
 
administration, and a general attitude and outlook one could call race-blind. “Commissioner 
Kross,” the memo begins, “who had not seen or heard of the article by James Hicks, listened to a 
telephonic reading of the text in its entirety. Her audition was punctuated by frequent use of the 
comments ‘nonsense’ and ‘ridiculous.’” Kross claimed the piece was simultaneously motivated by 
her Republican opponents and a ploy to gain circulation for the New York Amsterdam News. 
Despite maintaining “there is not a single allegation in this attack worthy of reply,” and that she 
could stand on her record on racial questions, going back forty years, Kross offered a number of 
rebuttals. The work crews on Hart Island were volunteers. In response to the Chief Dietician, Kross 
replied: “Poor little Stevenson! Why doesn’t somebody talk about my salary?”  
Moreover, Kross reminded her staffers she “spoken in every church in Harlem, was an old 
and dear friend of Mary Bethune.” She promised to “append a series of articles by Margaret 
Cartwright on her role as a friend of Negroes.”387 This echoed Mayor Wagner’s sentiment, upon 
being confronted by self-identified black leaders: “Who elected you? I was elected up there. I got 
90 percent of the vote in Harlem.”388 Such a flippant approach to the color line in New York City 
had been possible with a lower population of non-white people lacking large-scale political 
organizations, and repressed by both the banal weight of labor market dependency and the swift 
blows of the policeman’s club. But this was changing.  
 
Awakening from the American Dream 
In July 1964, an off-duty NYPD cop named Thomas Gilligan shot and killed James Powell, 
a fifteen-year-old black boy engaged in a dispute with an Upper East Side super who had objected 
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to the presence of Powell and his friends in the neighborhood and, hurling racial epithets, had 
sprayed the boys with a hose. Then as now, the shooting was only the latest episode of regular 
police violence against black and brown New Yorkers. Similar to contemporary cases that have, 
with no precise logic, broken the proverbial camel’s back, this shooting touched a particular nerve. 
A crowd of three hundred black teenagers gathered at the scene, pelting the cops with bottles and 
cans, until dispersed by a repressive deployment seventy-five cops strong. The protestors shouted 
“This is worse than Mississippi!” and “Come on, shoot another nigger!”389 The following night, a 
protest in Harlem organized by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) marched on a police precinct at 
123rd Street, and against the urging of the organizers, escalated to violence between the police and 
protestors.  As Marilyn S. Johnson argues, “the first major ghetto uprising of the 1960s was 
underway.”390  
Riots flared across Harlem and Brooklyn for almost a week, resulting in hundreds of 
arrests, over one hundred injuries, and one death. NYPD’s response echoed the repression which 
had occasioned the rioting in the first place, including wanton beatings and firing “warning” shots 
at crowds of black New Yorkers. As Harlemite Abayama Katara later recalled: “I saw people I had 
known all my life, the same people that broke up the fights around the block, that screamed and 
called the cops when rumbles started, these same people that had stopped us from killing ourselves 
in our futile attempts at gaining manhood by gang wars—they were out in the street with bricks 
and bottles in their hands.”391 
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Herald-Tribune journalist Barry Gottherer, who would assume the role of mediator of race 
relations in Harlem under the next mayor, John Lindsay, understood the Harlem riots as a symptom 
of an absent black leadership class. “Between the absentee leaders, the rioters, the looters, the 
opportunists, and the respectable people,” wrote the paper, under his direction, “there was little or 
no communication. The middle class, which might have bridged the gap, was sorely missed.”392  
Katara begged to differ: “Housewives, young bloods, pimps, pushers, whores, bloods with so-
called ‘good’ jobs,” he recalled, “were all in the streets telling the man in the only way they knew 
how that black people had started to awaken from the ‘American dream.’”393 Langston Hughes 
captured the zeitgeist similarly the poem  “Death in Yorkville (James Powell, Summer, 1964)”: 
How many bullets does it take 
To kill a fifteen-year-old kid? 
How many bullets does it take 
To kill me? 
How many centuries does it take 
To bind my mind — chain my feet — 
Rope my neck — lynch me — 
Unfree? 
From the slave chain to the lynch rope 
To the bullets of Yorkville, 
Jamestown, 1619 to 1963: 
Emancipation Centennial — 
100 years NOT free. 
Civil War Centenntial: 1965 
How many Centennials does it take 
To kill me, 
Still alive? 
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When the long hot summers come 
Death ain’t 
No jive.394 
For his part, Wagner convinced Martin Luther King Jr. to take to the streets in order to quell the 
rebellion. When he agreed, King learned that Wagner intended no concessions to the enraged 
black New Yorkers. The New Deal scion simply wanted King to use his charisma and political 
clout to stop the rioting.395 
 
Support Your Local Police 
Black New Yorkers were however not the only group radicalizing. To NYPD rank-and-
filers, the growing movement against police brutality and murder was a simple affront to police 
power. Since the insurgent victory of Patrolman John Cassese, elected president in 1958, the 
Patrolman’s Benevolent Association (PBA), the union representing NYPD cops, had become 
increasingly antagonistic toward City Hall and any perceived enemies of the cops’ ability to do his 
job however they saw fit. Under Cassese PBA took aim at Wagner-appointed NYPD 
Commissioner Stephen Kennedy, who had refused to bargain with the union, and had taken the 
provocative step of banning police from holding part-time jobs. In response, the increasingly 
activist PBA conducted ticketing slowdowns that curtailed City revenue significantly. Anti-
Kennedy slogans sounded over the police radio and the increasingly frustrated commissioner 
bugged squad cars to find the culprits. Ultimately PBA succeeded in having Kennedy removed by 
Wagner, who needed the union’s support to stay in power. Initially denied union recognition, 
police were included in an amendment to Wagner’s executive orders in 1964, granting PBA the 
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full powers of a City union. This was largely a formality, however, as under Wagner PBA had 
largely enjoyed the same recognition and esteem as other municipal unions.396 This recognition 
cemented the power of PBA to act independently of City Hall, and solidified the legal standing 
and political clout of the union’s activism to follow. Moreover, it would never be enough for PBA 
to be just another City union.  
In 1965, the final year of Wagner’s mayoralty, PBA flexed its growing muscles in a 
campaign against a relatively mild plan to restructure the NYPD’s Civilian Complaint Review 
Board (CCRB). The CCRB had been established as a concessionary measure in 1953, amid the 
scandal surrounding the NYPD’s internal review of brutality complaints. Its name was, however, 
deceptive. The original CCRB was comprised of three NYPD officials, accountable only to the 
commissioner, and in practice did not represent a departure from the status quo.397 By 1964, a 
panoply of community organizations representing black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods called 
for a board comprised of actual civilians. Support for this plan grew amid a rash of suspicious 
deaths in custody, and murder confessions apparently elicited using “the third degree.” Support 
for a reformed CCRB extended even to the Guardian Association, an organization of black police 
officers.398  
Unfortunately this organization of black officers was matched and outnumbered by a 
growing organization of white officers mobilizing in response to the Civil Rights movement and 
the procedural revolution of the Warren Court. The latter movement would find its voice in the 
mayoral campaign William F. Buckley, who enjoyed considerable support among NYPD cops, 
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and the further development of PBA as a political force aligned with the nationwide movement of 
“law and order.”399  
In May 1964, operating under the banner of  the “Committee to Support Your Local 
Police,” a front group for the ultra-right John Birch Society (JBS), one-hundred right-wing activists 
picketed NYPD headquarters denouncing the plan to restructure the CCRB. They chanted “fight 
the red, support the blue,” waved American flags, and displayed signs including: “Police Are Our 
Last Line of Defense Against Communism.”400 Founded in 1958, JBS identified the liberalism 
underlying the Warren Court and civil rights legislation as a symptom of communist infiltration 
of the US government. The group fought to empower law enforcement against its malevolent 
enemies, including an invasive federal government imposing civil rights legislation on the states, 
as a matter of patriotism. Conveniently, this served to buttress localized white power structures, 
suddenly vulnerable to federal enforcement of civil rights legislation, especially after the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964—the group’s most active year. JBS was in part as an offshoot of the National 
Association of Manufacturers, a far-right organization of petit bourgeois business nationalists 
anchored in small, typically family-run businesses who had vehemently opposed the New Deal 
and the United Nations, and now opposed the encroachment of the federal government on local 
power structures.  
The Committee to Support Your Local Police, which soon began recruiting among the 
NYPD, had been developed in the south to specifically oppose the deployment of federal agents 
to uphold civil rights laws.401 The message found increasing resonance among New York City 
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cops. The following month, PBA, which increasingly adopted the anti-communist, race-baiting 
language of JBS in the years to come, sponsored a similar rally outside City Hall, where the new 
board was behind debated. This time, there were 1,200 in attendance. Speaking inside, Cassese 
called the restructured board “a deliberate and unwarranted affront to the police of New York 
City,” while Kennedy’s successor Michael J. Murphy, decidedly friendlier to PBA, warned that if 
the measure passed, “police would be hesitant to act, fearful of the second-guessers and the 
Monday-morning quarterbacks.” 402  
Wagner wanted nothing to do with the political minefield surrounding the CCRB. But the 
issue figured prominently in the 1965 election, in which future mayor Lindsay championed the 
issue. The Herald-Tribune’s “City in Crisis” series was instrumental in sidelining Wagner and 
clearing the way for Lindsay, whose campaign the paper endorsed. The series’ chief architect Barry 
Gottehrer, who went on to become a key player in the Lindsay campaign, and then the Lindsay 
administration, credits the series with Wagner’s stepping aside and Lindsay’s stepping up.403 
Candidate Lindsay found in “City in Crisis” a readymade campaign, pinning the rapidly eroding 
social fabric of New York City on Wagner.   
Lindsay was particularly responsive to black and Puerto Rican concerns about structural 
racism and police brutality, boiling after the Harlem riots and enduring police violence against 
young black and Puerto Rican men, in addition to the ordinary indignities and hardships of life 
under white supremacy.404 Lindsay’s victory at the polls would test the power of City Hall to 
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oversee the actions of its increasingly powerful police, who, through a union emboldened by 
Wagner’s legitimation of municipal unions and considerable expansion of their ranks, were now 
poised to flex their muscles, in response to an organized pushback from the communities they had 
long terrorized with impunity.405 “If New York City is ungovernable,” candidate Lindsay had 
declared, “then we’re all doomed.”406 This hypothesis would soon be tested, as Lindsay inherited 
a whirlwind of racialized economic insecurity that made its presence felt on New York City’s 
streets and inside its jails. By the end of Lindsay’s term, one piece of DOC property in particular 
would be synonymous with urban disorder and the City’s increasingly punitive response to it: 
Rikers Island. 
“I read in the newspapers that you have decided to proceed at full speed with the 
construction of a new Women’s House of Detention on Rikers Island,” mayoral assistant Robert 
Blum wrote to the newly elected Lindsay on March 23, 1966. “I should like to submit, respectfully, 
the following questions for your consideration,” Blum continued: 
1. What kind of legal services to you think a detainee will be able to receive, if a 
lawyer must travel all the way to Rikers Island to interview his client? 
Remember, the usual retainer in one of these cases is less than $100, and there 
is not even a bridge to Rikers Island! 
2. What assignments will the Legal Aid Society make to a Rikers Island Detention 
House? 
3. What transportation problems are created by having to shift a Rikers Island 
prisoner back and forth from a courthouse in Southern Manhattan? At what hour 
in the morning must a Rikers Island prisoner be awakened, fed and moved out 
to a Centre Street Courthouse pen? 
4. How readily can the family of an impoverished detainee (or, for that matter, the 
family of any prisoner) visit that prisoner on Rikers Island? 
5. What is the impact on (a) society and (b) the prisoner, of concentrating New 
York City’s penal population on an Alcatraz-type island? 
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“Personally,” Blum concluded, “I do not feel a worse place for a detention house could be found.” 
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CHAPTER 5:    A BRIDGE OF HOPE OVER THE RIVER STYX 
 
 
New mayor John V. Lindsay dedicates the bridge to Rikers Island with great optimism. Hope does 
not last long, as Lindsay quickly becomes embroiled in a landmark battle for the forces of “law 
and order,” who defeat his plan to establish civilian review of police brutality. The victory further 
empowers PBA, who set their sights on a new enemy: black and brown radicals, especially the 
Black Panther Party. An influx of arrests floods the City jails, necessitating the abandonment of 
Kross-era rehabilitation programming on Rikers Island—and the plans for new facilities on the 
island. The ascendant forces of law and order chip away at the ideological basis of Kross’s jail 
expansion plan, while the practice of its rehabilitative design continues to play a secondary role 
to custodial incarceration.  
 
A Bridge of Hope 
On November 22nd, 1966, Mayor John V. Lindsay formally opened the bridge between 
Rikers Island and mainland Queens, to which the island now belonged.408 The forty-foot-wide 
bridge extended just over a mile, its three traffic lanes and six-foot pedestrian walkway buttressed 
by fifty-six spans gradually inclining to an apex of fifty-two feet above water, for the convenience 
of small local vessels belonging to the coast guard and LaGuardia Airport.409 Lindsay spoke off 
the cuff that day, riffing that the great feats of Robert Moses had met their match in the mammoth 
bridge, and suggesting Queens Borough President Mario J. Cariello, a Democrat, ask President 
Johnson “to do something about these jet aircraft noises” from LaGuardia Airport. Still smarting 
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from his crash course in City politics, the mayor lauded DOC band for not going on strike on the 
eve of their performance—as had the transit workers on the first day of his mayoralty.410  
“Mention should be made,” underscored Lindsay’s preparatory notes, “that the bridge will 
pay for itself within 10 yrs.” In those same notes, the subject of the speech itself is listed as: 
“Emphasis on economies and money saving.”411 The mayor was sure to cover this ground, having 
cast himself as the fiscally responsible foil to Wagner’s extravagant public spending. The bridge 
was calculated to save $500,000 yearly on the elimination of the ferry service alone, in addition to 
twelve days of wages per DOC staffer previously compensated port-to-port for the ferry trip, the 
elimination of delivery fees, and a savings of twenty percent on the estimated $45 million of 
construction projects slated to reshape the island in the coming years. These included the 
Correctional Institution for Women, the Adolescent Remand Shelter, and a nearly $10 million 
expansion of the island’s power plant.412 Lauding the bridge’s role as the lynchpin of progressive 
infrastructure projects present and future, Lindsay dubbed the structure the “bridge of hope.”413 
Flanking Lindsay at the foot of the bridge was new DOC commissioner George F. 
McGrath. Whereas Wagner had leapt at the appointment of Kross, Lindsay dragged his feet for 
months to appoint a new DOC commissioner, suggesting a marked decline of interest in the agency 
that would define his mayoralty.414 On the apt date of March 17th Lindsay offered the position to 
McGrath, former Massachusetts State Commissioner of Correction. The child of Irish immigrants, 
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McGrath hailed from a large Catholic family in Boston, where his father worked as a bricklayer. 
McGrath began his jail career as a social worker at Charlestown State Prison, worked as a 
researcher at Harvard, and subsequently earned a law degree at Boston College, where he also 
taught criminal law.415 Kross hailed McGrath as “rehabilitation minded; not just lock them up and 
throw the key away,” and he certainly seemed in Kross’s mold.416 Yet, as commissioner in 
Massachusetts, McGrath had also distinguished himself by calling in the State Police to repress a 
rebellion at Walpole State Prison, with guns blazing, just days after taking office. “You don’t give 
into inmates under any circumstances,” he had reflected, earning him plaudits from the Times as a 
“firm prison hand.”417 McGrath’s salary of $25,000 would be $5,000 more than the City paid Anna 
Kross.418 
By all appearances McGrath represented a continuation of Kross’s program of 
rehabilitation. Echoing Kross’s belief in human engineering, DOC’s 1966 Annual Report opens 
with the sagely words of Daniel Webster: “if we work upon man’s immortal minds, if we imbue 
them with high principles, with the just fear of God and love of their fellow men, we engrave on 
these tablets [prisoners’ minds] something which no time can efface, and which will brighten and 
brighten to all eternity.”419  
McGrath himself underscored this theme in an introductory essay to the report entitled “Is 
Our Investment in Prison Justified?” Beyond the ordinary use of jails as custody—punishing 
offenders, protecting the community by their withdrawal from it, and standing as a deterrent to 
others—McGrath argued that the additional component of rehabilitation, aimed at assisting the 
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lawbreaker in becoming a law-abiding citizen, was not only socially desirable and individually 
ethical, it was in fact the legal obligation of DOC according to its very charter.420 Interestingly, the 
City charter actually had little to say on the matter, only calling for the “care and custody of felons, 
misdemeanants, and violators of local law” held in DOC facilities.421 McGrath’s generous reading 
of this mandate seems to have derived from his conviction—in keeping with both the rehabilitative 
program of Kross and the political philosophy of the Lindsay administration—that “in most cases 
the crime the individual was convicted of is merely a symptom of more basic underlying problems 
which are not effected by mere custody or punishment.”422 
McGrath shared Kross’s conviction that prisons are “in a very real sense, agencies of crime 
prevention.” Hence, the expansion of DOC facilities and programming was the logical response to 
an increase in quantifiable crime.423 As under Kross, however, the time when these facilities could 
truly do the job for which they were designed always seemed to fall on the proverbial day after 
tomorrow. “Once the Department can house the inmate population, spacewise and with institutions 
designed and reconverted for rehabilitative purposes,” claimed the 1966 report, echoing years of 
sentiments under Kross, “a great deal more can be done than is currently being accomplished.”424  
As ever, DOC singled out crowding as the primary obstacle. By 1966, the average daily population 
for the entire system was above 10,000, and all facilities were above rated capacity. In 1965 HDW 
in particular had reached a peak of 760, 166% of capacity.425 Despite Kross’s best efforts to 
rationalize DOC’s expansion and plan for the future, the situation remained dire.  
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“The Department of Correction has not had a planned growth,” wrote Mayor Lindsay’s 
1966 Task Force on Correction, part of an expansive study of the City government meant to 
maximize the “good government” campaign he had waged against Wagner. “Organizational 
changes have been made but they have not kept pace with the prodigious development of the 
agency,” which included a budget approaching 30 million dollars, and a capital budget in excess 
of that figure for the coming five years alone.426 Chaired by progressive penologist James V. 
Bennet, and boasting former DOC luminaries Austin MacCormick and Richard McGee, the Task 
Force lauded Kross for having “transformed the agency from one whose chief emphasis was on 
custodial problems to one stressing rehabilitation as well as safekeeping,” and largely attributed 
the shortcomings of her program to “budgetary and legal restrictions.”427  
However the chief culprit they identify hindering a robust rehabilitative program was not 
an external obstacle but the structure of DOC itself. Namely, they argue, the “semi-military” 
hierarchy of the agency, combined with the civil service requirement for vertical promotions, 
fostered an institution resistant to substantive change. “Consequently ,” the Task Force argued, “a 
central organizational structure suited largely to conventional custodial needs, making only 
reluctant accommodations to the new correctional philosophy and program characterizes the 
Department.” This arrangement was at root of “an uneasy truce between the custodians and the 
rehabilitators,” which had characterized the Kross years, propped up by the significant material 
gains enjoyed by uniformed staff amid the City’s post-war prosperity.428 The Task Force was 
correct to point to this truce as an uneasy one, and it would be tested in the years to come.  
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Still more alarming to the Task Force was the lack of coordination between the various 
agencies responsible for people arrested by the NYPD. They found the present level of cooperation 
between DOC and the courts, police, probation, public health, and mayoral officials to be 
“haphazard,” “ad hoc,” and largely in response to crisis. Accordingly they proposed the formation 
of a an inter-agency council, to take the place of the Board of Correction. 429  The latter, the Task 
Force argued, lacked the resources or properly defined role adequate to its task, and should 
therefore be “reorganized, redefined, and more clearly delineated,” or else eliminated.430 This was 
partly a reference to BOC having fallen into semi-dormancy. “The board had been virtually non-
functioning for years,” Gottehrer recalled.431 Earlier that year, an announcement by BOC Chair 
Ethel Wise that the board need not meet for the second consecutive month due to “no material for 
an agenda” earned a harsh rebuke by board member David A. Schulte, Jr., which found its way to 
the desks of Kross, Lindsay, and the entire BOC. There was, Schulte argued, plenty to discuss. He 
was surely correct.432   
In response, to the Task Force, the Board of Correction wrote both the Mayor and 
Commissioner McGrath, concurring with the recommendation for an inter-agency council, but 
defending their own role as a watchdog group directly accountable to the mayor.433 After several 
vascillations—including the December issuance of letters to each BOC member, announcing the 
dissolution of the board—Lindsay ultimately reversed course and allowed BOC to endure as a 
watchdog organization.434 While the inter-agency board envisioned by the Task Force would never 
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take shape, BOC would in fact endure. As we will soon see, the agency was to assume something 
of an activist role in DOC in the coming decade, while overseeing an unprecedented expansion of 
the City’s carceral capacity on Rikers Island, enabled in no small part by the bridge which Lindsay 
and McGrath dedicated on that fateful November day. As DOC itself reflected, “the bridge enables 
the Department of Correction to move ahead on its major institutional building contracts,” 
including the facilities for women and adolescents.435  
Traversing the Rikers Island bridge for the first time, one feels in their stomach an uncanny 
pressure as the bus engine gears downward for the fight against gravity in approach of its apex. At 
mid-point, fifty-two feet above the East River, this hump is abruptly overcome and for a split 
second, one becomes momentarily airborne, suspended between the free world left behind, and the 
prison world toward which one now surges forth intractably. Gravity, that unseen force of nature, 
now pulls inexorably toward Rikers Island. When the bridge is long departed, the passenger is left 
with the lingering memory of that fleeting moment at mid-point, when the upward climb has been 
overcome, yet the inevitable descent has yet to begin. Mayor Lindsay’s dedication of the bridge 
was such a moment for the New York City Department of Correction, which would henceforth be 
drawn irresistibly toward Rikers.  
 
A Fun City? 
In many ways the bridge serves as an apt metaphor for Lindsay’s mayoralty itself, 
connecting as it did the City’s period of post-war prosperity, romanticized by Freeman, and the 
City of disorder and racial strife known to any aficionado of 1970s cinema. As New York spiraled 
out of control, Lindsay often seemed like a man from a different time, and to a large extent, he 
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was. The tall, handsome, and charming congressman from Manhattan’s east side “Silk Stockings” 
district was a species of Republican held over from the mid-nineteenth century and soon to be 
extinct. Lindsay was a traditional progressive, part of a lineage stretching back through Thomas 
Dewey, Fiorello LaGuardia, and Theodore Roosevelt, all the way back to the reformers who had 
grappled with Tammany Hall patronage in the late nineteenth century in the name of scientific 
principles of urban management.  
Lindsay’s campaign platform paired themes of fiscal austerity and the distrust of 
bureaucratic machine politics with a steadfast belief in the formal equality of all people before the 
law, in a lineage Lindsay traced back to the Republicanism of Lincoln. Lindsay had supported the 
aborted 1960 civil rights bill, and had been instrumental in passing the 1964 Civil Rights Act. He 
had long pushed for Republicans to incorporate civil rights into their platform, and was 
increasingly taken by Johnson’s Great Society. Racial discrimination was anathema to Lindsay’s 
pro-business, individualistic vision of liberal harmony amid optimal free market completion, 
facilitated, if need, be by interventionist city and state governments. This position made Lindsay 
an ally of President Johnson, whose Great Society agenda fueled a strong welfare state aimed at 
redressing America’s racial order with anti-poverty spending and civil rights legislation, through 
federal funding streams to US cities. Partisan rivalry prevented their closer collaboration.436  
When Johnson assembled the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in 1967 
to study the torrent of racialized urban unrest in US cities, he tapped Lindsay as vice chairman. 
Lindsay and his staff, largely composed of youthful idealists, penned the striking introduction to 
the final report of what is commonly called the Kerner Commission, after its chair, Illinois 
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governor Otto Kerner. With profound brevity they summarized the new mayor’s outlook in words 
that could have flown from the pen of James Baldwin: “What white Americans have never fully 
understood—but what the Negro can never forget—is that white society is deeply implicated in 
the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones 
it.”437 Correcting the structural inequality inscribed into the very geography of the modern city 
was, in their estimation, the primary task of the moment, lest violence and “mob rule,” the 
desperate response to unaddressed structural inequality in US society, consume America’s cities. 
Hence, their progressivism bridged a moral imperative with the practical necessity of uninterrupted 
development of the free market, unhindered by racial strife and urban insurrection.  
“The alternative [to mob rule] is not blind repression or capitulation to lawlessness,” the 
authors argued, but a reasoned reckoning with the country’s past, and the legislative rectification 
of racial and economic inequality facing the nation’s poorest people. “It is time now,” they 
implored, “to turn with all the purpose at our command to the major unfinished business of our 
nation… to adopt strategies for action that will produce quick and visible progress… to make good 
the promises of American democracy to all citizens—urban and rural, white and black, Spanish-
surname, American Indian, and every minority group.”438 This was a marked departure from the 
race-blindness of Wagner. Yet, despite its forward-thinking, the motive behind such dire 
prognostication is more attributable to the pressure of external circumstances—namely, the 
activity of millions of anonymous Americans, mad as hell and taking to the streets—than to any 
particular profundity of insight belonging to Lindsay or his cohort. 
The near-apocalyptic vision the Kerner introduction invokes, of “the continuing 
polarization of the American community and… the destruction of basic democratic values” was 
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not only justified given the immense crisis facing the present, it was effectively prescient—to 
whatever extent an “American community” or “basic democratic values” could be said to have 
existed for all Americans in any earlier epoch.439 In short, the crisis was real. Lindsay, however, 
remained optimistic that the course could be reversed. When the Transit Workers Union launched 
a strike on the first day of his term, crippling New York City for almost two weeks, the mayor 
notoriously strove to put a positive spin on the myriad symptoms of urban crisis amassing around 
him. “I still think it’s a fun city,” he remarked.440  
Lindsay was not however blind to the explosive situation he inherited. The polarization to 
which the Kerner Commission alluded was the combustible combination of two sharpening 
political positions that would define the coming decade. On the one hand stood civil rights, anti-
war activism, and the growing zeitgeist of leftist militancy, anti-authoritarian fervor, and outré 
lifestylism these movements ushered into the mainstream. On the other stood a rightward-shifting 
segment of working class whites, especially those affected by deindustrialization and urban 
disinvestment yet too poor or stubborn to join the white flight.441 Likely already sympathetic to 
the traditional power of the police to dispose of black and brown people as they saw fit, this class 
fragment became evermore dedicated to untrammeled police power as urban crisis heightened, 
elite politicians like Lindsay appeared oblivious to their concerns, and the police emerged as an 
organized political alternative to permissive liberalism.442 The backdrop for the clash of these 
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forces was a complex constellation of deindustrialization and the rapid urbanization of a racialized 
underclass.   
The forces that converged in the streets during Lindsay’s mayoralty had in part been set in 
motion by the Warren Court.443 In tandem with Brown and other victories for formal racial 
equality, which spurred the mobilization of both organized efforts like the John Birch Society and 
also informal backlash across the entire south, the Warren Court also delivered a number of rulings 
strengthening due process dubbed “the criminal law revolution,” most famously Miranda rights 
and greater protections against unreasonable search and seizure. Police across the country 
perceived this as an affront to their control over working conditions, which it most certainly was—
perhaps especially to their role as de facto enforcers of the white power structure, acting outside 
the law to discipline non-white people in Northern ghettos and the Jim Crow South alike. The 
growing Southern backlash against civil rights and civil liberties reached a high watermark in the 
1964 presidential campaign of Alabama governor George Wallace, which along with the growing 
influence of the John Birch Society, captured the imagination of enough NYPD cops that Wallace 
bumper stickers had to be removed from their cruisers.444 To make matters worse, Wagner’s repeal 
of the Lyons Law in 1960 meant that police largely lived outside the city in white flight enclaves, 
and as the rhetoric police organizations adopted in the coming years indicated, increasingly 
considered much of the City nothing short of enemy territory. 
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Lindsay entered office already hounded by the so-called New Right, whose chief ideologue 
William F. Buckley launched a 1965 spoiler campaign to defeat the progressive Republican.445 
Running on the Conservative Party line, Buckley capitalized on the rightward shift of a segment 
of New York City’s outer-borough ethnic whites, and the politicization of the NYPD, to advocate 
for a muscular police response to urban unrest that would by the decade’s end be common sense 
to the “law and order” movement.  
Shortly before his campaign announcement, Buckley appeared  before 5,600 members of 
the NYPD’s Holy Name Society and pledged full allegiance to the nascent law and order backlash. 
He opened the speech by declaring “a general atmosphere of hostility toward the police force” that 
made their supporters something akin to an oppressed minority.446 Buckley proceeded to praise 
the “restraint” of the police in Selma who had the previous month violently repressed civil rights 
marchers led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. “Nobody is more sacrosanct,” he declared 
melodramatically, “than the man who strikes a policeman. No man more guilty than the policeman 
who strikes a defensive blow.”447 Buckely went on to address the recent murder of civil rights 
activist Viola Liuzzo by the KKK in Alabama: “So the lady drove down a stretch of lonely road 
in the dead of night, sharing the front seat with a young Negro identified with the protest 
movement; and got killed. Why,” he hedged, “one wonders, was this a story that occupied the front 
pages from one end to another, if newspapers are concerned with the unusual, the unexpected?”448 
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The speech generated considerable controversy, not in the least because of the spirited support it 
received from the assembled cops.449 
In his subsequent campaign announcement Buckley argued “until such a moment as the 
crime rate is reversed,” New York needed “a much larger police force, enjoined to lust after the 
apprehension of criminals even as politicians lust after the acquisition of votes.” Buckley naturally 
gravitated to the controversy surrounding the Civilian Complaint Review Board. “Under no 
circumstances,” he droned ominously, “must the police be encumbered by such political irons as 
civilian-review boards—or by any other contraption whose presumptive concern is for 
advantageous political relationships, rather than for law and order in our streets.”450 Moreover, 
Buckley’s choice for City Council President, Rosemary Gunning from the anti-school integration 
Parents and Taxpayers Association (PAT), sent a clear message that the forces of white resistance 
among New York City’s downwardly-mobile ethnic whites had a somewhat unlikely friend in the 
performatively aristocratic Yale wordsmith.451  
Buckley campaign aid Neal B. Freeman recalls: “in the summer of 1965 the NYPD fell in 
love with Bill Buckley.”452 Some police openly donned “Buckley for Mayor” buttons, and even 
booed Lindsay, in uniform, at campaign appearances.453 Buckley was never a completely serious 
candidate. When asked if what he would do if elected, Buckley had famously replied: “I’d demand 
a recount.”454 Yet the impact of his campaign was, as intended, not to place Buckely in Gracie 
Mansion, but to provide a vehicle for a right-wing political movement in New York City, uniting 
the resentment of downwardly mobile whites in the outer boroughs with the ascendant political 
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aspirations of PBA, in whose footsteps the Correction Officers Benevolent Association would soon 
follow.455 
Buckley’s New Right was however not the only game in town. While PBA may have been 
louder, CCRB reform, civil rights and the burgeoning movement for black and brown power in 
New York City enjoyed a long-standing reservoir of support, only broadened by the civil rights 
movement in the South. The original 1954 CCRB had been demanded, in response to widespread 
claims of racialized brutality gone unchecked, by a panoply of organizations including the Urban 
League, American Federation of Labor, the ACLU, the American Jewish Congress, and the 
NAACP.456 When James Powell was murdered in Harlem, CORE and the NAACP were among 
the initial organizers of demonstrations against police brutality and murder—until the crowd 
escaped their control, and the venerable principles of non-violence went sailing out the window 
once more. By the time the PBA took to picketing its opponents, it had been watching CORE do 
so for several years, including the picketing of precincts where cases of brutality had been 
reported.457  
 
Your Life May Depend on It 
In May of 1966, flanked by NYPC commissioner Howard Leary, Lindsay announced the 
heralded restructuring of the Civilian Complaint Review Board. It would include seven members, 
four appointed by the mayor and three by the NYPC commissioner. Additionally, it would be 
supervised by a high-ranking police official. The board had no disciplinary authority, nor could it 
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make specific disciplinary recommendations.458 The new CCRB was toothless. It was designed to 
perform opposition to the NYPD while possessing no formal power. The CCRB was a measured 
compromise designed to appease activists without upsetting police power. But the PBA of 1964, 
fresh off the defeat of a sitting NYPD commissioner, and emboldened by the political movement 
of police across the country, was not in the mood for compromise. PBA was capitalizing on the 
law and order movement to expand its role in City politics. But on a more basic level, as Gottehrer 
recalls, rank-and-file cops “believed the rhetoric of the PBA’s campaign against the civilian review 
board—the picture of the policeman with his hand tied behind his back—and, because they felt 
themselves the real victims, forced to answer for all of the city’s failures, the man on the beat 
began to hate the mayor and his people and what they believed he stood for.”459 
PBA and the Conservative Party, on whose line Buckley had run, filed a ballot initiative to 
repeal the new CCRB so quickly that there were initially two initiatives. The campaign drew on 
the nastiest elements of New York City politics, especially the city’s growing racial panic, but also 
the anti-communist language of John Birch.460 “I’m sick and tired of giving into minority groups,” 
Cassese spat in a press conference announcing the campaign, “with their whims and gripes and 
shouting.”461 Anti-CCRB advertisements, funded by PBA, pulled no punches. One depicted a 
vulnerable young woman exiting the subway at night, and declared: “The Civilian Review Board 
Must Be Stopped. Her Life, Your Life May Depend on It.” Another claimed: “With A Review 
Board, It May Be The Police Officer Who Hesitates, Not The Criminal.”462 In short, the PBA-led 
campaign argued, the NYPD must be allowed to dispose of undesirables—and the racial 
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connotation of this clear—however they saw fit. Otherwise, the state of crisis, which many New 
Yorkers felt on a visceral level, intensifying with the passage of time, would degenerate into utter 
chaos akin to that of a failed state.  
The pro-CCRB campaign, led by a Lindsay-sponsored umbrella group called Federated 
Associations for Impartial Review (FAIR), was largely incoherent, ineffectual, and failed to rally 
support. It evinced the weaknesses of an anti-police brutality movement that had been purged of 
communists. FAIR believed it was adequate to point out the nefarious supporters of the anti-CCRB 
referendum, which included JBS and the American Nazi Party, and draw high-profile support from 
senators Robert F. Kennedy and Jacob Javitz—rather than taking on the reality of structurally 
racist police violence. Milquetoast slogans like “Join the forces of PROGRESS – not HATE!”  and 
“Don’t let the Bigots Ruin Our City!!!” sidestepped the visceral presence of violent police in black 
and brown communities, and appealed instead to the moral sensibilities of middle-class white 
liberals.  
Either disbelieving the prevalence of police brutality or unwilling to tackle it as a political 
issue, the campaign argued police brutality was a rare phenomenon, and the CCRB could prove it, 
thereby restoring faith in the police. “A Civilian Review Board,” one flyer boasted, would “help, 
not only those who have complaints, but it would prove that police brutality is not as prevalent as 
has been alleged.” The CCRB, it concluded, promised to “raise the morale of the slum dwellers 
and… help reinstate a respect for law and order among the citizens of our city.”463 Under the 
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heading “Better Understanding,” another flyer declared: “there is no longer any reason for anyone 
to take his grievances to the street, since the new Board guarantees a fair hearing to all.”464  
Unable to take the issue of police brutality seriously, and thus build meaningful ties with 
the black and brown New Yorkers for whom it was a visceral reality, the liberals behind the 
campaign effectively conceded the election in advance, regardless of its outcome. 465 Ultimately, 
in a stinging blow to Lindsay and New York State’s celebrity senators, the CCRB was defeated by 
ballot referendum. Their star power, it seemed, was no match for Cassese, a mere police patrolman 
bearing a message of militant white revanchism whose time had come. The PBA had blazed an 
independent path in City politics, which soon enough COBA would follow.466 “They had won 
extraordinary rights to prevent investigations after incidents had occurred;” Gottehrer reflects, 
“now they were looking for the right to reject consultation before the fact as well.”467 As PBA 
pushed for an expanded role in City politics, and rank-and-file police for the power to do as they 
saw fit, liberals offered no serious alternative to law and order.   
In marked contrast to the milquetoast sloganeering of the pro-CCRB campaign, a militant 
tradition confronting the NYPD had been in formation for over a decade. In April of 1957, a young 
black Harlemite named Johnson Hinton observed cops clubbing a black man on the corner of 125th 
St and 7th Avenue. Hinton commanded the police to stop, telling them “You’re not in Alabama – 
this is New York!” The cops responded by beating him severely, fracturing his skull, and arresting 
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him for felonious assault. Hinton, it turned out, was a member of the Nation of Islam, and a 
congregant of Mosque Number Seven, under the leadership of Malcolm X.468  
As Malcolm X later recalled, within an hour and a half, fifty of the NOI’s elite Fruit of 
Islam gathered under his command outside the precinct where Hinton was held. “I told the 
lieutenant in charge,” Malcolm recalled, “‘That man belongs in the hospital.’ They called an 
ambulance.” Under his leadership, the Fruit of Islam followed Hinton to Harlem Hospital. 
“Negroes who never had seen anything like this were coming out of stores and restaurants and bars 
and enlarging the crowd following us,” Malcolm recalled. “Harlem's black people were long since 
sick and tired of police brutality. And they never had seen any organization of black men take a 
firm stand as we were.”469 Before Hinton was released, thousands of people had gathered outside 
the precinct.470 Under the leadership of Malcolm X, Harlem became an important base of 
operations for the Nation of Islam, and subsequently his Organization for Afro-American Unity, 
until his 1965 assassination. But the militant tradition Malcolm had established in Harlem did not 
die with him. 
 
White Tigers Eat Black Panthers 
In 1967 a new tendency in black militancy emerged in the form of the Black Panther Party. 
The Party was founded in Oakland in 1966, based on the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), 
a radical black nationalist organization founded in Philadelphia, the Lowndes County Freedom 
Organization (LCFO), a project of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in Alabama 
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under the direction of Stokely Carmichael, and the teachings of Malcolm X.471 The group’s 
platform drew heavily from the current of black nationalism responding to the failure of post-
Brown integration with demands for an independent black polity. “We want freedom,” the 
Panthers’ ten-point platform began. “We want power to determine the destiny of our Black 
community.”472 True to the spirit of the age, the New York City chapter of the Black Panther Party 
was founded in 1968, just weeks after Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination. Two of its earliest 
members were Sekou Odinga and Lumumba Shakur, from Jamaica, Queens. The duo had become 
politicized while prisoners at Comstock prison, where they had organized a riot against 
discriminatory hiring, and subsequently joined Malcolm X’s Organization for Afro-American 
Unity. 473  
The New York Panthers drew members from different backgrounds. Many had roots in 
street gang culture. “All I am is an ex-Disciple,” Panther Afeni Shakur later reflected, of the street 
gang she was part of before the Panthers, part of a violent subculture filled with drugs and brawls 
that sometimes ended in death. “But I’m able now to use the things that I had when I was a Disciple, 
the desire to survive… in a manner that has nothing to do with just having fun and cutting 
somebody. It has to do with something greater than that.”474 Sympathetic to Malcolm X, though 
more immersed in the local bar and drug scene than politics, Shakur came upon Bobby Seale 
speaking on the corner of 125th Street and Seventh Avenue, and joined the Party shortly 
thereafter.475  
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By contrast, Kuwasi Balagoon lived comfortably as a paid tenant organizer financed by 
local anti-poverty initiatives, organizing rent strikes, pressing for building repairs, representing 
tenants in court, blocking illegal evictions, and using withheld rents to pay for repairs while 
agitating for collective ownership. But Balagoon was drawn toward a more militant approach to 
politics. When he traveled with other tenant organizers to Washington DC to release a rat in 
Congress in protest of slum conditions, his New York delegation ended up brawling with police 
under the rotunda. Balagoon went on to join the Central Harlem Committee for Self-Defense, 
organizing against the encroachment of Columbia University in black neighborhoods.476 During 
the occupation of Columbia of 1968, Balagoon and his comrades broke through the right-wing 
student blockade surrounding an occupied building in order to bring food and water to the 
demonstrators inside.477  Balagoon subsequently decided “working as I did as paid opposition was 
only a sham, making black people believe that things were getting better.” He began following H. 
Rap Brown, read Robert Williams’ Negroes with Guns and The Crusaders, studied Mao’s “Little 
Red Book,” and joined the Party shortly after it came to New York.478  
In keeping with their program and diversity of influences, the New York Panthers 
organized around tenant issues, against school segregation, and against police brutality. The Young 
Lords Party, tracing its roots to a 1950s Puerto Rican street gang in Chicago, emerged the following 
year as a Panther-inspired group for Puerto Ricans.479  
The NYPD took immediate notice. In August of 1968, two young Panthers were beaten 
and arrested for demonstrating outside the Party’s Bedford Stuyvesant office at 780 Nostrand 
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Avenue, on the pretext they did not have a sound permit. The pair wound up charged with 
assaulting an officer and resting arrest.480 When they appeared in court, their Panther comrades 
packed the gallery in solidarity. PBA’s Cassese later claimed, quite improbably, that the Panthers 
“cursed at” and “spat upon” the arresting officer, while presiding judge John Furey and the court 
officers did nothing to intervene. To make matters worse, two days after the duo’s arrest, two 
police officers responding to a distress call near the Panthers’ office had been wounded by an 
unknown shooter. Cassese claimed “war has been declared against the Police department,” and 
promised to issue “get tough” directives from the PBA, for cops “sick and tired of taking it on the 
chin.”481  
Despite his tough talk, however, Cassese was merely tailing the militancy of his own 
union’s rank-and-file. Several days earlier, an independent organizing group within the NYPD had 
broken ranks, declared itself an independent entity, and issued “get tough” directives of its own. 
Calling itself the Law Enforcement Group (LEG), the hard-right organization had emerged from 
a petition calling for Furey’s removal, which had taken on a life of its own beyond the control of 
the PBA leadership. LEG released a seven-point program, calling for a grand jury to investigate 
the “coddling” of criminals, the abolition of even the police-led CCRB, the removal of civilians 
from police clerical duties, and most tellingly, to “contact and wholeheartedly support the United 
States Senators who are trying to prevent another Warren Court.”482 Ira Glasser of the New York 
Civil Liberties Union called the document an “undisguised declaration of war against the black 
militants.”483  
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LEG’s banner action came in early September, at the arraignment of three Panthers for 
another altercation with police. A small group from Students for a Democratic Society picketed in 
support, and fifteen Panthers attended the trial but did not participate in the picket. The counter-
mobilization, however, numbered in the hundreds. “The crowd that gathered to jeer at the pickets 
was comprised largely of off-duty policemen,” Gottehrer recalls, “including members of a 
particularly conservative splinter group with in the PBA,” the LEG. “Many wore sportshirts, their 
shirttails untucked, barely concealing the guns and blackjacks tucked into their belts. Some wore 
police badges.”484 Abayama Katara, a New York Panther in the courtroom that day, recalls the 
uniformed police trying to provoke the Panthers by poking them with nightsticks. But the fifteen 
Panthers “weren’t fools and were completely outnumbered,” facing an estimated 250 cops in and 
out of uniform, and attempted to leave in peace.485 But as the Panthers and their supporters left the 
courtroom, melee ensued. Chanting “white tigers eat Black Panthers” and “Wallace for President,” 
the LEG members and other off-duty cops attacked Panthers and their supporters with blackjacks, 
sending some to the hospital.  
Uniformed cops dropped their nightsticks for the off-duty cops to pick up and wield against 
the unarmed Panthers and supporters—some, like Katara, of high school age. Given the setting, 
the cops knew there was little chance the people they attacked with clubs had any weapons of their 
own. Cops chased the Panthers down the street as they attempted to flee and even prowled the 
subways in hot pursuit. LEG affiliates even stole the briefcase of the New York State Panthers 
chairman David Brothers, who was beaten viciously and kicked dozens of times while on the 
ground. Rather than return it, NYPD used its contents for intelligence gathering. Initially they 
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misread the entry for Gottehrer—entered as “Mayor”—as “Major,” and placed the Jewish Lindsay 
aid under surveillance, thinking he secretly held the rank of “Major” in the Black Panther Party.486  
The incident garnered significant bad press for NYPD and PBA. PBA passed a motion 
condemning LEG as would-be usurpers of the union’s power, and threatening to expel any 
members belonging to the latter organization.487 Despite an initial burst of defiant bluster, LEG 
first amended some of its strongest positions, including the demand for new height standards for 
cops purportedly meant to exclude Puerto Ricans, and soon after petered out under extreme 
pressure from the union’s powerful officialdom.488 But LEG represented a movement within 
NYPD that did not go away so easily. An anonymous lieutenant stationed in Manhattan told the 
Times that LEG was the product of “dissident youth on the police force—like around the 
universities. They’re exploding. They’re fighting back against what they consider an intolerable 
situation. Just as there’s a New Left on the campuses, there seems to be a New Right among some 
younger men on the Police Department.”489 This new crop of cops would define NYPD politics 
for decades to come.  
 
A City in Itself? 
Amid this fraught political terrain, McGrath attempted in apparent good faith to continue 
Kross’s policies. Ground was broken for the Correctional Institution for Women on Rikers Island 
on April 11, 1967. The expansive open space on Rikers made possible a horizontal plan, 
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“predicated on a closed campus design which will offer internal freedom and circulation.”490 Two 
wings of chevron-shaped dormitories emanated from a central institutional building. One wing, 
for sentenced prisoners, featured four buildings, a mixture of dormitories and cells, with a capacity 
of forty women per housing unit. As with C-76,  two housing units could be monitored by a single 
guard at the point of the V, connected to the corridor, in the so-called pinwheel design. The other 
wing featured two buildings for pre-trial detainees, one two stories, another three. They followed 
a similar design, only with a capacity of thirty women per unit. The central institutional building 
contained the workshops, laundry, religious facilities, commissary, visiting facilities, and 
infirmary, and all other jailhouse amenities, making the women’s facility a wholly self-contained 
institution. The principles of its design emphasized natural light and free circulation of air, using 
clerestory windows and window walls.491 DOC had even consulted with cutting edge “Design 
Teams” at Parsons School of Design, culminating in what it dubbed “a modern environmental 
approach to rehabilitation.”492  
Much of DOC’s activities in this period took place on Rikers Island. The opening of the C-
76 enabled DOC to close the Hart Island Workhouse in August 1966. By this point the Hart Island 
facility had virtually disintegrated, many of its facilities deemed uninhabitable and requiring costly 
maintenance just to honor the minimum standards provided by law.493 In 1967 DOC added another 
building, comprised of 496 beds, to the C-71 facility.494 Small-scale “specialty clinics” were 
established on Rikers in 1966 for “ear, nose and throat, skin, orthopedics, general surgery, and 
chest disorders,” obviating the transfer of prisoners to Bellevue or Kings County.495 A massive 
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baking facility opened on Rikers in 1966, providing bread for DOC, Department of Education, and 
Parks Department, in addition to purported vocational training for prisoners.496 All the while, 
Kross’s planned infrastructure overhaul hummed along, as the foundation continued to be laid for 
a dramatic expansion of DOC’s holdings on Rikers Island.  
McGrath’s administration also continued Kross’s policy of involving volunteer 
organizations in DOC programming, largely to fill the shortfall left by insufficient funding for its 
rehabilitative vision. Under the auspices of the Pre-Release Orientation Program (PROP), an anti-
recidivism initiative for adolescents sponsored by Lindsay, DOC enlisted a broad swath of 
organizations including the MDT Administration, the Board of Education, the Harlem YMCA, the 
City Parole Commission, the Salvation Army, Haryou Act, and the Seafarers International Union 
to offer a variety of job training and post-release services, steered by the mantra “If you want help, 
we’ll help you.”497  
Another youth program called BYCEP provided post-release employment placement in 
conjunction with the City’s major anti-poverty programs and the neighborhood-based Manpower 
Centers.498 Conversely, many young people employed by Lindsay’s youth jobs program ended up 
working on the civilian side of DOC programming. The Summer Youth Work Program put high-
school-aged students to work in the City jails, filling the gaps left by deficiencies of inmate labor, 
in areas like repair and cleaning. The Urban Corps Work-Study Program placed university students 
from across the country as educators and social workers in the jail system. The majority of these 
students were from NYU, whose School of Social Work continued its partnership with DOC begun 
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during the Kross years.499 As in the Kross years, however, the efficacy of these projects remained 
contingent on the expansion of DOC’s plant facilities.  
On September 1, 1967 the New York City Parole Commission was abolished, and with it 
indeterminate sentences. All sentences greater than a year became the provenance of the State 
system. The temporary dip this engendered in DOC’s population was cause for optimism.500 
“When we contemplate the grim prison fortress of the past and even certain crowded institutions 
of the present,” McGrath wrote, “we find ourselves encouraged at the prospect of the planned 
Rikers Island Complex.” Drawing from criminological tradition of environmentalism, McGrath 
argued “the antisocial individual’s negative attitude toward the excessive monotony of the city 
slums—tenements, schools, public buildings” contributed to “a negative conception of society as 
a whole.” By extension, if monotonous and unpleasant environments caused anti-social behavior, 
then an “improved environment would tend to change the individual’s outlook and attitude.”501  
The new capital projects, which McGrath considered nothing short of the “rebuilding of 
Rikers Island,” were to be “characterized by the use of colors and light.” In the place of “prison 
cells with iron bars, the inmates’ quarters feature rooms and doors, with reinforced window 
dimensioned and placed to let in light and air and a plentiful view of earth and sky.” The new 
facilities taking shape, McGrath boasted, “incorporate the most advanced designs possible in large 
scale institutions.”502 DOC’s ability to construct large, horizontally oriented institutions, McGrath 
argued, was thanks to the Rikers Island Bridge, which “has made available on the Island almost 
five hundred acres, sufficient for us to develop new institutional designs,” emphasizing a freedom 
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of movement and possibility for classification absent in the high-rise jails DOC was forced to build 
elsewhere.503  
Yet, the optimal use of these facilities was not a guarantee. “Standards of decent living, 
essential to human dignity and effective correctional rehabilitative programs,” McGrath wrote, 
echoing Kross, “are difficult to achieve in physical plants that are overcrowded, obsolete, and 
dominated in their administration by ameliorative emergency measures.” While facilities could be 
constructed using the most cutting-edge principles, this would be largely for naught if they were 
allowed to be overcrowded. “When our present Capital Building Program has been completed,” 
McGrath looked “forward to the day of completion of our planned, sound Correctional 
environment.”504 However if crowding prevented the realization of these facilities’ optimum 
usage, and the influx of prisoners could not be stemmed by chastening NYPD, or the courts, or 
addressing the economic issues at the root of the crime epidemic, how else could the original intent 
of these path-breaking rehabilitative facilities be honored than by simply building more facilities, 
which would, in turn be filled to capacity?   
Uninhibited by such questions,  DOC was quite taken with the new real estate possibilities 
opened up by the bridge. The  Rikers Island facilities were now known as the “Correctional 
Institution Complex at Rikers Island,” which DOC hailed as “a city in itself.”505 The bridge had 
enabled five autonomous institutions, constituting a “community,” reminiscent of the “island 
metropolis,” boasting a power plant, bakery, tailor shop, improved classification and segregation, 
“ready deployment of professional and custodial staff in an emergency,” and “centralized control 
of employees and visitors to the island.” This centralization also entailed the increasing 
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concentration of DOC’s paramilitary forces on an island the department completely controlled—
with one way in and one way out.  
“The community,” DOC argued, “when completed, will establish for the City of New York 
one of the finest correctional complexes in the world.”506 McGrath followed Kross in urging the 
City to build new facilities in order for the existing facilities to realize their rehabilitative potential. 
Absent from this calculation was any number of external factors driving up DOC’s census, with 
which even the most ambitious architectural program could scarcely compete. The year was, after 
all, 1968. The “city in itself,” it turned out, was not removed from the goings on in the world 
outside.  
In the present, the mention of the year 1968 evokes images of chaos and social turmoil, 
revolution and anarchy in the streets. The Tet Offensive rocked the US forces in Vietnam, adding 
fuel to the conflict over the war that now stratified US society and catalyzed violent clashes in 
New York’s streets, exacerbated by class tensions, racial animosity, and the growing desperation 
of the City’s déclassé working class. The student movement bubbled up all over the world, perhaps 
most famously in Paris. In Chicago, the Democratic Convention degenerated into a brutal police 
riot before the eyes of the world. In New York City, the harmless and goofy “YIP-in” at Grand 
Central Station, organized by the Youth Internationalist Party’s Abby Hoffman, was violently 
repressed by an emboldened NYPD. Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., were gunned 
down, the latter occasioning riots across the US, and the near-imposition of martial law in New 
York City.507 
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After the assassination of King, Gottehrer recalls walking the streets with printed copies of 
an order declaring a state of emergency in New York City, which placed the National Guard under 
the command of the NYPD.508 Lindsay’s office had coordinated, with the close cooperation of the 
Vera Institute for Justice, a plan to institute martial law in the case of widespread urban disorder, 
and to use the City jails as detention facilities for upwards of 12,000 arrestees, with Rikers as 
ground zero.509 Despite the alacrity with which Vera prepared detailed counterinsurgency plans 
for the maintenance of order by way of mass arrests, the plan was never quite necessary.510 The 
Mayor’s office, NYPD, and Vera were however able to practice their war games on New York 
City’s student movement during the Columbia occupation of April 1968, which was violently 
repressed with over 700 arrests.511 Mayor Lindsay’s Committee on the Administration of Justice 
Under Emergency Situations reported “appropriate parts of the plan were invoked with generally 
successful results during the student demonstrations this spring.”512  
Law and order became the touchstone of the 1968 presidential election, in which Richard 
Nixon rode its momentum to the White House. The following year, Lindsay would find himself 
effectively pushed out of the Republican Party, defeated in the mayoral primary by Staten Island 
state senator John Marchi, a right-winger in the vein of Buckley who had already earned the 
Conservative Party nomination.513 Nixon aide Pat Buchanan called this “a permanent blow to the 
Dewey-Rockefeller, Eastern Liberal Establishment coalition” within the Republican Party.514 
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Lindsay retained the mayoralty by running on the Liberal Party line, as an underdog—this time, 
with only 964,844 votes.515 Lindsay, who had staked his candidacy on the hypothesis that New 
York was governable, was barely hanging on.  
 
Less Humane than Public Zoos 
The year 1968 was also of great significance for DOC: it was the first year in the agency’s 
history that its detainee population exceeded its population of sentenced prisoners.516 The influx 
of pre-trial detainees put tremendous pressure on DOC, necessitating the move of adolescents—at 
long last—from the Brooklyn House of Detention to the Correctional Institution for Men (CIFM, 
the old Penitentiary on Rikers), a crumbling maximum security facility which in 1968 was 
repurposed as the Adolescent Remand Shelter. In anticipation of the new adolescent facility, all 
adolescents were now concentrated in one central location: Rikers Island. A prisoner from this 
period, identified as Chick, describes life in the facility: 
 There they put two people in a cell that’s really too small for two people. The cells are 
 about six feet by eight feet by eight feet, something like that. Real small and dirty.  
 
You don’t do too much of anything at Rikers. Some days you might eat at six o’clock in 
the morning, other days you might eat at eight o’clock in the morning. After you eat you 
gotta come back to your cell and wait, If they feel like letting you out for some recreation, 
they let you out around ten-thirty or so. You stay out till around twelve-thirty, then you go 
to chow. You come back, get locked in again. If they feel like letting you out again, they 
let you out. If not, you have to wait until it’s time to eat again. It’s really what they feel.517  
 
It was as if Kross had never come along at all—except for the infrastructure she had left behind.   
 
The most poignant token of DOC’s move away from Kross’s vision of Rikers came when 
the so-named New York City Reception and Classification Center (C-76), flagship of Kross’s 
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rehabilitative program, was redesignated the new Correctional Institution for Men, to take the place 
of the old Penitentiary, which was not decommissioned but repurposed for adolescents. Though 
DOC claimed the facility would still “process” sentenced males, and continued to experiment with 
social work programming at the facility, its revised nomenclature represented a significant revision 
of the project’s original intention, and a move toward inmate warehousing. An ugly incident of 
racially-motivated violence in August 1968 testified to the reality underlying Kross’s brainchild. 
A gang of at least twenty-three white prisoners viciously attacked six black prisoners said to 
encroach on white terrain, leaving the star pitcher of the Rikers Island Tigers in a coma with 
“absolutely nil” chances of recovery.518  
A 1969 investigation led by jail reformer and state senator John R. Dunn, spurred by a rash 
of suicides in custody—forty since 1963 and sixteen in 1968 alone—documented how “[i]ntense 
overcrowding, inadequate personnel and poorly designed facilities have resulted in turning 
detention facilities into settings less humane that our public zoos and more fertile breeding grounds 
for crime that the streets from which they have been taken.”519 Dunn found 2,000 prisoners in the 
Tombs, meant for 925; 3,100 in the Rikers Adolescent Remand Shelter, meant for 2,100; 1,650 in 
the Reformatory (Penitentiary), meant for 980; and Kross’s pet project, CIFM (C-76), packed with 
2,300 prisoners, far in excess of its 1,457 capacity.520 Additionally the report noted the prevalence 
of alcoholics in jail custody, estimating that 90% of prisoners jailed for public intoxication were 
in fact alcoholics in need of treatment, who were instead “serving life sentences on the installment 
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plan.”521 While DOC data did not keep track of race,522 one investigative journalist estimated that 
by this point, 80 to 85 percent of the prisoners on Rikers Island were black and Puerto Rican.523 
The average suicide victim, the report found, was young, non-white, and experiencing withdrawal 
from narcotics in facilities ill-suited for drug treatment.524 The State report coincided with at least 
two high-profile arrests of Rikers guards for brutality and sexual abuse.525  
Kross’s plans for infrastructure, including an Annex to the CIFM which added 768 beds to 
the sentence facility, were “sorely needed” by this point and well underway.526 But the grand 
humanistic theory underlying this design was rapidly becoming at best an afterthought.  Kross’s 
Institute of the Behavioral Sciences, which her administration had spent so many hours and so 
much ink plotting in exhaustive detail, had already been forgotten. Instead, DOC’s transportation 
division, now responsible for 300,000 transfers each year, clamored for a $3,675,000 auto shop, 
to be built on Rikers Island to facilitate transfers to court for its growing population of pre-trial 
detainees—for whom there was virtually nothing in the way of programming.527 A Times reporter 
found that overcrowding and insufficient programming and facilities had transformed Rikers into 
an “island of idleness.”528  
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By 1970, only 180 of the estimated 3,000 adolescent prisoners held on Rikers Island could 
attend school, and preference was given to those who had not dropped out prior to being locked 
up.529 MDT industrial facilities regularly stood idle, only intermittently activated by the release of 
much-needed federal funds.530 Some programming persisted, but as Warden Raymond McAlonan 
of the Adolescent Reformatory admitted, “if they care for 5 percent of our population, it’ll be a 
lot.”531 A Reformatory prisoner named Hector described to investigative journalist Harvey 
Swados, an early critic of the new Rikers, a crowded and cruel environment marked by violence, 
fear, distrust, sexual assault, callous disregard for human life, and nothing to do to pass the time. 
“Night after night after night,” Hector recounted, “I’d lay there masturbating—that was all there 
was for me.”532 
In March of 1970, four students of NYU’s Graduate School of Social Work, the a lodestone 
of DOC’s Kross-era rehabilitative partnerships, refused to accept awards recognizing their service 
to Rikers Island prisoners, in protest of the island’s conditions. The students had previously 
charged the island’s programming as “deforming rather than reforming” young people locked up 
there. “We would have liked to burn the citations,” student Gloria Robertshaw declared, “but we 
can’t, so we just won’t accept them.”533 Later that year, DOC’s Director of Psychiatry Dr. Violet 
E. Stephenson, the head of another Kross pet project, resigned the position in protest, calling its 
services “disgracefully inadequate” due to short-staffing, disrespect from other DOC staff, and 
medical standards often below the legal minimum. DOC, she charged, “functions along military 
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Whatever optimism accompanied the temporary decrease in DOC’s prisoner population 
after the 1967 reform of parole was soon dashed. In 1969, Vera documented a population explosion 
with “serious consequences. Already overcrowded institutions have become ever more burdened, 
resulting in impairment of security, strains on personnel, and destruction of prisoner morale.” 
Moreover, DOC had “been forced to lodge over 2,000 detention cases in facilities on Riker’s 
Island, previously used only for sentenced prisoners. The remoteness of this location hampers the 
preparation of defenses by lawyers and visiting by families and magnifies the problem of 
transporting prisoners to court.”535 By 1969, the average daily census in DOC custody was 13,170, 
up from 10,973 the previous year, a pronounced majority of whom were pre-trial detainees.536 The 
total capacity of DOC’s facilities was 7,993.537 By 1970, DOC’s population would crack 14,000, 
or 183% above capacity.538 Its facilities were by now synonymous with overcrowding; in Long 
Island, guards protesting crowding and overwork held signs reading “Keep the Tombs in N.Y.C.” 
and “Don’t Bring a Rikers Island to Nassau County.”539  
DOC desperately undertook new hiring to keep up with the surplus, still clinging to the 
ideology of rehabilitation that was quickly becoming a relic of the past. In hiring 131 guards, 
twenty-five “trainees” (a second tier of guards aged 17-21, too young to formally take the position), 
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and nine “administrative aides” hired to do administrative work currently done by guards, DOC 
claimed it was responding to the department’s activities having “grown considerably more 
complex and diversified in response to recent advances in penology.”540 Such rhetoric was 
however flimsy and by this point perfunctory.541 As ever, City and State fought to pawn off 
responsibility for the city’s sentenced prisoners on one another. “Governor Rockefeller and Mayor 
Lindsay,” quipped reporter Martin Arnold, “called upon each other yesterday to solve the crisis in 
the city’s jails.”542  
What was the source of this influx of detainees driving DOC’s facilities to the breaking 
point? While a comprehensive answer is beyond the scope of the present study, it is worthwhile to 
consider a political explanation. Then as now, the question of how vigorously the police should 
uphold the law during protest situations was a contested political issue. Lindsay’s administration 
practiced a pragmatic policy toward urban unrest that enraged some conservatives, going as far as 
to put known troublemakers, including 5%ers in Harlem, Yippies in Greenwich Village, and even 
the Mafia in East New York, on the City payroll.543 As student protesters and black power militants 
became increasingly confrontational, prone to property destruction, and verbally, if not physically 
aggressive toward the police, the PBA demanded a more aggressive hand repressing protests by 
sheer force.  
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At a July demonstration outside City Hall, some of the 1,500 young people protesting cuts 
to City poverty programs smashed parked cars belonging to City workers. The police, who had 
been prevented by their superiors from aggressively quashing the demonstration, were incensed—
especially after one of the demonstration’s organizers was revealed to be on Lindsay’s payroll.544 
In response, Cassese issued a directive to the rank-and-file: “We’re going to enforce the laws 
100%... regardless of what orders we may get from any superior officer.”545 The following month 
came the scandal over Furey’s courtroom, and the rise and fall of LEG. 
Yet, as PBA and LEG loudly clamored that the time had come to “get tough” and 
“vigorously enforce” the laws “100%,” outside of spectacular street demonstrations, NYPD had 
largely spent the entire year doing just. In the first nine months of 1968, arrests in New York City 
rose by 18.5% from the previous year. Felony arrests, however, were down by .4%. The influx  of 
detainees came not from serious crimes, but from a 36.5% increase in misdemeanor arrests, and a 
staggering 53.8% increase in arrests for “violations,” in which police have the greatest discretion 
over whether to make an arrest. These arrests, not felonies, accounted for the influx in the City jail 
system.546  
Far from demanding a new direction for law enforcement, therefore, Cassese and LEG 
were arguing for the extension to spectacular protest events of police policy that had already been 
adopted, and which had flooded the City’s jails with the lowest level of lawbreakers. Hardly a 
“City in itself,” Rikers Island, and all DOC facilities, were inheriting the brunt of the changing 
political configuration of the City—in which the police, strengthened by the public sector 
recognition of Wagner, and bolstered by the national movement against the Warren Court, were 
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now becoming a powerful political actor in their own right, under the banner of “law and order.” 
This new regime, however, would not go uncontested.  
“The Black man is unique,” wrote Stanley Eldridge, imprisoned in the Adolescent 
Reformatory on Rikers Island in 1968,  
 
   in that his feet are  
 perpetually moving toward, 
    around, about, perfect  
 rhythm no doubt, tapping,  
            he will eventually, dancing 
 get there. 
  The Black hand is  
 is forever climbing into 
       rings, 
 explaining things, fingerprinted, 
 pushing brooms, defying grief,  
 in shadowy rooms, 
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CHAPTER 6:    IN THE WHIRLWIND 
 
 
COBA follows in the footsteps of PBA to cultivate a militant approach to bargaining with the City, 
and its rank-and-file prove able and willing to take independent action. This further diminishes 
what meager share of power civilian staff held in DOC, and paves the way for the conclusive 
defeat of any penal philosophy save for the “custodial.” Meanwhile conditions in the City’s 
overcrowded and squalid jails become literally unbearable. Black and brown radicals jailed by 
NYPD capitalize on tinderbox conditions to help organize a citywide jail rebellion, only 
suppressed by a combination of brutality and broken promises from the City. Revolutionaries 
Angela Davis and Joan Bird are locked in HDW and documents conditions there, virtually 




  “When history is written as it ought to be written,” writes C.L.R. James, “it is the 
moderation and long patience of the masses at which men will wonder, not their ferocity.”548 In 
March of 1970, 1,500 prisoners held in Kross’s C-76 building, now known as the Correctional 
Institution for Men, conducted a hunger strike and work stoppage to protest the reduction in “good 
time” from ten to five days per month, the general conditions of crowding in the facility, and, 
implicit in every jail and prison rebellion, the fact that they were locked up in the first place. DOC’s 
director of operations Anthony Pricipe remarked that the mass action was the first in memory.549 
The strike lasted four days, and ended only when McGrath appeared in person to received their 
grievances, the “validity” of which he conceded, and promised to pass along their petition. As one 
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strike ended however, another action began. Prisoner workers at the Tombs delayed the service of 
breakfast in solidarity with the Rikers strike. After breakfast, sixty prisoners refused to be locked 
back into their cells, three of whom had to be forced back in by guards, causing minor injuries on 
both sides.550 Kross had been correct that C-76 would represent the future of DOC; she had only 
been mistaken about what that future would look like. 
If the prisoners’ response to these conditions was unprecedented, they weren’t alone. Under 
the direction of president Leo Zeferetti, COBA had been conducting slowdowns since February, 
in direct violation of State law.551 The pugnacious Zeferetti followed in the footsteps of PBA’s 
Cassese, the latter of whom had undertaken at least one slowdown since 1968.552 It wasn’t so much 
COBA’s attitude or beliefs that changed during this period, as much as its ability to act upon them, 
rooted in the growing political power the organization enjoyed as part of the movement for law 
and order. Fighting for an increase of 700 guard positions, COBA had been intermittently slowing 
down prisoner transportation, thereby crippling the courts, jail hospital, and prisoner work 
details.553 In fact, when the Rikers prisoners struck in March of 1970, COBA was still in the waning 
days of a slowdown.554  
Drastic actions, undertaken by prisoners or staff, were hardly a surprise. In early 1970, the 
Tombs was at 209% capacity, meaning cells intended for one prisoner contained up to three, the 
third of which slept on the floor. Tombs prisoners, “overwhelmingly black and Puerto Rican,” 
were packed three to a cell, in six foot by eight foot steel boxes with one side for bars, and no 
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access to fresh air or daylight.555 The Tombs library boasted 500 identical copies (!) of a menu 
translation book (!) for travelers (!) called Dining Out in Any Language, 200 copies of Coin 
Collectors Guide, and, as BOC later noted, not a single book about Martin Luther King Jr., or any 
Spanish-language books concerning Puerto Rico.556 Manhattan congressman Edward Koch 
conducted a survey of Tombs prisoners, who reported vermin infested cells, a shortage of soap, 
and medical care so poor that one prisoner had lived there for seven months with a bullet lodged 
in his body. Of Koch’s respondents, over 40% had witnessed a guard assault a prisoner. Almost 
all prisoners reported having no mattress or blanket for days on end, and those with blankets 
overwhelmingly reported them to be filthy.557  
The Tombs became emblematic of the City’s jail conditions, but the facility was not 
unique. Black Panther Jamal Joseph was held in old Penitentiary, which by this time was being 
used for adolescent pretrial detainees, and called the Adolescent Remand Shelter. “My cell was 
cramped and dirty,” Joseph recalls, of the protective custody cell where he began his stay, “with a 
paper-thin mattress on a metal slab passing for a bed. My only bedding was a coarse grey blanket. 
Mice darted around the floor looking for food like shoppers at a mall…This was obviously their 
jail and I was the visitor.”558 General population, he soon discovered, was no better. “The cell 
block was huge,” Joseph recalls.  
Four tiers with two inmates per cell. Four hundred adolescents with hormones raging and 
anger and frustration pulsing through their veins. The charges ranged from burglary and 
drug possession to armed robbery and murder. All the teenagers in this section of Rikers 
were trial prisoners. They either could not afford bail or had been remanded without bail. 
It was sad to see young men locked up for relatively minor offenses because their family 
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couldn’t afford a few hundred dollars to get them out, but that was the case for a lot of the 
young inmates at Rikers.559 
 
These inhumane conditions engendered inhumanity between prisoners. Joseph witnesses a brutal 
stabbing, with a sharpened bed spring called a figa, over a petty debt involving some cigarettes. It 
ended in the arrest of the attackers and, it was rumored, the death of the victim.560  
Soon Joseph experienced first-hand both the brutality meted out between prisoners and the 
sad reality that sometimes it was required to survive. Joseph learned a “notorious booty bandit” 
(rapist) named Lefty, who had befriended him under the guise of learning more about the Panthers, 
had designs on “taking [Joseph’s] manhood.” Joseph’s cellmate, who had previously instructed 
him in institutional knowledge to his great benefit, described the drastic measures necessary to 
stave off the common occurrence of rape:  
the only way to back a dude like Lefty off of you is to sneak up on him with a mop ringer 
or a figa and fuck him up real good in front of everybody. And while he’s on the ground 
bleedin’ you yell at that motherfucker so that everybody can hear you, ‘I’m a man, 
motherfucker. I ain’t nobody’s bitch, motherfucker. Anybody try to take my manhood is 
getting wasted.’ The guards are gonna fuck you up and put you in the bing for a couple of 
months, but when you come out the dudes is gonna know that you ain’t to be fucked with.561 
 
After repeated entreaties to be left alone, the otherwise thoughtful and cool-headed Joseph ended 
up beating his would-be rapist with a food tray and stomping him on the ground, breaking the 
man’s nose, for which he served a month in solitary. Upon his release, Joseph learned he was now 
respected, and had no more trouble. He had been forced to commit brutality himself and to suffer 
in turn a traumatic punishment, all to simply be left alone.562   
While life inside these detention facilities was miserable, getting out for the day was 
possibly worse. Court appearances for pretrial detainees citywide were ordeals of days spent in 
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cramped and filthy garbage-strewn court pens clogged with stale smoky air reaching temperatures 
that literally soaked many prisoners in sweat. There they were denied medical care, fed barely 
edible food, and in the cases of recent arrestees, denied food for upward of seventeen hours. Most 
prisoners in the pens were deprived of a place to sit.563 As the final insult, prisoners routinely 
reached the courtroom to find their case simply postponed to another day, if they even reached the 
court room at all, which often did not happen. The staggering rate of prisoners forced to appear for 
inconsequential hearings or not produced from the pens at all, was justified by DA staffers as 
calculated to improve morale by giving the prisoners hope that their case was progressing. 
Conventional wisdom among prisoners, however, held that this was a tactic meant to bully them 
into accepting a plea. This theory seems likelier than the official explanation.564  
Anger among those subjected to these conditions, on top of being locked up in the first 
place, seems to have been always simmering. One Tombs prisoner in particular earned the 
nickname “The Toilet Breaker.” Regularly subjected to fruitless days in the pens, BOC reported, 
“when the Toilet Breaker is brought to the pens but does not reach the courtroom, he frequently 
vents his anger at the endless waiting and delay by smashing toilets in the pens. It usually takes 
four officers to subdue him.”565 For the growing number of revolutionaries in the City’s jail system, 
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this kind of visceral reaction to the inhumanity of incarceration, seemingly becoming generalized 
across the prisoner population, represented an opportunity for mass resistance impossible in more 
subdued moments.  
 
Power to the People 
On July 29, prisoners sent a petition to Lindsay and McGrath complaining of these 
conditions. They received no response.566 The Tombs was at 212% capacity, which means triple 
celling.567 One Tombs prisoner from this period describes quadruple celling.568 On August 8, 
David Felder, a black prisoner on the ninth floor of the Tombs, allegedly struck a guard for 
bringing him milk in a cup instead of a bowl.569 In Felder’s When he was removed by guards, 
thirty black prisoners, fearing for his safety, held two white prisoners hostage for over an hour 
until he was returned safely.570 Two days later, at breakfast, prisoners on the same floor took five 
guards hostage, barricading a housing unit for eight hours, breaking windows.571 The prisoners 
declared they had five hostages, but “No harm will come to them if we are not attacked. We want 
to see the mayor and the Press.”572 “The manner in which we chose to express our grievances is 
dramatic,” the prisoners wrote in a statement stuck in a paperback book, placed inside a sock, and 
                                                            
it would be well worth the $350 expenditure per bowl to purchase steel bowls. Mr. D'Elia stated that steel bowls are 
almost as easy to break as are the china ones. Commissioner Malcolm expressed his appreciation for any assistance 
which the Board could give in this area” (BOC Meeting Minutes 3/6/72, 1, 3). 
566 Toussaint Losier, “Against ‘Law and Order’ Lockup: The 1970 NYC Jail Rebellions,” Race and Class 59, no. 1, 12. 
567 New York State Committee on Crime and Correction, The Hidden Society (Albany: NYSCCC, 1971), 11. 
568 Richie, “To My Brother,” 34. Richie, a young white man in and out of a variety of City and State carceral facilities 
from an early age, rates the Tombs as the worst he had seen, including Sing Sing. 
569 “Two Whites are Seized by Black Prisoners in Tombs Incident,” New York Times, August 9, 1970; Francis X. Clines, 
“Inmate’s Beating Called Riot Spark,” New York Times, August 19, 1970.  
570 NYSCC, Hidden Society, 11. 
571 Alfonso A. Navarez, “Tombs Prisoners Seize 5 Hostages in 8-Hour Protest,” New York Times, August 11, 1970.  
572 Gottehrer, Mayor’s Man, 262. 
165 
 
tossed outside the window to the street below, “but it is not as dramatic and shocking as the 
conditions under which society as forced us to live.”573  
While racial tension between black and white prisoners had marked the onset of the 
rebellion, one communication identified the prisoners as the “people of Cuba Puerto Rico Black 
and whites.”574 Inmate Julio Senidez later reported that virtually all ninth floor prisoners were 
black and Puerto Rican, but “there was one Italian guy, and I give him credit, he was with us all 
the way.”575 William Hickey, who had been taken hostage and beaten in the original incident, later 
testified that white and black prisoners were united in the subsequent actions.576 
In their statement of grievances and demands, the prisoners complained of court 
proceedings where they were denied hearings or prevented from speaking, kept waiting in pens all 
day without ever getting to court, provided with inadequate counsel who pressured a guilty plea 
regardless of the case—all the while stuck in the Tombs for upwards of a year by excessive bail. 
There, guards regularly beat prisoners on the slightest pretext, disrespected the women visitors, 
and evaded accountability, though their behavior was surely known all the way up the chain of 
command. “Not one leaf of a tree could turn yellow,” the prisoners reasoned, “without the silent 
knowledge and consent of the tree itself.” Moreover, the food was deemed “NOT FIT FOR 
HUMAN CONSUMPTION,” prisoners were denied law books, the facility was infested with 
vermin, and clothing was inadequate, as was medical care. The prisoners demanded an end to these 
conditions, and amnesty for all participants in the uprising. “We do not know how the present 
system of brutality and dehumanization and injustice has been allowed to be perpetuated in this 
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day of enlightenment,” they concluded, “but we are the living proof of its existence, and we cannot 
allow it to continue.”577  
Importantly, this last statement would appear in almost identical language the following 
year, in Manifesto and Demands of the Attica rebellion.578 At least two Tombs prisoners, Herbert 
X. Blyden and Akil Al-Jundi, would take his experience of rebellion at the Tombs upstate to Attica, 
the most famous of a national movement of prison rebellions arising from similar conditions.579 A 
guard named James Clancey who had been held hostage reported he had not been harmed, and 
opined “I believe their grievances are just…reforms should come. If the reforms are not done, God 
help the correction officers who are working on the floor.” The hostages were released later that 
day, after the prisoners presented their demands to a City Hall staffer and three reporters.580  
The following day, however, while Lindsay met with McGrath at City Hall to discuss the 
situation, the Tombs exploded once more. Over 800 prisoners on the fourth, fifth, seventh, and 
eight floors seized four more hostages, smashing windows, setting fires, and dismantling the 
facility’s tile and concrete walls. Three inch-thick glass tumbled to the street below, followed by 
burning sheets and the carcasses of dead rats. A front group for the Workers’ World Party called 
Youth Against the War and Fascism demonstrated outside, chanting “Bail is ransom” and “Free 
the prisoners.” These rebellious prisoners were less willing to compromise than their comrades on 
the ninth floor. McGrath even sent a delegation of ninth floor prisoners to try to broker a peace 
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deal. Their overtures were rejected. Militancy at the Tombs had grown by leaps and bounds in a 
mere matter of days.581  
When negotiations stalled, tear gas wielding guards led an assault that quelled some areas 
of the Tombs, and the hostages were released by the evening. It would however take until August 
20 for the entire jail to be subdued, with prisoners on the fourth floor holding out for over a week, 
albeit with no hostages.582 In the meantime, Tombs prisoners launched a coordinated boycott of 
court appearances, meant to underscore their demands, intimidating and even attacking those who 
refused to participate.583 A small contingent in at House of Detention for Men in Queens also 
joined in the boycott, and a demonstration outside the Tombs called for the facility’s closure.584 
Prisoners at the Bronx House of Detention set small fires and staged a short-lived rebellion of their 
own.585 Simultaneously, prisoners at CIFM staged a small disturbance in the cafeteria.586 During 
this time the many broken windows punctuating the foreboding facade of the Tombs bore episodic 
flashes of the clenched fist and V-sign. For a time a sign draped from the building’s fourth floor 
bore the slogan “Power to the People.”  
After a spirited COBA meeting, Zeferetti responded by demanding the power to 
shakedown the jail. The City’s guards, he argued, must be allowed to “clean up our institutions,” 
by going through each facility, repairing broken locks, returning prisoners to their cells, and 
searching for contraband. The demand was backed by the threat of a mass-quitting.587 The 
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following day, the guards were allowed to storm the fourth floor of the Tombs, where prisoners 
had not been successfully locked into their cells since the rebellion began. By threatening to quit 
en masse, COBA also won back overtime pay, paid in-service training, paid orientation, and new 
riot gear.588 Additionally, the City worked out a deal to transfer 670 sentenced prisoners to State 
facilities, albeit at a rate of one hundred per week.589 
The disturbances came as City and State politicians and bureaucrats were breaking ranks 
in a very public way. Even with portions of the Tombs still off limits to guards, McGrath feuded 
publicly with State Senator John R. Dunne, who demanded Tombs prisoners to testify in front of 
special hearings called by his New York State Committee on Crime and Correction (NYSCCC), 
which had in recent years become sharply critical of the City’s jails.590 Placing more blame at the 
foot of police policy than City Hall or DOC would dare, Dunne proposed all prisoners jailed for 
nonviolent misdemeanors be released, and that the police begin issuing summonses for 
misdemeanors.591 When asked if they considered the Tombs conditions as an outcome of 
preventative detention, the prisoners responded “Yes sir! Right on! That’s the basics of the 
thing!”592  
The hearings only added fuel to the unfolding feud over who was the blame for the City’s 
jail conditions. “The city’s bad, the state’s wonderful—that’s the kind of thing you heard,” 
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complained Fortune Society Vice-President Kenneth Jackson, who believed the Tombs prisoners 
were given false hope by the hearing, and were soon going to “tear that garbage can down.”593 
Meanwhile in Queens, a judge had publicly ordered that either McGrath produce rebellious 
prisoners in court, or produce himself to explain their absence.594   
The report produced by Dunne’s hearings presented a damning account of the Tombs 
consistent with prior reports and exposés, while painting an equally damning picture of City and, 
to a lesser extent, State inactivity in the face of crisis conditions. In a remarkable rhetorical flourish, 
Dunne placed responsibility for the disturbance at the feet of DOC—an agency he claimed “does 
not correct but further aggravates the problem and spews its pollution in the form of un-
rehabilitated angrier men into our streets, bringing forth an even greater pestilence of crime and 
violence for an already terrified public to endure.”595  
McGrath in particular was singled out for failing to pursue an agreement reached with 
Dunne in December 1969. McGrath had agreed to mitigate overcrowding through shifting some 
City prisoners to State facilities, work toward a policy consigning all sentenced prisoners to State 
custody, and undertake “an immediate, intensive search for additional alternative short-term 
detention facilities within the City.”596 In his testimony before the committee, McGrath was grilled 
on DOC’s months-long failure to report back to City Hall on an inspection of the Brooklyn Navy 
Yard Barracks as a potential detention site. The commissioner came up empty. “I know what 
probably happened,” McGrath replied. Mayor’s Counsel Michael Dontzin, he speculated said “I’ll 
get ahold of McGrath and let him look into it.” Next,  
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he got on the phone amid a thousand phone calls. He said ‘Look—will you look into that 
Marine Barracks. This guy Dunne is giving us a hard time,’ right. I say I have already done 
it and it is not feasible and he probably said ‘Good. Send me a copy.’ I probably sent him 
a copy, his secretary looked at it, it is mimeographed and it was probably thrown in the 
basket. I don’t know.597 
 
McGrath subsequently told the committee “I don’t know any other places, that is all. If you know 
any, let me know and I’ll go down there.” 598 
The committee concluded that “McGrath’s attitude seemed to be that this… was somebody 
else’s responsibility, not his, despite the explicit agreement at the December City Hall meeting,” 
and the affair was “typical of the priority correction matters receive in New York City.”599 The 
committee also found that key civilian positions in DOC had been left unfilled, central DOC staff 
were inaccessible during the uprising, a constant rotation of managerial staff resulted in a low level 
of institutional knowledge among administrators, and that McGrath himself knew little about the 
institutions, insisting at one point that the Tombs lacked stairs. “Even the inmates knew there was 
a stairway in the tombs,” the report observed, citing one prisoner who told them “mice use the 
stairway.”600  
Moreover, rank-and-file guard morale was discovered to be “very low,” which one guard 
told the committee was due to the fact that guards had “foreseen” the rebellion and “mentioned it 
to people in authority many times.” In response, their higher-ups “smile—and that’s that.”601 The 
report also chided the State for moving slowly to mitigate the crisis, and the courts for delays that 
exacerbated the crowding.602 The total picture was bleak. “A man has to be angry,” the report 
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concluded, “when he rips an iron leg from the table in his cell and batters through three inches of 
glass brick—not with the hope of gaining freedom, but of merely transmitting his message of 
anguish and frustration to the society that imprisoned him.” 603 
In early September, as the City, State, DOC, and COBA leadership feuded amongst 
themselves openly, an additional contender announced itself. COBA’s rank-and-file undertook 
what Zeferetti claimed a wildcat sick-out at Rikers Island. Zeferetti had long been arguing, and 
conducting slow-downs, for 700 new guard positions. When the guards took the drastic action of 
the sick-out, COBA was promised 300 new hires that very day.604 Zeferetti declared victory, but 
many of DOC’s rank-and-file defied him and stayed out the following day. The demonstration 
even spread to the Women’s House of Detention. Only McGrath’s threat to withhold paychecks 
brought the action to an end.605  
This kind of rank-and-file militancy represented a qualitative shift in labor politics in DOC. 
Shortly thereafter, Legal Aid helped file a group of prisoners’ class action suit, Rhem v. McGrath, 
calling for the outright closure of the Tombs, on the grounds it violated the First, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments. This would become an important case for the Tombs in the coming 
years. The besieged McGrath, who stubbornly (if not obliquely correctly) blamed the disturbance 
on the “doctrine which says the bad guys are the good guys,” and society’s tendency “to call all 
criminals political criminals,”  responded by thanking the litigants, claiming “I’m very pleased this 
subject has been brought to a head.”606 It hadn’t.  
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While the young upstarts of the LEG wanted to swing blackjacks at the Panthers and their 
supporters in broad daylight, more responsible agents of the law had a better idea. On April 2, 
1969, NYPD had conducted a coordinated raid of five Party houses, arresting twelve of the twenty-
one Panthers who had been indicted on a specious conspiracy charge that included a plot to bomb 
the Bronx Botanical Garden, and of course, police stations. The evidence was flimsy and all 
twenty-one defendants, including some already in jail on other charges, and some who evaded 
capture, were eventually acquitted. Yet, in what was surely part of the State’s strategy, the trial of 
the “New York 21,” the longest in City history up to that point, kept some of the core leadership 
of the New York Panthers in jail for upwards of two years.607 As a result, work on the outside 
revolved around defending the 21, and recruitment dried up amid suspicion of infiltration.608  
These were only the most prominent arrestees of the City’s black and brown 
revolutionaries, who by this point were amply represented in the jail system due to the NYPD’s 
aggressive crackdown on their presence in the streets. In August on 1970, Tombs prisoner Julio 
Senidez reflected that a change had come over the jail in the preceding months. “The other times 
I was in jail,” he recalled, “prisoners were sort of conditioned to accept brutality… It’s different 
now. People are not giving in.” Senidez attributed this sentiment to the prominence of two groups 
in the City’s jails: the Black Panthers and the Young Lords.609 Both had been making their presence 
known in New York City’s streets. That summer, the Young Lords, acting as “representatives of 
a community fed up with the disgraceful neglect by city government of the health of its citizens,” 
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occupied a portion of Lincoln Hospital, a notorious City hospital in the South Bronx.610 As with 
the Panthers, the Lords demonstrated through this action the possibility for broad support among 
the City’s racialized working-class.611 Soon this momentum would come to the City jails.  
Young Lord and Tombs prisoner Victor Martinez later reflected that he and his comrades 
had been organizing political education classes, and planning to take action, starting in May of 
1970.612 Meanwhile, at the Adolescent Remand Shelter, Jamal Joseph, one of two adolescents 
charged in the New York 21 case, had been smuggling Panther propaganda and radical literature 
into the facility in his legal papers. He formed a karate class that became a political cadre. Members 
were forbidden to participate in “juggling” (usury), sexual assault, hard drug use, and collaboration 
with guards. The guards broke up their exercises as “unlawful assembly” but they were undaunted 
and continued practicing. Joseph’s block formed a common fund of commissary items lent out 
with no interest, and provided basic supplies to new arrivals.  
“The house gangs and the jugglers didn’t like what we were doing,” Joseph recalls, “but 
our cadre was about forty prisoners strong and we knew how to rumble.”613 Joseph’s cadre began 
taking root in other blocks, karate replaced basketball, football, and softball in the yard, and the 
guards took notice. Around this time DOC, which had been fighting Joseph’s requests to be housed 
with the other Panthers, abruptly reversed its position. “We had all been organizing in our various 
prisons,” Joseph recalls. “The authorities now realized it was a greater risk to their security to have 
Panthers on the loose in the general prison population.”614  
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On Thursday, October 1, 1970, the Branch Queens House of Detention for Men in Long 
Island City, rated for a capacity of 160, held 338 prisoners. Nine of them were Panthers from the 
New York 21, having been moved from the Tombs to Branch Queens after the August rebellion. 
Joseph recalls the Panther’s segregation floor at Branch Queens as the site of tight solidarity 
buttressed by intensive political education. The group intensively studied Sun Tzu, military 
strategies dating back to Hannibal, the writings of Marx, Mao, Che Gueverra, Patrice Lumumba, 
Sekou Torre, and Amílcar Cabral. Joseph was assigned with writing position papers, and then had 
to argue them. “If prison was a university, as Malcolm said,” Joseph remarks, “then our Panther 
wing was grad school.”615 Present elsewhere in the facility was Young Lord Victor Martinez, who 
had been working with comrades from the Tombs since their transfer to organize another rebellion, 
even producing upwards of 200 copies of a newsletter, reproduced by hand, called Inmates 
Forum.616 In fact, on October 1st, around two-thirds of the Branch Queens population had been at 
the Tombs during the August rebellion.  
That day, as Branch Queens prisoners were being transported to lunch, a small group 
sprang into action, overpowering guards, confiscating a set of keys, and quickly unlocking nearly 
every cell in the jail. Five guards, a captain, and a DOC cook were taken hostage. Initially the freed 
prisoners ran wild through the institution, flooding some floors, setting fires, and smashing almost 
every window on the building’s East side. But soon the fires were extinguished, the smoke 
subsided, and a red, black, and green flag of black liberation flew from the top floor. It was later 
joined with a sign reading: “Equal justice! Stop oppression, exploitation, and persecution. Power 
to the people.”617 Panther Kuwasi Balagoon remembers October 1 as “turnabout day,” when the 
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guards “were captured by the people, and put on the right side of the bars, for a change.”618 “What 
a beautiful feeling!” he reflects. “Next to getting out of jail, turnabout day is where it’s at… It was 
a religious experience… It was art and it was life.”619 
The Panthers, sequestered from the rest of the population, had no direct role in planning 
the rebellion.620 But their influence, and that of the Young Lords, was immediately palpable. 
Demands, printed in advance, including more black people on the New York 21 jury, and bail for 
Afeni Shakur, who was locked up in HDW. Additionally, the prisoners demanded no reprisals, no 
transfers, disciplinary actions against certain guards, and an end to charging prisoners money for 
basic amenities like soap.621 The rebellious prisoners established a governance system of tier 
representatives, and delegated responsibilities for guarding the facility, assigned relief duties, and 
created two roving security teams.622 A hostage described the prisoner’s division of labor as “like 
a guerilla unit, with an organization staff, lieutenants, and security units.”623 This was no 
coincidence; in addition to closely studying works by revolutionary guerillas, Balagoon and other 
participants brought prior experience in the US Army to the operation.624  
The prisoners also appointed a negotiating team of six, composed of black, Puerto Rican, 
and white prisoners, including Lumumba Shakur of the Panthers. The team requested to meet a 
variety of public figures including Mayor Lindsay and Muhammad Ali, but settled on visits from 
                                                            
618 Balagoon, Whirlwind, 497. 
619 Balagoon, Whirlwind, 498. 
620 Losier, “Law and Order,” 16. 
621 Balagoon, Whirlwind, 498-499; Sibley, “Prisoners Seize Hostages.”  
622 Balagoon, Whirlwind, 498.  
623 Emmanuel Perlmutter, “Assault on 5 Guards at Rikers Brings Union Warning that Jail is a ‘Bombshell,’” New York 
Times, October 8, 1970.  
624 Losier, “Against ‘Law and Order,’” 17. Stationed in Germany during a stint in the Army before becoming a tenant 
organizer, Balagoon had formed a clandestine group called De Legislators, “an organization based on fucking up 
racists,” and engaged in a number of carefully planned retaliatory beatings of racist white soldiers, after which “we 
would have critiques, just like at the end of war games…” Balagoon had earned the nickname “De Prophet” due to 
his “prophesying that so-and-so was going to get fucked up in a predetermined amount of time, and then going on 
and fucking the chump up” (Balagoon, Whirlwind, 371-372). 
176 
 
Bronx Brough President Herman Badillo, Representative Shirley Chisholm, Louis Farrakhan of 
the Nation of Islam, and Manuel Casiano, the executive director of a City program for Puerto Rican 
migrants.625 They also demanded a press conference, which they received, broadcast on WCBS. 
Meanwhile, 200 police, many armed with shotguns and tear gas surrounded the jail, erecting 
barbed-wire barricades outside the entrance and inside the underground tunnel connecting the jail 
to the Queens Court.626 
On the second day, Friday, October 2nd, the Queens prisoners released two hostages in 
“good faith,” to begin negotiations.627 At 3 p.m., as the Queens comrades met with Badillo, 
Chisholm, and Farrakhan to begin negotiations, prisoners at the Tombs rebelled.628 “The actual 
take-over of the floor was executed perfectly, like clockwork” recalls Panther Ricardo de Leon, 
who helped seize the Tombs’ eleventh floor that day.  
It was the complete surprise—a classic guerilla operation. We were coming out of the 
chapel, where a movie had been shown, toward the elevators to go back to our floor; the 
advance group split up and seized all the guards on the elevators and herded them toward 
the chaplain’s office. At this, the brothers who were in the chapel had the rest of the guards 
under control. The gate leading to the elevator was secured with handcuffs and barricaded 
with furniture; guards were placed. When the policeman who was in charge of the inmate 
commissary dug the take-over move, he locked the commissary and everybody in there. 
All we had to do then was post guards so they couldn’t get out. Later he gave up the keys 
voluntarily.629  
 
Eighteen hostages were taken, and while the prisoners could only secure the eleventh floor, it was 
done with precision.630 Once the eleventh floor was secured, the prisoners formed a “revolutionary 
committee,” which included who had participated in the August rebellion. Also present were 
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members of the Young Lords, and the Nation of Islam.631 They reiterated the demands from 
August, to which many more had been added, including clothing for needy prisoners, trained social 
workers, Spanish interpreters, and a new recreation area. They also pledged full solidarity with the 
comrades’ demands in Queens.632  
Once more, Tombs prisoners rained debris on the street below, including two guards’ hats, 
shouted “Power to the people!” and “We want the Mayor right away!,” and unfurled a banner 
reading, in part: “We want to see the Mayor and we don’t want promises.” As in Queens, they 
demanded to speak to Lindsay. The mayor, who somewhat sympathetically called the events a 
barometer of “the tragic state of our criminal justice system and the city’s limited power alone to 
bring relief,” refused to meet with either prisoner delegation until all hostages were released.633  
That evening, upwards of 900 prisoners at the Queens House of Detention for Men in Kew 
Gardens also rebelled, setting fires and smashing windows. 634  They did not take any hostages, 
but some hazarded escape, until beaten back by police smoke bombs.635 Their lack of hostages was 
most likely due to the uprising originating dayrooms guarded from the outside, giving the guards 
a chance to escape as the prisoners took over, and not a moral or tactical aversion to the practice 
of hostage-taking.636 
On the third day of the uprising, the Branch Queens rebellion was granted one of its most 
audacious demands—a summary bail hearing, held by a judge, in the ground floor visiting room 
                                                            
631 Robert D. McFadden, “All Hostages Out: Holdout Inmates in Queens Yield,” New York Times, October 6, 1970. 
632 de Leon, “Rebellion in the Tombs.” 
633 McFadden, “Rebellion in the Tombs;” Alfred E. Clark, “Prisoners Citing Old Grievances,” New York Times, October 
3, 1970.  
634 The institution names become tricky here. The facility in Long Island City where the disturbances began was the 
Branch Queens House of Detention, technically a branch of the Tombs. The Kew Gardens Facility was the Queens 
House of Detention. I have therefore used Branch Queens and Kew Gardens to avoid confusion.  
635 Losier, “Law and Order,” 19.  
636 NYSCCC, Hidden Society, 13. 
178 
 
of the besieged facility.637 “A precedent was set;” reflects Balagoon, “never before in the history 
of this racist empire had judges been summoned to a jail by inmates to hold court.”638 The first 
nine prisoners considered by the judge were paroled outright. Their cases, Badillo recalls, were 
largely ridiculous,  a mixture of frivolous charges and prohibitive bail known all too well to DOC’s 
captives past and present. One prisoner had been held for attempted murder of a police officer—
after a police officer had asked to see his BB gun, and complying with the order, he had produced 
it. The man’s low bail told Badillo that this was not a serious charge, and even the courts 
recognized its frivolity. But the bail was nonetheless enough to keep this man locked in a cage 
awaiting trial. His was a common case, of prisoners “in jail simply because they were poor,” as 
Badillo puts it.639 The judges stopped hearing cases after thirteen. By Badillo’s reckoning, “had 
the judges stayed to hear all 460 cases, at least 400 of those men would have been freed on the 
spot.”640 
In exchange for the thirteen hearings, the Branch Queens prisoners released two 
hostages.641 At this point there emerged a discrepancy about how many hearings had been agreed 
upon as a condition of releasing the rest. Gottehrer insists that the Queens prisoners promised to 
release all their hostages after this bail hearing, and thus broke their word when they proceeded to 
demand additional bail hearings as a condition for additional releases. By his account even 
Farrakhan told the prisoners “they had broken their word and he was very disappointed in them.”642 
Sensing loggerheads foreshadowing a violent conclusion, Farrakhan and Badillo departed, on the 
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heels of Chisholm, who had already left fearing bad press to come.643 Balagoon recalls the promise 
to release all hostages had been made in the heat of the moment by a delegation whose actions did 
not represent the wishes of all the prisoners—or a sound strategy. “In this writers opinion,” he 
opines, “we should have not given up shit, after giving up those first two captives in some 
motherfucking ‘good faith.’ But some members of the team went out there and fucked up, talking 
about letting all captives go. A general consensus of all inmates, after learning about the fuck-up, 
was to let two go.”644  
Prisoners rose up at yet another facility that same day. Three more hostages had been taken 
amid rebellion at the Brooklyn House of Detention on Atlantic Avenue. Beginning at lunchtime, 
seven out of nine floors of a facility packed wall to wall with 1,500 prisoners was consumed in 
revolt, following the same pattern of freshly liberated prisoners smashing windows and anything 
breakable, setting fires, and throwing flaming bedding and other debris onto the street below. 645 
“Ain’t that a rewarding sound,” writes Balagoon, on the breaking of glass. “Kids love it. It can’t 
be spelled… Some people can sound like cars. Hot rods even. Some can imitate a fire engine. But 
to hear the sound of glass breaking, glass must be broken.”646 BHD prisoners also hung signs, 
including “Power to the People.” Thousands of supporters gathered outside, and clashed with the 
cops, who fired their guns at rooftops from which rocks and bottles were being rained down on 
them. Several arrests were made.647 Panthers and Young Lords demonstrated in solidarity across 
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the City.648 Inside the City’s institutions, more than 2,700 prisoners would have taken part in the 
uprisings by the time they were repressed.649 
 
Power to the Pigs 
Mayor Lindsay promised no reprisals, but the rebelling Brooklyn prisoners refused to 
release their hostages. As the prisoners fought among themselves over strategy, a squadron of 
guards stormed the facility from the street, firing tear gas canisters. Most of the ill-trained guards 
had failed to properly secure their gas masks, however, and when a prisoner threw a canister back 
at them, the guards were scattered and sent running back into the street, leaving the doors to the 
jail wide open behind them.650 Six were hospitalized due to the gas. The cops who had held the 
line outside, not wanting to get involved in what was undoubtedly DOC’s problem, demonstrated 
for the guards how to put on the masks. Another assault was undertaken, in which all but two floors 
were retaken. Around midnight, the remaining 450 prisoners were violently subdued, and the three 
hostages released. Hundreds of prisoners were injured in the process.651 “If you dwelt on the end 
result rather than the means by which it was accomplished,” Gottehrer concludes, “you could call 
the Correction Department assault a victory.”652 
Around 3 a.m., fifty DOC guards and 100 cops from the NYPD’s Tactical Patrol Force 
stormed the Kew Gardens facility from the roof, cutting their way into the building using acetylene 
torches. They faced what the warden later called “heavy” resistance, battling floor by floor in hand-
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to-hand combat on floors made slick with soapy water to slow their advance. The prisoners held 
out for hours against tear gas and clubs, especially the “hard-core” on the fourth floor. It wasn’t 
until 6 a.m., that the final prisoners was locked in.653   
Gottehrer toured the facility as the battle raged on and then in its aftermath. “I was stunned 
by the wreckage,” he reflected. “Glass crunched underfoot. Water from firehoses ran ankle deep 
in the corridors.”  While much would be made of the wrecked facilities, Gottehrer was certain that  
“prisoners were responsible for only a fraction of the property damage, much of which could only 
have been caused by the acetylene torches carried by the guards… They had injured more than 
200 inmates, they had bludgeoned their way through solid walls. They had cut their way through 
steel doors rather than unlocking them.” In subduing the revolt, “guards had ripped up their own 
building more vehemently than any gang of rampaging prisoners. One had the feeling, looking at 
the shattered plaster and falling fixtures, that in the space of an hour or two the guards must have 
let out violence they had suppressed for years.”654 
By this point it was Sunday, October 4th, the fourth day of the rebellion. Lindsay was afraid 
the City was running out of tear gas, and sent an emissary to rural Pennsylvania, to find a 
manufacturer at his church service and acquire 1,200 fresh gas grenades.655 Kew Gardens and the 
Brooklyn House of Detention had been subdued. Prisoners at a fifth jail—the Adolescent 
Reformatory at Rikers Island—had briefly erupted, but were quickly put down and their four 
hostages released. Nonetheless, they got on the board.656 Hostages remained at the Tombs and the 
Queens House of Detention, the only facilities still holding out.  
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Facing the possibility of a violent showdown, the political fault lines dividing the self-
conscious political militants from the rest of the prisoners began to emerge. From the onset of the 
takeovers there had been problems at both jails with some prisoners shirking guard responsibility, 
eating more than their share of food, taking drugs from the infirmary, and generally causing 
chaos.657 The militants were understandably unhappy with this behavior, though Balagoon counted 
himself among the recreational window smashers. “Some of us had to be restrained by the 
collective to cut down on the confusion at times,” he recalls. “But it was good clean 
entertainment.”658 Now, with a showdown on the horizon, both sides understood the options of a 
confrontation were fairly limited.  
“If the pigs came in with guns and we fought,” Balagoon reasoned, “many of us would die 
and many of them would die, and we would have guns.” In other words, it would be a mixed bag. 
Alternatively, if the cops “teargassed us and came in with clubs, then the battle would take the 
form of a medieval war, the Crusades, a gory, bloody, extremely down-to-earth old-fashioned real 
war, extremely real… how many inside the building would die? Maybe all of us before the shit 
was over.”659  
A particularly acrimonious debate broke out over the release of the remaining hostages, 
who the Panthers understood as the source of power—and guarantors of the safety—of the Branch 
Queens prisoners. While an impressive degree of tactical unity had been achieved in the takeover, 
broader political, if not existential, questions emerged. “So many of them that had been right on 
with the building of barricades, surely they asked themselves, ‘What the fuck am I doing?’” 
Balagoon recalls. “Those of us who wanted to be a man for five days and until death, said, in effect, 
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we ain’t giving another inch. We’re prepared—and we want to fight anyway!” As time progressed 
this became a minority sentiment at Branch Queens. One prisoner, upon being told “this is a 
revolution,” remarked to Balagoon: “You hear that, I’ve just been drafted into the army.”660  
A similar split was making itself felt in the Tombs. At 9:30 p.m. on Sunday the 5th, Lindsay 
broadcast a radio message to the Tombs over WINS and WNYC, offering to meet with their 
representatives upon the release of all hostages. Otherwise, he warned, the facility would be 
stormed in a half hour.661 At this, de Leon recalls, “all the waverers, fence sitters, and opponents 
started shouting ‘Let them go! Let them go!’ Those of us who did not want to give up without 
getting a commitment on our demands were out maneuvered by the compromisers on the 
committee, who took over the public address system and steamrollered surrender.”662  
Lindsay’s threat was not as concrete as it seemed. As the Tombs prisoners debated 
Lindsay’s proposal, DOC Chief of Operations Principe revealed his plan—or lack thereof. To 
Gottehrer’s amazement, Principe produced a blank piece of paper and marked it with an X. “Here’s 
the door,” he began. “You go up this way.” Someone interrupted: “Are you sure the stairway ends 
up here? I thought it was further over.” Debate ensued. In short, Gottehrer quickly surmised, there 
was no plan; “No one even had a map of the building.” Principe further stunned Lindsay’s staffers 
by declaring “we’re just going to have to consider the hostages expendable.”663 City Hall stalled 
for over two hours, until the prisoners agreed to release the hostages, on the grounds there be no 
reprisals, and Lindsay meet with them as planned. The visiting Lindsay made rhetorical gestures 
to the validity of the Tombs grievances, and order was restored at the jail.664 
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Meanwhile at Branch Queens, the cops surrounding the jail were having a veritable field 
day, broadcasting the theme song from the television show Dragnet, interspersed with recordings 
of machine gun fire, from their loudspeaker system.665 Supporters of the prisoners also rallied. 
Since the occupation began, Panther 21 co-defendants Jamal Joseph, Afeni Shakur, and Dhoruba 
al-Mujahid bin Wahad, had addressed the crowd of supporters gathered outside.666 Inside, the 
prisoners’ general assembly was consumed by a practical question: whether to kill the hostages if 
the jail was raided. Positions ranged from “Let’s cut their throats, hang them, set them on fired and 
throw them out the eighth floor window,” to “I think we’ve gone far enough… we should call a 
press conference and give the prisoners up.”667  
The Panthers had consistently disputed accusations, circulating in the media and within the 
jail itself, that they alone were pulling the strings. When Lindsay broadcast a radio message early 
Monday morning similar to the one that had quelled the rebellion at the Tombs, the Panthers 
encouraged a vote on whether to continue fighting. In this ballot, one prisoner elected to represent 
each tier cast a vote.668 Initially, the prisoners voted to stay and fight. However, the presence of a 
small army of cops and guards outside, at once illuminated by floodlights, and an impassioned 
speech in English and Spanish from DOC Public Affairs director Al Castro, apparently occasioned 
a second vote, which was to turn the hostages loose.669  
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“Listen brothers,” Balagoon recalls the Panthers telling the other prisoners, “we’ll go along 
with the majority because we don’t want to fight you, but the pigs are gonna fuck you up anyway,” 
regardless of whether they turned the hostages over peaceably. Nonetheless the hostages were 
quickly released by a faction of prisoners eager to end the standoff.670 By this point, many of the 
300 guards outside—as distinct from the 300 cops—had shed their uniforms and armed themselves 
with pipes, axe handles, bats, table legs, and trash can lids. The NYPD Emergency Service 
Division distributed helmets, clubs, and gas masks to the guards, though supply ran thin and some 
guards preferred their makeshift weapons. Some were armed with shotguns as well. Many had 
come directly from other jails, where they had already engaged in hand-to-hand combat with 
prisoners.671 Principe, warned the guards were restless, gave a speech ordering the lawful and non-
violent evacuation of the jail. These remarks were met with obscenity-laced heckling by the rank-
and-file.672 
As Lindsay prepared to meet with the Branch Queens prisoners as promised, McGrath 
argued the jail must be searched first, which involved herding the prisoners into the yard. Lindsay’s 
aides worried the prisoners would be beaten, in violation of the promise the Mayor had made to 
them. McGrath assured them he was in control of his men, and that he would personally oversee 
the operation and ensure nobody was harmed.673 Under McGrath’s leadership, guards began 
escorting prisoners out of the jail and into the yard. Guard and prisoners alike subsequently testified 
that the initial evacuation went off peacefully, with over one hundred prisoners taken to the yard. 
However the appearance of Kenneth Cender, who had been identified as a leader, changed that.  
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A guard shouted “It’s Cender!” and upwards of twenty-five guards began viciously beating 
him, breaking some of his teeth. One guard continued to beat him under the pretext of helping a 
medic administer first aid as Cender lay on the grass. A similar fate befell Robert Drake, identified 
by one guard who shouted “That’s one of the leaders!”674 Drake was beaten unconscious with 
nightsticks in plain sight of Michael Dontzin, a high-ranking City Hall official, as he clutched onto 
Dontzin for support, taking the latter down with him.675 According to Gottehrer, the look on 
Drake’s face as he was beaten into unconsciousness shook Dontzin so much he could barely speak 
about it for months.676 On the record, most City officials didn’t speak about what they saw at all.  
From there the violence became more generalized. A media blackout was thwarted by 
reporters who, heeding updates on the beatings broadcast over a bullhorn by Victor Martinez, 
climbed to a nearby roof and captured dramatic photographs of the violence in progress.677 There 
they observed prisoners beaten severely, even after they had gone limp; kicked while on the 
ground, including in the genitals; and denied medical assistance for their injuries. Officials in 
suits—denoting high rank in DOC or City Hall—who the reporters could not positively identify 
loitered nearby in plain sight of the beatings, doing nothing.678 When a paramedic requested help 
from a group of loitering guards to load an injured prisoner into her ambulance, they responded 
“Power to the pigs,” and walked away.679 
The Panthers secured themselves in an upper floor, armed with all the makeshift weapons 
they could find, and prepared to fight. Meanwhile supporters of the prisoners continued to rally 
outside the jail, and the Panthers’ lawyers tried to negotiate a peaceful surrender. All the while the 
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Panthers communicated their situation, and the beating they had witnessed.680 As guards set small 
fires in the jail to smoke out the holdouts, Lindsay’s aid Sid Davidoff persuaded McGrath to allow 
a cherry picker to carry the remaining prisoners out the window, thus avoiding the chance of guard 
brutality as they made their way through the jail. All parties agreed.681 As the prisoners’ supporters 
rallied outside, simultaneously bearing witness, the City was forced to demonstrate its commitment 
to avoiding more bloodshed by removing the holdouts in plain sight and placing them on a bus to 
Rikers. “The sight of the Panthers 21 members riding down in those cherry pickers with clenched 
fists,” recalls Joseph, “was the equivalent of watching Hannibal enter Rome.”682   
 
Gestapo-Style  
In the immediate aftermath, Tombs prisoners found their cells completely wrecked and all 
their belongings destroyed by guards. They were then kept on 24-hour lockdown. “We have no 
communications with the outside world,” wrote de Leon, of the “Gestapo-style” lockdown. There 
were “no visits, no showers, shaves, haircuts, no opportunity to wash our clothes, no recreation… 
Medical attention is non-existent; I have requested a doctor since last Monday and have yet to see 
one. The guards act as if they were deaf.”683 McGrath justified the lockdown, which multiple 
visitors reported making conditions worse than before the uprising, by the claim that keys and a 
gun were missing.684 “All this is a lot of B.S.” wrote de Leon. “I was working with the brothers on 
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the security squad and I would have definitely known if any firearms had been available.” Besides, 
he reminded the reader, you can’t bring guns into a jail.685  
The lockdown engendered a condition of violence and despair, in which multiple prisoners 
were said by DOC to take their own lives, though this claim was itself controversial.686 The most 
famous of these cases became that of Julio Roldan. Roldan was arrested following a Young Lord 
demonstration against deteriorating City services, where uncollected trash was dragged into the 
street and set on fire. The case fanned the flames kindled by the August and October rebellions.  
The Young Lords organ Palante charged murder, noting that Roldan had been beaten in the court 
bullpen after calling the judge a “fascist pig,” and that he had then been put in a single cell despite 
the facility’s dire overcrowding. Additionally, they cited prisoners’ accounts of him shouting at 
guards shortly before his death.687 Palante also allowed McGrath and Lindsay to share the 
prestigious  “Pig of the Week Award,” typically only bestowed upon a single pig, for their broken 
promise of no reprisals to the Queens prisoners and their stonewalling the investigation of Roldan’s 
death.688  
Appearing before the Board of Correction, McGrath explained that when he promised “no 
reprisals,” he spoke only for DOC, a promise he had kept. However, he continued, if the District 
Attorney wanted to press charges, that was his prerogative; McGrath could not speak for the DA, 
nor the mayor.  By his account, the seasoned lawyer continued, he had simply promised to meet 
with the rebellious prisoners in exchange for the release of hostages, which he had done, and had 
promised no retaliation from DOC, which had not occurred. Progressing from such pettifoggery 
to outright falsehood, McGrath concluded that no physical retaliation had been taken against the 
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rebellious prisoners, and therefore he had kept all his promises.689 The broken promise to the 
Queens prisoners would be compounded by the subsequent indictment of thirty-two of the 
rebellious prisoners on a number of charges including kidnapping. To their ranks was added a 
guard who allegedly encouraged the uprising. After drawn out court proceedings, all but two of 
the defendants would have their charges dropped, or else were acquitted, and nobody served 
additional time.690  
By this point City Hall wasn’t looking on McGrath much more favorably than were the 
Young Lords. Echoing the findings of Dunne, Gottehrer found McGrath had little control over 
DOC or the requisite knowledge to exercise it; especially with regards to the guards.691 “Like most 
bureaucrats,” Gottehrer observes, “McGrath had made it a practice to not probe too deeply into the 
way his subordinates carried out their duties, and he kept himself about departmental conflict.” 
The staff riot at Branch Queens had revealed how little control he had over his own department.692  
“McGrath’s career was ruined,” Gottehrer recalls, “and he was eased out after a respectable 
number of months to make way for a new commissioner, Ben Malcolm.”693 When this time came, 
in November of 1971, McGrath was adamant he wasn’t being pushed out, though admitted he felt 
like “an inmate who’s just been given a parole date.”694  
The uprising had a curious effect on the courts. Judges generally responded not by 
tightening bail, but by significantly decreasing, via the mechanism of lower bail, the amount of 
pre-trial prisoners remanded to City custody. Lindsay’s Criminal Justice Coordinating Council 
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cited this as evidence of more “flexibility” available to judges than was often acknowledged.695 
Less favorable was the impact on the Adolescent Reformatory on Rikers Island. In the wake of the 
rebellions, DOC shifted hundreds of sentenced adolescents to upstate facilities, to make way for 
adult detainees. This move to ease crowding in the City system effectively gutted what was left of 
the Reformatory’s Kross-era rehabilitative programming—which by this point, was not much to 
begin with. Despite the facility’s mandate to house “reformatory” prisoners with to indeterminate 
sentences intended to be tethered to rehabilitative programming, out of a random sample of forty-
five prisoners, only fifteen had seen a social worker, psychiatrist, or vocational employment 
counselor.696 As a testament to this lack of basic oversight, in 1972 BOC received a $7,000 grant 
to evaluate adolescent prisoners for “mental retardation.” After consulting with DOC officials, the 
Board predicted that thirty percent of the adolescent population would be deemed “retarded.” In 
fact, none were; most were simply “functionally illiterate.”697 
 
Free All Our Sisters! 
The resistance around New York City’s jails, on both sides of the bars, continued well after 
the uprisings, as it had smoldered before—in tandem with the ordinary everyday degradations of 
life in a cage. Stonewall veteran and trailblazing queer activist Sylvia Rivera came of age in the 
1960s cycling in and out of the designated wing for gay male adolescents at the Adolescent 
Reformatory at Rikers Island. There, she first began using heroin, and also learned how to adopt 
the appearance of insanity to avoid being victimized. She and friend Bambi L’Amour performed 
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“like two crazy abnormal bitches,” hailing imaginary taxi cabs in the hallways and staying away 
from the other prisoners. Once Rivera was placed in a holding cell at 100 Center Street with a 
group of men who the guard told “Enjoy yourself boys, have fun.” Immediately seized upon as a 
target for rape, Rivera feigned interest in performing oral sex on them. However she bit the penis 
of first man so hard that it bled, only letting go after being beaten. By the time she got to Rikers 
Island, Rivera recalled: “It was ‘That’s the crazy bitch that bit that boy’s dick. Leave her alone.’ 
…It was always good to play crazy.”698  
Later Rivera founded Street Transvestite Action Revolutionaires (S.T.A.R.) with fellow 
activist Marsha P. Johnson, a radical community group for queer and gender-nonconforming 
people, predominantly young and marginally housed. Based on their own experiences with 
incarceration, S.T.A.R. organized around the conditions in the City jails, co-founding the Gay 
Community Prison Committee, regularly picketing HDW on a weekly basis in the early 1970s. 
Contemporaneously, the Gay Activist Alliance picketed the Tombs over the treatment of queer 
prisoners, and the Gay Liberation Front routinely bailed out Panthers, Young Lords, and activists 
from its own ranks.699 These regular demonstrations by local activists took on a national dimension 
when HDW received one of its most famous prisoners.  
Less than a week after the October 1970 rebellion ended, former Panther Angela Davis was 
apprehended in New York City in connection with an ill-fated raid on the Marin County 
Courthouse in San Rafael, California, meant to free George Jackson and the other “Soledad 
Brothers” held at San Quentin. While awaiting extradition to California, Davis was held in the 
HDW.700 While race data from this period is frustratingly scant, by 1975 DOC’s population of 
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non-white women prisoners—and the women who guarded them—would be eighty-five and 
ninety-five percent respectively. In the early 1950s, the majority of both had been white.701 Davis’s 
account of her time in HDW, and the political activity it engendered, provides a window into daily 
life at the facility contemporaneous with the rebellions in the male facilities, while situating these 
rebellions in a larger context of everyday resistance born from human caging.  
Davis found the facility “old, musty, dreary and dim.”702 All women were searched 
“internally,” meaning vaginally and anally, upon admission, despite the scandal Dworkin’s 
testimony had inspired years prior.703 “Just enough activities were provided to distract the 
prisoners from any prolonged reflection upon their wretched condition,” Davis reflects, of the 
facility’s much-vaunted programming, held over from the Kross era. “The point was to fill up the 
day with meaningless activities, empty diversions…a network of institutions was there to absorb 
the energies of the prisoner.”704  
While sequestered in a psychiatric unit she dubbed a “maximum security arrangement 
camouflaged as a therapeutic cellblock,” Davis was alarmed at the high doses of Thorazine and 
other tranquilizers administered to women to keep them quiet.705 In general population, Davis 
discovered, “the prisoners spent most of their time in corridors…sitting on cold, filthy cement 
floors.”706 To make matters worse, these cells had no trash receptacles, and garbage was instead 
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tossed through the bars into these corridors.707 Visits, initially denied Davis, were conducted in 
twenty minute intervals through grubby glass, on a telephone prone to break down.708  
Women engaged in the nightly ritual of plugging up every crevice in their cell entrances, 
lest “Mickey,” their name for the facilities infestation of mice, would descend on them in their 
sleep. One even made it to Davis’s top bunk. “Indulging in a flight of fancy,” Davis recalls, “I 
would sometimes imagine that all the preparations that were made at night to ward off those 
creatures were barricades being erected against that larger enemy,” capitalism, and “hundreds of 
women all over the jail, politically conscious, politically committed, were acting in revolutionary 
unison.”709 While such revolutionary unity remains elusive to the present day, Davis nonetheless 
encountered the seeds of rebellion at HDW.  
Davis, a prominent member of the Communist Party, had originally been segregated on the 
pretext that anti-communist prisoners would cause her harm. After petitioning successfully to be 
placed in general population, Davis found many women receptive to her political ideas, and for 
this was soon transferred once more to a makeshift solitary cell in a converted examination room. 
Davis undertook a ten-day hunger strike in protest of being held in solitary, women across the jail 
joined in.710 “It was not difficult to go on a hunger strike,” Davis recalls. “If the food had looked 
palatable, it would have been hard; but the unsavory dishes they placed before me actually 
facilitated the strike.”711 A group of prisoners organized a march by Davis’s cell chanting “Free 
Angela, free our sister.”712  
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On the outside, two Board of Correction members, including a young Geraldo Rivera, filed 
motions demanding her release into general population.713 The duo had pressed for Angela Davis’s 
release from solitary at their first BOC meeting, and visited Davis before filing the affidavit.714 On 
the tenth day of the hunger strike, federal judge Morris Lasker ruled Davis’s isolation 
unconstitutional and she was released into general population.715 “The court was all but saying that 
Commissioner of Corrections George McGrath and Jessie Behagan, superintendent of the 
Women’s House of D., were so fearful of letting the women in the jail discover what communism 
was that they preferred to violate my most basic constitutional rights,” Davis recalls.716 While the 
ruling only freed Davis from solitary, not the jail itself, in his 1991 memoir Exposing Myself, 
Rivera scrupulously recalls himself as the “ringmaster” of a raucous courtroom scene culminating 
in Davis’s release from jail—thereby exposing himself to serious questions of narrative 
credibility.717 
Once in general population, Davis and her comrades on the seventh floor staged multiple 
direct actions demanding medical attention for their fellow prisoners. One ailing woman had been 
brushed off repeatedly by the jail’s doctor with the advice to “get a job” and she would feel better. 
Davis and her comrades refused to return to their cells until this woman received a serious 
examination. The action worked, and she was rushed to the hospital with tumors in her breasts.718 
Contemporaneously Davis began leading discussions on white supremacy and communism, 
finding much interest in her dialogic lectures. Sympathetic guards smuggled in copies of Soledad 
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Brother, which became “the most valuable piece of contraband in the jail.”719 Davis corresponded 
with George Jackson, who urged her to inform the women of the HDW he had outgrown his male 
chauvinist views expressed in the book’s early letters. Davis met at least one prisoner who had 
been locked up with New York 21 defendants Joan Bird and Afeni Shakur, and who wanted to 
join the movement. Davis conducted karate classes, despite frantic administrators banning this 
practice, thinking, perhaps rightly, she was preparing for an insurrection.720 
A few stray books on DuBois, the Chinese revolution, and the principles of communism 
lay buried among pulp novels in the jail’s library. Davis imagined they had been left behind by 
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Claudia Jones, or other women jailed under the anti-communist Smith 
Act, thanks to a DOC policy whereby prisoners donated their books to the library upon leaving the 
institution. When Davis then received ten copies of Soledad Brother, however, this policy was 
revised, just for her.721  
While Davis brought a sophisticated understanding of praxis to the facility, a culture of 
subversion and resistance doubtlessly predated her arrival. After lock-in, she discovered, the 
prisoners engaged in a nightly ritual of calling to one another by name and saying goodnight, in 
defiance of the policy of silence. Women used the church services, much heralded by the Kross-
era partnerships with the religious organizations celebrated by Feinman, largely as a social 
gathering where they could see their friends from other floors. Movies served the same purpose, 
and provided added cover for sex. Davis also discovered elaborate kinship structures modeled on 
the nuclear family—including marriage, anchored in elaborate wedding ceremonies--and many, 
though not all, were based on the romantic relationships that crisscrossed the institution. “The Gay 
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Life,” she found, pervaded the entire facility. Davis also encountered prisoners who presented as 
men and had adopted masculine pronouns, which she refused to honor.722 When Davis received 
notes of support from all over the jail, it was through a well-established and elaborate network of 
“kites,” illegal notes between prisoners smuggled by fellow prisoners and even guards, with no 
discernible profit incentive.723  
The culture of subversion extended in part to the guards. “A lot of officers here—the Black 
officers” one guard told Davis, in confidence, “have been pulling for you,” during her period as a 
fugitive. “We’ve been hoping all along that you would get to some place that was safe.”724 Davis 
found a number of guards who were sympathetic, even politically. “They were a conglomeration 
of Black women, both young and old, whose political sentiments ranged from ‘liberal’ to straight-
out sympathy with the most militant wings of the Black Liberation Movement.”725 Two had even 
been dismissed recently for affiliation with the Panthers. These black guards told Davis “they had 
been driven by necessity to apply to for this kind of job…it was one of the highest-paying jobs in 
New York that did not require a college education. In a way,” she reflected, “these officers were 
prisoners themselves, and some of them were keenly aware that they were treading ambiguous 
waters. Like their predecessors, the Black overseers, they were guarding their sisters in exchange 
for a few bits of bead.”726  
Sympathetic guards smuggled in political literature and hair combs, both of which were 
contraband, and smuggled prisoners’ messages out of the jail. Some even claimed while they were 
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not willing to needlessly sacrifice such lucrative jobs, they would throw down their badges and 
join the prisoners in a moment of revolt. Davis was skeptical but did not rule the possibility out.727  
Organizing on the outside had a profound effect on Davis and the political situation inside 
HDW. On multiple occasions she heard demonstrations on the street outside, with chants of “Free 
Angela Davis,” and “Free all our sisters!” piercing the jail’s walls.728 Davis was also able to 
conduct “street visits,” a time-honored HDW tradition of shouting out the window to visitors on 
the sidewalk below. These included a meeting with the Harlem Black Women to Free Angela 
Davis, which ended with one woman arrested after she ignored the cops’ demand to disperse.729 
Simultaneously, Davis fought extradition to California in court.730  
The threads of outside organizing to free Davis and her own organizing within the facility 
converged at a final demonstration in December of 1970, organized by the New York Committee 
to Free Angela Davis. As demonstrators amassed on Greenwich Avenue chanting “One, two three, 
four, the House of D. has got to go!” and “Free our Sisters, Free Ourselves,” Davis and her 
comrades inside chanted back, in rehearsed unison, from different cells, proclaiming solidarity 
with the Soledad Brothers, Panthers Erica Huggins and Bobby Seale, and the deceased Jonathan 
Jackson.731 Davis attempted to focus the demonstration beyond herself, shouting the names of her 
HDW comrades to her supporters below: “Free Vernell! Free Helen! Free Amy! Free Joann! Free 
Laura! Free Minnie!”732  
As the rally intensified outside, one HDW guard tried to clamp down the chanting of Davis 
and her comrades, but the women refused to stop. A captain was called to the scene, and she too 
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was rebuffed harshly by Davis’s cohort, and left dejected. Soon the HDW administrators gave up 
altogether on calming the women down, and after lock-in, they demonstrated loudly, banging 
shoes, and chanting: “One, two, three, four. We won’t let Angela go! Five, six, seven, eight. We 
won’t let them through the gate!”733 Guards responded by loudly beating one of their comrades in 
the adolescent wing and throwing her in solitary. At this, the women caught the attention of a white 
couple on the street below to spread the news. The couple spent the night placing phone calls to 
spread the news, and a sizeable demonstration was organized in response.734 That very night, Davis 
was extradited.735 During the surprise extradition, Davis put up her hands and began fighting with 
the male riot squad guards, who responded by beating her. Two women guards entered the brawl 
on Davis’s side. They accompanied her until she was turned over to the California authorities.736 
Panther 21 defendant Joan Bird was in and out of the HDW during the trial, both before 
and after Davis’s stay. In an exhaustive account of the daily life of the facility, Bird corroborates 
many points of Davis’s account, while providing rich detail about the facility in its final years of 
operation.737 Bird describes a large sign in the receiving room: “You can write Legal Aid for a 
lawyer after you’ve been here two weeks.” She describes women forced to submit to the internal 
search, or else locked in isolation until they submitted, similarly forced to undergo a forceful Pap 
smear, and peppered with “medical” questions that amounted to an interrogation about their sexual 
history.738 Bird and co-defendant Afeni Shakur later told their comrade Assata Shakur that the 
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women called this “getting the finger,” or “getting finger fucked.”739 The purportedly rehabilitative 
adolescent school, Bird found, “is actually a game which the adolescents play to get whatever 
candy, cigarettes, pencils, pens they can con out of the teacher.” Like Davis, Bird cites the chapel 
as a place women go to socialize, where incidentally there happen to be “a priest and a nun who 
offer you the forgiveness of the Lord and offer the advice ‘Sinner, repent, or to hell you will go,’ 
when actually you are living in hell—jail—called the Women’s House of Detention.”740  
In this hell, Bird writes, many women were doped up with Thorazine or cloral-hydrate, “to 
keep you from shouting out how awful and horrible the place actually is, they just drug you up.”741 
The Friendly Visitors, Bird claims, are just profiteers who sell the clothing women make, in 
exchange for “nothing but three cigarettes wrapped in foil, deodorant, and candy—and this they 
expect you to be thankful for.”742 “They say they’re now closing the Women’s House of Detention 
on Greenwich Avenue,” Bird concludes, “and they’re going to have it in a new building.” 
However, “it really isn’t going to change things; it’s not the building it’s the people, the cruel and 
corrupt people who can treat other human beings in a way they would never in the world think of 
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CHAPTER 7:    OUT OF CONTROL 
 
 
Citing the intransigence of black and brown militants, Commissioner Benjamin Malcolm declares 
Kross’s rehabilitative vision dead. The facilities Kross designated, and their island home, 
nonetheless remain rife for use… and expansion. But the spirit of reform is not completely 
eliminated. In the aftermath of the citywide jail rebellion, Lindsay reconstitutes the Board of 
Correction (BOC), long in disuse. Against the wishes of COBA, BOC cultivates an independent 
watchdog presence in the City jails capable of disrupting the status quo. Meanwhile a landmark 
lawsuit brings the considerable weight of the federal judiciary to bear on regulating conditions in 
NYC jails. The Tombs is shuttered for noncompliance with the law, and a precedent is set that 
extends to Rikers. All the while, the tradition of rebellion and escape continues. These factors 
combine to place the City jail system outside anyone’s control.  
 
 
The Old Way of Doing Things? 
 
Upon their arrival at Rikers, the Panthers from Branch Queens were summoned to the 
office of Warden James A. Thomas, the first black warden in the DOC system. “We are going to 
take over your institution,” one told him, “and when we do, we are going to lop off your head.”744 
While this particular act of resistance never came to pass, the disruption that the August and 
October uprisings had engendered in DOC would reverberate for years to come.  
Three main factors constituted the legacy of these rebellions.745 The first was the City 
response to the conditions publicized by the uprisings, which spawned a limited yet considerable 
                                                            
744 Caldwood, Right Moves, 117.  
745 Curiously, Feinman attributes these changes to the rebellion at Attica, making scant reference to the rebellions 
in DOC custody. While Attica certainly provided additional impetus for reform in the City jails, as I demonstrate, 
these reforms were already underway and made with explicit reference to the New York City jail rebellions. See: 
Imprisoned Women, 257. 
201 
 
effort at reforming the City’s jails, spearheaded by the revitalized Board of Correction. BOC and 
its allies constituted a renaissance of the largely discarded Kross-era reforms. The second was 
Rhem v. McGrath, the class action lawsuit filed in September of 1970 over conditions at the 
Tombs. As DOC struggled to stay on the right side of increasingly activist federal courts, this 
lawsuit produced others like it, and set  new precedent for hitherto unseen judicial intervention in 
DOC affairs. The third was the continuing tradition of resistance behind bars, which would never 
quite reach the spectacular heights achieved in October 1970, but remained nonetheless, always 
below the surface, and sometimes above. These pressures converged on DOC in the mid-1970s, 
closing some facilities, hastening the opening of others, and paving the way for further jail 
expansion on Rikers Island, as the City’s massive public sector infrastructure teetered on the brink 
of fiscal disaster.  
“The history of prison riots,” writes William vanden Heuvel in a signed introduction to 
BOC’s 1971 Annual Report, Crisis in the Prisons,  
is generally a pattern of immediate concessions to the prisoners to regain control of the 
facilities with a minimum of violence followed by excited public attention that concerns 
itself mostly with the noise of the riot explosion rather than the legitimacy of the grievances 
expressed, a few symbolic gestures of reform—and then a return to the old way of doing 
things with a few cosmetic touches added to mark the event of the disturbance.746 
 
The new BOC intended to buck this trend. Nobody had been appointed to the Board since Lindsay 
took office, and the Board had gone without a chair for over two years, featured multiple vacant 
positions, and was de facto disbanded by the time of the uprising.747 Testifying before the Dunne 
Commission, McGrath had remarked BOC was “just about dead on the vine but nobody has killed 
it.”748 Following the rebellions, however, Lindsay quickly moved to “reactivate” the Board, 
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appointing progressive lawyer William vandel Heuvel as chair, and six newcomers, including 
William H. Satterfield, the administrator of a Bronx poverty program, and Geraldo Rivera, who 
had become a television personality based on his work as a lawyer for the Young Lords.749  
NYSCCC celebrated the new BOC, while recognizing that Lindsay undertook the 
revitalization only “after initially blaming the entire situation on the judiciary.”750 In 1971 BOC 
acquired for the first time an office and a small staff, funded by a grant from the Federal Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration. BOC’s $54,283 budget was, vanden Heuvel remarked, 
“pittance in terms of the $92 million Department of Correction budget [the Board] was obliged to 
oversee,” yet an influx of volunteers reminiscent of the Kross era allowed the board to carry this 
small budget quite far.751  
For its part, Palante charged the appointment of vanden Heuvel, a “millionaire, Democratic 
Party politician” as chair was the precursor to a cover-up, akin to “letting the killers investigate 
the killing.”752 The Board’s subsequent report on Roldan’s death, for which vanden Heuvel wrote 
a dramatic introductory letter and Rivera served as co-author, proved this charge to be at least 
partially unfair. While disputing the Lords’ claim that Roldan had been murdered—BOC 
supported both DOC’s and Chief Medical Examiner’s ruling of the death as a suicide—the report 
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held the court system and the prevailing conditions in the Tombs, especially in the lockdown 
following the uprising, culpable in Roldan’s death.753  
The Board handed down an even more blistering assessment in the death of another 
prisoner, a young gay black man named Raymond Lavon. Vanden Heuvel had met with Lavon 
shortly before his death and, troubled by inconsistencies in the guards’ stories about his final hours, 
demanded an immediate report from the Board.754 BOC subsequently recounted how Lavon took 
his own life after a hellish ten-month ordeal of pointless court delays, wanton guard brutality, 
disastrously incompetent medical care, and as the final straw, a fabricated charge of assault on a 
guard, pressed by guards who had brutalized him in his locked cell—all as his mental and physical 
health dramatically unraveled and DOC did nothing to help him.755 Despite the stridency of its 
language, the Lords dismissed the report as a “whitewash.”756 
These death reports were only a small part of the revitalized Board’s mission. Vanden 
Heuvel released an ambitious program for the Board’s first hundred days, published in the Village 
Voice, a provocative move in itself, alongside a punchy editorial heralding the Board as an activist 
player in the City’s court and jail systems. The fifty-one points of vanden Heuvel’s agenda was 
comprised of sweeping reform demands, including more efficient and equitable court proceedings, 
bail reform, improved jail facilities and services, more freedom for prisoners to receive mail and 
visits, work provided for detainees, expanded oversight of guard violence, and of course—what 
                                                            
753 BOC, Investigation into the Death of Julio Roldan, 1-4.  
754 BOC Meeting Minutes 11/5/70, 1.  
755 BOC, A Shuttle to Oblivion: A Report on the Life and Death of a Citizen, Raymond Lavon, in the Manhattan House 
of Detention for Men, also Known as “The Tombs” (New York: BOC, 1970). BOC concludes that while it accepted the 
official ruling of suicide, Lavon’s death “must have come as a relief, for who among us could have survived the caged 
confinement, navigated the labyrinth of justice, endured the endless psychological and physical punishment, and 
then accepted the medieval dungeon and the final despair of learning that freedom’s possibility had expired again 
with a new warrant by a Correction Officer in the court where the whole journey would begin again” (34). This report 
is a visceral and heartbreaking account of the sheer inhumanity of the practice of locking people in cages.  
756 “Young Lords Decry Lavon-Death Study,” New York Times, December 5, 1970.  
204 
 
jail reform program would be complete without it?—“sensitivity training” for uniformed DOC 
staff.757  
BOC also initiated the Clergy Volunteer Program (CVP) in 1971, under which volunteers 
from local churches labored as de facto social workers. The BOC architects of this program 
postulated that previous reform efforts had run aground when faced with the impossible scale of a 
massive jail system. Therefore they focused on the granular level, the cell block, each of which 
would by “adopted” by a local church.758 In 1972 the CVP acquired its own funding and staff, 
though the City later assumed a share of its operating costs.759 The Board’s Task Force on the 
Church and Prisons pushed for DOC’s waged chaplains to be further professionalized, and to 
further involve community groups in the jail system.760 The Board also built ties with the Friendly 
Visitors, the Ethical Culture Society, the Legal Aid Society, the Women’s Prison Association, the 
Fortune Society, Vera, and other legal advocacy and charitable organizations—representing this 
revitalization of Kross era policy as innovation, just as Kross had represented her development of 
certain Williams policies as radically new.761  
DOC experimented with adding civilian staff to the jails under an idealistically packaged 
program called Correctional Aides, providing employment to underprivileged youths as part of 
Lindsay’s youth employment initiative. DOC was however driven less by the spirit of social justice 
than by an influx of federal aid money that allowed it to hire young black and brown people to 
undertake low-level custodial and administrative tasks in place of the overworked guards.762 
Initially Zeferetti opposed the Aides, threatening legal action against DOC that never gained 
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traction.763 While any union president can be expected to oppose the hiring of low-waged workers 
to do jobs ordinarily done by union members—especially if the workers in question are non-white 
and non-male—Zeferetti couldn’t quite put his finger on why he was opposing the program.  
Therefore, he opted to play the field. BOC meeting minutes reflect a variety of arguments, 
offered in rapid succession:  
Mr. Zeferetti stated that one of the major problems with these aides is that there is a conflict 
with Department of Correction trainees. He stated that aides are permitted in the cellblocks, 
while trainees are not. He further stated that the Correctional Aide program pays for the 
aides to go to college while the trainee program does not, and that aides earn more money 
than do trainees. He added that trainees are checked very carefully as to their background, 
while aides are not checked as thoroughly. 
 
Mr. Zeferetti stated that one major problem with the program is that institutional personnel 
have not been briefed or given any sort of guidelines as to what is the responsibility of 
these aides, or who is to supervise them.  
 
Mr. Zeferetti declared that it is important to determine whether the aides plan to become 
correction officers upon completion of their program. He further declared that the system 
of appointment must continue to be based on a competitive examination.  
 
He stated that he had tried to discuss with appropriate Departmental officials, including the 
Commissioner, ways in which the aide program and the trainee program could be 
integrated, but was told that since the aide program was federally funded, the Department 
had no jurisdiction.  
 
Mr. Zeferetti stated that the aides’ function so far has only been to assist in making 
telephone calls.764 
 
Ironically, once the Aides were situated and began relieving the guards of the more mundane 
administrative tasks of their day-to-day work, they became an indispensable part of the institution, 
supported by the guards themselves. When an austerity budget threatened the Aides program 
several years later, COBA would defend the program. This was however not due to any shift in 
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the balance of power, or even respect, between civilians and uniformed staff. The volunteers 
simply did jobs that would otherwise fall to guards.765  
In general terms however DOC under McGrath was far less tolerant of civilians in the jails 
than it had been under Kross. Speaking with the Board, McGrath said he considered the presence 
of civilian volunteers in cellblocks, a hallmark Kross policy, “a severe blow to the morale of 
correction officers.”766 Director of Operations Joseph D’Elia. “speaking as a former correction 
officer,” told the Board “it is the feeling of correction officers that all ‘bad’ things are attributed to 
them.” He continued, arguing somewhat perplexingly “the officers do not always want to be 
‘repressors,’ and having outsiders on the floor makes the officers’ job much more difficult, since 
if a volunteer is more available than a correction officer, the inmate will turn to the volunteer for 
assistance.”767  
George Camp, the Assistant Commissioner for Rehabilitation, agreed with McGrath and 
D’Elia that the guards would be unhappy with volunteers in cell blocks.768 Appearing before the 
Board in 1973, CVP Director Greg Harris described a disrespectful guard attitude toward clergy 
and other volunteers, especially at the Rikers Island control house, which was also extended to 
Board staff.769 This problem would recur; the optimists atop the Board’s hierarchy attributed it to 
a lack of understanding of the Board’s role in the jails among uniformed DOC staff and perennially 
called for reminders to be issued to the guards clarifying the Board’s role. However the staffers 
                                                            
765 BOC Meeting Minutes 12/9/74, 5.  
766 BOC Meeting Minutes, 4/19/71, 4-5, not a direct quote in the cited text. 
767 BOC Meeting Minutes, 4/19/71, 5, not a direct quote in the cited text. 
768 BOC Meeting Minutes, 4/19/71, 5. 
769 BOC Meeting Minutes, 2/5/73, 1-2.  
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with the most direct experience in the jails reported consistent trouble, ranging from ordinary 
rudeness to denial of access to DOC facilities on flimsy pretexts.770 
With McGrath in their corner, and their own power in the City’s political landscape rising 
in the footsteps of PBA, COBA was emboldened to take on BOC. Appearing before BOC in 
February 1971 flanked by two COBA delegates, Zeferetti claimed that since the Board’s 
revitalization, guards were afraid to do their jobs lest a prisoner make an unfounded claim of 
mistreatment to a Board member, who would transmit it to the press without getting the other side 
of the story. COBA Delegate George Smith complained that the Board never praised guards but 
only focused on misconduct. Zeferetti announced COBA would oppose the adoption of subpoena 
power by the Board, advocating instead backroom meetings between DOC, City Hall, COBA, and 
BOC, to which the Board should consent instead of going to the press.771 Although the Board was 
relatively lacking in its own actionable authority—one staffer complained DOC viewed the Board 
as a “toothless tiger”—COBA was certainly correct to distrust the Board’s ability to call attention 
to shortcomings in the court and jail system, and generate unfavorable press.772  
Such bad press was the Board’s major weapon, and made it increasingly unpopular with 
DOC as it had with COBA. While it is at times tempting to follow the Young Lords’ claim that 
the Board was simply “whitewashing” the atrocities of the City’s jails, a more dialectical 
understanding of these reports permits us to understand the Board’s revealing special reports as 
the mediated outcome of militant struggles within the jails. The revitalized Board’s reports on 
Roldan’s and Lavon’s suicides were only the most famous of a number of studies of prisoner 
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deaths which by no means let DOC off the hook for its culpability.773 Additionally, the Board co-
founded the Prison Mortality Review Board in collaboration with City Hall, DOC, and the Health 
Services Administration, to study deaths in custody.774 The Board drafted a scathing indictment of 
the City’s court pens, cited in detail above.775 The Board also presented the plights of mentally-ill, 
indigent, and non-English-speaking detainees, whose experiences in the City’s courts and jails 
were particularly hellish and dehumanizing.776 The Adolescent Reformatory, a Kross-era 
innovation, similarly fell under BOC scrutiny.777 The sum total of these reports put DOC on the 
defensive almost constantly, challenging the ability of DOC and COBA to define for the public 
what was occurring in the City’s jails.  
BOC’s high-profile investigations, coupled with an aggressive public advocacy campaign, 
resulted in a number of additional early reform victories. The punitive “bread and water” diet and 
stripped-cell “bing” cell at the Tombs were abolished following the Lavon report. Whereas visits 
had once been limited to family members or else pre-approved friends, prisoners received 
unquestioned power over who could visit them. Guards lost the ability to screen prisoners’ mail. 
Under Board pressure, Lindsay consolidated the disorganized mental health care in the jails under 
                                                            
773 These include: BOC, The Death of John Wayne Wilson (New York: BOC, 1973); BOC, Report on the Death of Juanita 
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774 BOC, 1973, I-5, 
775 BOC, A Day in Court Means a Day in the Pens. 
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the jurisdiction of the Health Services Administration. Paid work, albeit at DOC’s extremely low 
wages, was offered to pre-trial detainees for the first time, including work as “suicide prevention 
aides,” another Board innovation. Prisoners were granted the right to know the rules of the 
institution they were locked up in, a Board recommendation backed by a federal judge resulting in 
the distribution of a bilingual prisoner handbook.  
The Board lobbied to convert Branch Queens into a special facility for mentally-ill 
prisoners, which was partially undertaken before the fiscal crisis. Black entertainers like Harry 
Belafonte, James Brown, and Odetta were brought to perform for prisoners in the City jails.778 The 
Board pressured DOC to adopt Inmate Liaison Committees, intended as forums for elected 
prisoners and DOC staff to dialogue about grievances, toward “increased understanding,” in the 
presence of BOC staff who would serve as administrators of these meetings.779 The Board also 
helped create the Investigation Unit, precursor to the office of Inspector General, an internal 
watchdog within DOC.780   
One enduring legacies of this periods’ reforms is the introduction of methadone into the 
DOC system. Prior to 1970, the City’s addiction policy had effectively been a supervised “cold 
turkey” withdrawal under grim conditions.781 The Tombs, for instance, had a small poorly-
ventilated block where prisoners experiencing withdrawal, a common symptom of which is 
vomiting, were crowded two or more into thirty cells set aside for a facility where some 471 
prisoners experienced withdrawal in February of 1970. This wretched facility made the absolute 
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779 BOC, 1973, I-36. 
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worst of an already bad situation.782 In 1969 City Council, overruling a veto by Lindsay, mandated 
DOC establish a methadone program across the jails system.783 Lindsay and McGrath, however, 
dragged their feet on initiating the controversial program, and had to be continually pressed by 
counselors.784 Between the August and October rebellions, Lindsay announced a plan to make the 
program citywide.785 The new BOC subsequently took up the issue of citywide methadone with 
determination. Beginning in March of 1971, all prisoners taken into DOC custody had the option 
of “methadone detoxification,” as it was then called.786  
Another lasting legacy of this period was the abandonment of the direct model of health 
care in the City’s jail system. Prior to the uprisings, medical care in all DOC facilities was 
administered nominally by the Department of Health, but in fact was directly controlled by DOC, 
whose uniform staff had considerable power over day-to-day operations.787 Lindsay hired an 
outside consulting firm to evaluate medical care at the Tombs, and its results concurred with the 
reformers—and the prisoners.788 The City’s own Health and Hospitals Corporation undertook an 
equally damning study of DOC healthcare, finding it decentralized, “overwhelmed by the 
influence of the Department of Correction’s obsession with custody and discipline,” and home to 
staff deserving of their reputation of “senility and incompetence.”789 In response, Lindsay created 
the Prison Health Services division of the Department of Health with the mandate to standardize 
and improve healthcare in DOC custody. The DOH subsequently contracted healthcare to 
                                                            
782 Lesley Oelsner, “Jail to Expand Methadone Use,” New York Times, March 29, 1970.    
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Montefiore Hospital, a private nonprofit hospital in the Bronx, which had the advantage of being 
the only bidder for the contract.790  
Under this arrangement, which persisted until 1996, medical care was generally considered 
to improve, perhaps especially in the case of programs like methadone, prenatal care, gynecology, 
and obstetrics.791 These and other innovations were accomplished either directly by vanden 
Heuvel’s Board, or with its support, demonstrating an earnest exercise in addressing the grievances 
underscored by the 1970 rebellions. As ever, the modest strengths of working within the system, 
free from violent repression and permitted minor victories by the ruling powers, came with strict 
parameters, outside of which the Board did not stray.  
 
Administration by Administrators  
McGrath had openly plotted to abolish BOC, complaining it “interfered” with his 
department and calling it “a group of lay people who get involved in matters that are none of their 
business.”792 His departure opened the door for a commissioner even more hostile to the civilian 
side of jail administration. By 1972, the jail system was ninety percent black and brown, as was a 
majority of DOC staff. To replace McGrath, Lindsay tapped Benjamin J. Malcolm to become 
DOC’s first black commissioner. Describing himself as “a poor country boy from the South who 
came here believing there was an opportunity here,” Malcolm had been born in Philadelphia before 
moving to Georgia, attended college in Atlanta, and after a stint in the Army, became a New York 
                                                            
790 Shalev, “From Public to Private Care, 991”; Lloyd F. Novick, M.D. “The Contractual Model for Prison Health Care,” 
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City parole officer—a  position, by Malcolm’s own estimation, at the “bottom rung of the criminal 
justice system”—where he working his way to the position of Deputy Chief Parole Officer. After 
two decades in Parole, Malcolm had served as DOC’s Deputy Commissioner under McGrath, 
earning a Master’s in Public Administration at NYU two years prior to his appointment as DOC 
Commissioner. Malcolm understood himself as an advocate of “community centered” jail policy, 
which, importantly, he took to mean community-sponsored post-release services, not civilian 
involvement in jails.793  
“Institutions,” Malcolm remarked, “have to be administered by the administrators,” not the 
prisoners. And it was not the civilian administrators Malcolm had in mind. The outgoing McGrath 
offered a dubious plaudit for the appointment of a black commissioner, saying “it helps to have 
the top man more closely identified with the inmates.” By his own account, however, Malcolm’s 
primary identification was with the badge.794 This was due not just to his professional allegiances, 
but what he understood as the gravity of the period. Malcolm, who counted himself a believer in 
rehabilitation, later spoke of the sharp contrast between his tenure and the days of Kross. Kross, 
he recalled,  
was a humane individual, but she was dealing with a docile population of prisoners. Most 
of them were sentenced inmates, mostly for misdemeanors. We heard nothing of political 
prisoners then, nothing of riots, militancy. Then, in 1969, the number of detainees began 
to exceed the number of sentenced prisoners. Recently I was reading something in the 
magazine Presbyterian Life, which I often refer to, and it was about Watts, Newark, 
Detroit, Kent State. Well, it said the unrest in the cities moved to the campuses, and then 
to the prisons. The year 1970 was critical in New York because you had the emergence of 
the political prisoners, The emergence of groups who decide they’re victims of society. So 
they’re a problem and maybe they’ll be even more of one in the future.795  
 
                                                            
793 “Up from the Ranks: Benjamin Joseph Malcolm,” New York Times, January 20, 1972; Tom Goldstein, “New US 
Parole Board Member: Benjamin Joseph Malcolm,” New York Times, November 12, 1977. 
794 Martin Tolchin, “Malcolm, a Black, Named Correction Chief by Mayor,” New York Times, January 20, 1972. 
795 John Corry, “Spokesman for the City of Unwanted,” New York Times, May 15, 1974. 
213 
 
While Malcom speculated that he would simply be viewed as “part of the Establishment” by his 
staff, many DOC guards must have seen in the new commissioner a sympathetic figure sharing 
their views on how the Department should be run.796 If not, it was not due to lack of loyalty on his 
part. The siege mentality Malcolm described in his contrast with the days of Kross would animate 
DOC affairs as it approached a crisis the likes of which the City had not seen in its recent history. 
In June of 1972, the Board came under heavy fire from DOC uniformed unions, due to its 
willingness to talk to the media (instead of meeting behind closed doors), continuing insistence on 
granting jail access to civilian volunteers, and a particular incident in which a Board member 
traveled to C-76 after a work stoppage and made comments suggesting possible violence due to 
the crowding there. The Board held an emergency meeting with DOC staff representatives, 
including Francis Buono of the Warden’s Association, Gerald Singleman of the Assistant Deputy 
Wardens’ Association, Ray Mandanici of the Captain’s Association, and Zeferetti. The record 
reflects Zeferetti declaring “his people saw the Board as a vehicle of sensationalism and as an 
opportunity for the Chairman to appear in the press. He declared that the Board was inmate-
oriented.” Mandanici “declared that its group had ‘had it up to here’ with its relationship with the 
Board.”797  
For his part, Singleman offered an olive branch to BOC, suggesting that they could 
demonstrate “good faith” by issuing a public statement supporting suspended sentences for the 
Branch Queens guards charged with brutality following the October uprising, which vanden 
Heuvel granted as a possibility.798 When the City imposed fines on fourteen of the guards, vanden 
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Heuvel wrote to City Hall requesting the fines be suspended.799 BOC’s obsequiousness, 
constituting nothing short of a betrayal of the prisoners brutalized by these guards, did little to 
improve relations between BOC and DOC. Malcolm subsequently reported widespread sentiments 
among guards that the Board made their jobs more dangerous, while vanden Heuvel complained 
COBA actively prevented the Board from interfacing with its rank-and-filers.800  
Similarly, when Warden Albert Ossakow and ten guards at the Kew Gardens facility were 
suspended for brutality arising from the handling of the 1970 uprising at their facility, vanden 
Heuvel continued to defend the guards, taking the position that guards who had not been convicted 
of a crime should not be suspended without pay.801 When Ossakow was allowed to plead to 
diminished charges and retire with his pension intact, vanden Heuvel argued that this leniency 
should extend to the low-ranking guards as well, spurring a fascinating exchange with Malcolm. 
“The Chairman declared that he felt that line officers must be treated alike,” the minutes reflect. 
“He stated that the Department cannot treat those who are in subordinate positions more severely 
than those in command. Malcolm declared that, in that case, the My Lai senior officers should 
have been punished,” referring to the 1968 massacre conducted by American servicemen in 
Vietnam. “The Chairman responded that he agreed.”802  
Regarding these subordinates, a contemporaneous profile by BOC staffer Sylvia Kronstadt 
revealed a demoralized and cynical workforce driven to DOC employ as a “last resort” for those 
with “no place else to go,” serving twenty-year “sentences” awaiting retirement. The guards 
profiled hated working for DOC and had no identification with any broader mission than simply 
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securing means of subsistence and material comfort for themselves and their families.803 They also 
described a profound stigma attached to their job. “When I ran to tell my mom I was going to be a 
correction officer,” one guard told Kronstadt, “she cried ‘Oh my son!’… like I had just admitted 
to being a pervert or something.”804  
 
Rhem v. McGrath 
In the months prior to the 1970 uprisings, the Legal Aid Society of the City of New York 
planned to file a class action lawsuit around conditions for pretrial detainees in the Tombs. Their 
inspiration was at once local—Koch’s investigation of the Tombs bolstered their own knowledge 
of the facility’s grave condition, and contact with experienced prison litigator, NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund attorney Stanley Bass, proved a valuable influence—and national, as a budding 
prisoners’ rights movement had grown alongside a federal judiciary emboldened to take on 
scandalous conditions in prisons and jails across the nation.  
This final point is worth particular emphasis. Prior to the 1960s, the federal judiciary was 
uniformly reluctant to set any precedent impinging on the ability of prison administrators to run 
their facilities as they saw fit, deferring to the latter’s superior expertise, imperative to enforce 
order, and their ultimate responsibility to states, not the federal government. Spurred by the Warren 
Court, the Civil Rights movement provided impetus for the application of federal authority to 
constitutional matters once deemed local, and many judges followed suit. Of particular relevance 
to New York City, the 1971 case Hamilton v. Love found that unconstitutional carceral conditions 
could not be justified by pleas to state poverty; if the state could not afford to hold prisoners in 
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conditions meeting the minimum constitutional standards, the court reasoned, it could not hold 
them at all.805 
The August uprising at the Tombs, and the accompanying prisoner grievances, which 
dramatically underscored much of Legal Aid’s case against DOC, expedited the filing of Rhem.806 
The complaint painted a blistering picture of conditions in the Tombs, where upwards of 2,000 
prisoners were cramped into facilities rated for a maximum of 932. Michele Hermann, a deft 
student of the case, tersely synopsizes the initial complaint:  
Often three men were squeezed in a cell six feet by eight feet by eight feet, without 
sufficient beds, blankets, or mattresses for all. Sanitation was virtually nonexistent: the 
institution was overrun with vermin, inmates were not given adequate showers, toilet or 
cleaning articles were not available, and no provisions were made to launder the prisoners’ 
clothing The men received little or no physical exercise. They were locked in their cells 16 
hours a day and crowded in groups of 80 in a corridor measuring 60 feet by 7 feet during 
the remainder of the time. The Tombs was almost totally without ventilation, so that during 
the summer temperatures commonly exceeded 100°, and translucent windows which were 
welded shut prevented inmates from even looking outside. The metal interior of the Tombs 
caused a noise level of unendurable proportions, exacerbated by the overcrowding and the 
constant blaring of loudspeakers. The prison was understaffed, and complaints of guard 
brutality were frequent. Medical and psychiatric care were totally inadequate; no medical 
assistance was provided for inmates undergoing narcotics withdrawal, and suicides were 
common. Visits with family and friends were severely limited in scope and duration, mail 
was censored, and telephones were not available. Disciplinary procedures were summary 
and lacked due process protections.807  
 
As previously stated, these conditions, the plaintiffs argued, coupled with lengthy stays spent in 
these conditions awaiting trial, amounted to violations of First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments; constitutional guarantees of free speech, due process, speedy trials, and protection 
from excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment.808  
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Federal Judge Edward McLean approved the case as a class action suit, and against the 
protests of the City, which complained of potential “disruption of prison discipline,” mandated 
that all Tombs prisoners be served notice of the suit.809 Following the second uprisings, the 
plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, citing the conditions which de Leon described as 
“Gestapo-style”—including the twenty-four-hour lock-ins, denial of showers, suspension of 
medical care and practically all programming, and suspension or curtailment of visits—as cause 
for the court to take immediate action. On this claim, Judge Walter R. Mansfield dealt the plaintiffs 
a frustrating blow. The conditions, he ruled, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
sufficient to warrant injunctive relief. Much of these conditions, Mansfield reasoned, were due to 
the riotous acts of the prisoners, not the City. Mansfield further cited DOC’s good faith efforts to 
ameliorate these conditions, in part through the construction of three new facilities set to open soon 
on Rikers Island, and a contract to house thousands of prisoners with the State.  
More vexingly still, Mansfield cited an auspicious downward trend in the City jail 
population, and even noted the “new paint…in pastel colors” set to spruce up the Tombs in tandem 
with new windows. Mansfield did however issue injunctions ordering DOC to provide private 
consultation between the plaintiffs and their attorneys, and to post clearly-defined rules governing 
prisoner behavior and a regular schedule structuring institutional life, to which prisoners could 
appeal.810 Despite these minor victories for the plaintiffs, this ruling was a demoralizing defeat, 
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sapping their will to push the case further, while emboldening the City to make a few token 
concessions while continuing to flouting the law.811 The City went as far as to demand the case be 
dismissed, but this was denied in December.812 
The case hung in limbo until the summer of 1972, when New York State’s Southern 
District instituted a novel assignment system, distributing cases, at random, to judges who would 
assume sole responsibility for carrying them through to completion. To the great fortune of the 
plaintiffs, Rhem fell to the liberal Morris E. Lasker, who set a November trial date and began to 
aggressively pursue a resolution. DOC, by this point under the control of Malcolm, whose name 
now adorned the suit in place of McGrath’s, did not wish to defend the City’s deplorable jail 
conditions in court. Nor did it want the publicity the case would entail, which would only 
exacerbate its ongoing public relations disaster.  
When negotiations involving Malcolm, Deputy Mayor Dontzin, prisoner representatives, 
and lawyers from both sides failed to produce a settlement in time, the City’s counsel began the 
hearing by declaring: “The City finds itself having agreed, at least in principle, to almost every 
demand made by the inmates.”813 Testimony proceeded for four days, during which time the City 
undertook what was effectively a media strategy, attempting to impede the inclusion of damaging 
testimony onto the record, and generally pushing to wind the trial down, while emphasizing that 
the case was unnecessary due to its willingness to negotiate with the plaintiffs.814  
In January of 1973, these negotiations produced a stipulation of settlement, involving the 
City’s willingness to mitigate crowding, and improve sanitation and medical care. This stipulation 
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was formalized into a consent decree in August 1973, while myriad other issues went to trial. 
These were, as Lasker later grouped them: excessive lock-in, visiting conditions, environment 
(noise, ventilation and heat, windows), physical exercise, the lock-out corridor (in which 
mandatory time was spent outside of the cell), programming activities, detainee employment, 
abuses by guards, and optional lock-out (the mandatory nature of said time spent outside the cell). 
 In a scathing decision, Lasker subsequently ruled that conditions at the Tombs, which he 
had twice visited, would “shock the conscience of any citizen who knew of them,” and demanded 
the City draft a plan for their amelioration.815 There was however no ambiguity in this ruling about 
the connection between Rhem and the uprisings. “This suit,” Lasker concluded, “constitutes the 
effort to secure by law the objectives of the 1970 violence.”816 Naturally, unlike the militants who 
catalyzed his dramatic challenge to DOC, Lasker remained above all loyal to the state he 
represented. For instance, the case detailed a variety of abuse and degradations meted out on 
prisoners by guards, ranging from disrespect to the “beating of an inmate chained naked to bars, 
and the beating of an inmate who was also burned by officers putting out cigars and cigarettes on 
his body.” Though “totally unrefuted by defendants either through cross-examination or by 
offering evidence in contradiction,” Lasker excused the guards’ actions as just another 
manifestation of stress caused by the facility’s noise and heat.817  
When this ruling was discussed by the Board, its new chairman, the business lawyer Peter 
Tufo, astutely “noted that it is the first time the imprimatur of a court had been applied to such 
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broad aspects of prison reform.”818 Malcolm “noted that the opinion of Judge Lasker would 
revolutionize the prison system in the City,” and quite presciently “declared that in his judgment, 
the Tombs would have to be closed down completely if the decree in any way approached the 
scope of the judge’s opinion.”819 Tufo argued that Malcolm and his subordinates, who had already 
begun to dispute the ruling in the press, might be missing the positive aspects of Rhem, which by 
dint of legal compulsion now allowed DOC to partner with City Hall and the courts to transcend 
politics and undertake a long-term overhaul of the jail system. Echoing this view, Deputy 
Commissioner Dickstein expressed the hope that the ruling would loosen up the Bureau of 
Budget’s constraints on funding jail expansion, now that it was a matter of compliance with a court 
order.820  
By this point, however, there was already ample indication the City was not taking 
compliance seriously; for a time, City officials stymied the plaintiffs by claiming they could not 
find the consent decree and therefore could not take any action.821 The City would continue to 
stall, making it increasingly clear over time that it had no intention of following through on even 
the most basic step toward compliance, which simply called for a comprehensive plan of action. 
“The history of this case,” since January, Lasker wrote in a July 1974 memorandum, “has been 
one of frustration largely caused by the City defendants’ delay and the absence or incompleteness 
of reports or plans of performance which they were ordered to submit.”822 The City had spent the 
calendar year first buying time, then submitting an incomplete plan of action, then finally declaring 
it would not submit a completed plan at all. Out of patience, Lasker ordered the Tombs closed 
                                                            
818 BOC Meeting Minutes 1/14/74, 4. 
819 BOC Meeting Minutes 1/14/74, 7. 
820 BOC Meeting Minutes 1/14/74, 7.  
821 Herman, Rhem v. Malcolm, 21.   
822 Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F.Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1974) at 996. 
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within thirty days, should the City not submit a plan meeting the specificities of his January 
ruling.823  
The City appealed the ruling, to no avail. Adding to the growing cache of quotable poesy 
lyricizing the wretchedness of life in the City jails, Judge Wilfred Feinberg called Lasker’s ruling 
“a melancholy picture of a fortress in bedlam.”824 The following week, the City attempted to 
sidestep the case altogether by announcing the closure of the Tombs, and the transportation of its 
prisoners to the House of Detention for Men on Rikers Island.825 Lasker later told a colleague “I 
didn’t realize how much the City was stonewalling… I thought they would comply.”826 Perhaps 
DOC imagined it was done with Rhem, and done with Lasker. However, when the Tombs was 
shuttered in December of 1974, the facility’s problems were simply spread around. A Times 
headline shortly captured the new reality: “Rikers Island Problems,” it read, “Now Resemble 
Tombs’s.”827 Moreover, much to the chagrin of DOC, these prisoners brought Rhem to Rikers with 
them. The City wasn’t done with Lasker yet.828 Meanwhile, irrespective of the gains won in federal 




                                                            
823 Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F.Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1974) 995. In a bizarre twist, Lasker received a letter from Tombs prisoners 
pleading to keep the facility open, and another from a group of ranking Tombs guards supporting its immediate 
closure. “We feel that it is short of a crime in itself that these 400 inmates are constitutionally and morally denied 
decent and humane living conditions,” the latter wrote, “when space is available for immediate occupancy on Rikers 
Island and that the Correction Staff must also suffer because of [Malcolm’s] obstinate position” (Hermann, Rhem v. 
Malcolm, 24-25).   
824 Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 V.2d (U.S.D.C.S.D 1974) 333. 
825 Max H. Siegel, “Tombs Closing, Inmates to Go to Rikers,” New York Times, November 16, 1974. 
826 Baer and Bepko, “A Necessary Role for Federal Courts,” 21-22.  
827 Tom Goldstein, “Rikers Island Problems Now Resemble Tombs’s,” New York Times, February 23, 1975. 
828 Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., “Tombs Closes as the Last of Its Inmates Depart,” New York Times, December 21, 1974. 
In the follow chapter I will examine this subsequent litigation.  
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The Struggle Continues  
In the years following the uprising, a steady supply of revolutionary literature streamed 
into the jail system by mail, including the English-language propaganda weekly Peking Review, 
distributed by the Chinese government. Appearing before BOC, DOC officials noted the 
proliferation of study groups, specifically under the leadership of Tombs prisoner Alfred “Hap” 
Gary, complaining of “those in the institution who would welcome revolution rather than 
change.”829 Vanden Heuvel, a dedicated Cold War liberal, dismissed DOC’s concerns, claiming 
that prisoners read such material out of boredom, and he could arrange for an outside scholar to 
visit the jails and talk about another revolutionary who might hold their interest—Thomas 
Jefferson. Malcolm was not convinced, arguing that revolutionary literature in the jails “causes 
problems for him and his staff in administering the prisons.”830 Board member Kirby responded 
that he had read accounts of the 1970 uprising from a revolutionary perspective, and while he 
didn’t agree with the political rhetoric, he could not dispute the facts.831 Malcolm and Kirby were 
both correct. Moreover, BOC, along with practically every policy document from this period, 
hastened to speak of the 1970 unrest in the past tense. Yet, while nothing quite as spectacular or 
large-scale as the October rebellion would recur, the legacy of struggle continued, often in the 
ideological mantle of black and brown power, through a series of rebellions and escapes.   
On February 1, 1972, prisoners in cellblock 7 of the Adolescent Remand Shelter—the 
facility where Joseph had built cadre two years earlier, and which had briefly revolted in October 
of 1970—smashed up furniture, dismantled toilets, and hurled the debris at guards, at least one of 
                                                            
829 BOC Meeting Minutes 5/1/72, 3, not a direct quote in the cited text. It is unclear whether DOC chose May Day to 
discuss this issue out of respect for the international workers’ revolution, or if it was simply a coincidence. 
830 BOC Meeting Minutes 5/1/72, 3, not a direct quote in the cited text. 
831 BOC Meeting Minutes 5/1/72, 3. 
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whom they also attacked.832  The prisoners were armed with a variety of improvised weapons, and 
shouted “revolutionary slogans.” Barraged with tear gas, they retreated into their cell block behind 
barricades made of broken furniture. Unlike most of his colleagues, Captain Roy Caldwood was 
sympathetic to the rebellion. “Considering their unpleasant existences,” he reflected, 
it shouldn’t have been surprising that the adolescents at Rikers had revolted. The real 
surprise was how long it had taken them to do so. They had a long list of legitimate 
grievances. Medical care was bad. The food was barely tolerable. There weren’t enough 
showers. Access to families and lawyers was limited. Inmates couldn’t even make phone 
calls. Instead, any messages to a family member or an attorney was filtered through an 
officer who would pick up a phone and relay news or ask questions based on notes from 
the inmates. That was on top of overcrowding.833 
 
The setting was significant. Debriefing on the 1970 rebellions, McGrath had observed that the 
short-lived uprising at ARS was handled most deftly—that is, repressed quickly, before the 
prisoners could organize and develop a strategic advantage. McGrath reasoned that as the clock 
ticked, DOC forfeited tactical advantage. 834 This was the City’s stated policy since Attica, though 
the lessons of its own rebellions surely contributed.835  
More importantly, the policy of decisive repressive action was the position of the average 
rank-and-file guard, though likely fueled more by testosterone than tactical thinking. Surrounded 
in February 1972 by colleagues eager to suit up and repress the rebellion by brute force, Caldwood 
spurned the gung-ho attitude of many of his peers, and worked against the clock to broker a deal 
for the prisoners’ surrender. The rebellion’s ostensible leader proposed to Caldwood the simple 
condition they would desist if assured they wouldn’t be beaten, which Caldwood believed to spell 
the end of the uprising. “I can’t promise them that,” the deputy warden had initially told Caldwood, 
                                                            
832 “16 Hurt on Rikers in Inmate Brawl,” New York Times, February 2, 1972.  
833 Caldwood, Right Moves, 66. 
834 BOC Meeting Minutes 10/30/70, 2.  
835 Robert D. McFadden, “100 Hurt as Rikers Attack Frees 5 Hostage Guards,” New York Times, February 28, 1972. 
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to the latter’s shock. Warden Thomas however reversed this order, and the standoff between 120 
prisoners and forty riot squad guards was defused.836 Though it was already de facto disallowed, 
the diplomatic approach Caldwood successfully advocated was subsequently ruled out altogether. 
After the events of February 1, DOC management officially took clemency off the table as a 
bargaining chip in prisoner disturbances.837  
On February 27, the same cellblock, with a capacity of 240, held about 315 prisoners, 
mostly black and Puerto Rican.838 Seventy-seven of them had already been convicted and were 
awaiting sentencing.839 By Caldwood’s telling, the impending transfer of two prisoner leaders set 
the wheels turning for another rebellion.840 This time the prisoners were better organized and more 
defiant. They took five guards hostages, threw up elaborate barricades, and responded to calls for 
their surrender by announcing their intention to kill their captives.841 The prisoners demanded to 
speak with members of the Young Lords, Black Liberation Army, and “the Muslims,” meaning 
either the Nation of Islam, the 5%ers. They also demanded to meet with the media, who were not 
even allowed on the island.842 A captive himself, Caldwood himself, recalls the scene:  
                                                            
836 Caldwood, Right Moves, 48-52.  
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840 Caldwood, Right Moves, 3-6. 
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Pandemonium. On fire with energy, the inmates tore at their belongings, carting out bed 
frames, mattresses, toilet seats and tops, and chairs to build barricades at the cellblock 
gates. At the gate, they piled it all high, constructing a mountain of prison bric-a-brac and 
debris. A scaffold used for cleaning the cellblock became the centerpiece of the barricade. 
The scaffold blocked the gate and gave the prisoners a place to stand, to be up high, ready 
to swing down on any attacker below.843 
 
This time there was to be no peaceful resolution. DOC devoted less than two hours to negotiations, 
which simply amounted to a call from Malcolm to surrender. Mayor Lindsay, on the campaign 
trail for a disastrous presidential run, personally called in a siege to free the hostages just over an 
hour after the rebellion began.  
At Malcolm’s call, a force of  ten guards entered through a side door and fought for upwards 
of ten minutes to open the main gate, through which roughly 140 guards clad in riot gear entered 
the cellblock in a cloud of tear gas. Prisoners met their clubs with a variety of improvised weapons, 
sharpened bed springs, chair legs, and buckets of hot water. Caldwood recalls the guards “forcing 
their way into the block, and the prisoners were trying to come out—grunting, screaming, clubs 
swimming. Pipes, wood, and steel smacked bodies. Inmates threw chunks of metal and toilet tanks 
and seats—whatever they could rip free.”844 After fifteen minutes of hand-to-hand combat that left 
a reported seventy-five prisoners and twenty guards injured, the rebellion was quashed.845 
                                                            
prisoners began circulating handwritten scriptures written from memory. “Just to show you how bad it could get,” 
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The guards subsequently “had a holiday,” one prisoner reported. “Most of the people were 
beaten up after the prisoners gave up.”846 A Fortune Society staffer reported prisoners were run 
between a double line of guards swinging their clubs, commonly called a gauntlet, and otherwise 
viciously beaten after the rebellion was repressed. Malcolm attributed the rebellion to “a handful 
of hardcore militants,” remarking “I don’t think the inmates have any bona fide grievances. They 
are making excuses.”847 While not explicitly endorsing the beatings, Zeferetti remarked “The only 
thing necessary, is absolute discipline in these overcrowded institutions.”848 The message to his 
rank-and-file was clear. Four prisoners—Pedro Yanes, Ernest Hall, Frank Smith, and Stanley 
Davis, all either twenty or twenty-one—were charged and convicted for their roles in the uprising, 
and given five year sentences. At their final court appearance, they attempted to flip over their 
chairs and shouted to their assembled supporters: “All power to the people!”849 
One of the groups the rebelling prisoners had requested to meet with would soon become 
synonymous with black struggle on both sides of the bars: the Black Liberation Army (BLA). The 
BLA emerged at a time when the remnants of the New York Panthers were forced underground 
by a combination of state repression, COINTEL subversion, and violent internecine conflict within 
the crumbling Party. When Huey P. Newton and Eldridge Cleaver split over the question of 
immediate armed struggle, New York was the only chapter to side with Cleaver, who supported 
it. The New York 21 had already been expelled from the Party for an open letter that endorsed the 
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militant Weather Underground, advocated armed struggle, and critiqued the Party for not 
following suit.850  
The Cleaverite remnants of the New York Panthers subsequently drew militants from all 
over the US who did not want to wait until some far off day to take revolutionary action. There 
they met a core of Panthers who had gone underground, subsisting off robbing heroin dealers and 
night clubs in black and brown areas. This regroupment served the basis of the BLA, which 
included New York 21 defendants like Balagoon, who had participated in the jail rebellions. 
Cleaver ordained that the BLA have no leadership, operating instead as autonomous cells with no 
central command structure. After an unplanned shootout between police and four Panthers, 
including Anthony “Kimu” White, this underground assemblage announced itself as the Black 
Liberation Army.  
Police across the country had declared war on the Panthers whether through harassment, 
prosecution, brutality, or outright murder. George Jackson and Fred Hampton were only the most 
prominent revolutionaries felled by state bullets under flimsy pretexts no Party member believed. 
And the slain Panthers were only a tiny fraction of the nearly 1,000 black people shot by the US 
police between 1971 and 1973 alone. In response, the BLA declared war on the cops.  
Their inaugural action was the non-fatal shooting of Thomas Curry and Nicholas Binetti, 
two cops guarding the house of District Attorney Frank Hogan, who had prosecuted the New York 
21, on May 19th, Malcolm X’s birthday. Two days later, two NYPD cops name Waverly Jones and 
Anthony Piagentini were shot dead in an ambush at the Polo Grounds projects in Manhattan. The 
latter shooting was not the work of the nascent BLA, but a similarly fractured group of 
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underground Cleaverite Panthers from out of town. The BLA however took responsibility for both 
shootings. The group immediately earned the attention of law enforcement all the way up to J. 
Edgar Hoover—amid debate, which would long recur, over whether it even existed. Cleaver had 
hoped to exercise de facto leadership from Algeria, via audiotapes smuggled back to the US. But 
once the BLA began armed conflict with the police, this became more difficult, and the cells 
became truly decentralized.851  
Perennially on the defensive and in forced into flight, BLA cells bushwhacked across the 
Eastern US, robbing banks and shooting it out with police. A number of cadre wound up behind 
bars, a few dead, and the cells rapidly unraveled. The most notorious incident became the execution 
of NYPD cops Greg Foster and Rocco Laurie, which remains technically unsolved to the present 
day, but was most likely carried out by the cell that included Ronald Carter, Assata Shakur, and 
Sha Sha Brown. The group fled the City afterward, setting up shop in St. Louis. Following a 
shootout with police there that left Carter dead, Brown was captured with a gun belonging to 
Officer Laurie. Shakur evaded capture, and like Twymon Meyers, Ronald Anderson, and other 
stray BLA cadre left stranded by the violent dissolution of their cells, found her way back to New 
York City to regroup.852  
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Kimu White, a Cleaverite Panther, was a part of the shootout with the police that served as 
the BLA’s call to arms as an organization at war with the police.853 During the dramatic rise and 
precipitous fall of the group which had drawn influence from his acts, he sat behind bars in City 
custody, held on $250,000 bail for attempted murder. In October of 1972, when White was held at 
the Tombs, a comrade inside named Ronald Johnson received a new pair of size twelve sneakers 
from two women visitors. Sewn into the soles were two hacksaw blades. Eleven days later, 
Johnson, White, and five other prisoners held for robbery, weapons charges, and assault, undertook 
the first escape the Tombs had seen in over thirty years.  
In preparation, the men had sawed their way out of their housing area and covered the 
displaced bars with a table. Just after the 6:15 a.m. headcount, the group sprang into action. They 
slipped through the small opening, creeping thirty feet across a gangplank overlaying a disused 
area still wanting of repair since the rebellion, scaling a sixteen foot wall to a small window, and 
reaching it, sawed off its bars. The men then unfurled a rope made of bedsheets, down which they 
climbed forty feet to the street below. The entire operation took ten minutes at the most. At 6:25, 
a building employee of the Criminal Court Building spotted one of the prisoners descending the 
rope and sounded the alarm. Citing no evidence, Malcolm and Zeferetti took turns blaming the 
escape on the “liberal” policies of BOC-sponsored volunteer initiatives (Malcolm) which in 
bringing civilians onto the jail floor had “allowed everyone and their brother to come and go as 
they want” (Zeferetti). Only later was the source of the hacksaws revealed as a routine visit.854  
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Upon his premature release, White connected with Assata Shakur, Twymon Meyers, Zayd 
Shakur, Melvin Kearney, and others BLA cadre whose activity revolved around bank robberies. 
In early 1973, White perished in a hail of gunfire alongside his companion, BLA cadre Woody 
Green, who cops had tracked to a Bushwick nightclub by tailing his wife on their anniversary.855 
Before the year was out, Meyers and Zayd Shakur would also be dead, felled by police bullets in 
dramatic shootouts, and Kearney and Assata Shakur would be in custody.856 Meyers’ demise was 
particularly grisly. NYPD and FBI agents surrounded him on the street, riddling his body with 
eighty bullets. As he lay dead, a cop stood over him, firing a single shot into his head, as if to kill 
him a second time. NYPD subsequently held a rally celebrating his death outside the 44th Precinct 
in the Bronx.857 Police Commissioner Donald F. Cawley declared NYPD had “broken the back of 
the B.L.A.”858 
That same year, Sha Sha Brown was extradited from St. Louis, where he was already 
serving twenty-five to life for the shootout with police, to stand trial for the shootings of Foster 
and Laurie. In St. Louis, Brown was alleged to have planned a foiled jailbreak.859 Shortly after 
arriving at the Brooklyn House of Detention, Brown similarly hatched a plan for his premature 
departure from that facility. In July, a sophisticated escape plan well into it is final stages was 
discovered by BHD guards conducting a surprise shakedown. Clearly influenced by White’s 
escape from the Tombs, Brown, his cellmate, and two prisoners in an adjacent cell had used 
carbonite hacksaw blades to saw their way out of their own cells and into the guard catwalk that 
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ringed the floor, thus placing only one more set of bars—and a fifty-five foot climb down a rope 
they had fashioned from bedsheets—between themselves and freedom.860   
Two months later, Brown was transported to Kings County Hospital for an x-ray after he 
insistently complained of stomach pains. In order for Brown to change into the gown for his x-ray, 
he was uncuffed and shown into a three square foot changing booth with no room for either of the 
two guards escorting him. Brown changed into the gown, and received the x-ray. It’s likely he was 
thinking all the while of curious design of the changing booth: eight feet high, leaving a four foot 
gap between the back wall and the ceiling, and fronted with a curtain that extended all the way to 
the floor. As the guards waited for Brown to change back into his clothing, he hopped onto the 
booth’s bench, scaled the wall and hit the ground running toward an exit eighteen feet away. 
Hearing the bench clatter beneath Brown’s feet, the guards took off after him. They were, as 
Malcolm later testified, no match for Brown’s speed.861 Based on an informant’s tip to NYPD, 
Brown was recaptured a week later in a Bushwick BLA safe house, along with multiple other 
fugitives.862  
Though speed and ingenuity abetted his daring escape, Brown was also assisted by simple 
negligence typical of a department stretched to the breaking point. After discussing the escape 
threat posed by BLA detainees at multiple meetings with NYPD, reviewing the escape record of 
Brown, and learning a map of Kings County Hospital was captured in a raid of another alleged 
BLA safe house, DOC had enacted a protocol for monitoring the transfer of BLA prisoners like 
Brown. Only it wasn’t followed.863 A defensive Malcolm insisted the accounts of NYPD warnings 
about Brown had come from “low level policemen” and there was no forewarning of an escape. 
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Less explicable were the words “escape risk” and “murderer” stamped in red on Brown’s prisoner 
identification card, which made the trip to Kings County along with him. Moreover, DOC denied 
the map had anything to do with the escape. Ultimately, however, Malcolm conceded “any time a 
Black Liberation Army group wants to release a fellow Black Liberation Army inmate from a 
hospital they can do it. The Department is planning to establish procedures to make this impossible 
but the procedures have not yet been created.”864  
Malcolm took the rare step of suspending the guards involved, though they had by all 
accounts done little wrong. But Brown’s case came amid a rash of embarrassing escapes, and 
Malcolm testified “he was personally ‘fed up’ with reports showing that procedures had broken 
down without pointing at individuals who are at fault,” or perhaps more precisely, pointing to 
him.865 In all likelihood, the overtaxed DOC simply did not have the capacity to match in practice 
the City’s tough talk about BLA and other militant prisoners. One investigator dubbed DOC’s 
uniform staff “Keystone guards.”866  
Before fleeing Kings County, Brown supposedly told guards at BHD “I will escape, you 
can’t stop me.”867 In December of 1973, Brown had been transferred to the Tombs, along with five 
other alleged BLA members. A patrolman spotted two men and two women loitering around an 
open manhole outside the facility. They included Bernice Jones, a prominent New York Panther 
and widow of Twymon Meyers, and Ashanti Alston. Jones was alleged to be carrying a list of 
BLA members in the Tombs, information about their upcoming court appearances, and numerous 
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documents about Brown.868 Less than two months later—and just weeks after a judge dismissed 
the final charges against the quartet due to lack of evidence—another group of four, two men and 
two women, also including Alston, handcuffed a guard in the Tombs visiting area at gunpoint and 
attempted to cut through the wall with an acetylene torch. Their plot was foiled when the torch ran 
out of oxygen and they had to beat a hasty retreat.869  
The BLA cadre fled with two guards’ guns and a set keys, the latter of which they mailed 
to the Times along with a taunting letter thanking DOC for its “cooperation,” thanks to which “you 
only lost your guns.” This was news to the public; the missing guns had not been disclosed by an 
embarrassed DOC awash in charges of “Keystone guards,” and the Department had generally 
attempted to downplay the entire incident. Birnbaum claimed DOC did not mention the missing 
guns “because nobody asked us.”870 Al Castro later complained that despite DOC’s efforts to move 
BLA cadre around the jail system and thwart escape plots, “the trouble is that they can pretty well 
call their own plays.”871  
In August of 1974, with Brown back at BHD, the facility’s brand new metal detector 
thwarted the smuggling of hacksaw blades, allegedly intended for Brown, via the same mechanism 
that had succeeded at the Tombs: a pair of shoes.872 The following week, Brown, Kearney, and a 
third BLA cadre, Pedro Monges, fled a transport van returning them from court to BHD, after the 
latter stole a key. The unshackled men were able to subdue multiple guard and began to climb a 
thirty-foot fence, when Brown was shot in the shoulder by a guard and dropped to the ground. 
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Kearney surrendered, but Monges was able to breach the fence, and made it a short distance before 
a passing police patrol unit drew their guns and recaptured him.873  
The following May, Kearney and Monges managed to saw an eighteen by eleven inch hole 
in the back wall of their cell, smash through a plate glass window, and shimmy through an air vent, 
all to undertake the 128-foot descent to the ground below. Monges made it safely outside the jail 
gates, but was quickly captured by chance by an off-duty cop. Kearney only made it five feet 
before the rope broke and he plummeted to his death.874 DOC later alleged that Brown and another 
BLA cadre, Roderick Pearson, were seen running back to their cells shortly after the rope 
snapped.875 It would be harder to believe Brown wasn’t involved.  
In early 1975 a maximum-security block at HDM home to eleven accused BLA cadre was 
the scene of another dramatic escape attempt, the failure of which was surely not due to lack of 
imagination or daring. It began when Herman Bell, on his second trial for the murders of Piagentini 
and Jones, asked a guard to use the phone. When the guard appeared with the phone, Bell pushed 
him against a metal-grated wall and held a sharpened stick to his neck. Another prisoner grabbed 
the guard’s keys, and the duo tied him up and placed him in a nearby cell. Next they lured another 
guard into the cellblock by complaining of a broken television, and he too was tied up and placed 
in a cell. Fourteen prisoners, including the eleven BLA cadre, held the block unchallenged for 
almost an hour while attempting to saw through a barred window with hacksaw blades.  
The escape was foiled when a passing guard noticed the men sawing. Evidently deciding 
on the futility of the effort—and for whatever reason, seeing no use in the cell block occupation 
tactic as an end in itself—the prisoners surrendered their hostages and returned to their cells 
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without a fight.876 NYPD claimed the escape was part of an elaborate seaborne rescue in which 
armed BLA cadre set sail in three rafts from the Tiffany Street piers in the Bronx, at least one clad 
in scuba gear, headed for the facility. After receiving a report of the flotilla, the harbor patrol had 
discovered an abandoned raft, which the cops claimed contained ammunition and a map to HDM. 
The East River current, it seemed, had foiled their mission.877 Asked how hacksaw blades got into 
HDM, Johh D’Elia replied that a broken window had recently been discovered in a visiting booth, 
and more broadly, “declared that these inmates are clever people who can estimate when they will 
not be searched and thus will be able to sneak contraband into the institution.”878 
It is worth emphasizing that the black and brown revolutionaries of this period by no means 
held a monopoly on taking proactive steps to free themselves from DOC custody. In fact, some of 
the civilians even proved better at it than the BLA. In 1975, prisoner Joseph James reported to 
Kings County Hospital for a dental appointment and ducked into the bathroom, where a co-
conspirator had left him a gun. James opened fire in the crowded hospital, killing guard George 
Motchan, and injuring another guard and a patient.879 Shortly before Bell’s foiled escape, a group 
of  prisoners at HDM discovered the liquid in the facility’s Xerox machine, when ignited, could 
melt the glass on windows to the outside, allowing it to be broken quietly using a rag mounted on 
a stick. Working quietly and quickly, four were able to break a big enough hole to climb through 
undetected. But getting off the island proved more difficult.880  
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In the month of May 1974 alone, at least fourteen prisoners with no discernible connections 
to the BLA escaped from three different DOC facilities, including Rikers. Four prisoners at BHD 
accomplished what eluded Brown, sawing through the bars of an eighth floor dayroom and 
climbing down a rope made of blankets and twine—along the facility’s face, on busy Atlantic 
Avenue—to the ground below.881 Recaptured prisoners claimed to have obtained the saw blades 
from a guard for $50, as part of an elaborate smuggling operation. Four civilians and five guards 
were indicted, and the subsequent security crackdown catalyzed a hunger strike at BHD. A mere 
four days after the BHD escape, nine prisoners at Rikers Island pried open a window and fled into 
the night. One was apprehended on the island. Three swam to an anchored tugboat, and wielding 
a knife, obliged the seven man crew to drop them off on the Tiffany Street Pier in the Bronx, where 
they were shortly thereafter recaptured, clad in yellow seafarer outfits pilfered from the vessel.882 
Later that month, a prisoner at Branch Queens sawed his way through the bars, climbed down forty 
feet, and then over a twenty foot wall to freedom. His accomplice did not make it out behind 
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CHAPTER 8:    BURN CITY BURN 
 
Two facilities planned since the Kross era open on Rikers, amid the continuing expansion of the 
island’s infrastructure. HDW closes and its replacement, on Rikers, is dubbed a “space jail” by 
prisoner Assata Shakur. The New York City fiscal crisis, however, dashes all lingering optimism. 
Funding for DOC and BOC are cut, amid the withdrawal of massive funds from the City 
government, most importantly, employment and benefit programs reproducing working-class life. 
Most unions enter a period of retreat continuing to the present day. By contrast, the movement of 
“law and order” unions capitalizes on the crisis to demand a larger share of the City’s dwindling 
pie, in exchange for playing a greater role in the reproduction of the City’s working class. The 
stage is set for replacing, in the lives of the City’s racialized working class, the modest benefits of 
New York’s public sector with policing and jails. Ground zero of this new paradigm will be Rikers 
Island. 
 
Gazing upon the Finished Product 
“A current review” of Rikers Island, wrote New York City Department of Public Works 
engineer Ted K. Raderman in 1972, “reveals a constant upgrading of facilities in a never ending 
attempt to conform with current penal philosophy, both in new construction and in the 
rehabilitation of existing buildings.”884 Talk of “penal philosophy,” was however anachronistic at 
this point and become ever more so, as DOC struggled and failed to simply keep its facilities at 
the absolute minimum standards provided by law. However Raderman, responsible for overseeing 
all construction on Rikers, captured the frenzied activity which accompanied a period defined by 
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the uprisings and Rhem. These pressures, under the watchful eye of BOC, bore down on DOC’s 
existing physical plants and influenced the planning and implementation of new ones.  
Three facilities in particular had been in the works for over a decade. The annex to C-76, 
planned by Kross, was completed in 1971, but was not immediately operational due to 
understaffing.885 The Correctional Institution for Women (CIFW), designated to replace the 
scandal-plagued HDW, was nearing opening. So too was the Adolescent Remand and Detention 
Center (ARDC) designated to replace the Adolescent Remand Shelter in the old Penitentiary, 
where prisoners aged sixteen to 20 had been held since 1968. The viability of these institutions 
was largely contingent on a significant expansion of the island’s steam system and roadways, 
including the addition of a four lane Central Mall “fan[ning] out like a spine from the bridge,” 
underlain with steam lines to power heating, cooking, and cooling in the new facilities.886 This 
network was only the most prominent of a number of infrastructural improvements to the island 
undertaken during this period, which along with the new facilities, constituted a $100 million 
capital project, laying the foundation for the Rikers Island of today. Raderman described his 
overseeing of the construction as “characterized by moments of anxiety as a project started to rise 
out of the ground and the indescribable satisfaction of gazing upon the finished product.”887 
“Presumably, the City was induced to place half of its prison facilities and population on 
[Rikers Island] and to build a $9 million bridge to connect it with the mainland,” wrote BOC in its 
scathing 1972 indictment of the Adolescent Remand Shelter, “so that prisoners could be kept in 
safe and rehabilitative confinement secured by geography rather than by steel cages.”888 The Board 
did not mask its disgust for the adolescent facility which stood on Rikers instead. Recall how a 
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new facility for pre-trial adolescents had been one of Kross’s earliest priorities. Capital Project No. 
74 (C-74) was intended to comprise two adolescent facilities, one of which would be in the 
Bronx.889 The plans for this facility was placed on ice when adolescents were moved into the 
Brooklyn House of Detention, where they stayed until 1968, when they were moved to the old 
Penitentiary. Rechristened ARS, BOC found this facility was “the worst prison in the City,” a 
“depressing and oppressive physical plant” lacking adequate programming, staffing, and housing, 
in addition to being a place where, to BOC’s incredulity, prisoners were largely kept indoors in a 
maximum security institution, despite a majority of its 2,300 adolescent prisoners being held on 
$500 bail or less.890  
The Rikers Island location, the Board argued, “isolates the prisoners from their families, 
makes it difficult for them to be in touch with lawyers for the preparation of their cases, and 
removes the prison from public attention.” With DOC in dire need of new facilities for adolescents, 
the Board looked forward to the opening of a new adolescent facility, for detention cases, letting 
it pass unmentioned that this facility too would be on Rikers Island.891  
BOC’s optimism was however not unqualified. If “properly administered,” they argued, “it 
could be the most innovative institution of its kind in the country. However, if it is left to 
traditional, unimaginative management and programming, it will stand as a $48 million monument 
to the past.”892 Again, no mention was made of the drawbacks to a Rikers Island location. The new 
jail, named Adolescent Remand and Detention Center, sat in the southeast of the island, stretched 
across fifty acres comprising six three-story housing units following the chevron design.893 The 
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vast majority of its housing consisted of 1,080 single cells, with the exception of a dormitory built 
to accommodate sixty sentenced prisoners working in the facility.894 The $40 million facility 
officially opened on June 29, 1973.895 BOC’s optimism, no matter how tempered, would prove 
short-lived. 
The Correctional Institution for Women (CIFW) was similarly decades in the making. The 
scandal of HDW congealed a remarkably broad consensus favoring its closure, which was however 
not fast in coming. The $24.2 million facility that took its place covered fifty-five acres with a 
horizontal, closed campus. CIFW’s design called for a combination of dormitories and cells, the 
former broken into connected wings each holding forty prisoners, split in half for dormitory areas 
with a capacity of twenty, the latter being seven by ten feet, spacious by DOC standards. In theory 
prisoners would live in the cells for most of their time, and be transferred to the dormitories two 
weeks prior to release, to facilitate return to society. CIFW was rated to hold 620 adult and 
adolescents in dormitories and cells, and 58 in the clinic.896  
“Welcome to New York’s newest and perhaps best hotel,” McGrath remarked, flanked by 
Lindsay at the jail’s opening ceremony.897 While this was surely tongue-in-cheek, it seems to have 
been a common assessment in the City’s official society. The Times cited the jail as a beacon of 
progressive carceral architecture, describing the facility in terms perhaps better suited for its real 
estate section: “With its sleek, two-story chevron design, large windows, and brightly colored 
interior, it looks more like an Eastern girls’ college than a detention facility. The buildings are 
sprawled across the northern edge of the island, giving the inmates a commanding view of the East 
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River.”898 In fairness, it must have been a great relief for respectable Manhattanites to bid farewell 
to the spectacle of HDW rubbing their noses in the indignity of incarceration. In 1973 Mayor 
Lindsay, happy to put the scandal of HDW behind the City, led a ceremony celebrating its 
demolition. Lindsay climbed a scaffolding in front of the jail and symbolically swung a 
sledgehammer. Some passersby booed the unpopular mayor.899 
The programming at CIFW, reminiscent of the days of Kross, was planned to match its 
auspicious launch. When HDW prisoners were actually transferred to CIFW, however, it became 
clear that the effective use of the new facility required a much larger staff than presently existed.900 
“The place was really colorful,” recounts Chris, an early prisoner. “If you had to be in jail, it was 
nicer than the House of D. It was cleaner anyway. But it was totally boring. There was nothing to 
do if you were on the detention side except watch television in the Day Room.”901 Moreover, the 
women guards claimed their grievances about the new facility were not taken as seriously as those 
of the male guards, and accordingly they filed a petition with McGrath in the summer of 1971.902 
Visiting the facility, BOC member Rose M. Singer found pervasive short-staffing, among civilians 
and guards, exacerbating problems with the physical plant, resulting in a generally demoralized 
climate of high absenteeism and widespread plans among guards to quit.903  
The facility was also immediately overcrowded.904 By the Fall, Singer subsequently 
reported, a crackdown on street-level sex work packed the facility beyond capacity, with forty-two 
cells in the new building doubled up. This was exacerbated, Singer complained, by the mistaken 
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assumption among judges that there was room at CIFW.905 Appearing before the Board to discuss 
medical care at the facility, CIFW warden Essie Murph testified to the scant availability of 
gynecological services. As Singer subsequently revealed by pressing Deputy Health 
Commissioner Alan Gibbs, gynecology was considered a “specialty.” In her testimony Murph 
“stated that the general attitude of both medical and correction staff is that the inmates are there to 
be punished and that there are limits to the services to which they are entitled. Some of the medical 
staff believe chronic medical problems should be treated after inmates leave the institution.”906  
This attitude certainly played a role in the death of prisoner Juanita Robinson. Arrested for 
disorderly conduct in 1974, Robinson died three days later at CIFW. While Robinson had 
demonstrated clear symptoms of illness, the institution evinced no particular urgency in seeing to 
her care. While the Board failed to find criminal negligence in her death, it concluded Robinsons’ 
to be “not a story of gross negligence, or deliberate and calculated disregard of a seriously ill 
human being. Instead, it is an example of how an accretion of rather small and individually almost 
insignificant failures to do more than the minimum required, to put oneself out on behalf of 
another, ultimately may help produce a tragic result.”907  
Regardless of CIFW’s issues, the primary problem posed by HDW had in fact been solved. 
“The Women's House of Detention…was a commonly-known sightseeing spot,” reflected Black 
Panther and Young Lords member Denise Oliver shortly after its closing;   
They even used to drive a tourist bus by it and point it out: 'Oh there's the women's prison.' 
People that lived in the Village area were very used to hearing women that were 
incarcerated in the prison screaming and yelling 'Let me out,' and 'Let me out, they're 
beating me in here,' and things like that. Finally the City government decided to do 
something about it. So they moved it, and they put it out on an island so 'nice' people outside 
wouldn't have to be bothered by the noise made from those horrible inmates in there. You 
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see, because as long as the Women's House of Detention was right in the middle of New 
York City, people couldn't forget it existed.  
 
Oliver surely simplifies, but often there is truth in simplicity. “They have moved women to this 
place on Riker's Island,” she continues, “which they have said it’s a much nicer place. The only 
thing that's nicer is about it is that it's not as old, so there's probably there's not as much dirt 
collected in the place. It is still a prison. The conditions are still the same.”908 
 
Space Jail 
A detailed portrait of the CIFW and its inhabitants in these earliest years comes to us from 
the BLA’s Assata Shakur. Captured in 1973 following a shootout on the New Jersey Turnpike that 
left Zayd Shakur and a New Jersey state trooper dead, Shakur experienced the new facility first-
hand during multiple BLA-related trials between 1974 and 1977. Transferred to Rikers in 1973 to 
face trial for armed robbery, Shakur recalls “The car came to a bridge where pigs were stationed, 
pointing rifles and shotguns.” Shakur asked: “Where are we? Where is this place?” A marshal 
answered: “You are now on Rikers Island. This will be your new home for a while.”  
“It’ll never be my home,” Shakur replied.909  
“When i went in,” to the cell, she recalls, “the door slid shut behind me. It was something 
out of a science fiction movie. The long halls, the sliding door, the control panel. ‘Space jail,’ i 
said to myself.” But a familiar scene awaited. “Inside, there was a cot, a dirty sink, a seatless toilet, 
and a roll of toilet paper.” The smell of the jail was similarly familiar. “I don’t care what jail i’ve 
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been in,” Shakur recalls, “they all stink. They have a smell unlike any smell on earth. Like blood 
and sweat and feet and open sores and, if misery has a smell, like misery.”910  
CIFW’s state-of-the-art design nonetheless left an impression on Shakur. “Instead of bars,” 
she reflects, 
the cells have doors which are painted bright, optimistic colors with slim glass observation 
panels… The cells are called rooms with everybody. They are furnished with a cot, a closet, 
a desk, a chair, a plastic upholstered headboard that opens for storage, a small book case, 
a mirror, a sink and a toilet. The prison distributes brightly colored bedspreads and throw 
rugs for a homey effect. There is a school area, a gym, a carpeted auditorium, two inmate 
cafeterias and outside recreation areas… The guards have successfully convinced most of 
the women that Riker’s Island is a country club. They say that it is a playhouse compared 
to some other prisoners (especially male): a statement whose particular veracity is not 
predicated upon the humanity of correction officials at Rikers Island, but rather, by contrast 
to the unbelievably barbaric conditions of other prisons. 911  
 
Fittingly, the doctor “was a filthy looking man who looked more like a Bowery bum than a doctor. 
He coughed all over me without even covering his mouth, and his fingernails looked like he had 
spent the last five years in a coal mine.” The only advantage, Shakur surmised, was that he worked 
quickly. He “rattled diseases off like he was an auctioneer and asked me if i had them. Then he 
gave me a one-minute examination, took my blood, and that was it.”912  
Shakur’s impression of her fellow prisoners echoes in part the accounts of Bird and Davis 
from the previous facility. “There are no big time gangsters here,” Shakur observed, 
no premeditated mass murders, no godmothers, no kidnappers. There are no big time dope 
dealers, no kidnappers, no Watergate women. There are virtually no women here charged 
with white collar crimes like embezzling or fraud. Most of the women here have drug 
related cases. Many are charged as accessories to crimes committed by men. The major 
crimes women here are charged with are pickpocketing, shop lifting, robbery, and drugs. 
Women who have prostitution cases or who are doing ‘fine’ time make up a substantial 
part of the short term population. The women see stealing or hustling as necessary for the 
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survival of themselves or their children because jobs are scarce and welfare is impossible 
to live on.913  
 
Like Davis, Shakur estimates that over ninety-five percent of the women were black and Puerto 
Rican. They came largely from New York’s major black areas: Harlem, Brownsville, South Bronx, 
South Jamaica, and Bedford-Stuyvesant. Many had suffered abuse as children, and at the hands of 
intimate partners. She estimated that eighty percent used drugs on the street, and getting high was 
the most common activity women looked forward to doing upon release. Many women carried 
scars from self-harm.914 
Also similar to HDW, over half the women took psychotropic drugs, while “elaborate 
schemes to obtain contraband are always in the works,” constituting a culture Shakur understood 
as escapist, with days packed full of television, love affairs between prisoners, and games. Despite 
the prevalence of romantic relationships, Shakur found no connection between these practices and 
liberatory politics, noting instead how they replicated the patriarchal couple form of the outside 
world, including violence and intimidation perpetrated by “butches” against “femmes.” Neither 
did the black liberation movement, nor any kind of anti-capitalist politics, hold any sway. While 
most women considered “whitey” the source of their oppression, Shakur bemoaned, “They do not 
want to destroy Rockefella. They want to be just like him.”915  
Shakur found the same to be true of the guards. “I was quickly to find out that the 
overwhelming majority of guards in the female jail at Rikers are Black,” Shakur discovered. “But 
when they opened their mouths and expressed their opinions, you wondered.”916 To Shakur’s 
chagrin, despite their professed understanding of the white supremacist structure of US society, 
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the guards held unabashedly middle-class values, adhered to the “boot-strap theory,” and even 
consider the legal system “lenient.” Additionally, they were possessed of occupational chauvinism, 
considering themselves superior to the prisoners, despite the fact that “their dubious 
accomplishments are not based on superior intelligence or effort, but only on chance and the civil 
service list.”917  
Ultimately, however, Shakur discovered that most guards were hemmed in, “hate and feel 
trapped by their jobs,” fraught with abuse from co-workers and a punishing work schedule. Yet, 
“no matter how much they hate the military structure, the infighting, the ugliness of their tasks, 
they are very aware of how close they are to the welfare lines. If they were not working as guards 
most would be underpaid or unemployed.” The guards insist, Shakur notes, that they are just doing 
a job like any other. “The more they say that,” she concludes, “the more preposterous it seems.”918 
 
Reprivatization 
Candidate Lindsay had denounced Wagner’s spending habits, including the sale of short-
term revenue anticipation bonds, which basically means borrowing based on future revenue that 
may or may not come. Yet faced with the immense pressure of holding the City together amid 
declining revenues and simmering political crisis, Lindsay had followed in his predecessor’s 
footsteps, relying on speculative borrowing, paying operation costs out of capital funds, and billing 
one year’s expenditures to the budget of the next.919 Lindsay turned to debt, as historian Kim Fein-
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Phillips argues, “to evade open struggles about its priorities, and about the limits, disappointments, 
and failures of the postwar liberal regime.”920 This strategy could not last forever.  
By 1973, 21.6% of the City’s revenue came from federal aid, up from 4.5% in 1961. This 
was due in large part to Johnson’s Great Society programs—commitments from which Nixon, and 
then Ford, were eager to extricate the federal government. Additionally, State aid to the City 
increase fivefold during this time. Simultaneously, New York City lost 257,000 jobs between 1969 
to 1973 alone.921 By 1972, roughly one in eight New Yorkers were on some form of public 
assistance.922 Meanwhile hiring in City agencies, driven in large part by pressure from black and 
brown organizers, continued to balloon, amid decreasing revenues, until 1974.923 
Lindsay left office at the end of 1973, his political career effectively destroyed by his 
inability to straddle the widening chasm between left and right wing insurgencies in the City’s 
streets and institutions. Taking his place was Abraham D. Beame. It would be difficult to find a 
politician cutting a greater contrast to Lindsay in practically every sense, including stature; 
standing five feet, two inches, Beame was known to deliver addresses while standing atop an 
attaché case. The child of Jewish Russian immigrants who fled czarist repression of his father’s 
socialist politics, Beame hailed from a Lower East Side slum, using his City College education to 
become an accountant, and plodding his way through Democratic Party machine politics. Beame 
served as comptroller under both Wagner and Lindsay, and unsuccessfully challenged Lindsay for 
the mayoralty in 1964. While Beame’s contrast to Lindsay was unfavorable in 1964, it is was 
perhaps what drew a plurality of City voters fed who by 1973 were fed up with everything the 
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Lindsay years represented. Beame’s was an electic base composed of comfortable working-class 
white people, labor unionists, property owners, businessmen, the elderly, and denizens of the so-
called outer-boroughs, who flocked to a mayoral candidate devoid of the slightest charisma, 
ideological vision, or grand promises of any kind save for responsible fiscal management of City 
affairs and keeping the subway fare thirty-five cents. Even this would prove impossible.924  
Beame of course proved no more adept than Lindsay at resisting the necessity to keep the 
City afloat with the aid of inordinate spending, coupled with creative accounting practices on the 
grey fringes of legality. Each year since the Wagner era, the City had juggled a number of 
increasingly audacious financial tricks to fudge the numbers, as Wall Street became bolder, more 
globalized, and less invested in the financial health of New York City. The City’s finance and real 
estate elites had long bristled at the redistributive policies of post-war New York. However amid 
such seemingly boundless plenty as post-war period facilitated, these policies did not demand 
drastic and decisive action. This changed, however, as the global economic picture soured, amid a 
decline in the rate of profit, and a general sense among urban elites that the cities had gone far 
enough in the wrong direction. “Real elites,” argues economist William Tabb, “only enter day-to-
day operations of government in periods of crisis; they move to the background as soon as possible, 
after they have restructured the context of decision-making in ways they find congenial.”925 For 
New York City, this moment came in 1974.  
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Much has been written about the unfolding of the New York City fiscal crisis and its 
ramifications for New York City, the broader US, and the world.926  While the intricacies of the 
crisis fall beyond the present scope, it is worth emphasizing a few key points. First, the budgetary 
shortfall that set the crisis in motion was not a figment of the bankers’ imaginations. There was a 
legitimate crisis of profitability in US manufacture endemic to a broader capitalist crisis, from 
which the international market has yet to recover.927 Moreover, demands from below, including 
better pay and benefits for a greater number municipal employees, better and more expansive 
public services, and other redistributive policies that disproportionately assisted non-white New 
Yorkers, did not play a negligible role in pushing the City toward the breaking point.928  
Above all, however, the dramaturgy of the fiscal crisis, engendered by the City’s inability 
to pay its bills, catalyzed by the deliberate divestiture of New York City’s financial and real estate 
elites to pay for services and employment that benefited an increasingly non-white working class. 
Most importantly, it provided financial elites, with the support of Gerald Ford’s White House, the 
opportunity for a dramatic reversal of the redistributive trend which had operated under Wagner 
and Lindsay—a reversal of course which the City’s ruling class had long coveted. In the process 
the City government was effectively put into private receivership, and forced to undertake deep 
cuts to its public sector, as the prerequisite for being allowed to remain fiscally solvent and not be 
forced into bankruptcy. New York City thus became a laboratory for policies now commonly 
known as austerity. “The policies put into practice in the 1960s may be described as redistributive 
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liberalism,” writes Tabb, “and in the 1970s a neoconservative reprivatization.”929 The effects of 
reprivatization hit the City jail system hard.  
 
The Bureau of Budget Takes Charge 
In its 1975-1976 Annual Report, BOC dedicates the first and last sentence of its 
introductory paragraph to underscoring “the City’s correction system underwent a series of crises 
unmatched in its history” in these years.930 The first hint of budget trouble for the Board came in 
May 1974, when staffing cuts were demanded by City Hall. Brickman thought he could eliminate 
jobs yet to be filled, thereby preserving the existing staff.931 In an October appearance before BOC, 
Malcolm was asked about the status of the full-time librarian position the Board had been 
promised. “The Commissioner declared that he recognized the need for a professional librarian 
position,” the minutes reflect. However, “Assistant Commissioner Ford stated that the 
coordinating librarian position had been killed by the Bureau of the Budget.” And then came the 
buried lede: “Commissioner Malcolm stated that he will be required to lose an additional sixty 
civilian employees by the end of this year.”932 To save money Brickman proposed DOC replace 
clerical work done by guards with (presumably lower paid) civilians, and to replace guards who 
drove buses on Rikers Island with prisoners.933 Simultaneously, the Correction Aide Program itself 
was gutted.934  
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BOC fought against the gutting of the Correction Aide Program in particular, asking DOC 
to find $700,000 worth of cuts somewhere else. Its demise was emblematic of the rapid changes 
befalling the New York City public infrastructure. BOC member Kirby framed the cuts as violating 
the prisoners’ rights and also the civil rights of the aides, given that they were predominantly non-
white women. 935 This was a profound observation. The austerity budgets of this period, writes 
Tabb,  
had a much greater impact on blacks and Puerto Ricans than on other New Yorkers. In 
1975, 15,000 teachers and paraprofessionals – constituting 20 percent of union 
membership—were laid off, and this reduced the proportion of black and Spanish-
surnamed teachers from 11 to 3 percent… Between the fall of 1974 and the winter of 1976, 
the city workforce lost half its Spanish-surnamed workers, two-fifths of its black male 
employees, and one-third of its female employees… minorities, who made up 31 percent 
of the city payroll, suffered 44 percent of the cuts.936 
 
BOC was further enraged by the cuts being dictated not by Malcolm but by City Hall. For his part, 
Malcolm claimed to have stumped for the program, but been told by Deputy Mayor Cavanagh that 
it had to go, save for nineteen positions. Commenting that “in his 27 years of working for the City, 
he has never seen anything like this before,” Malcolm shared BOC’s frustration with the unilateral 
cuts, noting that a permanent civil service job had been effectively eliminated without his consent, 
and “the Bureau of Budget had taken to running the Department.”937  
Rikers prisoners circulated a petition supporting the Aides program, which they credited 
with providing legal advice and helping them communicate with their families on the outside. A 
ranking officer at the Tombs argued in defense of the program on the grounds that the Aides would 
wind up on welfare if dismissed.938 Even COBA, which had opposed the program in strident 
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language some years before, defended the fired aides.939 BOC even courted Lasker’s intervention, 
hoping to continue the program on legal grounds, but the judge refused.940 Amid the elimination 
of Aides, Clergy Volunteers were pressured to take on their duties. As the HDM Clergy Volunteer 
coordinator put it, after the influx of Tombs prisoners doubled the population of that facility amid 
the mass firing of Aides, “To ask [Clergy Volunteers] to assume what had been a full time job for 
a prisoner population half as large is the surest way to the destruction of morale and the general 
debilitation of the program.”941 
Medical services in the jails, grim as they were to begin with, suffered tremendously. Dr. 
Lloyd Novick of Prison Health Services told the board that basic services like examination upon 
intake had become “at best, cursory. Most physicians or physician associates who perform the 
initial medical exam have not been instructed as to what should be done, he said; at times, the 
writing on charts is illegible… Sometimes people who are scheduled for OPD clinics never get to 
the clinics because of the correction officers' schedules.”942 By March, the jails had lost ten percent 
of their medical staff in just three months, and seventy-two positions stood vacant and unlikely to 
be filled. Novick told the Board “PHS is approaching the point that precludes the minimum 
medical care needed in the prisons.” Even the program’s analysts had been cut, so quantification 
of this diminishing quality of care would be impossible. Novick welcomed the impending takeover 
of medical care at HDM and CIFM by Montifiore.943  
By the end of 1974, BOC itself was on the chopping block. In mid-December a round of 
cuts was announced that would reduce the Board to only three City-funded positions. Deputy 
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Commissioner Birnbaum told Tufo that the cuts were the result of DOC administrators being put 
on the spot, with only one hour to cut twenty-five “provisional” positions—and was forced to 
choose, as BOC minutes word the issue, between “emasculating the staff of the Department or the 
Board.”944  
Board members pushed against Birnbaum’s account, noting DOC had more than an hour, 
and many possible jobs to cut, before gutting BOC. Tufo “stated that the Department now has three 
strikes against it—the Tombs, the Branch Queens House, and the present cutback.” He clarified: 
“three strikes and you’re out.” Finally comprehending what should have long been obvious, the 
“rest of the Board was similarly disposed. The general outlook was that the board can no longer 
count on the Department of Correction.”945 At this juncture, Tufo got Birnbaum on the phone, who 
assured him Malcolm believed the cuts to BOC to be too severe, and Malcolm had pledged to call 
City Hall and advocate for the return of some of the fired staffers.946 This promise was not kept.947 
The moment was so chaotic, questions of the Board’s future hung not just on City funding, but 
whether Mayor Beame would follow through on a plan to transfer the entirety of DOC to the State, 
which already had its Commission of Correction.948 
The closure of the Tombs also corresponded with a dramatic influx in the City jail 
population, which Malcolm attributed to a sharp rise in arrests, and a lag time in court 
processing.949 Moreover, as unemployment mounted and City services unraveled, quantifiable 
crime had risen precipitously, with the murder rate more than doubling, from 653 in 1966 to 1,680 
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in 1973.950 Following the closure of the Tombs, the population at HDM shot up from 800 to 1700. 
A CVP coordination at HDM reported:  
Since Christmas I have begun to see less and less of a possibility of any tasks for the aid 
and assistance of inmates being completed. It is almost impossible to return to a particular 
inmate for a follow-up interview. First, you have to find him, then you have to attempt to 
interview him in the chaos in front of each block. This difficulty is also heightened by the 
absence of the Correctional Aides who were formerly able to relay messages to the Clergy 
Volunteers as well as to the proper personnel in the social services.951  
 
Crowding became so pressing that DOC considered shifting detainees to sentenced buildings. 
Testifying before the Board in March of 1975, Malcolm claimed DOC was a ninety-two percent 
capacity. Asked if this figure counted total cells or usable cells. Malcolm replied usable cells, to 
which Deputy Commissioner Birnbaum corrected the Commissioner, telling him the figure 
referred to total cells. The figure, the men agreed, must be higher than ninety-two.952 
 Malcolm floated a dubious plan to partition the CIFM dormitories to accommodate 
upwards of 200 prisoners, which seems to have amounted to splitting dormitories down the middle 
with caging, providing an interior catwalk for guards.953 DOC sought to sidestep the single-cell 
requirement by building a dormitory facility capable of holding 760 prisoners, the C-95 building, 
which would bear the name Anna M. Kross.954 Meanwhile costly plans to renovate the Tombs 
stalled out due to lack of funding.955  
By mid-1975, the City was demanding over 800 layoffs from DOC, the closure of the 
Bronx and Brooklyn Houses of Detention.956 However, the Bronx House received a stay only after 
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riots at Rikers made the closure impossible for the City to countenance.957 The Adolescent 
Detention Center was closed due to cuts in June 1975, and the surplus was foisted on the new 
ARDC, where double-celling—coupled with a spike in guard brutality, and battles between rival 
factions black and brown prisoners—became the norm. The violence became so bad that BOC 
teamed up with COBA to provide anti-violence outreach. By the former’s telling, this promising 
program was scuttled by DOC and COC forcing themselves into the project and running it aground 
before it could get traction.958 By September DOC had lost 209 civilians, and 250 guard positions 
through attrition, and 250 through layoffs.959 Thanks to the principle of “last hired, first fired,” 
these layoffs skewed disproportionately to non-white guards, given the recent adoption of 
affirmative action policies in hiring.960  
Malcolm complained that losses by attrition were exacerbated by portended wage cuts, 
which made the present the opportune moment to retire at a rate that might be diminished in the 
near future.961 Timed as this was with a legal mandate against double-celling, and a spike in the 
City jail population, DOC was experiencing pressure from all sides that manifested itself in a 
redoubled climate of struggle within the jails. 962 On the July 4th weekend, twelve guards at HDM 
called in sick, “crippling the tour,” as the warden testified, by delaying dinner and keeping the 
prisoners stuck in their cells. Prisoners responded by setting fires, and order was only restored by 
imposing further overwork on the guards who would come in, some working shifts in excess of 
twenty-four hours.963 The New York City fiscal crisis played out in microcosm in the City jail 
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system, even in the most banal sense: prisoners received a cut in their wages, clothing provisions 
were diminished, and the number of bread slices per meal was diminished from four to three—
while commissary prices went up.964 
 
Law and Order Takes the Streets 
On July 7th, just days after the work stoppage inside Rikers, guards undertook a militant 
action on mainland Queens. Parking their cars across Hazen Street, they successfully blocked the 
bridge to Rikers for almost an hour. They dispersed only when police arrived, flanked by tow 
trucks prepared to impound their vehicles.965 This would not be the last time guards resorted to 
this new tactic. Nor was this bold militancy limited to the City’s jail guards. The actions was part 
of a broader political movement among the organized forces of law and order, operating in tandem 
with police and prison guards’ unions statewide and across the country.966  
The following week, a mob of recently laid off police and their supporters, many visibly 
intoxicated, descended on Lower Manhattan for a raucous five hour demonstration against layoffs 
in NYPD. The demonstrators blocked the Brooklyn Bridge, let the air out of car tires, menaced 
motorists who confronted them, pelted on-duty cops with beer bottles and invectives, and refused 
to move until three arrests were made.967 At least one Brooklyn Bridge arrest did not go as planned, 
when a group of off-duty cops assaulted the arresting officers, thus allowing their comrade to 
escape.968 PBA did not demand NYPD and City Hall take immediate action to apprehend these 
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attackers. While the union claimed the entire day of action was “a spontaneous protest,” multiple 
cops told a reporter they had been contacted by the union and encouraged to attend.969  
A week after the Brooklyn Bridge demonstration, prisoners at Kew Gardens staged an 
action of their own. They beat two guards and threw a third over a railing to the ground fourteen 
feet below. Prisoners then seized the fourth floor for almost three hours, smashing chairs, a 
television, and heating equipment, and sending a barbershop chair flying over a railing. They also 
broke into the guards’ office, located their own prisoner identification cards, and set them on fire. 
This rebellion would prove difficult for DOC to attribute to overcrowding caused by City 
underfunding. The facility was actually under capacity at the time. Moreover, in the course of 
negotiations, which resulted in prisoners ultimately agreeing to go back to their cells peacefully, 
no substantive grievances about jail conditions were raised.  
“They attacked us and we stood up as men,” an unidentified prisoner shouted to reporters 
below. “They have been harassing us…with penny ante things… Every damn black man in this 
institution has a ransom, a bail he can’t buy. They harass us because we’re Muslims.” These were 
not the symptoms of overcrowding, but symptoms of the broader balance of political and economic 
forces that also manifested itself in crowding. The political context of this demonstration, building 
for many years amid enduring structural inequality outside the jail walls, was clearly beyond 
matters of jail administration. Zeferetti, by this point running for a Congressional seat he would 
win, complained this context was not worthy of attention, as “inmates are getting everything 
according to law.” 970  
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Similarly, one demonstrator at NYPD’s raucous City Hall rally held a sign reading “Burn 
City Burn.”971 The politics underlying this nihilistic message were sharper than they might have 
seemed. The previous month, a group of uniformed unions including COBA had authored the 
notorious “Fear City” pamphlet under the auspices of the Council for Public Safety. Intended for 
tourists, with its name a play on Lindsay’s “Fun City,” the pamphlet warned: “Mayor Beame is 
going to discharge substantial numbers of firefighters and law enforcement officers of all kinds.” 
Therefore, the reader should “stay away from New York if you possibly can.” If this was 
impossible, the reader could follow the steps taken by those New Yorkers who “manage to survive 
and even to keep their property intact.” This meant vacating the streets after 6 p.m., avoiding 
walking anywhere, staying in Manhattan, guarding their property as if it would be snatched at any 
moment, and staying mindful of fire hazards—given that there were fewer firefighters to 
extinguish blazes.972  
The pamphlet proved immensely controversial, and was even for a time blocked by court 
order sponsored by City Hall, and the unions ultimately reneged on their promise to distribute it at 
airports, bus stations, and Midtown hotels.973 Such theatrics were only the most public expression 
of a power struggle long in progress, which the City’s agents of law and order would now fight to 
a decision.    
 
Essential Services 
The fiscal crisis, in tandem with taxpayers rebellion anticipated by groups like PAT, 
represented a turning point in state expenditure on a national, and then global scale. New York 
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City was the laboratory of this transformation. The result was, as Ruth Wilson Gilmore 
demonstrates, “delegitimation of programs the state could use to put surpluses”—whether 
unemployed people, disused land, surplus tax revenue, or other means of production—“back to 
work, while at the same time, the state retained bureaucratic and fiscal apparatuses from the golden 
age.” In short, “the state did not disappear… Rather, what withered was the state’s legitimacy to 
act as the Keynsian state.”974  
This means the management of the lower tiers of the working class, disproportionately non-
white as they were, would now be handled less by welfare state bureaucracies and more by 
bureaucracies revolving around policing, courts, jails, and prisons. In New York City this process 
was greatly influenced by the tradition of rank-and-file militancy among the police and guards’ 
unions who, having cast in their lot with the movement for law and order, were uniquely positioned 
to demand a larger share of the dwindling pie.975 To this end they engaged in political struggle 
over the definition of what the City considered to be “essential services.”976  
In no eternal register is it carved into stone that a beat cop accosting the homeless, doling 
out tickets for public urination, or responding to more serious crimes whose perpetrators have long 
vanished, is more “essential” than teachers, trash collectors, social workers, park rangers, or any 
other City employee responsible for providing a more dignified and comfortable quality of life for 
working-class New Yorkers. The definition of “essential” therefore was the result of political 
struggle. This is especially so given the inconvenient fact that when NYPD had undertaken an 
ostensible wildcat strike in 1971, arrests dropped, but there was no great spike in crime. New York 
did not become Fear City.977  
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More significantly still, the ostensible purpose of NYPD’s 1971 strike was the rejection of 
pattern bargaining, by which every City union resolves their contracts with roughly the same gains. 
Its greater impetus however was the State investigation of NYPD corruption under the Knapp 
Commission, most commonly known for its chief whistleblower, Frank Serpico, which 
represented not only the dismantling of corruption rackets, but the intrusion of an external authority 
on the cops’ ability to do their jobs as they saw fit. Both motives speak to a rank-and-file growing 
increasingly impatient with their status as one City agency among others, forced to obey the same 
customs and laws as other City employees.978  
Since the days of Wagner, the police had been arguing behind the scenes for a break from 
pattern bargaining with other City workers, even firefighters and guards, arguing theirs was a 
uniquely difficult and hazardous job.979 In 1975 the PBA officially opposed so-called “me-too 
clauses,” by which City unions could demand the City offer similar terms as those won by others. 
This was met by understandable disgust by other City employees, perhaps especially the sanitation 
workers, who the cops argued deserved twenty-eight percent less pay than they did, despite the 
former’s early gains having laid the foundation for the success of PBA through the same “me-too 
clauses” the cops now opposed.980 Even NYPD was not immune to cuts however, though its ranks 
escaped the worst of the layoffs by far.981 Steep cuts to drug treatment programs, disastrously timed 
to coincide with the implementation of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, replaced the vestiges of a 
medical approach to addiction with the carceral solution that reigns supreme today.982 While large 
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segments of New York’s racialized working class was positively decimated by the transition to 
come, it wasn’t just Wall Street who came out on top. COBA fared just fine. 
COBA would never tire of crying poverty and hardship for its members, and complaining 
they were disrespected and not afforded the benefits given to other City workers, most notably the 
cops. However, an observer looking solely the contract COBA won in the heat of the fiscal crisis, 
the fall of 1975, would have a hard time believing the City didn’t have money to spare. On top of 
a $17,458 minimum base salary, the guards also received automatic cost-of-living raises pegged 
to increases in the US Department of Labor price index, an annual “longevity adjustment” of $100, 
upwards of $261 per year placed in an annuity fund to be paid upon departure (including 
termination for any reason), twelve paid leave days per year, and significant medical benefits, 
combining to provide a comfortable life for those administering captivity in the most 
uncomfortable quarters in all of New York City.983 John M. Wynne, Jr., an MIT-educated 
management scientist who studied this contract, lauds COBA for “a remarkably effective job of 
negotiating for economic benefits.” Wynne cites an unnamed union officer who claimed the secret 
to their success lay in public ignorance of just how good the guards had it.984   
One of these guards was Eric M. Taylor, a black Bedford-Stuyvesant native whose name 
today adorns the C-76 building. Taylor was laid off from the NYPD in 1975 amid budget cuts, 
only to find work available in DOC.985 This is emblematic of an arrangement in which guards fared 
even better than the police in avoiding cuts, especially after using a jail rebellion as pretext to force 
the City to rehire many of the positions lost.986 On a very basic level, hemmed in by court rulings 
and already facing dire conditions, there wasn’t much to be cut from the jail system without 
                                                            
983 Wynne, Prison Employee Unionism, 164-165. 
984 Wynne, Prison Employee Unionism, 164. 
985 On the Gate, “This Former CO Aimed High,” Spring 1996. Reproduced on correctionhistory.org.  
986 Hill, “Common Enemy,” 87.  
262 
 
breaking the law. More broadly, however, amid the dramatic reordering of the New York City 
public sector, the City needed the jails more than ever before, to absorb the side effects of cuts to 
sundry social services, paired with the withdrawal of public sector work that as of late had 
disproportionately benefited non-white New Yorkers. In short, the City jails picked up where other 
City agencies had left off, housing under squalid and treacherous conditions the same people who 
would in an earlier regime have benefited from public housing, public assistance, City 
employment, or other features of Freeman’s “working-class New York,” which was effectively 
vanquished during this transitional period.987  
Between 1971 and 1980, “guilty pleas to felonies increased from 47 percent to 66 percent 
in the criminal courts, the percentage of defendants sent to state prison (excluding city prison 
sentences) rose from 23 to 54 percent, and the percentage of defendants sentenced to more than 
three years increased from 26 to 85 percent.”988 A survey of 300 random City court defendants 
conducted in 1977 “found only 30 percent to be employed, and of those with jobs over a third took 
home less than $100 a week; more than 90 percent took home less than $200…Many cases 
involved stealing from supermarkets, not paying for meals, and not paying subway fares.”989 
Pressed by the political savvy of COBA, DOC thus managed to transfer the greatest burden of the 
fiscal crisis not to its uniformed staff, but to those locked unwillingly in its custody. To say their 
living conditions went from bad to worse does not do the severity of the situation justice. This was 
not just a matter of neglect and squalor, either. The power structure imbricating the City post-fiscal 
crisis, with the balance of power shifted toward uniformed agents of law and order, was being felt 
inside the jails.  
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A New Order 
In November 22, 1975, Tufo paid a visit to HDM after receiving a tip it was on the brink 
of crisis. He found “services to inmates had broken down, food was served cold and late, working 
conditions had deteriorated to the point were on-duty officers walked off their posts and left the 
cellblocks unmanned.”990 The facility had absorbed the populations of the Adolescent Detention 
Center when it closed on June 19th, and 250 prisoners from the Bronx Detention Center when it 
was “half-closed” as part of a planned phasing out.991 The following evening, Roy Caldwood, now 
an Assistant Deputy Warden, was on patrol at HDM, when a guard notified him of an “unusual 
huddle” of prisoners on the opposite end of one cell block, amid an ominous and thoroughly 
uncharacteristic quiet. “For the gate officer” guarding these nearly-hundred-yard blocks, 
Caldwood explains, “it’s like trying to figure out what play the other team’s quarterback is going 
to call when you’re way down in the opposite end zone.”992 As Caldwood and his colleagues 
speculated what was afoot, Caldwood was called at once to another block, where guards discovered 
prisoners had been removing bricks from the shower wall. But this “wasn’t the start of an escape 
hole nipped in the bud. The bricks were ammo for a fight.”993   
No sooner was the plan discovered than the conspirators, packed into two blocks with over 
600 prisoners total between them, sprang into action. Malcolm later called the action “a massive 
force of manpower.” Complaining of inadequate medical care, food, and housing, to the point of 
triple-celling, they demanded to speak with Judge Lasker in person. In keeping with its public 
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relations strategy, DOC initially strove to keep the uprising quiet. The Fire Department responded 
to multiple calls reporting fires on the island, only to be turned away and told “everything was 
under control.”994 Meanwhile, five blocks holding a combined 1,510 prisoners had fallen under 
prisoner control. Prisoners destroyed two of the shower walls separating Block 2 and 4, while 
others breached the wall between Blocks 4 and 6, to great tactical advantage. Simultaneously, 
prisoners in Blocks 3, 5, and 7 breached their connecting shower walls, thus creating a concentrated 
force of 921 prisoners.  
Malcolm soon discovered “instead of having to attack five different blocks of 
approximately 300 inmates in each block, the breaching of shower walls between blocks had 
created two massive forces of inmates,” numbering 1,501 total. The prisoners of Block 7 even 
electrified its metal gate, unbeknownst to the guards anxious to break it down.995 While DOC later 
tried to explain the rebellion as the logical result of a number of numerical factors related to 
crowding and understaffing—which, of course, could be alleviated with more City funds, and still 
more jails—Malcolm admitted “it was not clear what their demands were. The spokesmen were 
making general attacks on the bail system, the courts, inadequate legal representation and the social 
conditions in this country and its effects on blacks and hispanics.”996 
Outside the jail, upwards of 450 guards, sixty cops, two NYPD helicopters, and two NYPD 
boats encircled the institution as negotiations dragged on. Lasker made an appearance, as did four 
journalists, all at the prisoners’ request. A lone injury occurred when Warden Louis Greco allowed 
a tear gas grenade to explode in his hand. Tufo and Malcolm hazarded gas-laden air to enter an 
occupied cellblock through a hole in the wall, playing an instrumental role in negotiating for a 
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peaceful resolution.997 The seventeen-hour revolt ended with an agreement signed by Malcolm, 
Tufo, the Bronx District Attorney, and a number of prisoner representatives. It stipulated amnesty 
for prisoners promised by both DOC and the DA, to be monitored by BOC. (Recall McGrath’s 
duplicity on this point in 1970.) No prisoners on the negotiating team would be transferred against 
their will. Moreover DOC pledged to address “with all the resources at their command” the 
problems of overcrowding, bail, prisoner disciplinary procedures, harassment of visitors, and 
medical care. Finally, DOC agreed to “periodically” admit news media to check up on the 
institution’s progress.998 The rebel cell blocks lay in ruin. But there had been no great siege of 
guards as there had been three years prior.  
This was not happy news for everyone on Rikers. “Scarcely had this crisis ended,” recounts 
Malcolm, “when another crisis developed. Approximately 550 correction officers from all the 
institutions on Rikers Island (except the Correctional Institution for Men) had walked off the job 
in protest over the settlement and particularly amnesty… They were extremely incensed over the 
presence of outsides and the role they played in the final decision,” although this had resulted in a 
peaceful and orderly end to the rebellion, marred only by a warden’s incompetent  handling of a 
tear gas grenade.999 Still, things had not gone the way the guards wanted.  
In his first and only visit to Rikers Island as mayor, Beame toured HDM, praising the 
guards effusively, and “shook his head in disbelief at smashed toilets, broken walls and heaps of 
makeshift weapons.”1000 Malcolm joined him, attempting to appease COBA, while defending his 
position to provide amnesty on the grounds that “another Attica could have been the outcome” 
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otherwise.1001 In a prominent showing of how the City was to function, however, COBA President 
Harold Brown was not content to meet with Malcolm; he wished to negotiate directly with Mayor 
Beame. Moreover, COBA drafted a telegram to Governor Carey, co-signed by the Correctional 
Captain’s Association, requesting his intervention in DOC’s handling of the riot, and 
characterizing the City justice system as “all too quick to make a correction officer a victim and 
let the inmate go unpunished.” All this was announced at a belligerent press conference.1002  
City Hall, stretched so thin by dictates of austerity that Beame was sometimes forced to 
tears in announcing the latest cuts, was nonetheless cowed by COBA. Beame “agreed to the 
correctional officers’ demands, for the right to continue carrying guns while off duty, the hiring of 
50 more correctional officers for Rikers Island, and the division into quarters of the 355-footlong 
cell blocks in the Rikers jail to facilitate supervision by the correctional officers,” remarks Wynne. 
“The mayor agreed to these conditions, which entailed great expense, even though other city 
departments were laying off staff and the city was facing bankruptcy.”1003 For its part, DOC 
responded to this latest rebellion by reducing the prisoner population at HDM by 1,000, achieved 
by sending prisoners to Sing Sing, and to a reactivated Bronx House of Detention. New pressure 
however came from Judge Lasker’s ruling in the ongoing Benjamin v. Malcolm that all DOC 
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Time for Roy to Go 
Beginning shortly before this latest riot, Roy Caldwood had noticed a change on Rikers 
Island. Officially recognized as a hero and a model officer, Caldwood had earned official 
commendations for ending confrontations between prisoners and staff at moments when the latter 
were itching for further violence. He had placed himself between guards and prisoners being 
brutalized, to uphold the rules that he believed kept the institution both honest, and functioning 
optimally. Caldwood received an official commendation for his role in the November 1975 
rebellion, only the latest in a string of accolades.1005 In other words, Caldwood had distinguished 
himself as a humanist administrator firmly in the tradition of Kross, under whom he worked, and 
whom he greatly admired. But Kross was long gone. And loyalists to her ideals were ever harder 
to find. Louis Greco, who took over HDM shortly before the November rebellion, openly ignored 
Caldwood despite the latter being among the highest ranking officers in the building.1006  
At this point, Caldwood began to encounter open insubordination from a subordinate guard 
who had a close relationship with Greco, and who encouraged his fellow “Paisanos” to spurn 
cooperation with Caldwood’s attempts to discipline him. One day, Caldwood was summoned to 
the control room, an unusual occurrence. Once inside, he discovered three prisoners from another 
building waiting for him—and no other guards in sight. They surrounded him menacingly, before 
taking leave. There was only one person in the jail who could have arranged such an elaborate 
scene, Caldwood rationalized. “To me, the message was clear,” he recalls. “I could be dead at any 
moment.”1007  
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That very day, Greco summoned Caldwood to his office for the first time, and demanded 
Caldwood post new regulations all over the jail. Though this was surely a task below his rank, 
Caldwood agreed to do so. “No,” Greco replied, “Don’t have somebody else post them. I want 
YOU to do it—throughout the building. And if any of them come down, I expect you to personally 
put them back up. I will hold you responsible.” Caldwood’s next stop was DOC headquarters to 
fill out retirement papers. There he learned Greco had already called, to inquire if Caldwood had 
enough time to retire.1008 Caldwood’s departure symbolized some of the last vestiges of the era of 
Anna Kross. That is, except for the infrastructure which now busily crowded Rikers Island, and 
would become the provenance of one administration after another with no use for the rehabilitative 
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CHAPTER 9:    LAW AND ORDER TAKES POWER 
 
Mayor Edward Koch pairs “law and order” politics with austerity, as the City’s jail population 
expands in inverse correlation to the City’s provision of public services and public sector 
employment. In keeping with the City’s new paradigm, austerity impacts DOC less than most other 
City departments. Accordingly, COBA continues to gain confidence and strength. A reform plan 
to remove City facilities from Rikers fails. Dramatic jailbreaks continue. BOC and federal judge 
Morris Lasker press DOC to comply with minimum standards for jail conditions, which DOC is 
largely unable to do. DOC proliferates temporary jail structures on Rikers to attempt compliance. 
Ultimately Lasker forces the City to release prisoners from custody. Koch  vows “never again,” 
and plans an unprecedented expansion on Rikers Island.  
 
Death Wish Politics 
On Christmas Day, 1977, Rikers Island received a special visitor: New York City’s mayor-
elect, Edward Koch.1010 Beame’s political career had been destroyed by the fiscal crisis and 
subsequent disclosure of the accounting tricks his office had undertaken to keep the City in the 
black.1011 In contrast to the hapless Beame, who had buckled under the pressure of imposing 
austerity on New York City, Koch was a man uniquely suited for his time and place. Koch was 
born in 1924 to a working-class Jewish family in the Morrisania section of the Bronx, hit hard by 
the Depression. Thanks to free tuition at City College, Koch worked his way to New York 
University Law School, punctuated by three years of service in World War II. An unremarkable 
lawyer handling wills and tort cases, Koch came somewhat late to politics, attracted to the failed 
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1956 presidential campaign of Democratic reformer Adlai Stevenson. In its course however Koch 
mixed with reform Democrats of his new home of Greenwich Village and developed a taste for 
electoral politics. Koch developed a calculated relationship with the reformist Village Independent 
Democrats (VID) who sought to build power outside the Democratic machine Tamawa Club, 
shifting his allegiances between the two with a calculated eye to his own electoral future. This 
attention to expediency over ideals would define Koch’s impressive political career.  
Though opportunistic from the start, in the 1960s Ed Koch had been nonetheless a staunch 
liberal. In 1962 Koch ran for state assembly on a uniquely liberal platform his opponents derided 
as a “SAD” campaign: the repeal of anti-sodomy laws, better access to abortion, and easier legal 
avenues to divorce. While Koch lost that race, he reached City Council in 1966, and captured 
Lindsay’s old seat in the so-called Silk Stockings district in 1968. Koch supported Lindsay’s 1965 
campaign for mayor and his reforms to the Civilian Complaint Review Board. He also opposed 
the Vietnam War beginning in 1966, backed Robert F. Kennedy’s presidential campaign, 
advocated for local and even federal rent control regulations, and most notably, supported the 
forced integration of his own district’s schools, with the use of busing, placing himself on the left 
side of one of the most divisive issues in urban politics.1012 Moreover, Koch had taken a particular 
interest in jails and prisons, campaigning for improved conditions at the Tombs prior to the 1971 
uprisings, and visiting jails regularly as a Congressman. By visiting Rikers on Christmas 1977, 
Koch had already paid the island as many visits as mayor-elect as his predecessor Beame had as 
mayor.1013 
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Regardless of the sincerity of young Koch’s liberal convictions, New York City’s political 
landscape was far different in the 1970s than it had been in the decade prior. The rise of an 
organized law and order movement and racial tension typified by the Ocean Hill-Brownsville 
teacher’s strike of 1968 worked in tandem with diminishing City services and the increasingly 
disastrous and divisive Lindsay mayoralty to set the stage for a conservative turn in City politics. 
Above all, the fiscal crisis had sounded the death knell for the Great Society approach to poverty 
and race relations, leaving in its place an organized bloc of capitalists bolstered by an organized 
bloc of cops and jail guards. This stubborn fact precipitated a change in Koch. Campaigning as 
moderate liberal not unlike Lindsay, Koch found little to distinguish himself from a broad field of 
professional New York City politicians, many of whom stood to his right, and many to his left. As 
New York City’s very own spokesman for Nixon’s so-called silent majority, adept at sounding the 
dog whistles of racial politics, however, Koch found his voice at long last. 
Koch debuted this new approach on the City stage in opposition to a “scatter site” housing 
development in Forest Hills, which would bring low-income black and brown people to a largely 
middle-class Jewish neighborhood in Queens. Sensing an opportunity to build a base beyond his 
Greenwich Village stronghold, and capitalize on the racial resentment of outer borough ethnic 
whites, Koch joined the coalition against the development, led by an openly racist firebrand named 
Jerry Birbach, whose followers brandished signs with slogans like “Niggers Go Home.” After 
appearing at one such rally and uncritically encouraging the crowd to keep up the fight, Koch 
battled longtime friends and colleagues dismayed by his new alliances, and moreover, by their 
ostensible root in naked political ambition.1014  
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Koch embraced the twin themes of law and order and austerity. As a mayoral candidate in 
1977, he capitalized on a redoubled popularity for racially-tinged law and order politics which 
followed looting amid the July 1977 blackout, to turn the race into a referendum on the death 
penalty, over which New York City’s mayor had no power. He baited black leaders as “poverty 
pimps” while maneuvering behind the scenes to get their support, in part by falsely promising to 
stop using this term. While promising to make dramatic cuts to City agencies, Koch also staked 
the position that he would simultaneously fight the power of City unions, including PBA, while 
nonetheless putting more cops on the streets.1015 The same political climate that produced the 
surprising and enduring popularity of Michael Winner’s Death Wish, and a cult around its fictitious 
white vigilante Paul Kersey, also produced a Koch victory.1016  
Catching his sail in winds rapidly shifting post-fiscal crisis, Koch argued government 
should facilitate private investment, rather than promote public consumption of state funds.1017 
The private sector takeover of the City government during the fiscal crisis had been dramatically 
emblematized by the ouster of First Deputy Mayor James Cavanaugh. Cavanaugh was a longtime 
Beame confidant who opposed public sector layoffs amid the crisis, famously declaring a “city is 
not a business” and could not simply cut services and jobs people needed. Taking his place was 
city planner and real estate advocate John Zuccotti, who had the approval of New York’s private 
sector.1018 Koch was firmly in the mold of Zuccotti. Koch campaigned openly for the City to be 
                                                            
1015  Newfield and Barrett, City for Sale, 126-128; 137-138. 
1016 Andy Battle and Jarrod Shanahan, “The Second Time as Farce,” Jacobin, April 13, 2018. “A Death Wish fever,” 
write Newfield and Barrett,” raced through the hot city during the summer of 1977” (127).  
1017 Mollenkopf, A Phoenix in the Ashes, 109.  
1018 Fein-Phillips, Fear City, 193-194. Zuccotti, the law partner of Peter Tufo, went on to become a successful 
developer in his own right, and helped launched the career of Donald Trump. See: Sam Roberts, “John E. Zuccotti, 
Urbanist, Financier and Would-Be Mayor, Dies at 78,” New York Times, November 20, 2015.  
273 
 
run precisely like a business.1019 Koch’s calculated political transition, for which he was greatly 
rewarded, was a sign of the times as potent as any. 
Koch’s visit to the House of Detention for Men on the eve of his mayoral inauguration 
therefore constituted a dubious, at best, act of charity toward those locked up there. Koch 
foregrounded in his remarks not the conditions of prisoners, but the morale of the staff, and pledged 
to mitigate the crowding on which he blamed the institutions sundry problems by expanding 
institutional capacity. Koch was sure to emphasize “the House of Detention for Men currently 
houses inmates who do,” and he stressed the word do, “belong here.” However, he continued, so 
long as the men with whom he broke bread remained locked up “for the protection of the 
community,” they deserved humane treatment. As a result, Koch would seek nine million dollars 
in funds to hire additional guards, to activate disused facilities, and increase the capacity at Rikers 
Island by 1,668.1020 Thus, amid massive cuts to the City’s public sector, Koch aimed to expand the 
capacities of DOC, and in particular, DOC’s holdings on Rikers Island.  
That same year Malcolm argued that while he supported improving the condition of City 
jails, “there was no constituency for correction,” and he never expected “a Stavinsky-Goodman 
bill for correction,” referring to a contemporary bill to fund public schools. Instead, he argued, 
“correction will always receive the crumbs of the criminal justice system.”1021 The Koch 
administration would in time prove Malcolm wrong. When the law and order movement met the 
fiscal crisis, a recipe had been devised for spending on police and prisons as not only a mechanism 
of social control mitigating against social movements, but as an austerity strategy in itself, with 
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policing and jails proving a less expensive, and thoroughly disempowering, alternative to welfare 
state spending. 
Acting deliberately to institutionalize this shift in New York City’s political economy, 
Koch’s mayoralty bridged the gap between the austerity of the fiscal crisis and a return to stability 
predicated on a new order defined by policing, incarceration, and private investment supplanting 
public sector spending the likes of which predominated in the post-war era. Accordingly, Koch’s 
mayoralty can divided roughly in two distinct periods.1022 In the first period, subject of the present 
chapter, Koch enforced austerity sufficient to discipline the City’s public sector on behalf of its 
private sector, and DOC suffered cuts to personnel alongside most City agencies as part of deep 
cuts Koch dubbed the “Program to Eliminate the Gap” (PEG).1023 In the second period, subject of 
the next chapter, with the City returned to fiscal solvency, Koch undertook an aggressive 
expansion of DOC unrivaled by any City agency, expanding its staff and physical plant 




Assuming office on January 1, 1978, Koch vowed to bring the jails up to constitutional 
standards, and settle the sundry legal cases pending against DOC.1024 Though Koch was the 
quintessential law and order candidate, it wasn’t mere ideology that motivated Koch’s plans for 
jail expansion. The 1974 closure of the Tombs had not resulted in the end of Rhem v. Malcolm, as 
DOC had hoped. Judge Lasker rejected the City’s argument that once transferred to the House of 
Detention for Men on Rikers Island, Tombs prisoners were no longer entitled to the rights they 
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had won at the latter facility. Thus the Rhem defendants at HDM retained certain victories such as 
one-hour daily recreation, and more importantly, brought the long arm of Judge Lasker to HDM, 
which now became the subject of judicial oversight. Even as the Rhem defendants dwindled, an 
additional lawsuit was filed by HDM prisoners not covered by Rhem, Benjamin v. Malcolm, which 
too fell under Lasker’s jurisdiction. The latter effectively subsumed the former, with a much 
broader scope. Rhem had come to Rikers, and it was not going away.1025  
Lasker was quick to point out that courts’ involvements in jails began only where public 
administration failed. Thus it was incumbent on the City to find not just a remedy for the ills of 
the City jail system, but also the costly intrusion of federal courts in municipal affairs.1026 In so 
doing, Koch would have a partner in the Board of Correction.  
The year 1977 marked not just the twentieth anniversary of the Board of Correction, but 
also the beginning of an expansion of the Board’s role in City affairs. Thanks to a revision of the 
City’s charter passed in 1975, beginning in 1977 BOC was responsible for establishing “minimum 
standards for the care, custody, correction, treatment, supervision, and discipline” of all people 
held in DOC custody, administering a standardized prisoner grievance program, and continuing 
its traditional oversight role as originally defined.1027 Moreover, the Board’s new powers were 
backed by the power of subpoena, by which the board could now demand documents, examine 
witnesses under oath, and work in tandem with courts to establish hearings on DOC affairs. 
Solidifying this independence, in July of 1977 BOC was established as an independent City 
agency. BOC’s new mandate translated above all into bringing DOC facilities into compliance 
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with the federal courts. While the minimum standards were legally distinct from the consent 
decrees, there was a practical blurring of the two, and considerable overlap in their demands.1028  
BOC’s minimum standards gained the additional support of the New York State 
Commission of Correction, a State level agency with similar watchdog powers. While the latter 
remained, like the courts, formally independent, BOC was the primary agent enforcing compliance 
in the years following the establishment of the minimum standards.1029 BOC established an internal 
Institutional Compliance and Development Unit, staffed by twenty-full time employees and 
funded by a LEAA grant from a program held over from the Lindsay years, the Mayor’s Criminal 
Justice Coordinating Council.1030 Henceforth DOC would have to answer to BOC directly, and 
more to the point, would need explicit BOC permission to deviate from minimum standards.  
The newly-empowered BOC did not mask its disdain for how the City had hitherto handled 
compliance with constitutionality. “The City’s adversarial posture continued,” the Board lamented 
in 1978, “although courts found that many conditions in New York City Correctional facilities did 
not meet minimal constitutional requirements. Even when the Federal District Court, as well as 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, had condemned a practice in one institution, the City 
defended the same practice elsewhere in the system.”1031 As John Boston, veteran of the Prisoners’ 
Rights Project of the Legal Aid Society, would remark decades later, “the system does not roll out 
reform; it quarantines it.”1032  
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As BOC’s new standards—the so-called “Inmates’ Bill of Rights”—were tried in the court 
of public opinion, Malcolm did his best to undercut public confidence in the feasibility of minimum 
standards, pointing to cost and administrative difficulty.1033 The savvy  Malcolm kept BOC on the 
defensive and otherwise treading softly, even as its powers expanded at the expense of his own. 
As per the ever-shifting allegiances of DOC politics, initially COBA sided publicly with the Board 
against the Commissioner, in supporting minimum standards.1034 As the reality of an empowered 
Board set in, however, COBA’s new president Richard Basoa assailed the Board, calling for the 
resignation of Tufo, who he dubbed “a playboy pseudo-penologist” wielding more knowledge of 
“the swells of the Upper East Side and [chic Park Avenue discothèque] Regine’s than he does 
about the problems of the city’s correction system.”1035  
BOC passed its sweeping minimum standards on September 7, 1977, though considerable 
room was left for individual jails to bring themselves up to compliance over the coming year.1036 
These standards were in part the product of compromise, rooted in the practical reality of imposing 
workable standards on DOC’s crumbling physical plants.1037 Nonetheless, the standards stipulated 
minimum requirements governing hygiene, clean clothing and bedding allowances, regular 
laundry service, protection against racial and religious discrimination, limited lock-in time (with 
an option to lock-in during lock-out), access to daily recreation, access to lawyers and legal 
material, regular contact visits, telephone access, written correspondence with the outside world 
(including the receipt of packages and publications), and access to journalists.  
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Of the greatest consequence to DOC administration were the stipulations limiting 
involuntary guard overtime (albeit worded to allow significant managerial discretion); the promise 
of seventy-five square feet per pretrial prisoner; and a guarantee of single-celling for every 
prisoner. A final item, however, allowing for “variances” to be granted temporarily to exempt 
DOC from compliance with individual sections or terms of the minimum standards, provided a 
considerable opening for noncompliance.1038 Regardless of this wiggle room built into the new 
standards, when Koch pledged constitutionally-sound jail conditions at his Christmas dinner at 
Rikers Island, his words evinced a sincere departure from the evasive and defensive posture of the 
prior administration. The City was ready to follow the law, Koch proclaimed. It was just going to 
need more time... and more jails.1039  
True to Koch’s word, City Hall further assisted the effort by allocating sixteen million 
dollars to DOC for the year 1979 to assist it coming to compliance. Simultaneously non-profit 
organizations like the Ford Foundation, the New York Community Trust, the Burden Foundation, 
and the New York Foundation supplied BOC with revenue to support improving conditions in the 
jails.1040 BOC’s power to set the standards was safe under Koch, but DOC’s willingness, or ability, 
to follow them was another matter altogether. 
In November 1979, with the minimum standards formally in effect across the jail system, 
the City signed a number of consent decrees with the Legal Aid Society, covering most of its 
ongoing litigation. “These agreements,” the Board reflected, “many of which reflect the language 
of the Board’s minimum standards, saved the City the considerable time and resources which 
would otherwise have been expensed in costly litigation.”1041 Benjamin v. Malcolm was only the 
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most famous of these. Bronx House of Detention for Men was embroiled in Ambrose et al. v. 
Malcolm, Brooklyn House of Detention in Moctezuma et al. v. Malcolm, Queens House of 
Detention for Men in Webb et al. v. Malcolm, ARDC in Maldono et al. v. Ciuros, CIFW in Forts 
et al. v. Malcolm, all supported by the indefatigable Legal Aid Society. 1042  Settling these cases 
and bringing DOC into compliance with BOC and constitutional standards were Koch’s primary 
managerial objectives. There were also part of a broader approach to managing the City under an 
austerity regime.  
 
Management and Responsibility 
As a candidate Koch had courted not just disaffected ethnic whites in the outer boroughs, 
but also the increasingly powerful “FIRE” sector, composed of finance, insurance, and real estate 
interests, who had emerged from the fiscal crisis in the driver’s seat of New York City politics.1043 
As mayor, Koch set about restoring New York’s credit rating by marketing himself in Washington 
as an agent of austerity, boasting before Congress of his twenty percent cut to the City workforce, 
forcible removal of hundreds of thousands of people from the welfare rolls, closure of daycares 
and fire stations, fare hikes on the subway, and the imposition of tuition at CUNY.1044 By contrast 
Koch increased investment in spending geared toward encouraging private development, and 
spending on City management, as the City government increasingly became run like the 
corporations to which it was made ever more amenable.1045 Koch even assigned Zuccotti to oversee 
monthly meetings reviewing departmental compliance with austerity, including DOC. BOC called 
                                                            
1042 DOC, Jails for the 80s, III, 19-44. 
1043 Mollenkopf, Phoenix in the Ashes, 110.  
1044 Fein-Phillips, Fear City, 290.  
1045 Mollenkopf, Phoenix in the Ashes, 133. 
280 
 
this placement of DOC under the scrutiny of Tufo’s law partner an “extremely positive 
development.”1046 
Koch’s neoliberal governing ethos was reflected in the leadership of DOC in his first term. 
The commissioner’s chair had been vacated in November of 1977 by Malcolm, who upon 
departure had declared “Free at last! Free at last!” and dedicated his emergency pager to “whoever 
has the guts, the intestinal fortitude, and the stupidity to succeed me.”1047 For a short time that 
someone was twenty-five year DOC veteran John D’Elia, who served as acting commissioner 
under Beame and for whom DOC uniformed staff lobbied Koch for a formal appointment to 
commissioner.1048 Koch opted instead for the deputy commissioner of DOCCS, forty-four year old 
William Ciuros. Hailing from the upstate prison town of Elmira, Ciuros had dropped out of high 
school to become a prison guard, and worked his way up the ranks of the State system. Despite his 
correctional lineage, Ciuros would prove far less popular than Malcolm in DOC thanks to policies 
ranging from restrictions of guards’ use of force against prisoners, the banning of informal coffee 
breaks, encouragement of civilian inspectors to monitor guard activities, and the most 
controversial issue of his tenure, the replacement of elective with mandatory overtime.1049  
Reminiscent of Kross, Ciuros undertook an extensive shakeup of ranking uniformed 
officials dubbed the “Monday Morning Massacre,” in which upwards of seventy of DOC’s highest 
ranking officials were shaken up—some promoted, some demoted, all reassigned. Unlike Kross, 
however, his motives were largely pecuniary. Ciuros insisted those demoted had failed to prevent 
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excessive overtime and sick leave.1050 This emphasis bolstered the sentiments of COBA President 
Richard Basoa, who called for Ciuros’s removal, declaring: “Let’s stop all the bull about him being 
out to improve the system. He wants to create a public-relations image of a reformer who can cut 
costs.”  Ciuros responded to the controversy his management inspired by accusing his detractors 
of resisting the reform of systematic abuses of power. “Good correction officers,” he insisted, “are 
not frightened by me.” An investigation by the Times, however, found Ciuros widely unpopular 
among the rank-and-file. Tufo, by contrast, praised Ciuros as a reformer.1051  
At the onset of his mayoralty Koch imposed a corporate management style on his 
commissioners, demanding a complex evaluation system for their subordinates, with the option of 
assistance from private consultants, and demanded bi-weekly progress reports.1052 In a practice 
dating back to Lindsay that seems to have become more popular under Koch’s austerity regime, 
unforeseen budgetary requests, such as a replacement generator for ARDC totaling a mere 
$12,000, were made directly to Koch using “declarations of emergency.”1053 At Koch’s insistence 
Ciuros undertook “Management and Responsibility” trainings for ranking uniformed staff. While 
these trainings were couched in the patronizing frozen smile of corporate governance, inviting 
attendees to “enrich your careers as corrections professionals,” Ciuros made their intent clear.1054  
“No longer will I tolerate the imagined or conceptual Table of Organization that separates 
you from Central Office and aligns you with Correction Officers, Captains and Assistant Deputy 
Wardens,” wrote Ciuros, in an invitation to a mandatory training addressed to wardens and deputy 
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wardens. “It is this misperception that has caused some of you to view your primary role as that of 
advocate for your subordinates. In fact, you are responsible for and are paid substantial salaries to 
help develop and then to carry out policy rather than defend others’ failure of it.”1055  In a letter to 
Koch outlining DOC’s budgetary priorities in imposing the PEG austerity program, Ciuros argued 
that cutting his “analytics” staff of management specialists would constitute “the gravest of 
sacrifices for [the City’s] financial security.”1056 Ciuros invested considerably in a scientific 
approach to management of staff and prisoners, spending $350,000 on a single computer as part 
of DOC’s  Management Information System.1057 Moreover, Koch contracted a private firm to 
evaluate Ciuros’s progress, and to make recommendations for the more efficient management of 
DOC.1058 
This attempt to foist more rational management on DOC was met by increasingly powerful 
guard unions, especially COBA. Phil Seelig, elected president of COBA in 1979, was an intelligent 
and fierce adversary, part of a citywide milieu of uniformed union leaders produced by the 
movement for law and order and the lean times of the fiscal crisis in which it battled for citywide 
supremacy. Building on this tradition, in 1980 the representatives of unions representing Housing 
Police, NYPD, FDNY, DOC, and other “uniformed” unions bargained separately from non-
uniformed unions, as part of the Uniformed Forces Coalition. The leaders of these unions 
represented a new crop, originally disdained by the City and longstanding City union politicians. 
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Such doubts were however quickly put to rest as Uniformed Forces claimed better contracts than 
even DC-37’s Victor Gottbaum, the avatar of professionalized municipal union politics.1059  
In addition to intimidating street mobilizations, COBA negotiators wore visible guns 
during negotiations, and one negotiator brandished a knife to clean his fingernails. An anonymous 
City official complained to the Times that City guards tended to bring to negotiations “a sourness 
of outlook [and] a tendency to intimidate” that were the hallmark of their workplace.1060 COBA’s 
unapologetic showings of force were paired with emotional appeals to deaths in the line of duty, 
which these law and order unions argued set them apart from all others.1061  Most importantly, 
however, these unions had the wind at their backs, needing only to build on the compact between 
law and order and the FIRE sector begun during the fiscal crisis. Doubling down on arguments 
made in the late 1970s, the Uniformed Forces Coalition argued for a greater share than non-
uniformed unions. At one rally, Nicholas Mancuso of the Uniformed Firefighters Association 
declared bluntly “We are not negotiating a contract for the entire city work force.”1062 They even 
endorsed the vehement union buster Ronald Reagan for president in 1980, and even again in 1984, 
after four devastating years for much of the non-uniformed US labor movement.1063  
COBA feuded with Ciuros throughout his troubled commissionership, most vehemently 
over Koch’s citywide policy to limit the overtime of senior employees soon to retire. Pushed by 
Koch, Ciuros sought to end the common practice by which outgoing guards could inflate their 
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pension considerably by taking on copious overtime in their final years, the salaries of which would 
determine their retirement rate. The new plan amounted to a limitation of overtime for these 
employees, and compulsory overtime across the board. As matters escalated, COBA took out a 
half-page advertisement in The Daily News calling for Ciuros’s firing, and threatened a slowdown 
action. However an agreement was struck in advance of any action, adding the possibility to opt 
out of mandatory overtime. “I hope this signals a new era of cooperation with the union” Ciuros 
wrote to Koch, in a scrupulous recounting of the conflict, “…but one in which they realized we 
will not be intimidated into making any more ‘sweetheart’ deals to keep labor happy at the expense 
of the future of this City.”1064 “You’re absolutely right,” Koch replied, “that there cannot be 
anymore ‘sweetheart deals to keep labor happy at the expense of the future of this City.’”1065  
When Koch attempted to weaken the power of public sector workers by introducing at-will 
positions in a number of City agencies, outside the purview of civil service law, Ciuros wrote to 
Koch complaining DOC was exempt.1066 In a letter to Ciuros praising his elimination of the 
“chronically ill” from DOC payroll, Koch declared: “Malingerers where identified should be 
removed forthwith wherever possible in accordance with departmental regulations. Keep it 
up!”1067 More dramatically still, Ciuros pressed charges against an two assistant deputy wardens 
and a captain for negligence precipitating a suicide, the first time in DOC history charges had been 
filed against a ranking officer related to a suicide.  
In what Ciuros claimed as retaliation for this and his “shake up,” an anonymous group 
calling itself the “Coalition of Concerned Correction Personnel” wrote a letter denouncing Ciuros 
for a variety of offenses including allegiance to “upstate political cronies,” unqualified staff, ethnic 
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favoritism, throwing lavish parties and picnics, and even lying about his New York City residence. 
Ciuros addressed these charges in detail in a rebuttal addressed to Koch, except for one. “I stand 
by my exceptionally well-qualified Executive Staff,” he wrote. “I also will not dignify the 
allegation that it is ‘loaded with alcoholics’ with an answer.”1068  
COBA opposed Ciuros seemingly at every turn. When the union slowed down prisoner 
transit in response to the new overtime policy, Koch and Ciuros pursued the possibility the Taylor 
Law had been violated, ultimately giving up.1069 COBA also picketed City Hall against what it 
considered the wrongful dismissal of probationary officers.1070  In its most dramatic move to date, 
in July 1979 guards staged what COBA insisted was a wildcat walkout, bringing hundreds to the 
Queens side of the Rikers Island bridge and blocking the bridge from prisoner transfer and other 
traffic as part of a fifteen hour strike. Their principal grievances revolved around guards’ right to 
arrest prisoners, which was tied up in litigation, COBA’s control over staffing matters pertaining 
to seniority, and of course the policy of forced overtime. Ciuros and Koch quickly invoked the 
Taylor Law, suspending a total of  856 guards, but the revocation of its invocation was also 
negotiated upon as part of a settlement. Importantly, while the action was called a wildcat, it had 
the full support of COBA President Phil Seelig.1071  
The following summer a smaller wildcat also blocked the bridge to Rikers until it was 
halted by Seelig, who was at the bargaining table discussing the overtime policy. The action was 
nonetheless effective, necessitating the ferrying of civilian employees to work.1072 In short, as non-
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uniformed unions were settling in for the long retrenchment ahead, COBA was flexing its muscles 
even more than it had before the fiscal crisis. Notably, the Rikers Island Bridge, a strategic 
chokepoint from which the functioning of City courts and jails could be brought to a virtual halt, 
was emerging as a tactical position from which COBA could bargain with the City from a position 
of great strength.   
Koch, not Ciuros, was the mastermind of the hated overtime restriction, as part of his 
austerity regime. However when it came to guards’ protection against prisoner assault, he was 
perhaps more zealous than COBA. It is possible Koch was simply pandering to the powerful union, 
offering a victory that came at the expense not of the City coffers but the far more disposable rights 
of prisoners. Regardless, this matter brought Koch into conflict with Ciuros, whose managerial 
approach to DOC treated the power of guards over prisoners as yet another facet of guard power 
to be limited by administration. When Koch pressed Ciuros to promptly and indiscriminately arrest 
prisoners charged with assault on staff, Ciuros argued “sometimes the case in which the Union is 
most demanding is also the case in which the inmate is the victim and not the villain.” Striking a 
position uniquely suited for the ears of Koch, Ciuros continued: “If we arrest an inmate who 
assaults and officer while the inmates is awaiting shipment upstate we must now house the inmate 
for an additional six (6) months to a year in our facilities,” thus constituting an undue expense.1073 
Koch was however willing to foot the extra bill for the imposition of law and order. 
In a telling exchange, Koch even instructed Deputy Mayor Herb Sturz to press matter with 
Judge David Ross, and to “take whatever other steps are appropriate to see to it that we heighten 
the consciousness of judges on the need for consecutive sentencing in these matters.”1074 This 
pressure campaign sheds light not simply on City Hall’s treatment of a pet issue to the Mayor, but 
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more broadly on the kind of extra-juridical pressures placed on the City’s judges during a period 
of rising political conservatism, when sentences were getting tougher. 
Beyond this particular disagreement, Ciuros had a great friend in Koch, until he didn’t. 
Sturz had long campaigned for Ciuros’s removal. In the summer of 1979, he got his way. The 
founder of the Vera, Sturz had pushed a jail reform agenda centered around the sale of Rikers 
Island to the State and its replacement with borough-based jails. Sturz deemed Ciuros 
insufficiently supportive of this plan and wanted him out. When Koch rearranged his deputies, 
eliminating Sturz’s title and demoting him to Coordinator of Criminal Justice, Koch offered the 
power to fire Ciuros as a consolation. Sturz lept at the chance, and fired Ciruos within two days. 
There was however a minor problem. “We were worried about him,” Sturz recalls.  
At Rikers Island he held ceremonies and would march through the audience—the audience 
was largely comprised of convicts—in full dress regalia, literally with a sash. God knows 
where he found it. He was so proud. Upon learning of his ouster, he made one demand: he 
wanted to see the Mayor, who hired him. He felt that was his right. Later that afternoon we 
arranged this. 
 
But one thing that we worried about was that Ciuros wore a gun in his ankle holster. 
[Corporation Counsel] Allen [Schwartz] and I were afraid he might take it out and try to 
shoot someone. This was after the Harvey Milk shooting in San Francisco. And yet we 
couldn’t ask him, we felt, to disarm. I remember speaking to Koch’s security guards, 
placing them at a slightly open door with a direct view of our meeting. Now, you might 
think this was melodramatic, but it was Ciuros’s life. He’d suddenly been stripped of his 
job; caught in a power fight. It was tough.1075  
 
Ciuros didn’t shoot anybody, accepting instead to stay outside the City’s jails. Upon leaving office 
he perhaps unwittingly evoked a choice expression of Kross’, declaring DOC to be “no longer a 
stepchild of the criminal justice system; rather, it is a professional, efficient, responsible municipal 
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agency.”1076 Simultaneously, Sturz’s plan to replace him with a more loyal commissioner 
proceeded. “Not only did I move on Ciuros,” Sturz recalls, still savoring his victory many years 
later, “but I immediately called Ben Ward and offered him the job of Commissioner of 
Corrections.”1077  
 
Good Guys and Bad Guys 
Benjamin Ward was born in a Central Brooklyn neighborhood he still referred to as 
Weeksville, after the community founded there by free black professionals in the mid-nineteenth 
century. Ward’s white father and black mother worked in show business. Before becoming DOC 
commissioner Ward served in the military police, drove a truck, and collected garbage, before 
becoming a police officer and earning a law degree through Brooklyn College. Ward subsequently 
chaired the Civilian Complaint Review Board, served as commissioner of the State prison system, 
and briefly worked at Vera, where he met and befriended Sturz.1078 Though welcomed by at least 
one DOC union as a welcome change from Ciuros, Ward had left DOCCS under acrimonious 
terms, declaring he was moving to Housing Police, “where one can tell the good guys from the 
bad guys, at least with more certainty than corrections.”1079  
In his return to corrections, however, Ward swore allegiance to Sturz’s plan to sell Rikers 
and build borough-based facilities. Yet Ward simultaneously carved out a position skeptical of bail 
reform—among the only possibly means of lowering the prisoner population short of taking on 
the sacred cow of NYPD autonomy—going as far as to claim “one of the great weaknesses in 
American jurisprudence is that judges do not pay enough attention to public safety in bail 
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decisions.”1080 Further, Ward later recalled that he was leery of Koch’s racial politics, especially 
his language denouncing the Great Society “Model Cities” program, and the notorious remarks 
about “poverty pimps.” While conceding neither Model Cities nor community-based anti-poverty 
programs were above reproach, Ward recalls “the way he said some of the statements, you know, 
it made you a little nervous about it… I didn’t think I’d ever work for him.”1081 
Race was an undeniable factor of Ward’s commissionership. While Ward was happy to not 
have to deal with the Ku Klux Klan, as he did as commissioner of State system, he nonetheless 
encountered malicious white chauvinism from some uniformed DOC staff, including a DOC 
branch of the Columbia Association, an advocacy group for Italian-Americans. The organization 
charged Ward had “wrongfully singled out many Italian Americans with years of dedicated service 
in correction and made them seem inept. On the other hand he has promoted and/or elevated others 
with horrendous records, simply because they are ethnically acceptable.” Columbia Association 
president Frank Bruni wrote Koch charging the Mayor found it “Politically Expedient to have him 
as your Commissioner.”1082 Bruni forwarded to Koch letter addressed to Ward, also forwarded to 
“every Italian American Politician” in the City, denouncing Ward for his pernicious discrimination 
against Italians, despite the fact that the “history and dedication of Italian Americans in this 
department… is a rich one and has not yet been topped by any other ethnic group.” Citing Italians’ 
“hereditary trait of being a proud people,” Bruni informed Ward he was not welcome at the 
Columbus Day Parade.1083  
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Moreover, Ward pursued, at least outwardly, the controversial Koch policy of 
“civilianization” of DOC operated under the auspices of PEG cuts, which amounted to the creation 
of lower-waged civilian lines to replace the functions of uniformed guards in functions like staffing 
DOC mailrooms. Retention proved difficult in these positions, however, likely due in part to 
COBA hostility to these non-union jobs.1084 Moreover, Ward  continued to enforce Koch’s 
overtime policy, which was sure to draw COBA’s ire. Well into Ward’s tenure, Seelig declared in 
his characteristic idiom that “Most orders that come out [from DOC administration] are 
promulgated for one of two reasons—either to have a Damoclean sword hanging over every 
officer’s head as a means of social control, or to find scapegoats.”1085 
Seelig was hardly reinventing the wheel with his criticisms of Ward’s administration, 
which echoed COBA’s line stretching back decades. On the other hand, it is impossible to overstate 
the amount time spent by DOC management, operating in tandem with Koch’s City Hall, to cut 
costs, while lower-level managers were made to feel less secure in their own positions should they 
fail. The model DOC and other agencies followed during this period is undeniably corporate, from 
its elaborate charts to its euphemistic managerial jargon. City management emphasized not only 
short-term cost savings, but a long-term realignment of the balance of power which Seelig referred 
to as “social control.” The costly and labor-intensive effort to eliminate superfluous labor 
expenditures during this period, in tandem with professionalizing an entire strata of middle 
managers and making them accountable for penalizing their subordinates, evinces the necessity of 
expanded managerial capacities to imposing austerity, not simply as a means of saving money in 
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the coming fiscal year, but also in the long-term interest of disempowering the workforce while 
establishing enduring norms favorable to management.1086  
Ward also oversaw the continuing expansion of DOC capacities on Rikers Island. The 
flagship of Koch’s plan for a revitalized Rikers Island, meant to accommodate the influx of New 
Yorkers swept off the streets under the new regime of law and order, was a facility bearing an 
ironic name: Anna M. Kross Center (AMKC). Technically known as C-95, AMKC was conceived 
as a “support building” for C-71, the facility Kross herself had opened as the Adolescent 
Reformatory back in 1962, as an adjunct to the Penitentiary.1087 C-71 thus lacked administrative 
space, a dining area, or any other amenities enabling it to function as an independent facility. By 
1977, 105 of its 1,240 maximum security cells had been converted to a medical area, and the 
facility, used for mental health observation, had been dubbed the Mental Health Center.1088  
AMKC is adorned with a brick face punctuated with reinforced steel-framed windows. By 
design, the three-story C-95 structure boasted space for 768 dormitory beds, with the one-story 
corridor connecting C-71 to administrative offices, a control room, a kitchen, two large dining 
areas for prisoners, an employee dining area, a gymnasium, commissary, and chapel, all meant to 
mitigate functions absent in the latter facility. There was however, despite the facility’s name, no 
space for prisoner programming. Though the building was dedicated on November 12, 1977 as 
Kross-era BOC member Rose M. Singer stood by, it could not open immediately, due to short-
staffing that kept C-71 and AMKC closed.1089  
This lack of staffing is what Koch meant to remedy with his nine million dollar promise in 
1977. But AMKC had bigger problems than short-staffing. Just three years after its opening, with 
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AMKC still not totally activated, DOC found the facility already in need of significant 
infrastructural repair, with water leaking onto electrical equipment, no smoke detection or 
sprinkler system, basic amenities like toilets and sinks in disrepair, in addition to a host of other 
oversights, including a lack of industry standard security functions like reinforced ceilings and 
walls. AMKC, DOC concluded, was “a monument to the folly of cutting development budgets… 
and to the poor quality of construction which results when there is inadequate involvement in the 
development process by the user/client.” The only defensible use of the building, the department 
argued, was to repurpose it to include no housing at all.1090 The problems nagging DOC’s newest 
facility were emblematic of a citywide failure of DOC institutions and programming to stay on the 
right side of minimum standards and the law.  
 
They Could Have Done a Lot Less 
As early as end of 1977, Tufo observed that DOC lacked a long-term plan for bringing its 
institutions into compliance with BOC’s minimum standards.1091 “It is, I believe, the desire and 
intent of the City of New York to implement the standards at the earliest possible date,” Ciuros 
wrote to Koch in October of 1978. “However, lack of personnel in many instances, will lead to 
partial, and even total non-implementation.”1092 In the 1979 fiscal budget, Koch set aside an 
additional sixteen million dollars to support compliance with the standards.1093 By early 1979, just 
months after the minimum standards had taken effect system-wide, BOC was beset with a number 
of variance requests, to which it typically granted stays of four and six months to delay 
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compliance.1094 Tufo told DOC leadership that “disagreements in costs or means of 
implementation was acceptable, but disagreement on principle was not.”1095  
Despite intermittent tough talk from Tufo,  this formula provided considerable wiggle room 
for claims to no-fault noncompliance, for which DOC simply needed to prove its variances were 
filed “not because of negligence” but due to some external factors.1096 For instance, DOC officials 
cited the prevalence of cell vandalism, which by no fault of its own, necessitated double-celling.1097 
Moreover, DOC claimed the hiring of additional guards to be a necessary step toward compliance, 
without which noncompliance was to be expected. Tufo confronted DOC General Counsel Larry 
Finnegan with a letter from Legal Aid asserting “the history of the Department’s response over the 
years to the Minimum Standards, as well as to court orders, is that it will move only so fast as it is 
absolutely required to move.” Finnegan begged to differ, citing DOC’s adolescent recreation 
program, and insisting “We could have done a lot less…”1098  
Ward’s own position on the consent decrees illuminates DOC’s attitude under his tenure 
as commissioner. Beame, Ward recounts “stonewalled the federal courts, which is not too smart, 
not too swift. Those federal judges served for life, and they’re tough as hell, and they’re not going 
to take stonewalling, and promises to do things, and then you don’t do them.”1099 Ward reasons 
that Koch was correct in wanting to work with the courts rather than against them. However, to 
Ward’s mind, Koch bent the stick too far in the opposite direction by entering into consent decrees 
that actually exceeded the Constitutional requirements for incarceration. Ward made his feelings 
known to Koch, he recalls, going as far as to refuse to sign any of the decrees himself, and insisting 
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instead that the Corporate Counsel handle it, being as he was the City’s attorney. Therefore, while 
Ward did not publicly oppose the consent decrees, a position which would have likely put him at 
odds with Sturz on the City stage, he nonetheless privately doubted their wisdom, believing 
prisoners were only entitled to the legal minimum outlined in the US Constitution.1100  
“Just because you built a gym,” Ward concludes, “doesn’t say you have to play basketball. 
When we signed the consent decree we not only had to play basketball in the gym, we had to build 
more gyms.” Ward contrasts this with the Federal prison system, which did not enter into consent 
decrees, and was therefore free to deal with crowding on the basis of need alone. “What the Feds 
did was turn [gymnasiums] into dormitories,” he recounts. “They didn’t like basketball. Play ping 
pong. Play checkers. Because we need this space to make beds.”1101 
As Ward’s DOC fell consistently short of compliance, Tufo’s BOC remained committed 
to mediation over litigation, which the minimum standards had effectively supplanted for the time 
being. “If we believe we are not being stonewalled,” he told a skeptical Clay Hines, of Legal Aid’s 
Prisoners’ Rights Project, “and if we have seen reasonable efforts to show that what can be done 
administratively is being done, then we believe taking the Department of Correction to court would 
not be helpful.”1102 When COBA attacked BOC for mandatory overtime pursuant to the minimum 
standards, however, Tufo traveled to Rikers Island to explain to guards that it was the consent 
decrees, and not the minimum standards, which they had to blame.1103 On another occasion, Tufo 
advised his fellow board members to remember “the compliance report only shows where there is 
not compliance and not where there is compliance.”1104 In a February 1980 BOC meeting, 
                                                            
1100 Benjamin Ward, OHCU, 82-83. 
1101 Benjamin Ward, OHCU, 91.  
1102 BOC Meeting Minutes 6/28/79, 1o.  
1103 BOC Meeting Minutes 7/23/79, 2.  
1104 BOC Meeting Minutes 7/23/79, 4.  
295 
 
following considerable new hiring, board member Wilbert Kirby pointedly asked Commissioner 
Ward for an update on just how many guards it would take for minimum standards to be met. “Mr. 
Ward,” the minutes reflect, “replied that it was impossible to give such a number and that it was 
unrealistic to state that by some magical date in the future the Department would be in 
compliance.”1105 
Austerity bore down on DOC, as it did all agencies save for City Hall management, during 
the early Koch years. But non-custodial aspects of DOC administration suffered the most in this 
period. Classification protocol proved faulty and ill-applied, or else non-existent, across the DOC 
system, most surprisingly at CIFW, the rehabilitative flagship of Rikers Island. There prisoners 
were admitted without even speaking to a mental health professional unless their file specified a 
prior record of mental health issues or unusual behavior. Upon hearing this, BOC board member 
David Schulte “commented that if a classification system could not be made to work at the 
C.I.F.W., it would never work anywhere.”1106  
Fifty-one doctors working for Prison Health Services were laid off in 1979.1107 Mental 
health services were perhaps impacted worst of all, and emblematic of a generalized apathy toward 
non-custodial programming of any kind. “The frustrations of working to improve prison mental 
health services,” wrote BOC, “are compounded in times like these and easily give way to the norm 
which says: ‘we’re doing the best we can with these inadequate resources.’ Defeating that attitude 
becomes an important part of the change process.” BOC was not however naïve in its assessment 
of the City terrain, adding that “these same resource stringencies require that we alter the nature 
of our response. Ten years ago, one could have discussed mounting a political effort to generate 
                                                            
1105 BOC Meeting Minutes 2/19/80, 3.  
1106 BOC Meeting Minutes 3/26/79, 4.  
1107 BOC Meeting Minutes 3/26/79, 3.  
296 
 
money for new programs and staff. That simply won’t work today. Instead our activities must be 
geared to finding solutions within the limited dollars available.”1108  
 
Escape from Rikers Island? 
One radical option did however remain in this period of grim austerity: the City evacuation 
of Rikers Island. Sturz’s plan for the sale of Rikers Island to the State, and the opening of “cost-
effective, modern decentralized facilities” provided not just an alternative to DOC’s growing penal 
colony on Rikers, but also allowed DOC to defer improvements on Rikers pending the outcome 
of the deal. In September of 1979, the City entered into an agreement that postponed further action 
on Benjamin v. Malcolm contingent on the sale. 1109 According to this plan, a phased process of 
transfer from City to State would culminate in the reopening of the Tombs, and the erection of 
similar facilities located near borough courts, and the final transfer of Rikers to the State for use 
as a jail for prisoners approaching release from the State system.1110 The renovated Tombs, based 
on the most cutting-edge principles of environmental design, was the be the prototype for eight 
borough facilities, including another Manhattan jail nearby.1111 It seemed simple enough, on paper.  
New York City and New York State are however ruthless negotiators, perhaps especially 
when facing one another across the bargaining table. By DOC’s account, as negotiations advanced, 
the State threw the City a curveball in early 1979 by demanding CIFW and C-74, “the two best 
facilities on Rikers,” as part of Phase I of the transfer, and subsequently rejected all proposed 
compromises.1112 In the Summer of 1979 both parties agreed to a 99-year lease, but terms of the 
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transfer continued to be hotly contested, including a plan to split the island in half, which of course 
implied questions over which facilities would fall on whose half, in addition to countless financial 
logistics surrounding this intricate deal.1113  
An initial memorandum of understanding specified September 1979 as the beginning of 
the transfer, with CIFW the first facility to change hands. By late June however, many details 
remained up in the air, most ominously, those of cost. As crunch time approached, the long-term 
savings associated with extricating the City from consent decrees, in addition to the far more 
abstract moral rewards of housing prisoners in adequate facilities, increasingly paled in the City’s 
eyes in comparison to the estimated $15m in added operations costs it assume by staffing new 
facilities in compliance with consent decrees. For instance, the new Tombs would require a staff 
of 350 guards and 100 civilian employees, all to administer 450 prisoners; an astronomical jump 
in ratio by the standards of 1980.1114 
The City’s Office of Management and Budget and Board of Estimate made clear to DOC 
that they would simply not finance this rise in operation costs. Though enthusiastic proponents of 
the deal, BOC soon defaulted to the passive voice, claiming “interim arrangements have to be 
made.”1115 Meanwhile, Seelig’s COBA opposed the plan on the grounds that it was too costly, and 
threatened the communities in which the new jails would be built. Rikers, Seelig argued, boasted 
a river between any escaping prisoners and the nearest New York neighborhood. Unspoken was 
the fact that it also boasted a river fortifying a militarized DOC holding increasingly controlled by 
its uniformed staff.1116 COBA simultaneously found common ground with Queens residents 
opposing the State facility on Rikers, which was apparently to them the greater of two evils, and 
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COBA joined forces with NIMBY to march through Queens 1,000 strong, waving American flags, 
and rallying once more at the foot of the Rikers Island Bridge.1117 
 While the NIMBY forces cited the greater security threat purportedly posed by prisoners 
convicted of serious crimes, regardless of the fact many would have to pass through Rikers anyway 
en route upstate, COBA’s opposition is more complicated. The group had for decades taken issue 
with DOC’s inadequate plant facilities, which at HDM in particular had become indefensible from 
any angle. Moreover, the new facilities would actually require more guards, another perennial 
demand. Against these benefits, it seemed, the possession of a fortified paramilitary island under 
the control of an increasingly powerful and centralized uniformed force of guards, increasingly 
comfortable taking militant direct action, was simply too powerful a position for COBA to give 
up without a fight.  
As time wore on, the date of transfer continued to change, with numerous logistical loose 
ends untied. Disputes over the logistics of the transfer increasingly spelled doom for the project.1118 
BOC held out hope until the end, holding a series of public hearings and drafting an elaborate set 
of recommendations in support of the transfer. Koch met with Tufo on May 19, 1980, to receive 
the Board’s case, with Koch assuring Tufo he would take it into consideration in formulating a 
final decision.1119 Shortly thereafter, citing the high costs of building new facilities, Koch 
summarily killed the plan. When reporters asked Koch the plan was truly dead, the ordinarily 
verbose mayor provided one word in the affirmative. Asked if negotiations would resume, Koch 
provided one word in the negative. “Did you ever get such short answers?” he teased his 
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interlocutors.1120 As an alternative, Koch pledged $40 million to get the existing City jails up to 
compliance.1121  
This expenditure, and likely more, would be necessary in short order, as the City was at 
once back on the hook with Lasker. Finding “the lease has failed of consummation,” Lasker 
proceeded with enforcement of the consent decrees, responding to the plaintiff’s demand for a 
1,000 cap on population at HDM—home at the time to 1,500 prisoners—by demanding a 
population cap of 1,200, and more broadly reminding DOC that all decrees were back in full 
effect.1122 Koch instructed DOC to produce a capital construction program capable of bringing the 
existing facilities up to compliance with minimum standards and the consent decrees, which it did 
in September, entitled Jails for the 80s. The study is a damning assessment of DOC’s holdings on 
Rikers. “It is today hard to believe that a facility intended for adolescents would be built with 
dropped metal pan ceilings in areas accessible to inmates,” DOC wrote, of ARDC, where “inmates 
routinely remove the supporting metal struts, sharpen them, and use them as weapons.”1123 HDM 
was found to have “outlived its useful life” and stood in need of closure and replacement.1124  
“Rikers Island,” the report sourly notes, “conceived originally as a complex for sentenced 
inmates, has been forced to become a detention center.”1125 This was a bitter pill to swallow. But 
plans to vacate Rikers were however off the table for the time being, and DOC would therefore 
have to make do with that it had. DOC’s new capital plan called for upgrading CIFM, C-71, and 
ARDC, while working toward the closure of HDM. The Rikers Island Hospital would be closed 
and replaced with a new Rikers facility, and, the Tombs was to be reopened as quickly as possible, 
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along with a new maximum security detention facility with 500 new beds, also in lower Manhattan. 
The other borough facilities were to remain functioning amid modifications to recreation and 
programming areas, and basic physical plants, to bring them to compliance with consent decrees. 
The new construction emphasized maximum security cells over dormitories, though there was to 
be a new dormitory at the Brooklyn House of Detention for upwards of 100 sentenced prisoners 
forced to work there.1126 The plan was based in part on shifting DOC’s center of gravity away from 
Rikers Island, where pretrial detainees were never meant to live.   
“It continues to be our position,” Tufo wrote Koch, in response to the new capital plan, 
“that Rikers Island is unsuitable for the housing of pre-trial detainees, and that the only rational 
correction system is one in which those awaiting trial are house in jails located close to the borough 
court houses.”1127 BOC’s continuing complicity in the expansion of Rikers was a testament to the 
dour pragmatism that prevailed in this period. “In a time of shrinking resources,” BOC itself 
lamented, “‘improvements’ are often in fact the avoidance of decline; ‘success,’ is the absence of 
failure.”1128 Later asked if Koch had a particular agenda for DOC, Ward replied “he had the same 
agenda as every other chief executive officer has. Sit on the lid of the can and keep the garbage 
inside. Don’t let it rise. Don’t let them get out.”1129 Even this would prove impossible.  
 
Patron of Prison Breaks and Some Underbosses 
The spirit of resistance among DOC’s captive population continued unabated in this period, 
aided by the corrosion of DOC facilities and an overtaxed workforce. These factors catalyzed a 
series of impressive jail breaks. Looking back on 1977, BOC recalled ruefully that the year “will 
                                                            
1126 DOC, Jails for the 80s, 4-11.  
1127 DOC, Jails for the 80s, 2.  
1128 BOC, 1979-1980, 19.  
1129 Benjamin Ward, OHCU, 84.  
301 
 
be remembered as a year of many escapes from Rikers Island,” totaling thirty-five successes, to 
say nothing of attempts. These pushed the total of escapes from DOC custody since 1974 to 
153.1130  
Hacksaws perennially materialized within the walls of Rikers jails, enabling multiple 
escapes, including from the maximum security area of HDM reserved for prisoners deemed escape 
risks. According to DOC, in one case blades were smuggled into the jail concealed inside working 
pens given to prisoners by family members in court. These pens were allegedly capable of passing 
a basic contraband test, by which the prisoner was made to uncap the pen and write with it, to 
prove it contained an ink cartridge. It is a story to be taken with a grain of salt for reasons that will 
soon be clear. But nonetheless, prisoners in this period revitalized the longstanding tradition of 
escaping DOC custody. They increasingly escaped in large groups, upwards of eight at a time, by 
cutting out of HDM and other facilities. As in the early 1970s, these escapes demonstrated not 
only familiar patterns, but also featured a recurring cast of prisoners dedicated enough to undertake 
multiple attempts to proactively free themselves from DOC custody.1131  
In 1977 three adolescents locked up at ARDC broke free, crept to the guards’ parking lot, 
commandeered a car, and successfully drove straight off the island, past multiple checkpoints, to 
the freedom of suburban Queens. In response to this embarrassing breach of security, DOC hastily 
claimed the young men had undertaken a sophisticated cinematic jailbreak complete with 
meticulous timing of guards’ comings and goings, and even counterfeit badges to get past the 
checkpoints. It was a compelling story but there was one problem. “There was no evidence to 
sustain that story,” BOC concluded. “What was known at the time the Department was being 
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quoted [about its imaginative version of the escape], is that the inmates took advantage of two 
inattentive correction officers who simply weren’t doing their jobs.”1132  
Three years later a trio of prisoners undertook a “carbon copy” of this escape, leaving a 
hapless guard’s car at Kennedy Airport for investigators to discover the following day.1133 Less 
successful but no less bold were a group of twenty-four prisoners who overtook a transport bus 
moving them between Rikers facilities, and attempted to drive it off the island. Their plot was 
foiled when the driver managed to crash the bus instead.1134 Foregoing the bridge altogether, a 
quartet of prisoners inflated trash bags into makeshift rafts, greasing themselves and the bags with 
Vaseline to stay afloat. The bags proved insufficient to the task and burst, but one of the four made 
it across regardless.1135 Subsequently, a pair of Rikers prisoners concealed themselves in a bread 
truck delivering stale bread to the Flushing Meadows Zoo. The duo’s disappearance was only 
detected by the driver, whom they startled by hopping off the back of the truck on Grand Central 
Parkway and vanishing into the freedom of the Queens night.1136  
Rikers was not the only place DOC prisoners deemed worthy of escape. In 1980, a famed 
horse-trader and Upper East Side socialite named Howard “Buddy” Jacobson, held at the Brooklyn 
House of Detention following a murder conviction, received a visit in the facility’s counsel room 
from a man purporting to be his lawyer, one Michael Schwartz. During this visit, the men swapped 
clothing and identification. Jacobson then tapped on the door, announced the visit had ended, 
flashed Schwartz’s credentials, and strode out the front gate of BHD to freedom, leaving his 
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purported counsel, apparently well-compensated for the rouse, to face charges for abetting 
escape.1137  
In early 1982, a group of six prisoners in the south wing of the sixth floor of the Bronx 
House of Detention overpowered the two guards overseeing their cell block, bound them, and 
placed them in the dayroom while attempting to saw through a window with one of the City jails’ 
ubiquitous hacksaw blades. One guard managed to set off his emergency alarm before being 
overpowered, but when the control room called, a prisoner answered, posing as a guard, and 
reported a false alarm. A third guard appeared shortly thereafter, and welcomed inside by a 
prisoner dressed in a captured guard’s uniform, became yet another hostage. The plot was at last 
detected when the guards on duty did not respond to calls for a coffee delivery. Opting to make 
the scene more memorable still, the tour commander responded in haste flanked by a small 
squadron of six guards, a near even match, who foreswore riot gear, rushing to the scene so quickly 
they forgot the keys to the tier’s gate. Once inside, they fought the prisoners with their clubs, 
viciously beating the rebels in a manner BOC found “completely disproportionate to the 
circumstances,” and for which there were no consequences.1138  
This wasn’t even the most spectacular escape that year—or even that month. Less than two 
weeks later, ten prisoners in transit at Brooklyn Supreme Court escaped leg irons and handcuffs to 
overpower three guards, one of whom provided them with a gun that one fleeing prisoner used to 
carjack a motorist, shooting them in the process.1139 Escapes were rampant during this period, and 
were far too numerous to recount here. In a scathing 1982 report to the Mayor and City Council, 
BOC concluded “despite the image of prisoners furtively digging tunnels or quietly sawing through 
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bars to escape, prisoners are more likely to escape by recognizing and taking advantage of lax or 
poorly trained personnel and inadequate or loosely enforced security procedures.”1140 For his part 
the studious Ward attributed the rash of escapes to a number of factors. The erection of the Rikers 
Island Bridge, he reasoned, had slowed the East River current. The extension of the La Guardia 
runway provided an attainable goal for swimmers. An increase in detainees meant an increase in 
smuggling, since they had more visits than sentenced prisoners. Technology had advanced, 
bequeathing better jailbreak technology such as smaller and more powerful saw blades.1141 A 
markedly more defensive D’Elia simply told BOC: “an escape is made on an officer, not on a 
system.”1142  
One escape of this storied period stands out so markedly, however, that artist David 
Wojnarowicz immortalized its protagonist as “William Morales, Patron of Prison Breaks.” Part of 
the diminished but by no means vanquished revolutionary underground, William Guillermo 
Morales manufactured bombs for the Puerto Rican nationalist group Fuerzas Armadas de 
Liberación Nacional (FALN, or Armed Forces of National Liberation), who fought in a long 
tradition of armed struggle for an autonomous Puerto Rico. Morales and his comrades in FALN 
had operated under the radar for years, detonating over 100 explosives throughout the mid-to-late 
1970s, without a single arrest. The uniquely unfortunate Morales was captured while operating out 
of an East Elmhurst, Queens apartment not far from Rikers Island, when a bomb he was 
manufacturing detonated quite unexpectedly, in his hands. 
The blast destroyed Morales’s hands and mutilated his face. Badly burned, maimed, 
bleeding profusely, missing an eye, and virtually blind in the other, Morales managed nonetheless 
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to flush a number of incriminating FALN documents down the toilet before the police arrived. He 
then filled the apartment with gas, hoping to blow himself up along with whoever stormed the 
apartment in response to the blast. Instead Morales was captured, and despite his grave condition, 
managed shortly thereafter to tell a NYPD detective, from beneath layers of bandages swaddling 
his disfigured mouth and broken teeth: “Fuck you. Fuck yourself.”1143  
Morales was held in the prison ward of Bellevue Hospital for almost a year before 
becoming the Patron. In April of 1979, after a sensational trial, he was convicted and sentenced to 
twenty-nine to eighty-nine years, on weapons charges. Prior to sentencing, Morales remarked 
“They’re not going to hold me forever.”1144 One month later, this prediction came true. While the 
details of the escape remain shrouded in secrecy, in all likelihood Morales was aided by a group 
of underground revolutionaries representing the remnants of the BLA and the Weather 
Underground, including Sekou Odinga and Marilyn Buck. Morales’s lawyer Susan Tipograph 
allegedly smuggled a pair of fourteen inch wire cutters to Morales, though she was never formally 
charged.  
With the help of a fellow prisoner Morales subsequently affixed these cutters around his 
waist using shoelaces, so that they dangled beneath his bathrobe. Over the course of the next two 
nights, Morales managed to cut a small hole in the metal grating covering his window. Morales 
then punched through the outside screen, produced a rope made of bandages, and began his descent 
from his third-floor room, some forty feet in the air. He was however, not alone. Waiting on the 
ground below were upwards of a dozen cadre, some armed, preparing a ladder to meet Morales. 
The bandage rope apparently failed, due not to Morales’s inability to handle it without fingers, but 
rather the excessive weight of his body, sending Morales tumbling to an air conditioner unit that 
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broke his fall, and then onto the grass below. Morales was whisked away to a New Jersey safe 
house, before making his way to Mexico City, then Cuba, where he lives today as a free man.1145 
 A mortified and enraged Ciuros, ridiculed for the escape of a handless man from DOC 
custody, pursued a slew of administrative charges against sixteen guards and captains responsible 
for every conceivable facet of the escape.1146  
 
Doubling Up, Doubling Down  
These escapes were symptoms of prisoner ingenuity but also a broader breakdown of 
DOC’s physical plants and administrative control that seemed evermore urgent as the City’s own 
plan to escape Rikers Island fell apart. While Eric M. Taylor stayed with DOC after being laid off 
from NYPD, many police in similar circumstances resumed their old job as quickly as the latter 
would have them back, leaving DOC facilities like RNDC short-staffed on short notice.1147  
Compounding short-staffing, Lasker affirmed a previous ruling by Judge Orrin Judd demanding 
the end of double-celling for detainees, who constituted the vast majority of prisoners in facilities 
with cells. While BOC’s minimum standards were negotiable, this was not.1148 This joined 
Lasker’s cap of 1,200 at HDM, and a fifty prisoner cap on dormitory population at AMKC, which 
proved evermore difficult to observe as the population rose.1149  
DOC however made attempts to comply, by demanding more staff, and expanding Rikers 
infrastructure. By early 1981, DOC had opened a fifth quad at C-71, four new dormitories for 
newly admitted prisoners at C-95, and had shifted sentenced prisoners to C-95 dormitories. These 
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solutions however amounted to a spreading of HDM’s problems across the island, as C-71 became 
the site of double-celling, and C-95’s dormitories exceeded standard capacity. In what had become 
a matter of course, DOC sought a variance from a sympathetic BOC, and got it.1150 Simultaneously, 
the practices of housing prisoners in non-housing areas such as gymnasiums became standard 
across the system, as DOC’s pre-trial prisoner population began a steady climb in the early 1980s 
and crowding in the upstate jails increased the backlog of sentenced prisoners awaiting transfer 
into the State system.1151  
As part of an eight point plan to reduce crowding, Koch favored the erection of temporary 
modular units on Rikers Island, akin to the mobile homes provided in the wake of major disasters. 
In March 1981, the Board of Estimates voted to purchase modular units adding 300 beds to Rikers 
Island. Lasker tentatively approved the units, while clarifying that they too fell under court 
jurisdiction.1152 Construction of the first batch was completed by early August.1153 Simultaneously, 
the City, with increasing tenacity, began to campaign against the seventy-five square foot per 
prisoner requirement BOC had imposed on dormitories.1154 Regardless, BOC was typically 
amenable to crowding variances, allowing DOC to rely on variances to keep its facilities 
running.1155 By the end of 1981, sentenced prisoners, not covered by the square footage mandated 
by BOC, were given an estimated thirty five to forty square feet of space, roughly half the Board’s 
requirement for detainees.1156 In the Summer of 1982, CIFM dormitories for sentenced prisoners 
were housing upwards of 100 prisoners.1157 
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At a pivotal juncture of New York State’s carceral history, BOC supported the 1981 
Security Through the Development of Correctional Facilities Bond Act of 1981, a massive $500 
million prison expansion plan, put to statewide ballot initiative, that would net $50 million for 
DOC facilities. By Tufo’s estimation this would allow DOC to comply with minimum standards 
at long last, hence the Board’s willingness to throw in its lot with nascent mass incarceration 
statewide in the name of jail reform in New York City. Board member Wilbert Kirby disputed the 
notion that locking more people up would somehow reduce crime, to which vice chairman John 
Horan responded that not only would the Act enable compliance with minimum standards, “it was 
utopian to presume that other approaches such as alternatives to incarceration would stand a better 
chance of succeeding if the Bond Issue were defeated.”1158 In fairness, State Commission of 
Corrections chairman Kevin McNiff had previously argued to the Board that the City in particular 
ought to support the measure, given the State could get its desired funding by other means should 
the measure be defeated, a feat not be so easy for the localities.1159 When the initiative was in fact 
defeated in the polls, this prediction proved prescient.1160  
While the plan to leave Rikers had fallen through, construction for the Tombs proceeded. 
The Tombs had been reactivated for a short period in response to large-scale arrests during the 
1977 blackout. Upwards of a dozen detainees had been crammed into each tiny cell, chained 
together, deprived of mattresses and phone calls for as long as a week.1161 Defending the arrests, 
Beame told the Board his options were “to overload our prisons or to overload our morgues.” The 
elaborate plan Vera had concocted less than a decade earlier for the orderly management of mass 
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arrests during emergency conditions was ignored.1162 In assessing DOC’s response to the blackout, 
the optimistic Tufo had remarked “the Department of Correction responds better to emergencies 
than it does to normal demands.”1163 By the early 1980s, the Tombs was being remodeled with the 
aid of sentenced prisoners.1164 The notorious facility received a considerable facelift thanks to the 
collaboration of social scientists in the tradition of Kross, who supported the construction of a new 
Tombs as an opportunity to test their theories of progressive human caging.1165  
The result was a structure combining three “mini-jails,” three-stories and self-contained, 
featuring all the support services of jail facility, and with the addition of a computer technology 
that controlled even the locks. The Tombs was hailed by its new warden as “a state-of-the-art jail, 
the most modern jail in the city of New York.”1166 Seelig argued against the amenities offered in 
the Tombs, claiming that the prisoners would simply fashion anything they could get their hands 
on into lethal weapons. “The more you give them,” Seelig claimed, “the more aggressive they’ll 
become.”1167 The Tombs’ reopening in autumn of 1983 generated some positive press for the 
modicum of progressive penology left over from Sturz’s failed attempt to build borough facilities 
in place of Rikers. But such fanfare was soon replaced with a new headline: “Koch Says He May 




                                                            
1162 BOC, 1977, 22. 
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1165 See especially: Wener, The Environmental Psychology of Prisons and Jails.  
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Severe Fiscal Constraints 
Lasker’s heightened role in DOC affairs was part of a national zeitgeist of jail and prison 
reform promoted by federal courts. In December 1981 a judge ordered 350 state prisoners in 
Alabama freed on early parole, to accommodate a mandatory cap on crowding.1169 Not only had 
Alabama proved an early testing group for the expanded power of federal judges, it was also an 
early site of contestation against federal encroachment in state facilities, led by George Wallace. 
After the December 1981 release, Alabama Attorney General Charles Graddick remarked “Parents 
should not tell their children that Prancer and Dancer are on the roof because it’s going to be a 
bunch of thugs and criminals released from our prisons.”1170 As in the 1960s, a movement against 
federal encroachment on local law enforcement practices effectively migrated north, transmuting 
itself in the process from a southern lexicon of “states’ rights” to that of the law and order 
movement taking firm hold in New York City.  
In 1980, Koch had literally advertised the City’s empty jail space, awaiting anyone found 
in possession of an unlicensed firearm. A television commercial depicted Koch strolling through 
an empty Rikers Island cellblock, and declaring sternly: “No plea bargaining. No judges feeling 
sorry for you… if you’ve got the gun, we’ve got the room.”1171 This was not quite true; the 
cellblock was empty because DOC could not afford necessary repairs to get it up to compliance. 
The City was in fact already in excess of its jail capacity, part of an upward trend that would not 
subside for many years.1172  
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While “crime” itself is difficult to quantify, the rate of indictment had incontrovertibly 
grown by seventy-five percent since Koch took office in 1978.1173 That year the average daily 
census in DOC custody was 6,993, and this was significantly overtaxing the department’s aging 
facilities. By 1982, the average had climbed to 9,279.1174 “At the Correctional Institution for Men,” 
Tufo wrote Koch in October 1982, “we see conditions which are strikingly similar to those at the 
House of Detention for men in the period preceding the 1975 riot.” The facility, Tufo continued, 
“which once housed only sentenced adult males, is now the repository for system overflow,” 
including almost 700 detainees. Since the summer, the population had soared from 1,700 to 
2,600.1175  
The following week Ward wrote to Koch aghast at still more austerity requests made of 
DOC amid these conditions. “At a time when I am sleeping inmates in thirty square feet of space 
in converted warehouses and classrooms,” Ward bemoaned, “I should be increasing services, not 
cutting them.” Echoing Tufo, Ward argued CIFM was particularly hard-hit. Prisoners without 
immediate life-threatening injuries were only given two chances per week to visit the clinic, and 
four social workers administered a population of 2,600 in the facility once designated Reception 
and Classification Center.1176 By DOC’s own account, the facility did “little more than 
‘warehouse’ sentenced prisoners who work elsewhere during the day.”1177  
As crowding intensified, DOC doubled down in its aversion to full compliance. Part of this 
came dressed in the trappings of austerity. On the one hand, DOC invoked minimum standards 
                                                            
1173 Philip Shenon, “Jail Release: Why?” New York Times, November 5, 1983. 
1174 Benjamin Ward, “Monthly Management Report,” July 12, 1982, Koch Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, LWA. 
1175 Peter Tufo, Letter to Hon. Edward Koch, October 22, 1982, 1, Koch Papers, Box 112, Folder 2, LWA. 
1176 Benjamin Ward, Letter to Hon. Edward I. Koch, November 5, 1982, Koch Papers, Box 112, Folder 12, LWA.   
1177 DOC, Jails for the 80s, III, 32. These conditions catalyzed the 1983 filing of Fisher v. Koehler, the first lawsuit 
against DOC that unified sentenced prisoners and detention prisoners as plaintiffs, to which I will turn in the next 
chapter.   
312 
 
and consent decrees to avoid budget cuts under PEG, arguing they would push the agency into 
noncompliance.1178 On the other, facing BOC and Lasker, DOC invoked PEG to argue for the 
economic necessity of noncompliance. First Deputy Commissioner Richard Koehler, appearing 
before BOC, adopted a language all-too-familiar to City officials under Koch, arguing “these 
amendment requests must be viewed in the context of the sever fiscal constraints facing the City.” 
Obviating a possible objection, he clarified “the savings represented by the amendment requests 
constitute only a small portion of the Department’s overall [1983 Fiscal Year] PEG reductions and 
should not be viewed as an attempt to cut back on inmates’ rights by vitiating the intent of the 
minimum standards.”1179  
In 1980 Lasker ruled the DOC population should not exceed 10,250. While DOC used a 
1982 Legal Aid strike to argue for a temporary increase of this cap to 10,600, Lasker was adamant 
that 10,250 remain the default, and resisted DOC’s numerous attempts to permanently raise this 
figure.1180 
DOC appealed directly to Lasker to raise the cap on prisoners at HDM, and dormitory 
capacity at AMKC and CIFM. While Tufo reasoned the former could possibly square with BOC 
standards, the latter was in clear contravention of the seventy-five square foot policy.1181 DOC’s 
repeated variance requests around the seventy-five square foot requirement were only an overture 
to the request for its outright reduction to sixty. Legal Aid pushed back, reminding DOC that not 
only was this requirement part of BOC standards, it was also built into a number of consent 
decrees. Moreover, as Ted Katz of Legal Aid asserted, DOC’s appeal to the fiscal crisis were 
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increasingly antiquated, as the City was in fact in significantly better economic shape, and could 
no longer flout minimum standards with appeals to financial insolvency. BOC continued its 
support of seventy-five feet as a principle.1182 By 1983 an exasperated Tufo “stated that it appeared 
to be Department policy to not cooperate with the Board,” adding “it would be a mistaken policy 
for the Department to continue to ignore and not provide information to the Board, which is 
established by local statute.”1183 
Considerable ambiguity, abetted by DOC stalling tactics and the deference of BOC, 
enabled DOC to push compliance ever further down the road. However by 1983 Lasker, pushed 
by Legal Aid, was demanding action. As rising population outpaced DOC’s infrastructure 
expansion, and the Department demonstrated time and again it was clearly incapable of following 
the law, by this point the only feasible alternative to noncompliance was the release of 
prisoners.1184 Lasker’s response to the City’s final entreaties to raise the population caps, in place 
of a mass release, painted a damning indictment of life in HDM and AMKC. Lasker wrote of 
squalid and dangerous conditions in which programming was perfunctory at best, daily sick call 
was impossible, sanitation had degenerated to a disgusting state that included a dehumanizing 
shortage of toilet paper, and prisoners were forced to fight each other for chairs, space, access to 
telephones, and even food. DOC, Lasker found, lacked an adequate plan to address these dire 
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Judge Lasker’s Federal Jail Break 
In February 1983, an intoxicated Ward stumbled into night court for no discernible reason, 
flanked by an unidentified woman. Ward berated the judge for not working hard enough. The DA, 
he argued, belonged in the holding pens alongside the prisoners. Moreover, he wanted Legal Aid 
held in contempt for taking a dinner break.1186 The following month a more subdued Ward told 
the Board it was “unacceptable to release prisoners after the police have risked their lives 
apprehending them and after the anguish that victims have suffered.” Ward affirmed his 
commitment to “everything possible to find or create space to house as many prisoners as 
necessary in order to avoid the indiscriminate release of prisoners,” this being the City’s 
uncharitable characterization of the plan to release prisoners with low bail.1187 This would however 
prove impossible.  
In late October, Koch wrote to seventy-seven judges, urging the expedition of sentencing 
in felony cases, in order to make room in the City system presently taken up by prisoners bound 
for upstate prisons. Koch claimed a mass release was eminent, as Lasker was poised to cancel the 
emergency order increasing the population in the wake of the Legal Aid strike. One high-ranking 
state judge responded by reminding Koch that the mayor could always make more space available 
in jails. Others claimed that Koch was trying to scapegoat the judiciary, which was already working 
as quickly as it could.1188  
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While Lasker was clear that the prisoners released would be those with the lowest bail, 
held for the longest time, for the most minor offenses, this nuance did not translate into the public 
discussion.1189 For instance, Ward had long warned that in any release, literal rapists and murders 
would walk free.1190 Lasker had originally planned to simply release the prisoners outright, without 
the payment of any bail. After negotiating with the City however, the ultimate plan amounted to a 
reduced bail policy, by which any prisoner with $1,500 or less in bail and no holds or warrants 
could be freed on just ten percent of their bail. On November 1, 1983, the releases began. The most 
serious charges included robbery and assault.1191 When a dozen prisoners charged with murder 
and sexual assault in fact met the criteria, the criteria was hastily modified to exclude them.1192 
When the City ran out of prisoners fitting this criteria, it began to release misdemeanants with bail 
less than $1,000.1193  
Ward called the move “Judge Lasker’s Federal jail break.”1194 When the dust had settled, 
613 prisoners had been freed. While Koch predicted a crime wave, a study one month later showed 
small numbers did not appear or else were subsequently arrested for charges ranging from felony 
burglary, larceny, and drug possession, two instances of robbery, and one of rape. The rate of 
failure to reappear was within the average of ten to fifteen percent, skewing dramatically toward 
those charged with minor offenses.1195 The prisoner charged with rape was later acquitted on all 
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counts, and the judge criticized the role the case played in the media following his arrest.1196 Times 
reporter Philip Shenon noted that while City Hall and the judiciary were quick to exchange charges 
of blame, nobody seemed interested in discussing the police and prosecutors who had in fact 
increased arrest and indictment rates considerably, thereby flooding the jails.1197  
Regardless of who was to blame, Lasker’s actions had a lasting effect on the jail system. 
“I am faced with a choice,” announced a somber Koch one month after the releases, “of releasing 
prisoners onto city streets, or taking scarce capital dollars from other programs to build more jails.” 
As the formulation implied, Koch’s decision was an aggressive jail expansion plan adding 2,200 
beds to the City system, 1,620 of which would be on Rikers Island, and 700 of which would be 
modular dormitories, to be constructed as quickly as possible.1198 This was however not so 
dramatic a reversal of course as Koch portrayed it. In September of 1983 Ward had addressed the 
Humanist Society of Metropolitan New York to discuss conditions in the DOC system. Ward 
spoke of the intense pressure on City jails from crowding and judicial mandates. The name of 
Ward’s talk was “We Must Build More Prisons.”1199  
In December, Koch wrote to Ward to compliment an interview he had given in New York 
State Association of Counties News. “You summed up the issue,” Koch wrote, when you said, ‘The 
issue is not: Do we build more jails or let people go free? The issue is not: Do we spend many 
millions more or run illegal inferior jails? The issue is: Do we make the courts accountable in a 
very real or literal sense or risk the collapse of our local criminal justice apparatus?’ I suspect,” 
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Koch continued, “the answer ultimately will be more jails and more relevancy by the courts.”1200 
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CHAPTER 10:    SHOW THIS MOTHER FUCKER WHO IS RUNNING THE JAIL 
 
The City fights the “War on Drugs” in the form of low-level arrests that throng the jails. Koch 
dramatically expands DOC’s workforce and physical plant on Rikers Island. COBA demands 
guards be allowed to dispose of prisoners as they see fit. Prisoner resistance is met with 
increasingly brutal and organized guard violence, culminating in two spectacular guard riots. 
DOC’s uniformed staff establish conclusively who is in charge of the City jails. Far from Anna 
Kross’s intentions of humanistic penology administered by experts, DOC facilities are run by 
brutal guards using violence and fear.  Ultimately, Kross’s vision for putting jails to work in the 
service of social good has only paved the way, quite literally, for the Rikers Island of today.  
 
 
No More Doubts 
 
In a poignant scene from Tom Wolfe’s novel Bonfire of the Vanities, Bronx prosecutor 
Larry Kramer beholds a blue and orange DOC bus unloading its daily cargo into the Bronx County 
Supreme Court. “Kramer had reached that low point in the life of an assistant district attorney in 
the Bronx,” writes Wolfe,  
 
when he is assailed by the Doubts. Every year forty thousand people, forty thousand 
incompetents, dimwits, alcoholics, psychopaths, knockabouts, good souls driven to some 
terrible terminal anger, and people who could only be described as stone evil, were arrested 
in the Bronx. Seven thousand of them were indicted and arraigned, and then they entered 
the maw of the criminal justice system—right here through the gateway into Gibraltar, 
where the vans were lined up. That was about 150 new cases, 150 more pumping hearts 
and morose glares, every week that the courts and the Bronx County District Attorney’s 
Office were open. And to what end? The same stupid, dismal, pathetic, horrifying crimes 
were committed day in and day out, all the same. What was accomplished by assistant 
D.A.’s, by any of them, through all this relentless stirring of the much? The Bronx 
crumbled and decayed a little more, and a little more blood dried in the cracks. The Doubts! 
One thing was accomplished for sure. The system was fed, and those vans brought in the 
chow. Fifty judges, thirty-five law clerks, 245 assistant district attorneys, one D.A.… and 
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Christ knew how many criminal lawyers, Legal Aid lawyers, court reporters, court clerks, 
court officers, correction officers, probation officers, social workers, bail bondsmen, 
special investigators, case clerks, court psychiatrists—what a vast swarm had to be fed! 
And every morning the chow came in, the chow and the Doubts.1201 
 
The historical moment that produced Wolfe’s masterful satire of 1980s New York City constituted 
the emergence of New York City from fiscal crisis and the beginning of its rebirth as a vibrant 
center of finance, insurance, real estate. The first half of Koch’s mayoralty, from 1978 to 1983, 
represented the imposition of austerity on the City government and realignment toward private 
interests.1202 In the second half, the City began to spend lavishly, but not in the same way that it 
had under Wagner, Lindsay, and Beame. Besides the extravagant giveaways to private developers 
for which the period is famous, however, a somewhat unlikely force in City politics enjoyed an 
immense reversal of fortune in this period: DOC.1203 And while there surely were in this period 
some of Kramer’s Doubts, these were allayed in short order, removing in the process the final 
obstacles to Rikers Island as we know it today.  
Koch endeavored in earnest to keep his promise to dramatically expand the City’s carceral 
capacity in the wake of Lasker’s mass release—thereby effectively doubling the expansion plans 
proposed in 1980. The City proposed 3,876 beds at a total cost of $277 million .1204 The only 
serious obstacle was presented by the timetable of approximately five years from conception to 
ribbon cutting which was standard for carceral facilities in that time. This included not just the 
sundry logistical considerations inherent in any construction project, especially one publicly-
funded, but also the added factor of community opposition, arising both from NIMBY 
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considerations and anti-prison political sensibilities, which made site selection and construction 
particularly fraught in a city with such precious little land to spare.  
“The opposition of community groups to jail facilities in residential areas and the necessary 
delays incidental to the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP),” a reluctant BOC 
admitted in 1983, “cause Rikers Island to become the primary site by default.”1205 In the early days 
of the 1980s crowding crisis, DOC’s solution to the logistical problems of jail construction largely 
hinged on a combination of temporary “modular” units, and the expedited construction of new 
jails on Rikers. 1206  
BOC supported Koch’s expansion plan, as part of a “three-part strategy” which also 
included “more rigorous management of the State court system” to expedite legal cases, and “a 
conscientious search for prudent alternatives to pretrial detention.”1207 On the second point, the 
Board was concerned that the State would interpret the City’s carceral expansion as an effort “to 
build its way out of the overcrowding crisis” and therefore not take seriously the concomitant need 
for court reform.1208 Above all, BOC emphasized “this plan must be viewed as a short-term 
solution only,” en route to a citywide jail topography concentrating detention facilities around 
borough courthouses.1209 For its part, the City took BOC’s consent to expand Rikers Island 
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The Completion of Rikers Island 
Benjamin Ward left DOC at the end of 1983 to become NYPD’s first black commissioner. 
To take his place Koch appointed a Ward protégée, Jacqueline McMickens, who became not only 
the first black woman to serve as commissioner of DOC, but perhaps more significantly—as 
McMickens herself was quick to point out—the first career New York City jail guard to attain this 
post. McMickens was born in Birmingham Alabama, the daughter of the first black conductor on 
the Railway Express transportation line. She became a New York City guard in 1964, working her 
way through the ranks while obtaining a BA in criminal justice and a MA in public administration 
at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. As incoming commissioner, McMickens cited Koch’s jail 
construction program as a top priority.1210 In fact, McMickens’ own plan would soon make the 
Mayor’s 1983 proposals seem modest.  
In early 1985, McMickens presented the Rikers Island Development Plan, an impressive 
expansion of Koch’s proposal, calling for the replacement of temporary facilities with permanent 
jails that would not simply meet existing departmental needs but prepare for population surges in 
the future. Contrary to BOC’s wishes, this move represented the normalizing of DOC’s emergency 
capacity limits, on facilities that were to be overwhelmingly concentrated on Rikers Island.1211 
“Commissioner Jacqueline McMickens,” wrote Ward to Koch in early 1986, “has developed the 
best and perhaps first comprehensive plan for the completion of Rikers Island in the history of 
Rikers Island as a Correction Facility.” Ward added, by contrast: “All of my plans were crisis 
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initiatives.”1212 Now the perennial capacity expansion of the City jails built into Ward’s crisis 
management was to become the status quo.  
There’s much to be gleaned from the rhetoric of “completion” that framed this initiative, 
suggesting as it does that the covering of Rikers Island’s surface with jails was an inevitable task 
facing DOC since time immemorial. Despite BOC’s entreaties throughout the years against 
concentrating detention facilities on Rikers—packaged as they sometimes were with agreements 
to support such plans in the short-term—by 1985, DOC was treating any available surface on 
Rikers as lacking a jail, including a site on the far east site of the island home to an active City tree 
nursery. Ward was only echoing McMickens’ call to “complete the Rikers Island Correctional 
complex so as to most effectively utilize existing jails and remaining sites.”1213 Thus began the 
most dramatic expansionary program in the history of Rikers Island, a breakneck race toward its 
completion as a penal colony packed with overcrowded jails.  
While it had become common practice under Koch—in keeping with Lindsay’s 1970 
executive order—to issue declarations of emergency to divert additional funds to meet DOC’s 
needs, this practice expanded considerably after 1983 and led to the expedition of a number of 
infrastructure projects in accordance with McMickens’ Rikers Island Development Plan. These 
included modular units appended to existing facilities like CIFM, CIFW, and AMKC. 
Additionally, modular unites comprised the Interim North Command, known at the time as the 
“Arthur Dorms,” after their contractor Arthur Industries, crowded into the island’s northernmost 
tip in anticipation of a permanent structure, which was itself expedited using emergency 
declarations.1214 This latter structure was to be called the North Facility, known today as the Otis 
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Bantum Correctional Center (OBCC). The rapid pace of this work demonstrated that DOC under 
McMickens had the full attention of City Hall. 1215 
Mayor Koch cut the ribbon for the North Facility on July 1, 1985, a mere thirteen months 
after construction began. Perhaps this staggering timeline was a bit of an exaggeration, as the 
facility’s 800 beds would not be fully operational until the Fall. But even this political gesture 
indicates the seriousness with which Koch was pursuing jail expansion in the wake of Lasker’s jail 
break.1216 The North Facility was part of a new generation of jails built using pre-engineered 
components subsequently assembled on Rikers, cutting down construction time considerably.1217 
In its original incarnation, prior to a 1989 annex, the building stood two-stories, comprised of 
sixteen rectangular dormitory units emanating at a ninety-degree angle from a central corridor. All 
programming and dining facilities are attached in a cluster connected on two sides to the housing 
area. In contrast to the sprawling chevron design of CIFM, CIFW, and RNCD, the North Facility’s 
design crowds an extensive jail into a comparatively small space, with little room between housing 
units. It’s presence on the map is a tiny block scarcely noticeable next to the other facilities 
stretched out luxuriantly across the once-spacious island.1218 This architecture is a spatial 
representation of DOC discovering, in the mid-1980s, the very real limits to what Kross had once 
referred to as the island’s “practically unlimited land.”1219  
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The opening of North Facility in June of 1985 was part of a 1,500 bed increase between 
April 1985 and April 1986. The lion’s share of the rest were modular units.1220 DOC proceeded 
with modular construction and renovations to existing facilities like CIFW and CIFM, planning 
for a minimum of sixty, and not seventy-five, square feet per prisoner, indicating they intended to 
lower the bar to this figure permanently.1221 Koch and McMickens further argued against imposing 
population caps in the new facilities, claiming quite bluntly that they did not want to support laws 
which they might, at a future date, be unable to follow. Moreover, the logic ran, since DOC wasn’t 
planning to build housing units that held more than fifty people, caps were unnecessary.1222  
These units, and McMickens’ Plan in general, were not prepared in advance of an 
anticipated spike in sentenced prisoners. Instead they were intended for pre-trial detainees. DOC 
was simply scrambling to build as many beds as possible to accommodate the prisoners foisted 
upon it by the police and the courts. One way or another, the capacity of the system had to be 
enlarged to make way for prisoners swept off the streets, denied bail, and awaiting trial in 
congested courts. For its part, COBA demanded, in the short-term at least, a move away from 
variances and toward the construction of more modular jails.1223 When Tufo tendered his 
resignation in January of 1986, he commended Koch for stewardship over the City “during a period 
that crime control became a primary concern of City government, the inmate population doubled 
to over 12,000, the correction budget grew to over 600 million dollars and the City undertook the 
largest prison construction and modernization program in its history.”1224 Tufo and BOC also 
deserved credit for their role in the dramatic expansion.  
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A smaller part of this plan took place not on Rikers but in the Brooklyn Navy Yard, where 
as part of Koch’s original 1983 expansion plan, DOC took control of a disused Navy Brig that had 
been a detention facility for the Immigration and Naturalization Service since its abandonment by 
the Navy in 1966. Under DOC’s stewardship, the jail was dubbed the Brooklyn Correctional 
Facility, but much like the Tombs, even in official DOC documents it was called the Brig.1225 
Originally intended to house 600 prisoners, the Brig presented one logistical problem after another, 
likely reminding DOC on a daily basis why it was scouring every possible inch of its Rikers Island 
facility for stable land on which to build.1226 The foremost among these was a strenuous community 
opposition, organized under the banner of the Committee Against the Navy Yard Prison, who cited 
usual NIMBY concerns, but more broadly the expedited process by which the jail was planned 
and constructed.1227 Nonetheless the facility opened in May 1984, though only housing roughly 
200 sentenced prisoners with less than ninety days remaining on their sentences.1228  
McMickens had foregrounded prisoners’ short sentences in her marketing of the facility to 
the community, but later claimed “this is not an absolute requirement and we are not bound by it.” 
The facility was however bound by the same BOC standards that bedeviled the rest of the City 
system. The provision of adequate outdoor recreation in particular, for which prisoners had to be 
transported to Rikers (!) from the Navy Yard, proved impractical and served as a limitation on the 
number of prisoners sent to the Brig.1229 Moreover, the community impact assessment that DOC 
had effectively railroaded during the renovation of the Brig eventually caught up with the City, 
necessitating millions of dollars in costs, and ongoing engagement with the activists and the Fort 
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Greene Community Review Board.1230 Though open until 1994, the Brig never became a major 
focus of DOC expansion.  
A similar fate befell the White Street Jail, planned to open next door to the Tombs in Lower 
Manhattan. The Chinatown community organized under the banner of the Citizens Coalition for 
Lower Manhattan, in one instance drawing over 12,000 people to a demonstration in Foley Square 
that succeeded in stopping the plan in its tracks.1231 The Coalition’s strident opposition also 
produced a number of conciliatory suggestions from City Hall, most notably a proposal to 
construct a mixed-use jail, which would also feature space for day-care facilities, offices, and 
retail.1232 Effectively opposed, the plan languished on the drawing board. 
The former rank-and-filer McMickens was by necessity no longer a friend to COBA, 
becoming embroiled in its now-unrelenting war with civilian administration for control of the jail 
system. In 1984, when McMickens introduced a tougher policy limiting sick leave, the union took 
out a full page ad in the Chief-Leader lambasting the Commissioner as “ANTI-OFFICER,” 
regardless of the fact she “claims to be one of us.” On top of DOC’s new sick leave policy, which 
made it easier for City Hall to label guards “chronic” absentees liable to loss of benefits, COBA 
also cited mandatory overtime, and a policy limiting the time guards on maternity leave spent out 
of the house.1233  While McMickens took the heat, the policies bore all the fingerprints of Koch, 
who enjoyed the continuing support of COBA and other uniformed unions. McMickens forwarded 
the Chief-Leader article to Deputy Mayor Stanley Brezenoff, with the note “This is what happens 
when I try to reduce sick leave. What do you think?” Illustrating City Hall’s convenient 
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relationship with McMickens and other commissioners serving as the face of austerity to their 
angry subordinates, Brezenoff replied by appending the memo with a simple handwritten scrawl: 
“What I’ve always thought: you’re the best!”1234  
In 1985, COBA sued unsuccessfully to block a new policy mandating guards wear 
nameplates that would clearly identify them to prisoners.1235  That same year McMickens courted 
an annual conference of the American Correctional Association by pledging guards to volunteer 
as guides. COBA took this opportunity to escalate an increasingly ugly feud. Calling McMickens 
a “lousy administrator,” Seelig publicly opposed this agreement, and further embarrassed 
McMickens by staging a picket outside the conference, demanding her ouster. “The inmates harass 




This complaint was only a token of what was to come, fueled in part by circumstances 
outside both DOC and COBA’s control, that would raise the stakes of the brutal contest for 
supremacy in the City’s jails. In the wake of the 1970 Knapp Commission’s revelations of police 
involvement in the City’s illicit drug trade, NYPD had virtually abandoned street-level policing. 
This accounted in part for a dip in the City’s jail population in the 1970s. By the early 1980s, a 
widespread, often blatant culture of drug sale and use had flourished in many working-class New 
York City neighborhoods, and a cheap and highly addictive new cocaine byproduct called crack 
was taking hold in communities hit hardest by deindustrialization, the fiscal crisis, and the City’s 
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subsequent restructuring. Beginning in 1984, in tandem with the aggressive private development 
policies of the real-estate friendly Koch Administration, NYPD resumed aggressive street-level 
policing, targeting drug users and low-level sellers in areas like the Lower East Side. The result 
had little effect on the availability or popularity of drugs like heroin and crack, but nonetheless 
filled DOC’s already overtaxed jails beyond capacity with felony drug arrests.  
Despite the tough rhetoric emanating from the Reagan White House, the federal 
government did not want to foot the bill for the “War on Drugs,” and largely left the warehousing 
of offenders to local and state jail and prison systems.1237 In response to crack in particular, NYPD 
undertook a strategy by which arrests and the pretrial process were weaponized against the drug 
trade; frequent mass arrests on inflated charges were meant to destabilize the drug market, although 
the charges would eventually be reduced or dismissed after arrestees had languished for a time in 
the City’s overcrowded jails.1238  
At the beginning of 1980 the average daily population in DOC custody was under 7,000. 
In early 1984, even prior to the NYPD’s turn toward aggressive street-level policing, that number 
hung just below 10,000. By October of 1986, the population in the City jails was over 13,000. 
Many of these were technically State prisoners awaiting transfer following sentencing. Others were 
State parole violators. While an August 1986 agreement between City and State over the 
contentious issue of their custody limited the stay of State prisoners to fourteen days, their presence 
nonetheless presented a strain on the City system.1239 Simultaneously, use of the precedent set by 
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a landmark lawsuit, Lareau v. Manson, enabled DOC to temporarily house prisoners in dormitories 
with as little as forty feet per prisoner.1240 
  “As you know, I have reservations about the addition of more modular [units],” Koehler 
wrote Koch in a 1986 request for yet another emergency order to expand facilities on Rikers—this 
time to the tune of six new modular units. “Unfortunately, there is no alternative given the surge 
in new admissions. The need for these beds is inescapable.”1241 Overseeing these precarious 
conditions was a workforce of guards that had grown considerably, from 4,523 to 7,008 in the 
previous five years, and was accordingly a younger force, ever more emboldened by the 
confrontational mien of their leader Seelig, truly a man for his time and place.1242   
In August of 1986, McMickens was removed from her post at DOC and transferred to the 
Housing Authority, a lesser-paying job widely viewed as a demotion for failure to minimize 
overtime and mitigate the effects of crowding. The following day, DOC attempted to move twenty-
five bunk beds into a dormitory already packed with ninety-four State parole violators. The 
prisoners decided immediate action had to be taken. They barricaded their dormitory with broken 
furniture and armed themselves with makeshift weapons, disarming voluntarily after apparently 
defeating DOC’s plan in negotiations. Seelig, an unlikely spokesman for the action, declared the 
prisoners “serious about their intentions to not be overcrowded,” and demanded DOC take 
immediate action to expand its facilities and staff.1243 In response to mounting bad press, and the 
stubborn fact of dire overcrowding which lay beneath it, the Koch Administration unveiled a plan 
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to construct to two City facilities near the Canadian border, and to convert a disused Staten Island 
ferry boat into a floating jail. Asked by reporters how he could countenance exposing prisoners to 
seasickness, Koch replied “We’ll give them Dramomine.”1244  
To take McMickens’ place, Koch appointed Richard Koehler, a career cop serving as the 
NYPD’s Chief of Personnel, who had served as DOC’s Deputy Commissioner under Ward from 
1981 to 1983. Not only was DOC to foreground its uniformed force; it would be run by a prominent 
City cop.1245  Despite the semblance of order his appointment was meant to convey, however, 
Koehler’s return to DOC could not prevent disorder of a historic magnitude.  
 
Use of Force 
On October 11th, less than three weeks after Koehler took office, 161 State prisoners held 
at AMKC were moved to two dormitories at CIFM, 5 and 6 Main. There they were deprived of 
their street clothes, and exposed to the practice of double bunking. On October 13th, these prisoners 
refused to leave their beds for 8:00 AM count. The morning count was controversial, as it often 
entailed guards waking up sleeping prisoners who were made to stand beside their bed and be 
counted. Worse yet, it could also involve a guard placing their hands on a sleeping prisoner, or 
even slapping them. The morning count thus amounted to a particularly onerous instance of the of 
countless daily degradations of jail life, in which the relations of domination which sustain prisoner 
compliance are reinscribed. These rituals however cut both ways, as they produce resentment 
alongside compliance. When the opportunity presents itself, many prisoners are happy to draw 
upon collective resentment and collectively fight back. October 13th, 1986 was one such day. 
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After the prisoners to stand for count, tensions escalated, and guards were forced out of 
both dormitories. Prisoners in each then erected barricades and fashioned defensive weapons. They 
appointed delegates to meet with jail administration, and presented an eleven-point, collectively-
signed list of demands. These included access to law library, a cessation of guards disrespecting 
visitors, receipt of cosmetic products from the outside, access to jobs throughout the facility (as 
opposed to house gangs, who clean the dormitory and never leave), more telephones, regular meal 
schedules, better food (including Halal food), a meeting with prisoners who had been removed 
from the house and placed in segregation, the removal of a specific guard named Officer Jordon 
from the dormitories’ staffing, and an end the practices  standing counts in the morning and waking 
prisoners up by touching them.1246   
Negotiations between the rebelling prisoners and DOC administrators, including the CIFM 
warden and DOC Chief of Operations, lasted from 9:25 a.m. until 3 p.m. During that time, the 
armed prisoners held down their barricades, some breaking windows. One prisoner who attempted 
to distance himself from the occupation was beaten with a broken bed leg that split his scalp open 
and later required twenty-one sutures. Meanwhile at the negotiating table, DOC officials conceded 
to virtually all the prisoners’ demands, including non-retaliation (contingent on no injuries or 
“extensive property damage”), the cessation of standing count, the meeting in segregation, more 
telephones, and even the reassignment of the despised Jordon. It was a breathtaking victory for the 
CIFM prisoners and a monument to the efficacy of direct action. It was simultaneously a startling 
affront to the power of the guards, and of COBA.1247  
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In response to DOC’s peaceful settlement with CIFM prisoners, virtually all CIFM guards 
scheduled to begin the next shift at 4:00 p.m. refused to assume their posts. Instead they marched 
to the facility’s chapel, meeting for over seven hours with COBA and DOC representatives. This 
job action, a violation of the Taylor Law, produced a number of demands, ranging from 
renovations to DOC facilities, to new emergency equipment, more guard assignments with shifts 
overlapping by a half hour, relaxed discipline of guards, increased legal consequences against 
prisoners assaulting guards, and the right to carry handcuffs. Finally, as a clear line in the sand 
illustrating the power struggle underlying unfolding events at CIFM, guards demanded prisoners 
stand for all counts. These issues were largely deferred for future discussion, and the guards 
returned to work. Koehler commanded his wardens to read a statement declaring that DOC had 
done nothing to endanger their safety. They refused. That very day, the DOC population reached 
14,264, its highest census since the early 1970s.1248 
On October 16th, sixty-six parole violators held in another modular unit at CIFM staged a 
similar action to that of the 13th, in what the New York State Commission of Correction 
(NYSCOC) later described as a deliberate and premeditated imitation of the great victory which 
by this point had become known across the facility. Their demands included no reprisals, long-
distance telephone calls, receipt of basic amenities like underwear and cosmetics from the outside 
(or else provided by the institution), less of a wait for visitors, regular meal times, daily sick call, 
the State control of modules, and a hastier transfer into the State system. This final point was likely 
not a hard sell, especially after the 13th. This time the warden demanded the removal of the 
barricades as a condition for negotiations, which accordingly proceeded for almost four hours, 
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once more to the satisfaction of the rebellious prisoners. Moreover, DOC kept its promise and did 
not retaliate against the prisoners.1249  
The following day, October 17th, prisoners from 5 and 6 Main were lined up for lunch in 
the CIFM cafeteria when prisoner Bebe Wise allegedly demanded an extra cup of juice. A guard 
named Angel Almanzar instructed Wise he could not have the juice, to which Wise picked it up 
anyway. Almanzar then blocked Wise’s path to the dining area, commanding that he return the 
juice. At this, Wise threw the juice at Almanzar, proclaiming “Take your fucking juice!” As Wise 
was escorted out of the cafeteria, some fellow prisoners encouraged him to fight back. At this, 
Wise began struggling, and a number of prisoners and guards quickly entered the fray. In the fracas 
that ensued, two guards were knocked clean unconscious. After a three-minute scuffle, eleven 
guards, including two captains, and five prisoners, reported injuries, though more prisoners likely 
concealed injuries to avoid culpability for the fight.  
As a measure of the institution’s atmosphere, at the sounding of the alarm, two responding 
guards from elsewhere in CIFM undertook the virtually unprecedented response of arming 
themselves with guns, and a third was in such a hurry to get to the scene that when a gatekeeper 
took too long to open a locked door, he attempted to smash through its heavily reinforced glass.1250 
As the subdued prisoners were escorted out of the dining hall, unsupervised rank-and-file guards 
taunted and physically menaced them. One guard got “almost nose-to-nose” with a prisoner, 
declaring: “We’re going to get you.”1251  
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This provocation was part of an escalating series of encounters “marked by increasing 
tension and attempts at intimidation from both sides,” as monitors later reported. One side, of 
course, had considerable weaponry, endless backup, and the legal monopoly on force. Nonetheless 
the guards considered themselves an aggrieved party on par with those they guarded, whose insults 
and provocations must be met in kind, as if the jail system amounted to one big rowdy proletarian 
barroom. Following the brawl in the dining hall, guards were talking openly among themselves 
about “breaking heads and kicking ass” in retribution.1252 Two false alarms were triggered in the 
afternoon, to which response teams promptly mobilized without any orders from superiors, as the 
chain of command required.1253 “We are on the verge of a riot,” Seelig predicted—if not 
threatened. “The whole jail system is out of control.”1254   
As the day wore on, DOC’s Inspector General (IG) staffers, also on hand as monitors, 
resisted repeated attempts from a deputy-warden to move them away from sites of guard-prisoner 
interaction. Beginning in the early evening, the 5 and 6 Main prisoners were transferred from 
CIFM to HDM. Despite the short distance, protocol required the transport be effected in a complex 
operation involving seven DOC buses. DOC’s elite Correctional Emergency Response (CERT) 
team was also on hand for the transfer.  
Before departure, multiple prisoners expressed their fears of retribution to IG observers, in 
addition to protesting that DOC was violating its promise to not transfer any of them without forty-
eight hours’ notice. Nonetheless, the prisoners were handcuffed together in pairs, and allowed a 
free hand to carry their belongings in plastic bags. As the prisoners exited CIFM for the buses, IG 
observers later reported, the assembled CERT team formed a gauntlet-like formation, edging 
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toward the prisoners menacingly. “Tensions,” IG later concluded, “were at the near breaking 
point,” but the prisoners were loaded into the buses without incident, thanks likely to the presence 
of civilian observers.1255 
The HDM receiving area was ominously dark when the buses arrived. A light rain spattered 
the facade of the gloomy old jail. The first bus, containing two prisoners and a squadron of CERT 
guards, emptied without incident, and the prisoners were dispatched into the HDM receiving area. 
The second bus, however, filled largely with prisoners, was quickly embroiled in chaos.  
Accounts of what happened next differ. Guards later claimed some prisoners refused to 
exit the bus, and subsequently tussled with guards in a conflict that spilled off the bus. Prisoners 
claimed a small group of guards simply boarded the bus and began violently ejecting prisoners on 
the pretext that the latter were not exiting quickly enough. The latter version is more likely.1256 In 
any case, defenseless prisoners were thrown off the transport bus and beaten with clubs. Many 
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were then made to run through a gauntlet, surrounded by CERT guards clad in riot gear swinging 
thick clubs. Guards rained down baton blows on the handcuffed prisoners’ heads and torsos as 
they struggled to vainly cover their heads with their bags of belongings. Some of these bags were 
dropped or split open, strewing prisoners’ precious few personal effects on the wet ground to be 
trampled underfoot in the dark. HDM warden Dante Albertie stood watching as the beatings 
unfolded and did nothing. It was only when prisoners began to enter the facility bloody and 
screaming that BOC and NYSCOC staffers, and some ranking DOC officials including Robert 
Davoren and George Vierno, rushed out to demand order. In the aftermath, thirty-four prisoners 
were injured, including a number of head injuries.1257 BOC staffer Brenda Lloyd described the 
impact of clubs on prisoners’ heads and bodies as sounding like “someone was beating a rug.”1258  
The chaos did not end there. Shortly after the chaos in the HDM courtyard, prisoners in the 
1 Top dormitory of AMKC erected a barricade at their front gate. It is unclear whether AMKC 
prisoners knew about the brutality outside nearby HDM, but it is quite possible given the 
impressive information grapevine at Rikers and all carceral facilities. The immediate trigger 
however seems to have been the removal of prisoner Sammy Mercano for placement in 
Administrative Segregation. Mercano had been beaten earlier that day and was now to be punished 
formally. As two guards attempted to remove him, an argument ensured between 1 Top prisoners 
and a handful of guards. AMKC’s probe team responded promptly to the argument, and seeing 
them, prisoners threw up barricades and tried to take two guards hostage. The guards escaped, but 
the barricades remained.1259  
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Assistant Deputy Warden John King initiated DOC’s emergency response Mutual 
Assistance Plan, meant to call specially trained guards from across the island, and were joined by 
Deputy Warden Brian Conroy and Supervising Warden Quaslim Inham, who began negotiating 
with the prisoners. Simultaneously, these ranking officials attempted to prevent a squadron of 
roughly thirty guards, agitated and itching for a fight, from entering AMKC and bringing a violent 
conclusion to the standoff. This tension was only exacerbated when a captain overseeing the 
negotiations was stuck by a boot thrown from inside the dormitory.1260 Many CERT guards who 
had beaten prisoners outside HDM had been ordered to leave the vicinity, due to their brutality, 
and to report to CIFM for a meal. They reached CIFM, however, only to learn of the alarm at 
AMKC, and were promptly dispatched there.1261 
Once at AMKC, the commanding officer of the CERT operation, Deputy Warden Clarence 
Brooks, acted unilaterally in calling a strike on the rebellious dormitory. Brooks did so without 
consulting the delegation of ranking facility commanders, including Conroy and Inham, who were 
presently inside that very dormitory attempting to broker peace. The operation entailed bypassing 
the main gate—blocked as it was by the wild tableau of prisoners’ barricades, angry AMKC 
guards, and the ranking officials sandwiched between them—and accessing the dormitory’s fire 
escape by passing through the dorm below, 1 Upper. One Upper was only meant as a passage way, 
but as the rapid dissolution of chain of command suggests, by this point few guards were concerned 
with details. Once inside 1 Upper, CERT guards beat prisoners at random, despite this not even 
being the rebellious dormitory. One of the guards yelled “wrong dorm!” out of ostensible surprise, 
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but it is unlikely this fact mattered very much to the CERT team, many of whom had participated 
in the gauntlet outside HDM in which prisoners were indiscriminately beaten.1262  
Meanwhile AMKC guards amassed outside 1 Top, agitated and armored for a 
confrontation, were demanding of their superiors: “Let us at them! Let us at those motherfuckers!” 
At this point Conroy, who was inside the calm dormitory attempting to negotiate, observed the 
rogue CERT teams barreling through the back exit. He instructed CERT team commander 
Guillermo Velez to “hold it.” This was a command not simply rooted in Conroy’s authority in the 
building, but also the chain of command requiring CERT assaults to be cleared from the top of the 
DOC chain of command. Yet just as CERT guards had ignored protocol to remove prisoners from 
the bus prior to the beating outside HDM, Velez ignored both protocol and Conroy’s order.  
CERT entered the 1 Top with clubs swinging. They rained their clubs down with abandon 
on the rebellious prisoners, including Craig Singleton, who was beaten by multiple guards while 
on the ground. Meanwhile ranking officers ran around trying to restore order, outnumbered and 
ignored. Singleton was helped to his feet by of these officers, and took off running out of the 
dormitory and down the stairs. By one captain’s account, he soon thereafter found Singleton 
surrounded by club-wielding guards ready to beat him more. The captain ordered they desist, and 
even then one guard refused to stand down until the captain grabbed him. Singleton’s ordeal was 
only one instance of a chaotic scene that left thirty 1 Upper and 1 Top prisoners injured, including 
numerous serious head wounds.1263 
Meanwhile, the most politically significant event of this tumultuous week was unfolding 
below, in AMKC’s administrative corridor, where NYSCOC monitors stumbled on a grisly scene. 
Gathered were upwards of forty guards, the four highest ranking COBA officials—Seelig, First 
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Vice-President Frank Ayala, Second-Vice President Stanley Israel, and Third Vice-President Fred 
Wilson—along with Supervising Warden John D’Elia, Captain Ralph Mierezejewski, and 
monitors from BOC and Inspector General’s office. In their presence, a guard clad in riot gear was 
beating a prisoner in the head with his club, while the guards designated to escort the prisoner 
restrained him, including holding him by the hair. One of the escorts then banged the prisoner’s 
head repeatedly against the wall. Above the din Seelig, flanked by his subordinates and a squadron 
of rank-and-filers, was cheering the beating on, encouraging the guards to keep it up.1264  
This was only one of multiple documented beatings in this same horrific scene unfolding 
under the leadership of COBA’s top brass. “Show them who is running the jail,” Seelig implored 
guard Steven Knutson, as he battered a defenseless prisoner with his club. “Show this mother 
fucker who is running the jail,” repeated Wilson, as a group of guards, including Knutson, beat 
another prisoner on the ground. Singleton was also taken through this hallway, similarly beaten by 
his escorts to the receiving room. When D’Elia tried to intercede, he was shoved by an unidentified 
guard who said “you can indict me.”1265 At least five prisoners sustained serious injuries in this 
hallway, far removed from the action in the dormitories.1266 
When NYSCOC monitor Joseph Patron entered this hallway he was immediately 
surrounded by the COBA brass and serenaded with a chorus of “‘what the fuck are you looking 
down the hall for,’ ‘what do you think you’re doing, ‘what are you doing here,’ ‘we don’t want 
you here,’ and ‘get him out of here.’”1267 Patron attempted to intercede in a beating in progress, 
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but the crowd of rowdy guards under the command of Seelig prevented him. Patron then attempted 
to leave the corridor and get help, to which Seelig ordered the hallway locked. An unidentified 
guard stepped forward and physically restrained Patron as the COBA brass shouted curses and 
threats. Seelig began to issue commands to D’Elia, insisting Patron was from IG. “Get him out of 
there,” Seelig barked to the Supervising Warden, “he is IG and all they want to do is burn officers.” 
Wilson joined in, attempting to attack Patron while shouting “Get these fucking IG out of here!”1268 
A flummoxed D’Elia placed himself between Wilson and Patron, at once explaining that Patron 
was not in fact IG, and insisting to Patron and other civilians, including BOC and NYSCOC 
monitors, that he had better leave. “They’ll kill you if you don’t back off and shut up,” D’Elia told 
the civilians.1269   
For a short time, the greatest excesses of this wild week of reciprocal prisoner revolt and 
guard rioting was successfully covered up in the press. For his part, Koch insistently blamed the 
presence of State prisoners, “the toughest inmates in the system” for the disturbances.1270 Details 
slowly trickled out, however, including the beating of handcuffed prisoners as ranking DOC 
officials stood watching. Koehler was forced to take action. Three wardens—Supervisory Warden 
Kathleen Cera, CIFM’s Dennis Cowan, and HDM’s Albertie, who had watched the gauntlet and 
done nothing—were given the choice of demotion or resignation. They chose the latter. Koehler 
also brought departmental charges against two CERT commanders, CIFM deputy warden Clarence 
Brooks, and assistant deputy warden Robert N. Davoren, whose name today adorns RNDC. 
Hearing that disciplinary charges were being announced, Seelig organized a hasty press 
conference—only to cancel it when it was revealed, quite miraculously, that no ordinary guards 
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were charged.1271 Nonetheless Seelig was soon placing himself at the head of one hundred CERT 
guards who resigned from the voluntary assignment in response to Koehler’s public statements 
suggesting prisoners had been beaten.1272  
It was not sufficient to these guards that not a single  guard suffered any consequences for 
their actions, including those named explicitly in IG reports, with multiple witnesses to their 
assaultive acts. Nor was it sufficient that Koehler’s official response to the guards, distributed and 
read at every roll call, emphasized Koehler’s compliance with the demands of the CIFM job action, 
downplayed the brutality, and largely constituted a pledge of support, concluding with the words 
“Keep up the good work.”1273 No; the emboldened rank-and-file guards of the New York City 
Department of Correction, with Seelig at their head, demanded the nature of reality itself obey 
their commands. And if reality itself wouldn’t, at least Rikers Island would. 
 
Never Again 
Unable to contain or spin the story, City Hall and DOC subsequently attempted to attribute 
it to the mathematical outcome of crowding, the remedy for which was new jails. Koch announced 
the addition of 70,000 square feet of modular units to its existing facilities, as well as locker rooms, 
clinic space, prisoner intake facilities, and a barber shop. The project would add 600 beds to the 
island’s capacity. More dramatically, the City converted a disused Staten Island ferry boats into a 
jail barge docked off the northern tip of Rikers Island. While the floating jail was assailed for its 
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unorthodoxy and overruns of cost and time, Deputy Mayor Robert Esnard defended the project on 
the grounds that “No one in modern times has built a prison ship. It’s something you couldn’t 
figure out until you did it… Now we’re experts.” In fact, Esnard declared, DOC would replicate 
the plan with a second ferry, which it did.1274  
Using its newfound expertise, DOC subsequently opened two more floating jails, on 
redesigned troop barges leftover from the Falkland Island War. These vessels, the Bibby Venture 
and the Bibby Resolution, raised considerable logistical problems due to their mazelike layout and 
design meant to facilitate privacy. Yet noting these deficiencies, and generally unsettled by the 
practice, BOC nonetheless cooperated with the plan, stipulating a number of modifications to be 
made to the vessels. They opened in 1987 and 1988, respectively, in the East River near Greenwich 
Village and the Lower East Side.1275  
In June of 1988 DOC opened a new 800-bed women’s facility named for veteran BOC 
member Rose M. Singer. The new jail was southeast of CIFW—close enough to connect to the 
latter’s modules—which in turn became part of the new women’s facility. CIFW was subsequently 
renamed the George Motchan Detention Center, after the guard slain by Joseph James in his escape 
from King’s County Hospital in 1975. The main building of the Rose M. Singer Center (RSMC) 
originally comprised 798 beds, largely dormitories, including a twenty-five bed nursery for 
expectant mothers, which emanated from a central administrative facility in three chevron X-
shapes. Including the modules, the capacity for RSMC was roughly 1,150. Koch oversaw the 
ribbon cutting at the new facility, flanked by Singer, and tellingly, also by Ward and McMickens, 
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whose administrations had proven so vital in leading toward the completion of Rikers Island.1276 
This was also in keeping with what Koch aides called his “never again” policy, formulated in the 
wake of the Lasker releases of 1983 to make sure no such event would ever again tarnish his law 
and order credentials.1277 
That same year, the island-wide Central Punitive Segregation Unit (CPSU) opened at the 
House of Detention for Men. The $1,476,000 investment was supported by Koch, and lauded by 
DOC officials on the grounds that moving from a home facility to the notorious penitentiary would 
itself be a deterrent to misbehavior.1278 When this deterrent had failed to take effect by 1990, DOC 
successfully campaigned to extend the maximum length of sentences to CPSU allowed by 
NYSCOC from thirty to ninety days.1279   
By this point DOC had expedited jail construction down to something of a science. This 
was a cooperative effort of developers, designers, and politicians aimed at delivering new jails in 
less time than the customary three to five years. The process, as one team of jail designers describes 
it, revolves around consolidating design and construction into one cooperative plan, and the use of 
prefabricated materials “something like an erector set”—including prefabricated furniture built 
into the cells offsite. Simultaneously the City provided emergency declarations, “on-board” 
management and review protocol, and “quick response” directives conducted on the fly, in order 
to eliminate red tape at every juncture and fast track a new jail from the drawing board to 
completion. The City contracted this “design/build” team to construct a 300-bed addition to OBCC 
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in 1987. “Pile driving for the building foundation began the same weak the team received the ‘go-
ahead’ for the projects,” the designers reflect, “even though the building design had not been 
completed.”1280 In addition to the this building spree, DOC continued to rely heavily on variances 
from BOC, and BOC continued to dispense them, despite episodic performances of opposition.1281 
Some of this new construction addressed a new problem: the AIDS epidemic. DOC 
recorded its first AIDS-related death in 1982, followed by three in 1983, and seven in 1984 and 
1985. The state system, comprised of a majority of prisoners who had passed through City custody, 
experienced an explosion during this time, from two in 1981, to three in 1982, eighteen in 1983, 
fifty-seven in 1984, and seventy-six in 1985. By 1984, AIDS was the leading cause of death in 
State custody. Virtually all of the prisoners who died in City, State, or county custody during this 
time had previously lived in New York City. A third had been born in Puerto Rico, and forty-six 
percent were Hispanic, compared to thirty-nine percent black, and fifteen percent white. Over 
ninety percent identified themselves as past intravenous drug users.1282 Kuwasi Balagoon died of 
AIDS-related complications in State custody in 1986.1283 Significant cuts to the public health 
infrastructure during the fiscal crisis, including addiction services, which had gone unremedied 
even as Koch ramped up City spending once more, considerably exacerbated the impact of the 
AIDS epidemic.1284 
                                                            
1280 John Grosfield (The Grosfield Partnership/Architects) and E. Eugene Miller (C.M. Security Group, Ltd.), 
“Alternative Construction Methods for Jails,” 1990, 1-4, Dinkins Papers, Box 20, Folder 158, LWA.  
1281 BOC Meeting Minutes 7/14/87; BOC, Annual Report 1987 (New York: BOC, 1988), 10-11; 7; BOC, Annual Report 
1988, 3-4 
1282 NYSCOC, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome: A Demographic Profile of New York State Inmate Moralities, 
1981-1985 (New York: NYSCOC, 1986). In this period DOC was testing for AIDS. HIV tests appeared slightly later. 
1283 Balagoon, A Soldier’s Story is in part a memorial commemorating his life.  
1284 Nicholas Freundenberg, DrPH; Marianne Fahs, PhD; Sandro Galea, MD, DrPH; & Andrew Greenberg, MS, “The 
Impact of New York City’s 1975 Fiscal Crisis on the Tuberculosis, HIV, and Homicide Syndemic,” American Journal of 
Public Health 96, no. 3 (2006): 426-428. 
345 
 
In July of 1985, DOC reported twenty AIDS cases in its custody.1285 By 1987 the number 
was forty. In accordance with State penal law dictating the isolation of prisoners with a 
communicable disease, prisoners diagnosed with AIDS were initially held in the Rikers Island 
hospital. That year, as DOC moved to renovate the hospital in response to the litigation of Vega v. 
Koehler, these prisoners were moved to module dormitory 18 E at the North Facility, pending the 
completion of a special module. The specially-designed sixty-six bed modular clinic, the first of 
its kind in the United States, was opened in May of 1989, eighteen weeks after the City issued final 
approval for its construction. It was assembled from prefabricated components manufactured off-
site and assembled on Rikers.1286 “There ought to be something done,” remarked a prisoner forced 
to live out his final days in the North Facility dormitory, “so AIDS patients could die outside, not 
in prison. If I had a choice, I’d rather die in the East River, not in here.” Several days later, he was 
dead.1287 
Speaking at a DOC medal ceremony on the twilight of his mayoralty, Koch looked back 
on the immense expansion of the department he had overseen in the previous decade, in tandem 
with a program of aggressive policing, prosecution, and incarceration that had taken the place of 
social service expenditure and employment in the public sector for the lowest tiers of the New 
York City working class. “In 1978,” Koch reflected, 
there were approximately 7000 inmates in 17 prison facilities. Today, the prison 
population—on any given day—is in excess of 19,000. Today, there are 25 prison facilities 
fully operative or planned for completion by 1990…. In 1978, as I took office, the 
Department of Correction [had] a total of 4,800 uniformed and civilian employees. Today 
there are slightly under 11,800. In 1978, there were approximately 570,00 arrests through 
the city in the categories known as ‘the seven major crimes’ [murder, manslaughter, rape, 
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assault, arson, burglary, larceny]. Last year NYPD figures show over 718,00 arrests in 
these major categories. And apart from those arrests, there were 90,000 drug arrests.1288 
 
In fairness to Koch, whose reputation among most black New Yorkers had long stood beyond 
repair, the composition of the jails was nothing approaching the State system, where the contrast 
of white guards and black prisoners is immediately striking. Of DOC’s guards in this period, fifty-
four percent were black. Black workers accounted for fifty-four percent of the civilian posts as 
well. By contrast, the prisoner population was roughly fifty-seven percent black, and fifteen 
percent Latino. The ranks of DOC, among the City’s least desirable civil service jobs, accounted 
for the highest rates of non-white growth during this period. Moreover white New Yorkers 
disproportionately held ranking positions, and with some notable exceptions, DOC followed this 
pattern. A singular exception to this pattern was the City school system, whose union, the United 
Federation of Teachers, supported the race-baiting mayoralty of Koch, and was rewarded 
handsomely.1289  
Between 1980 and 1988, the capital budget allocated to DOC increased over 3000%. 
Simultaneously direct public assistance was limited, and funding that had once put cash assistance 
in the hands of needy people was increasingly allocated to non-governmental organizations 
overseeing the social reproduction of the City’s neediest people—with far more strings attached 
than came with direct material assistance.1290  
DOC’s drastic expansionary measures during this time were a response not just external 
factors, but a dramatic spike in instances of violence, among prisoners and between prisoners and 
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guards, of which the incidents of October 1986 were only the most extreme.1291 In fact, during that 
tumultuous week, at least three other instances of violence flared up between prisoners, which 
were later deemed unrelated to the unfolding conflict between prisoners and guards.1292 Violence 
at Rikers Island was at the center of yet another lawsuit, Fisher v. Koehler, which argued that 
violence among prisoners and visited upon prisoners by guards at this facility violated the Eight 
Amendment. The trial was set to begin in Lasker’s court on October 23rd, 1986, and as Lasker 
himself admitted, the unfolding events on Rikers lent weight the plaintiff’s key arguments and a 
sense of urgency to the case.1293  
The testimony of CIFM prisoners Roy Hartley, and Rene Lisojo, the latter just eighteen 
year-old, capture the fear and brutality that characterized life in this facility for many locked up 
there against their will: 
On February 22, 1986, Hartley was assigned to night sanitation duty. While he was working 
outside the dormitory the inmates in his dormitory, 5 Lower, were warned that if the 
inmates continued to make noise, the riot squad would be called. Hartley arrived back at 5 
Lower at about 3:10 a.m. and went to bed. Almost immediately, he felt the covers being 
pulled off him, and saw Captain Chesaniuk, Assistant Deputy Warden DeCanditis and ten 
correction officers in the dormitory, throwing inmates out of bed and ordering them to the 
front of the dormitory. As Hartley walked to the front, Officer Henry hit him in the face, 
Officer Bland grabbed him from the back, and Officer Fisher punched him in the back of 
the head and kicked him. Fisher also hit two other inmates. When Hartley got to the front 
of the dormitory, he asked Captain Chesaniuk if he could go to the infirmary. Chesaniuk 
said that if Hartley would state that he received his injury from a fall, he would not get an 
infraction. Hartley refused to do this and was given an infraction for disobeying a direct 
order to stop talking after lights out. The infraction was dismissed at the disciplinary 
hearing on the basis of the testimony of Hartley and two other inmate witnesses. T. 206-
215; PX 20-21. Hartley's medical records show that he sustained a laceration of the right 
cheek and was given three sutures. He went to Kings County Hospital for x-rays and was 
diagnosed as having a fracture of the right cheek. He had persistent pain and blurry vision 
and spent a week in the infirmary…1294 
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First, in June or July 1986, an inmate chased [Rene Lisojo] with a broomstick when Lisojo 
refused to give him his sneakers, tried to extort money and commissary items from him 
and scraped him with a razor. Second, on the night of June 20, 1986, Lisojo woke up to 
discover that someone had wrapped burning toilet paper around his hand. He suffered 
second degree burns. Third, on another occasion, an inmate punched Lisojo in the face in 
the bathroom, allegedly in the presence of a correction officer. Lisojo required five stitches 
in the mouth. Lisojo testified that the inmate and his friends threatened to slash him if he 
reported the incident to the authorities, so he told the officer to report that he received his 
injuries by falling down in the bathroom. Officer Eder, the officer on duty, denied being in 
the bathroom and witnessing the punch and testified that he had believed Lisojo's statement 
that he had slipped and fallen. However, Eder stated that he made no effort to go into the 
bathroom to determine independently what had occurred. 1295 
 
Lasker found these cases, though perhaps extreme, to be nonetheless tokens of daily life in the 
treacherous facility designed so assiduously by Kross to stand as a penological milestone. In a 
way, it was. 
In a 1988 ruling in Fisher, Lasker paints damning picture not just of the daily violence of 
the facility but of the degrading conditions of life in its dormitories, even for those fortunate 
enough to escape behind made victim by a fellow prisoner or guard. The result was the entry of 
the city into still more consent decrees, requiring still more oversight of dormitory capacity, 
prisoner classification, and the handing of “use of force” incidents. However as the trial itself was 
underway, Mayor Koch issued Executive Order 105. Handed down less than two months after the 
events at Rikers Island, the order limited the scope of the Inspectors General of each City agency 
to corruption and outright illegality, leaving the rest to the sole provenance of the civilian 
leadership of each department. This made “use of force” investigations an in-house matter for 
DOC leadership.1296  
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Unfortunately, the need for independent oversight of guard violence remained as pressing 
as ever before, if not more so. In March, 1987, a prisoner transferred from State custody to the 
City in order to testify against guards charged with beating him while he had been held at ARDC 
found himself back at ARDC, where he was beaten, while handcuffed, in retaliation. The following 
month, a vicious beating at the same facility unearthed ARDC guards’ use of banned practice of 
public strip searching, in addition to meting out brutal violence and falsifying their actions in 
incident reports.1297 Amid this climate of brutality, thanks to Koch, COBA’s Wilson effectively 
got his wish, to “get these fucking IG out of here.” 
 
At it Again  
Conditions of crowding and brutality presented opportunities for resistance, through escape 
and mass struggle. Following the installation of the elaborate perimeter security, with multiple 
layers of razor-wire-tipped fencing and motion-sensor technology, there were no escapes from the 
island between 1981 and 1985.1298  However as conditions at Rikers deteriorated, new options 
presented themselves for prisoners seeking self-activated early release from custody. In 1987, a 
trio of prisoners held at the Hospital—George Koustanides, Joseph Anzalone, and Emmanuel 
Rivera—acquired a hacksaw blade, sawed through a window frame, removed its protective glass, 
and climbed down five stories on a fire hose, aided in part by a first-floor corridor connecting the 
Infirmary to HDM. Two of the men had been hospitalized for leg injuries, one of whom was laid 
up with a broken leg. He turned this negative into a positive, leaving his leg cast behind, protruding 
from a bed stuffed with clothing in the shape of a human form. The trio covered their tracks by 
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pinning a centerfold over the dislocated window, and covering the fire hose cabinet with a towel. 
They made it out of the much-vaunted security perimeter, and off of the island.1299  
As is often the case with escapes, this successful attempt followed two the previous week. 
Two men fled the second floor of AMKC by similar means, but did not make it off the island. In 
Long Island City, prisoner Sal Lupo successfully freed himself from his handcuffs while in transit 
to court. Upon arriving at the court’s sally port, Lupo broke free of the guards, climbed onto the 
roof of a nearby shack, and leapt to freedom over a wall topped with barbed wire. Guards took 
chase, pursuing Lupo down Jackson Avenue, until he hopped a turnstile at 21st Street and vanished 
into the MTA system.1300 These were only the most notable of a series of escapes that bedeviled 
DOC as it battled crowding, violence, and the ascendance of a brutal movement of rank-and-file 
guards bent on running the City’s facilities as they saw fit, with at least the tacit approval of the 
mayor.1301  
In August of 1987, over 500 prisoners at AMKC staged a hunger strike, purportedly against 
unsanitary conditions and bad food, amid a wave of violence among prisoners and meted on 
prisoners by guards. Overcrowding, violence, and guard harassment, exacerbated the ordinary 
aggravations of life in captivity. Backlog in courts and State facilities kept many State prisoners 
packed in bunk beds in a chaotic City jail. Among the most provocative issues was the guards’ 
shakedowns of prisoners living quarters. These shakedowns are invasive and violent, as prisoners 
are threatened and insulted while made to watch as their meager belongings are tossed around 
carelessly by guards, many of whom are itching for a confrontation. In February of 1988, a large-
scale guard shakedown of AMKC pushed a critical mass of prisoners to the breaking point. 
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On the evening of a particularly forceful shakedown, prisoners in twelve AMKC 
dormitories, most of whom were State-ready, rebelled. They threw up barricades, burnt mattresses, 
smashed television and windows, and armed themselves with broken furniture and broken glass. 
This time Koehler spent scant time negotiating before calling in a squadron of 200 guards who 
violently repressed one dormitory with clubs and gas, causing the others to surrender rather than 
face a similar fate. Seelig argued the uprising proved that rebellious prisoners had been treated too 
well in the past, and Koehler’s actions suggested tacit agreement. As if summarizing DOC 
leadership’s approach to the spiraling violence on Rikers Island, Supervising Warden James T. 
Garvey, appearing alongside Koehler and other ranking DOC officials at an emergency press 
conference, opened his coat to reveal a t-shirt reading: “Don’t bother me now, the game is on.”1302 
In September of 1989, AMKC was the scene of a similar rebellion, spurred by the removal 
of two prisoners who had fought with a guard over use of the phone. Prisoners of the 4 Top 
dormitory erected blockades, smashed glass, broke furniture, and set fires. Three other surrounding 
dormitories joined in. Initially the prisoners claimed their action was in response to the removal of 
the two combatants, one of whom they claimed was beaten. In response, DOC administrators 
produced the prisoner, ostensibly unharmed. But the issue, as the old revolutionary saying goes, 
was not the issue. “When the other inmates saw that he was unharmed,” Koehler later complained, 
“the inmates focused their complaints on general living conditions. During negotiations, the 
inmates change their reasons for the disturbance several times.”1303  
Deputy Warden John Bedron, attempting to negotiate with the prisoners, was instead hit 
with scalding water. At this Bedron lost his temper demanded an immediate strike—in defiance of 
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DOC policy, by which prisoners should have been warned prior to the use of gas. In the chaotic 
scene that followed, twenty guards and six prisoners were reported injured. Seelig denounced the 
raid as the product of a “personal, rather than a professional” handling by Bedron, arguing the 
prisoners should have been given a chance to surrender.1304 Any temptation to consider Seelig’s 
sentiments as stemming from humanitarianism—and not simply the fact of guard injuries—is 
allayed by the events of the following summer. 
 
The Age of Quarrel 
By the late 1980s, Koch’s aura of invincibility had been worn away by an asteroid belt of 
embarrassing scandals, and deteriorating race relations citywide, that eroded even his longstanding 
base and  destroyed any chance of a fourth term. In 1989 Koch was defeated in the Democratic 
primary by Manhattan Borough President David Dinkins, a measured and understated clubhouse 
politician out of Harlem, who subsequently defeated Rudolph Giuliani in the general election to 
become the City’s first (and to date, last) black mayor. Whereas Koch had stoked racial animosity 
for over a decade, perhaps most markedly by openly race-baiting 1988 presidential candidate Jesse 
Jackson, Dinkins presented himself as a figure capable of bridging the City’s racial divide in the 
wake of high-profile racially-charged incidents like the Central Park Five case, and the death of a 
black man fleeing a white mob in Howard Beach. Giuliani walked a fine line, mining the racial 
chauvinism of the outer-borough ethnic whites Koch had courted so successfully, while avoiding 
the rhetorical excesses that characterized the latter’s approach and had contributed in part to his 
downfall. It was nonetheless a racially-charged campaign, reflecting its times.1305  
                                                            
1304 Dennis Hevesi, “Guards Quell a Disturbance in Rikers Jail,” New York Times, September 29, 1989.  
1305 Mollenkopf, Phoenix in the Ashes, 166-185.  
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When Giuliani appealed directly to white voters to refuse to allow the election to become 
a referendum on the need to repair race relations, Dinkins observed quite correctly that Giuliani 
was centering the election around race, under the auspices of doing just the opposite. This 
demonstrated that appealing to white chauvinism was by no means excised from the political arena, 
but its practitioners were forced to become more subtle than had been Koch.1306 As a former 
prosecutor with no formal political experience, Giuliani accomplished this by drawing on a classic 
New York City racial shibboleth, “law and order.” Giuliani positioned himself as uniquely suited 
to put the bad guys behind bars and return peace to the City’s streets with the policeman’s 
truncheon. As one Giuliani supporter argued, the answer to crime was not healing, as Dinkins 
offered, “but effective law enforcement and more jails.”1307 In reality, however, there was no non-
law and order candidate. Even in the primary season, disagreement on the issue in both major 
parties centered around how to fund a dramatic increase in police.1308 In the end, Dinkins was 
sufficiently hawkish on policing and jails to earn even COBA’s endorsement.1309  
To lead DOC Dinkins tapped Allyn Sielaff, a lawyer who had run state prison systems in 
four states before managing juvenile justice and probation programs for the Cleveland court 
system. Sielaff distinguished himself as both a pragmatic manager and an advocate of “alternatives 
to incarceration” and “community-based” punishment, which Dinkins meant to help lower a jail 
population which by early 1990 had exceeded 21,000 amid conditions of great violence and 
disorder.1310  
                                                            
1306 Sam Roberts, “Giuliani Discounts Color as an Issue,” New York Times, November 1, 1989.  
1307 Raoul Lionel Felder, “Against Dinkins and For Giuliani,” New York Times, November 3, 1989.   
1308 Sam Roberts, “Crime is the Crucial Issue for New York’s Mayoral Rivals,” New York Times, August 30, 1989.  
1309 Martin Gottlieb, “After the Conflict At Rikers, A War of Words,” New York Times, August 27, 1990. 
1310 Todd S. Purdum, “Cleveland Expert Hired to Run New York Jails,” New York Times, March 6, 1990.  
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In the months prior to Sielaff’s March appointment, two separate shootings among 
prisoners had occurred inside Rikers facilities, using firearms smuggled from the outside. This was 
a new watermark for disorder, even at Rikers. “The system is in total chaos,” Seelig claimed, not 
without a good amount of evidence on his side, to the tune of over 1,000 stabbings and slashings 
between prisoners the previous year alone—and, unmentioned, almost twice that number of 
instances of guards using force against prisoners. “Inmates are running wild. They are going 
around stabbing and slashing one another. Staff morale is at an all-time low. There is an emergency 
and no one is showing a willingness to bring the situation under control.”1311  
Despite calls for “control,” Seelig opposed searching guards for contraband, blaming its 
presence in the jail solely on prisoners. Contrary to evidence that drugs—to say nothing of the 
mysterious and alarming appearance of guns inside jail walls—were coming into the facilities at 
least in part from guards, COBA’s solution was the end of contact between visitors and prisoners, 
more invasive searches conducted on prisoners, and additional jail time for prisoners caught in 
with drugs.1312 In short, the ability of COBA members to do their job as they saw fit with no 
oversight remained the organization’s bottom line, for which it was willing, as ever, to trade off 
the dignity and well-being of the City’s prisoners. 
On July 12th, 1990, OBCC administrators imposed a six-minute limit on phone calls. In 
response, prisoners in at least one housing area rebelled, and took control of their dormitory. OBCC 
management capitulated, agreeing to longer phone calls. Guards perceived this as a betrayal, and 
tension between guards and prisoners remained heightened for the coming month.1313  On August 
                                                            
1311 Leonard Buder, “Jail Chief Receives Volatile Welcome,” New York Times, March 19, 1990. The use of force figure 
is from 1990 (DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 30, n30).  
1312 Andrew H. Malcolm, “Explosive Drug Use Creating New Underworld in Prison,” New York Times, December 30, 
1989.  
1313 DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 57, n65.   
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7th, amid this tension, three prisoners held in the Annex of OBCC isolated guard Steven Narby in 
a secluded staircase, where they punched and kicked him, cut him with a shank, pushed him down 
a flight of stairs, and left him where he lay unconscious. In the process they robbed Narby of his 
jewelry, and left him with a fractured skull, broken jaw, broken palate, and multiple teeth missing.  
The brazen attack in an already-polarized climate electrified DOC’s rank-and-file, who 
quickly connected it to a recent cut in guard posts, DOC’s turn toward “alternatives to 
incarceration,” and above all, the new, more explicit “use of force” directives required by Lasker 
in Fisher—despised due to their clarity and insistence that “all reasonable alternatives must be 
exhausted before force is employed.” Word spread that DOC administrators had blamed Narby for 
wearing jewelry, an insensitive assertion made more inflammatory by Lasker’s insistence that 
pretrial detainees possessed a right to wear jewelry in the City jails. This coincidence bolstered the 
common cliché, propounded by COBA and apparently believed in earnest by a critical mass of 
DOC rank-and-filers, that the prisoners had more rights than the guards. To DOC’s uniformed 
staff, the situation could not stand.1314  
The final straw came when the Bronx District Attorney announced the charges against 
Narby’s assailants and these did not, as DOC had promised its guards, include attempted murder. 
In response, rank-and-file guards representing every jail in the DOC system formed the ad hoc 
group Friends of Officer Narby, and drafted a belligerent open letter to Sielaff. “One of your 
mandates,” they wrote in the letter, dated August 10th, “is to develop and implement alternatives 
to incarceration and detention for so called eligible offenders. These alternatives are suspose [sic] 
to provide more effective types of specialized program options for inmates. Program options that 
                                                            
1314 DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, August 14, 1990: Its Causes and the 
Department of Correction Response, New York: 1991, 29-33; “Use of force” directive under Fisher is excerpted in the 
Appendix, A-36.  
356 
 
are connected with the Community, where these inmates will ultimately return. Commissioner,” 
they continued, “this is not good Community relations. The People of the City of New York would 
like to rid the City of Crime and Criminals from their local communities. They do not want to have 
Homecomings for Criminals in their own neighborhoods… There are no alternatives [sic] 
programs that will change inmates for a return to society.”  
As for the treatment of these prisoners, who, irredeemable one and all, must remain kept 
behind bars, the guards the Friends of Officer Narby concluded the letter by informing the 
commissioner if it were up to them, he’d be replaced with Bo Jackson. “‘Bo’ knows baseball,” 
they remarked of the famous bat-swinging athlete, “and that is all you have to know to be 
Commissioner of Correction’s.”1315 
The letter was drafted on a Friday, as talk of a job action the following Monday began to 
circulate around OBCC. The next day, literature circulated among rank-and-filers calling for a 
“meeting” at the mainland side of the bridge, where guards had previously demonstrated multiple 
times, including blocking the bridge with their cars.1316 Simultaneously Seelig and Israel attempted 
to initiate an emergency meeting with Dinkins, Sielaff, and other ranking DOC and City Hall 
officials to warn the City of the possibility of an impending wildcat job action. The meeting 
included Sielaff, DOC’s Director of Labor Relations Richard Yates, Office of Labor Relations 
Deputy Commissioner James Hanley, DOC Chief Gerald Mitchell, and New York City Office of 
Labor Relations Commissioner Eric Schmertz. Seelig was visibly disappointed when Dinkins did 
not appear. Seelig and Israel were adamant they had nothing to do with the hypothetical action, 
and claimed they wanted to prevent it from happening.  
                                                            
1315 The Friends of Officer Narby, Letter to Hon, Allyn R. Sielaff, August 10, 1990, reprinted in DOI, Disturbance at 
Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, A-21.  
1316 DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 34 n36, 38-39. DOI investigators, who 
faced a stone wall in practically every attempt to speak with guards, never recovered any of this literature.  
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Hanley, at least, did not believe them. It was his position that COBA was either using the 
threat of a wildcat as a bargaining chip, or else had a hand in  whatever job action was coming 
down the pike. Regardless, the union leaders claimed to have the power to stop the action. 
Somewhat perplexingly, Seelig and Israel assured the City officials there would be no action 
Monday, and scheduled a follow-up meeting for Tuesday, while simultaneously claiming that the 
threat of a job action was real, yet they had nothing to do with it. According to Sielaff, Seelig 
rebuffed the City’s request to make it known to COBA members that he and Israel were engaged 
in talks around the grievances animating the rank-and-file campaign.1317 In hindsight, it seems as 
if Seelig was anxious to portray himself as in control of a situation that was quickly escaping his 
grasp.  
Around 5:30 the following morning, Monday, August 13th, roughly twenty off-duty guards 
assembled near 80th Street, one of two access roads from mainland Queens to the bridge. The other, 
Hazen Street, was blocked due to construction, making 80th Street  the sole access point to the 
island. They carried signs with messages like “Stop cutting posts,” “No more assaults on officers,” 
and “An assault on a prison guard is like a cop being shot.” The guards requested that drivers slow 
down traffic and honk their horns while driving across the bridge. As DOI later noted, this 
suggested there was not a plan to block the bridge entirely. “Slow down. Slow down,” they chanted 
to their colleagues driving by, “What happened to Narby could happen to you.”1318  
If it was in fact the organizers’ intention to merely block traffic, the situation soon escalated 
organically. One guard laid flares across 80st Street, blocking the street entirely. At this, some of 
his comrades removed them. Soon arriving guards were stopping their cars altogether, blocking 
                                                            
1317 Allyn R. Sielaff, “Events Leading to the Disturbance at the Otis Bantum Correctional Facility on August 14, 1990,” 
1-2, Dinkins Papers, Box 5, Folder 39, LWA; DOC, “Time Sequence Narrative,” 14; DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers 
Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 42-45. 
1318 DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 35.  
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the intersection and feigning that their vehicles had stalled. With traffic backed up for nearly a 
mile, guards began simply exiting their cars and joining the demonstration. The parked cars and 
the growing mob effectively stopped traffic in both directions. Buses attempting to leave Rikers to 
transport prisoners to court were made to turn around. By 9:00 AM, DOC had cancelled outgoing 
court trips. The bridge was blocked.1319  
Soon after, Yates called Israel to inform him the bridge had been completely blocked, with 
buses unable to make it off the island. “Oh my God,” he replied “let me get to Phil; I’ll get back 
to you.”1320 After speaking with Seelig, however, Israel refused the overtures of DOC management 
to intercede, reiterating that COBA had nothing to do with the action and disclaiming responsibility 
for its resolution. In response, Chief Mitchell invited a delegation of representatives, two from 
each institution, to meet with him and various other DOC brass in Sielaff’s conference room on 
the island. As a condition, these rank-and-file delegates were to instruct their comrades to cease 
blocking the bridge for the duration of negotiations. The delegates agreed, but the blockade did 
not cease for a minute, either due to bad faith negotiations by the representatives, or more likely, 
because nobody was in charge anymore.  
The delegation guard representatives was allowed to cross the picket line to Rikers, where 
Mitchell heard their grievances. Later he claimed, somewhat improbably, that after a mere twenty 
minutes, the meeting was working toward a resolution. However at that moment, Israel burst in 
the door, demanding the negotiations cease. Mitchell, he warned the rank-and-filers, was a skilled 
negotiator and they stood no chance—in contrast to professional union politicians like himself and 
Seelig. In the process, Israel disparagingly referred to Mitchell as a “black man,” at which his own 
members, most of whom were black, became enraged. A shouting match erupted and Israel was 
                                                            
1319 DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 35-37.  
1320 Sielaff, “Events Leading to the Disturbance at the Otis Bantum Correctional Facility,” 4.  
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run out of the room. Seelig stepped into this chaotic scene and convinced the rank-and-filers to 
allow COBA to take over negotiations on their behalf, terminating their negotiations with 
Mitchell.1321 Shortly thereafter, however, when Sielaff attempted to drive through the 
demonstration, his car was stopped by guards who refused to let him pass. “Meet with us,” they 
commanded Sielaff, “not the union.”1322 The picketers blocking the bridge were not answering to 
anyone.  
City cops were initially slow to respond. A NYPD mobile-command vehicle arrived at last 
around 11 AM, as protestors were already lined up at least twenty-deep across the street. 
Misidentifying the vehicle, a guard shouted “Paddy wagon!” and the demonstrators immediately 
ceased marching and sat down.1323 DOC captain John Grillo attempted to convince the NYPD 
officer in charge that the presence of this vehicle was a provocation. “In a very rude, uncaring, and 
disrespectful manner,” Grillo reflects, “he stated it would be placed as close as possible to the 
guard shack” near the center of the action. This enraged the crowd and appears to have steeled 
their resolve to keep the bridge blocked. As the massive police vehicle approached, a guard 
operating a DOC dump truck pulled across Hazen street, blocking the street entirely and preventing 
the command center from advancing. Amid fevered shouts from the police, the guard innocently 
claimed he was just trying to turn around and got stuck. The police commander on the scene 
demanded his arrest. Grillo interceded and escorted the dump truck driver away after the path was 
cleared.1324  
                                                            
1321 DOC, “Time Sequence Narrative,” 4, 8; Katie Lapp, “Riker’s Island Incident,” November 28 1990, Dinkins Papers, 
Box 22 Folder 169, LWA; DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 51-52.  
1322 Sielaff, “Events Leading to the Disturbance at the Otis Bantum Correctional Facility,” 5. 
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1992; DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 51-52. 
1324 James Grillo, “Correction Officers Job Action-8/13-14/90,” 2-4, Dinkins Papers, Box 5, Folder 39, LWA. In this 
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Amid this increased police presence, rumors swirled among guards that the NYD planned 
to open fire on them to clear the bridge.1325 This was of course false, but its grounding was 
shockingly correct. Unbeknownst to the guards, NYPD brass had determined that a direct 
confrontation with the guards, many of whom openly carried guns and, in Sielaff’s words, engaged 
in “considerable drinking,” would degenerate into a firefight, with both sides shooting. Sielaff 
shared this assessment, as did Dinkins, who later spoke of a possible confrontation “that could 
have been very, very nasty.”1326 Ted Katz subsequently described the guards as “flashing their 
guns on the bridge.”1327 The armed DOC guards therefore received preferential treatment based on 
their perceived willingness to use deadly force against strikebreakers. 
At roughly 4:30 p.m., an ambulance arrived at the picket, responding to a call of a seizure 
on Rikers. The assembled guards refused to let the paramedics through, surrounding the vehicle, 
smashing its windshield, denting its side panels, punching the paramedics inside in their faces, and 
attempting to drag them off the ambulance. In the melee, the driver hit the gas and the vehicle 
lurched forth, striking three guards in the process. Meanwhile the guards fought amongst 
themselves over whether to attack the already-bloodied EMTs. The EMTs put out a “10-13” call 
for police assistance and also called for help from their supervisors. Ranking EMS supervisors 
responded, and their vehicle too was surrounded and attacked. These supervisors then put out a 
call for backup, and at least six ambulances responded. At this, a wild brawl erupted between 
paramedics and guards. Paramedics fought among themselves and fought with the guards. DOC 
officials who tried to intervene were punched and kicked from all sides. Before the cops could 
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break up the fight, eight paramedics were injured, and criminal complaints were lodged against 
fifteen guards. One paramedic claimed he had been stabbed , but the City later charged him with 
inflicting this wound himself. His lawyer claimed the City was trying to sweep the ugly incident 
under the rug.1328 
By that evening there were anywhere from 600 to 1,000 guards blocking the bridge and 
assembling in the street around it, drinking alcohol and loitering on people’s lawns, ostensibly to 
relieve themselves.1329 Rainfall did not discourage the picketers, in part due to the distribution of 
plastic coverings by on-duty guards.1330 Meanwhile on the island, Seelig and Israel were locked in 
negotiations to end the picket. COBA insisted that only the elimination of the use of force policy 
stipulated by Fisher would bring the action to an end.1331 At one point Seelig refused to calm down 
the rank-and-filers until the EMS workers were arrested.1332  
COBA bargained around roughly thirty demands, including: more staffing (including two 
guards sent on hospital runs), an end to mandatory overtime, harsher penalties for prisoners 
assaulting guards, more regular searches, the lodging of “attempted murder” charges against the 
prisoners who attacked Narby, amnesty for all participants in the action (including the returning 
of parking summonses for those whose vehicles blocked the street and the cancelling of towing 
fines for those whose vehicles were towed), the abolition and replacement of the use of force 
protocol stipulated by Fisher, and no invocation of the Taylor Law.1333  
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DOC was happy to concede most of these points almost immediately, but had no 
jurisdiction over the use of force rules imposed by Lasker. Sielaff, who had to access the island by 
boat after being denied entry by the picketers, emphasized this fact throughout negotiations. In 
response Seelig demanded to see Lasker. The Judge was not produced.1334 The City was hesitant 
to invoke the Taylor Law, reasoning, as DOC later explained, “a Taylor Law injunction is not self 
executing and does not automatically impose a settlement. Officers may not have returned to work 
in spite of an injunction,” making a conclusion “even more difficult to reach.”1335 
Ultimately, the City agreed to most of COBA’s terms. As the for the use of force issue, 
which had become the central focus of the entire wildcat, federal law prevented the City from 
changing the existent policy, and DOC could only promise to present a modified use of force 
agreement to Lasker. In reality, Lasker’s guidelines only covered CIFM, the subject of Fisher, but 
DOC had adopted them throughout the system, and apparently wished to continue tethering the 
entire system’s use of force protocol to the most restrictive version. The final resolution with 
COBA therefore produce a non-binding agreement to replace the hated protocol with a less 
restrictive one. The agreement was struck at 6:30 PM on Tuesday, over thirty-six hours after the 
action had begun.1336  
Seelig quickly took to the bridge to announce the victory to his ranks. “With the swagger 
of a conquering hero,” recounted Village Voice reporter Annete Fuentes, “Seeling jumped on a 
van, bullhorn in hand, and told the crowd what it wanted to hear: that the use-of-force rules had 
been eliminated.”1337 That was all anybody recalled from Seelig’s remarks. It was surely a 
memorable announcement; the only problem it was not true. Seelig later claimed he had qualified 
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the heroic declaration with a more technical explanation of how the protocol was to be amended 
at Lasker’s discretion, but the crowd was cheering too loudly to hear him. DOI, however, unearthed 
a video of Seelig’s proclamation which, prior to cutting out, shows him standing for nine seconds 
after the initial announcement, basking in the adulation of the crowd, and making no such 
statement. DOI casts considerable doubt that the qualifying remarks were ever made. Nobody 
seemed to believe Seelig.1338 “Your false statements,” Schmertz, later wrote to Seelig, “may have 
constituted incitement to riot.”1339 
 
Set it Off 
This was not hyperbole. The conditions inside the Rikers jails had deteriorated 
considerably since the blockade began. The guards on duty when the blockade began were kept on 
for five consecutive shifts, totaling more than forty hours. Simultaneously many prisoners bound 
for court, seventy of whom from CIFM alone were scheduled for release, were prohibited from 
leaving the island. Visitation too was cancelled. Movement through the jails was restricted to 
emergency, constituting a de facto lockdown. Medication ran out. Food service deteriorated to the 
point where many prisoners missed breakfast on Tuesday. Conditions were particularly poor at 
OBCC, where tension had been heightened since the Narby incident. On Tuesday morning, a brawl 
between black and Latino prisoners erupted. Later that day, prisoners broke into the commissary. 
One prisoner’s attempt to take an extra milk in the cafeteria was met with a squadron of guards in 
riot gear, and the retaliatory beatings of several prisoners. Still more violent guard retaliation 
followed a group of prisoners telephoning local news to report on conditions at OBCC. This was 
not coming from a position of strength, but of weakness, and it’s likely the prisoners sensed this.  
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Guards were exhausted and in short supply, leaving all facilities understaffed in order to take 
breaks. By Tuesday afternoon, prisoners across the facility were organizing to “set it off” that 
night.1340 
The prisoners organizing to “set it off” provided a fascinating analogue to the events 
unfolding across the East River. A letter circulated between facilities calling for a unified action. 
Its organizers intended to initiate a building-wide rebellion at a designated hour in the mid to late 
evening—accounts vary of this time, placing it alternatively at 9 p.m., and midnight—beginning 
with noisemaking and barricades, leading to coordinated dormitory occupations. In the early 
evening guards, some of whom had overheard references to prisoners planning to “set shit off,”  
began observing prisoners “padding up” their bodies with extra clothing, blankets, and other cloth 
items, which they took to mean preparation for a violent encounter.  
In response, a probe team entered the 6 Upper dormitory, demanded prisoners remove 
excessive clothing, and confiscated their blankets. When prisoners in nearby 4 Upper saw the 
probe team entering 6 Upper, they too began padding up, and a small probe team was dispatched 
there. Initially the 4 Upper prisoners were peaceful and complied with orders to remove their 
excessive clothing. One prisoner however refused to remove his winter jacket. The prisoner, seated 
on his bed, was ordered to stand. He refused. Guards grabbed this prisoner to manually remove 
him. Unbeknownst to them, in the climate of violence since the Narby assault, the 4 Upper 
prisoners had decided in advance they would not let anyone be taken out without a representative 
overseeing transport to prevent assault.  
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In the heat of the moment, this resolution turned into an unwillingness to let anyone be 
taken at all. Prisoners armed with shanks or their bare hands squared off against riot gear and 
batons. Multiple guards were slashed. Some lost their batons and shields to the prisoners, who 
picked them up and used them in the melee. Guards were choked and beaten, as they sprayed gas 
into the air.1341  Reinforcements soon arrived and laid siege on the rebellious prisoners. Guards 
commanded all prisoners abstaining from the rebellion to sit on their beds, and then to huddle in 
the front of the dormitory, while the rebels held down the back. Still more reinforcements arrived 
and lobbed one, then another tear gas canister into the back of the dormitory. At this, all prisoners 
surrendered. The prisoners who had refused to immediately surrender were herded into the 
dayroom while being struck with batons. Once in the dayroom, many were beaten and sprayed in 
the face with still more chemicals.  
By this point, word had spread throughout the facility that it was going down in 4 Upper. 
Barricades sprang up across OBCC as prisoners padded up and prepared for battle. Prisoners 
breeched a security station and unlocked the doors of multiple dormitories on the lower floor. They 
also set fires, smashed windows, and one prisoner decided it was as good a time as any to escape 
through a broken window. He was quickly captured outside the facility.1342  
Faced with a facility-wide rebellion, DOC administrators made the curious decision to 
evacuate every dormitory into the facility’s receiving area and dining hall. The first evacuation, 
that of 4 Upper, was characterized by the beating of transported prisoners by guards, even though 
the prisoners had already surrendered and were not putting up a fight. Prisoners were lined up 
against the wall, ordered to place their palms on the wall, and then beaten from behind with clubs, 
with seemingly little differentiation between those who had resisted and those who had obeyed 
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guards’ commands. Some prisoners were stripped of their jewelry, in explicit retribution for the 
assault and robbery of Narby. Twenty-three prisoners from 4 Upper sustained injuries, nineteen of 
which required hospitalization. These included numerous head injuries. By the time the prisoners 
had been transported to the receiving area, the hallway floor and walls were streaked with blood. 
There would be more still.1343  
As Seelig stood atop a parked van issuing his spurious victory speech, the rebellion in 4 
Upper was already underway. DOC guards who had been drinking heavily, fighting other City 
workers and each other, and brandishing firearms for two straight days now cheered as the 
firebrand Seelig proclaimed the end of restrictive policies limiting their ability to mete out violence 
on prisoners. Shortly after Seelig’s speech, word reached mainland Queens of the prisoner 
rebellion at OBCC. The assembled guards packed onto DOC buses, which ferried them directly to 
that facility’s parking lot. There they attempted to join the hundreds of guards already mobilizing 
inside to quash the prisoner rebellion.1344 Some guards inside were arming themselves, but due to 
lack of holsters had to put the guns in their waistbands.1345 Yates, who witnessed this chaotic scene 
outside OBCC, later testified he beheld “150-250 people [from the bridge] outside in civilian 
clothes; 35 to 40 people were trying to get in through the left door but Chief Mitchell pushed them 
back.” He also saw a “hysterical correction officer and was advised the officer had been hit by his 
fellow officers,” and another officer “overwrought with hysteria” as they battled to get inside and 
make the first use of their newly relaxed policies regarding violence against prisoners.1346  
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Most DOC officials later claimed none of the guards from the bridge made it into OBCC, including 
Sielaff, who claimed that Division Chief Garvey and his own personal driver stood guard and 
prevented their entry.1347 However Garvey himself admitted some OBCC guard were letting 
people from the bridge into the facility, “many [of whom] appeared to be drunk.” The rest refused 
orders to return to the buses, whose operators had made the dubious decision to bring them across 
the bridge in the first place.1348 Echoing earlier sentiments by Seelig, Wilson, and company, this 
mob chanted “Don’t let the fucking IG in!” In response, Garvey advised against letting in IG or 
IAD, on the grounds it would cause a riot.1349 In its subsequent report, DOI’s findings are 
consistent with Garvey’s admission that some guards from the demonstration made it into OBCC, 
as evidenced by multiple guards taking part in the unfolding staff riot clad in riot gear overlaying 
t-shirts and shorts.1350  
The building-wide evacuation was a brutal affair, even as the mass resistance crumbled. 
Most dormitories surrendered peacefully, even by DOC’s account. Nonetheless hundreds of 
prisoners were subjected to the same treatment as those from 4 Upper: placed against the wall, 
stripped of jewelry, including glasses—either thrown on the floor, or in the case of gold, 
pocketed—and beaten from behind while being taunted with references to the Narby assault. Some 
were stripped completely naked. Prisoners were thrown down stairs, kicked in the genitals, beaten 
with handcuffs, and clubbed so hard that one nearly lost an ear, and another a finger, from baton 
blows. One prisoner was asked if he was bleeding, and when he replied no, was beaten with a club. 
Another had his Walkman broken over his head. There was an unevenness to who received 
                                                            
1347 Sielaff, “Events Leading to the Disturbance at the Otis Bantum Correctional Facility,” 11; DOC, “Time Sequence 
Narrative.”   
1348 DOC, “Time Sequence Narrative,” 31-32, not a direct quote in cited text.  
1349 DOC, “Time Sequence Narrative,” 44.  
1350 DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 128-129, 143.  
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violence, which seems to have been determined more by the presence of supervisors than any 
particular wrongdoing, imagined or actual, on the part of any of the prisoners.  
Some prisoners, most notably those in 6 Upper, resisted eviction until they were gassed 
into submission and assented to removal. Once outside, many were viciously beaten. Numerous 
prisoners describe guards issuing conflicting orders, and striking them for failing to obey the 
impossible commands. Meanwhile guards had ceased to follow any protocol of their own, except 
sometimes refraining from beating prisoners in the presence of their superiors—and sometimes 
not. In the eviction of 6 Upper, a group of guards under the command of a captain were awaiting 
orders to proceed through a barricade, when a large group stormed in, pushing them out of the 
way, and attempted to lay siege on their own initiative.1351 “When you come to our jail,” one 
prisoner was told by a guard, “we run things.”1352 
At the end of this grisly procession, prisoners were either packed into the receiving area or 
the dining hall, many denied medical assistance as they suffered from serious injuries stemming 
from the beatings. In the dining hall prisoners were made to sit with their hands on their heads and 
heads on the tables, or else to kneel against the wall. If they moved they were struck with batons. 
One prisoner’s head was grabbed and bounced off the table. Prisoners were beaten for requesting 
water, while held for hours in the stifling August heat. One was punched and kicked as he suffered 
an asthma attack, on the grounds he was faking. Guards went around asking prisoners which 
dormitory they were from, striking each one with a baton if they did not answer or answered too 
slowly.1353 From start to finish of this spectacular and macabre sequence of events, the press was 
denied access to the island. “It is a berserk irony,” Ted Katz later remarked, “that Ted Koppel is 
                                                            
1351 DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 131-198.  
1352 DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 161. 
1353 DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 185-186. 
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in Baghdad and Sam Donaldson is in Saudi Arabia and no reporter is permitted on the island and 
none was permitted during the riots and ensuing violence.”1354 
Following their ordeal, many prisoners returned to dormitories to find their personal effects 
smashed and strewn about, and their jewelry stolen.1355 There were 120 prisoner injuries serious 
enough to record, including eighty-one head injuries. Of these, only fifty-one came from 
dormitories that were said to resist eviction, and even these accounts were spurious.1356 DOI issued 
a scathing report finding widespread inappropriate use of deadly force, and a systematic effort on 
the part of DOC staff to either lie or keep the events quiet. “In negotiating to resolve the job action 
that led to the closing of the Rikers Island bridge,” its report concluded bitterly, “representatives 
of the correction officers union said that their members were in large part protesting the lack of 
respect they believe they were given. In this Department’s opinion, public servants earn the respect 
of the public and others in public service by the competence and integrity they demonstrate in 
doing their jobs.”1357  
The fallout from this spectacular week was largely dominated by open feuding between 
Dinkins and Seelig. “The Mayor is a minority mayor,” Seelig told reporters, “and the largest 
number of inmates, as the Mayor well knows, are minority.” Dinkins, he thusly concluded, was 
afraid to side with the guards against the prisoners. “His logic escapes me,” Dinkins replied, “given 
that the overwhelming number of correction officers also come from Latino and African-American 
communities.”1358 The logic was however plain. In his desperation, losing control of his own rank-
and-file and battling for political survival, Seelig had played an old tune, that sounded hopelessly 
                                                            
1354 Martin Gottlieb, “Some Link Rikers Melee to a Dismissal,” New York Times, August 21, 1990.  
1355 DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 136. 
1356 DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 264.  
1357 DOI, Disturbance at the Rikers Island Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 266. 
1358 Felicia R. Lee, “Guards’ Chief Says Dinkins Backs Inmates,” New York Times, August 24, 1990.  
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tone deaf to the new generation of black leaders emerging in the DOC rank-and-file, including a 
young Norman Seabrook.1359  
Seelig responded that he was not racist, as evidenced by him being married to a Puerto 
Rican woman. Seelig’s loss of control in COBA, and the clumsy steps he and Israel had taken to 
reassert it, were evidence of the changing racial composition of DOC’s uniformed workforce—
and its desire, by no means lessened by the guards’ racial makeup, to wantonly mete out violence 
on the black and brown prisoners who constituted a vast majority of the City’s jail population. 
Perhaps more offensive to the guards than Seelig’s race-baiting of Dinkins was his implication that 
racial solidarity was capable of softening conditions in the City jails. In reality, DOC’s becoming 
a majority-black workforce by no means translated into increased compassion for prisoners; if 
anything, the wildcat action demonstrated that Seelig wasn’t militant enough in his opposition to 
even a modicum of human rights for prisoners in City custody.1360  
As in 1986, following the bloody August events, special reports abounded, and fingers 
were pointed in every direction. Deputy Mayor Normal Steisel contacted DOI for all available 
papers on the October 1986 staff riot, and was provided with a modest cache and informed that no 
trial or grand jury transcripts could be found. They didn’t exist.1361 Nor would they for the events 
of 1990. In the end, as in 1986, no guards were charged.1362 Propelled by a militant rank-and-file, 
the City’s guards had capitalized on the law and order movement and the negative redistribution 
of the fiscal crisis to craft a powerful niche in City politics answerable to practically nobody. Their 
base of operations was a militarized compound in the East River called Rikers Island. Their union, 
                                                            
1359 Shanahan, “Solidarity Behind Bars.” 
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1361 Susan E. Shepard, “Rikers,” Letter to Norman Steisel, August 16, Dinkins Papers, Box 21, Folder 168, LWA.  
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the Correction Officers Benevolent Association, had emerged as a power on the City stage 
unmatched by any its size. Reached for comment, Ed Koch recounted his own experiences dealing 
with COBA. “They do have legitimate grievances,” Koch told a reporter. “But their threats are 
always the worst. Their rhetoric is always maniacal. They are the most irresponsible of all the 
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CONCLUSION:    ARCHITECTS OF A NEW ALCATRAZ 
 
 Anna M. Kross wanted to repurpose New York City’s jails as sites of civic unity. Kross 
believed that police, courts, and jails could serve a positive function in the City’s social life. Rooted 
in the tradition of the Progressive Era, Kross had a bold vision for transforming the City jail system 
into a paragon of humanistic penology. What she created instead was a new Alcatraz, Rikers Island 
as we know it today. Once the infrastructure was erected, its use was out of the hands of Kross and 
all reformers, and arguably, even the Department of Correction itself. As the City’s political terrain 
degenerated back to the violence and brute force underlying capitalist social relations, the class 
struggle intensified, and the racialized lower tiers of the working class found itself particularly cut 
out of the City’s dwindling public services and public employment. The jail infrastructure that had 
been created escaped its intended use, as even the reformers in  DOC and BOC became beholden 
to their Rikers Island holdings, forced to fill every square inch of the land with teeming jails. The 
captives of a new Alcatraz were not just those kept in human cages, but those who administered 
them. While the preceding pages have made crystal clear the role of the law and order bloc in 
forging the new Alcatraz, by way of a conclusion I wish to emphasize the role of the reformers. 
 Their avatar was Kross, a quintessential middle-class reformer. As such, Kross was not 
interested in addressing the political and economic basis of poverty, social dislocation, structural 
racism, and other great maladies that washed ashore in DOC facilities. The best she could do was 
launch limited and underfunded programs to deal with some of the most obvious symptoms. Every 
reform Kross proposed, from her days in family court to her time as Commissioner, was aimed at 
creating a more harmonious life under capitalism, a mode of production predicated on the brutal 
exploitation and disposability of a majority of the planet’s inhabitants. From this premise, Kross 
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attempted to broker social peace through the mediation of an enlightened professional class. And 
to be fair, there was no period nor place in US history when this perspective—laughable today—
was more defensible than in post-war New York City. It was however not to last. When the rate 
of profit inflated by the devastation of the Second World War began to wane, absent a social 
movement capable of uniting across the color line and abolishing capitalism, the forces of law and 
order intervened to manage capitalist crisis on the cheap.  
Despite a modernist faith in human malleability bordering on the utopian, Kross did not 
trust any such self-directed activity of ordinary working-class people to solve society’s problems. 
The concept of class power, or mass movement power, was utterly foreign to Kross’s thinking, 
even as she knocked her head against the bedrock of seemingly insoluble social problems like the 
criminalization of drug addiction or crowding in the City jails. Community involvement for Kross 
meant altruistic people from high society volunteering in the jails in their spare time. In terms of 
making actual decisions, Kross preferred backroom meetings with the power elite, where she was 
in fact quite effective. To be clear on this point, Kross was actually much more successful at 
reforming carceral practices than would have been a more radical reformer who didn’t have 
political connections or know the game.  
As such, Kross did not seek the fundamental reordering of social power, only the attaining 
of it by well-meaning individuals such as herself. She saw the transformation of society not in 
terms of everyday people building political power, but elites using education to change peoples’ 
minds. Does this mean the content of what Kross sought was wrong? Decriminalizing sex work 
and drug use, to pick two examples, are certainly worthy causes, long overdue. But the question 
of how these goals are accomplished is where their political substance is found, and explains the 
ultimate failure of Kross’s program. The middle-class reformer is willing to undertake all manner 
374 
 
of benevolent and progressive actions, so long as they do not empower working people to take the 
conditions of their daily lives into their own hands. Thus, great reforms can be pursued through 
the mediation of professional politicians, lawyers, and trained experts—and only within 
advantageous moments in the boom and bust cycles that characterize the chaos of capitalist society.   
 The postwar boom was one such moment, an aberration in the history of a country defined 
by violently policed class inequality, and a blood-soaked racial division of labor ingrained in its 
very marrow. Post-crisis New York, a scene of great wealth alongside great poverty upheld by 
great state violence, is far closer to the reality of American capitalism than the short window 
following the Second World War. In Kross’s mind, history was all moving toward a more 
enlightened age of penology. Kross underestimated the brutality at the core of class relations, 
confusing a temporary improvement in the situation of the US working class with the softening of 
an intrinsically exploitative dynamic that will always revert to the violence at its core in moments 
of crisis. Kross created Rikers as we know it today under the influence of a fantasy that a group of 
middle-class academics and scientists could somehow convince the ruling class to stop treating 
the working class like animals, which is the very basis of both classes’ respective existences. This 
reality cannot be abstracted from, save only in theory. Kross had theory in no short supply, but 
befitting the middle-class reformer (and the middle-class radical), theory cast more shadow than 
light on the glaring facts on display for all to see in the City’s squalid human cages. 
Today we find ourselves at a similar moment to 1954, though mostly in a negative sense. 
The optimism and prosperity that defined 1954 are nowhere to be found. Instead, amid sustained 
economic crisis, we find a crisis of legitimacy for policing and mass incarceration, in which the 
police and carceral solution to economic crisis are losing the broad base of support they have 
enjoyed since the 1970s. Like Kross, Jonathan Lippman and the zeitgeist of middle-class reformers 
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he represents have responded to this crisis by arguing for intensive investment in carceral 
infrastructure to solve the problem of jails with newer, better jails. This scheme is far less excusable 
than that of Kross’s day, not in the least because it has been tried already and didn’t work. What’s 
more, the law and order coalition, which was relatively weak in Kross’s day, has steadily increased 
its power in the decades since even this study concludes, such that the NYPD represents a political 
force on par with (or superior to) City Hall, and COBA wields the might of unions with 
exponentially greater membership rolls. Any meaningful reconfiguration of the balance of power 
between the civilian administrators and the uniformed forces of law and order would require a 
tremendous political, against what has become for all intents and purposes and occupying army in 
New York City, scarcely answerable to even the mayor. Instead, Lippman and his cohort sidestep 
this challenge altogether, with more of the same nods to “culture change,” sensitivity training, and 
other hackneyed bromides.  
While the preceding is admittedly harsh on the reformers, it is not from a position of cynical 
impossibilism. To the contrary, I find the crisis of legitimacy surrounding Rikers and mass 
incarceration in general to be an immense opportunity to challenge the distribution of resources 
forged in crisis-era New York City, as an inroad for contesting the class relations that underlie it. 
The program of “Invest/Divest” advanced by the Black Youth Project 100, which calls for the 
diversion of funding away from policing and incarceration and toward communities most directly 
impacted by mass incarceration, is a great example of a creative response to the present crisis that 
does not simply build the torture dungeons of tomorrow under a thin veneer of humanism. 
Similarly, the movement to disarm the US police as a first step in disbanding police altogether 
represents a positive strategic move that does not place the onus on the class struggle on a quixotic 
confrontation with the forces of law and order as they presently exist.   
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Even to this, however, I must add a note of caution. The middle-class reformer is not alien 
to the soil of activism against jails and policing, especially as the issues gain steam and attract 
mainstream attention. Even within projects proudly flying the flag of “abolitionism,” there exists 
the possibility for a strategy that empowers lawyers, non-profit leaders, technocrats, and 
progressive politicians to take action on people’s behalf, instead of empowering people to take 
their lives into their own hands. It’s impossible to beat the powerful at their own game, and on 
their own home turf. The power of working people resides in their control over production, and 
reproduction of daily life, in addition to the raw numbers they can wield in taking over space and 
repurposing it for use and not the dictates of the market. Therefore activism that denies this 
possibility and channels energy into arenas hopelessly prefigured against working people will be 
bound to fail. This is a pitfall that can only be avoided by struggling within the struggle, against 
those who would impute middle-class values within movements of popular resistance. 
In conclusion, the present moment is one of aporia—when justification for the present state 
of affairs is no longer given, yet its replacement not at all clear. Aporia is a nightmare for those 
who wrongfully believe the unfolding of complex social processes to be within their ability to 
programmatically plan. I however believe aporia should be inhabited, deepened, and plumbed for 
the opportunities it presents, not hastily filled with stopgap reformist measures that squander the 
opportunity which crisis represents.  If the present plan to close Rikers represents the concessions 
the City is willing to make after a mild and civil public relations campaign, just imagine what 
they’d be forced to do in the face of a belligerent mass movement. What if rather than attempting 
to solve the managerial problems of the carceral state on its behalf, a popular movement declares 
that the New York Police Department and the Department of Correction cannot be trusted with the 
bodies of our friends, families, and neighbors, and just can’t have them anymore? What would it 
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take for a mass movement—acting for-itself, not under the leadership of a small clique of middle-
class reformers—to turn the tide against the crushing hegemony of law and order, and trace the 
practical steps toward a society based on the premise: from each according to their ability, to each 
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